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This thesis attempts a sociological and feminist analysis of anorexia 
nervosa. Anorexia is an illness which affects predominantly women, and 
its incidence is greatest among middle-class young women in Western 
countries. Its strong bias along class and gender lines suggests that 
such an approach to the illness could prove fruitful. 
The thesis argues that analysis of anorexia demands a clear 
understanding of the sociology of the body. The sociology of the body 
sees the body as constructed in social life: understandings of the 
body vary temporally and culturally, and reflect the categories of 
their culture. It is suggested that anorexia nervosa represents an 
attempted transformation of the concept of the feminine body in 
contemporary culture. Anorexic women aim to transcend appetite, and to 
allow no intrusions into the body, constructing an anorexic body which 
is closed, separate and inviolable. Since this transformation is 
individuated and privatised, however, it cannot ultimately succeed in 
overturning a system of social meanings. The thesis concludes that 
individual solutions to anorexia will not lead to the end of the 
illness as a social phenomenon in the lives of women. Only collective 
feminist action can reconstruct the degraded contemporary concept of 
woman. 
The argument is pursued firstly through a discussion of the initial 
use of the term "anorexia nervosa" in the late nineteenth century by 
GJJJJ.... and Lasegue. The treatment of anorexia as a modern disease is 
discussed, and the claim that anorexia has always existed but has not 
been recognised is refuted. 
Psychiatric and feminist accounts of anorexia are then considered. The 
former see anorexia as a purely individual phenomenon, and the 
limitations of this position are discussed. Feminist analyses of 
anorexia, in seeing it as deeply intertwined with women's social 
position in a patriarchal culture, are argued to advance understanding 
of the illness, while still retaining individualist elements. 
The next section analyses the ways in which anorexic women themselves 
explain their illness. This leads on to a discussion of the notion of 
the body as concept. After a theoretical outline, several body-
concepts are analysed and placed in their social and historical 
contexts. Contemporary understandings of the body as an individuated 
possession are then discussed, with particular focus on the concept of 
the feminine body as passive object. Objectification, discipline and 
chaos are argued to be the central meanings of the feminine body in 
contemporary culture. Analysis of the issues of abortion and rape seek 
to make this theoretical point clearer. 
A detailed analysis of anorexic practices looks at how these meanings 
are transformed in anorexia. It is suggested that anorexic women try 
to construct an inviolate anorexic body which is completely under 
their control through a complexly ritualised eating pattern. The 
precarious nature of this control points to the limitations of 
individual "solutions" to social problems. 
Part One 
Introduction 
Twenty years ago very few people had heard of anorexia nervosa, an 
obscure psychiatric illness which seemed to be confined almost 
exclusively to teenage girls. Since then anorexia has risen from its 
psychiatric obscurity to take its place in "tabloidese". Any woman who 
is well-known as well as thin has a reasonable chance of being 
diagnosed anorexic by journalistic pop psychologists. The latest 
theories about etiology and incidence - "zinc cures" and anorexic 
yuppy men - are reported in the serious press. "My triumph over 
anorexia" stories are common in women's magazines. Popular interest 
:mirrors evidence of a real rise in cases of anorexia, with some 
estimates claiming that one in every hundred teenage girls is a 
sufferer. <See Bemis, 1978) Many more are thought to develop the more 
covert disorder of bulimia or teeter on the brink of anorexia. 
For the sociologist and the feminist, too, anorexia is an interesting 
phenomenon. The anorexic "boom" at precisely the time when feminism is 
again challenging the oppression of women, coupled with the evidence 
that almost all anorexics are women, that anorexia has a strong 
middle-class bias, and that it is virtually unknown outside the 
developed West suggests that the illness has some relationship to the 
social situation of middle-class women in modern Western culture. Most 
discussions of anorexia, whether psychiatric, feminist or popular 
include at least some reference to the social position of women. Few, 
however, develop this suggested linkage into a fully sociological 
analysis of anorexia; most, further, are both essentialist and 
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phallocentric. A sociological and feminist analysis of anorexia can 
avoid both these traps. 
The effects of the politics of physical appearance and the strictures 
of femininity on feminine psychology are frequent explanatory features 
in analyses of anorexia. However, with a few feminist exceptions this 
sociological perspective is simply "added on" to explanations of 
anorexia as an individual, or, occasionally a familial, pathology, 
implying that these two distinct types of analysis are totally 
compatible. What is suggested is that while, yes, there are "social 
pressures" on young women which impinge on their becoming anorexic, in 
the last analysis it is a deficiency in the "pre-anorexic" girl's 
psychology which explains anorexia. (1) 
A sociological view of anorexia, however, sees "social pressures" 
differently. In this analysis the concept of a "human nature" existing 
outside of culture is rejected; rather, human personality or 
psychology is understood as constructed by and in specific historical 
contexts. This social constructionist view of "human nature" is 
reflected in this analysis by a social constructionist view of the 
1 Analyses of anorexia which focus on the social situation of women 
are criticized for their inability to explain why all middle-class 
teenage girls do not become anorexic. This critique rests on 
determinist assumptions, suggesting that social position determines a 
single course of action. Rather than being the one inescapable 
response to patriarchal social structure, anorexia, I would argue, is 
one of a range of "solutions" to the irreconcilability of 
individuality and femininity. I am not concerned to explain why "woman 
A" becomes anorexic while "woman B" becomes a feminist; rather, my 
concern is to establish the political meaning of anorexia as one 
engagement with the dilemmas of patriarchy. 
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body. Rather than being direct apprehensions of biological reality, 
understandings of the body are here seen as cultural constructions, 
which incorporate within them the divisions and categorizations of 
their social contexts. Body concepts, therefore, are specific both to 
culture and to gender. 
From this perspective, then, anorexic women's attempt to radically and 
permanently change their bodies must be seen not as individual 
deviations from the norm but as transformations of the contemporary 
feminine body-concept. The central argument of this thesis is that in 
the anorexic symptom women's aim is to synthesize contradictory 
elements in their social position through the construction of an 
"anorexic body". Anorexic women attempt to change the meaning of the 
feminine body, and to make sense of these changes both a social 
constructionist perspective on the body and a clear understanding of 
masculine and feminine body concepts in contemporary culture are 
essential. 
In an early and influential feminist text Simone de Beauyoir argued: 
"The terms masculine and feminine are used symmetrically 
only as a matter of form ... In actuality the relation of the 
two sexes is not quite like that of two electrical poles, 
for man represents both the positive and the neutral, as is 
indicated by the common use of man to designate human beings 
in general; whereas woman represents only the negative ... He 
is the Subject, he is the Absolute- she is the Other." 
Cde Beauvoir, 1972: 15-16) 
Maria ~and Rosalind Coward pick up on this point, arguing that: 
"the attributes of the male can ... disappear into a 'non-
gendered' subject. Women, on the other hand, never appear as 
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non-gendered subjects. Women are precisely defined, never 
general representatives of human or all people, but as 
specifically feminine, and frequently sexual, categories: 
whore, slag, mother, virgin, housewife." 
<Black & Coward, 1981: 83) 
Black and Coward point out, then, that definitions of femininity often 
centre on sexuality: women are "the sex". (ibid.: 85) Women, further, 
are - in a significantly different way to men - bodies. De Beauvoir 
argues that social definitions of man as individual and woman as 
feminine resonate in our understandings of the body. C2) She suggests 
that the masculine body is thought to be "a direct and normal 
connection with the world ... apprehend Ced) objectively"; the feminine 
body, by contrast, is "a hindrance, a prison, weighed down by 
everything peculiar to it". Cde Beauvoir, 1972: 15) She quotes ~: 
'"The body of man makes sense in itself quite apart from 
that of woman, whereas the latter seems wanting in 
significance by itself'". 
(ibid.: 16) 
Individuality is presented as gender-neutral but is fundamentally 
masculine. The social construction of gendered subjectivity conditions 
our perception of sexuality and of the body. Just as "individuality" 
and "femininity" are understood by sociologists to be social 
constructions rather than naturally existing facts, so too are 
masculine and feminine desire and the masculine and feminine body. The 
self, the body and desire are socially constructed in the same 
2 I am not suggesting that de Beauvoir takes a social constructionist 
view of the body, but that her work can be used in the development of 
such a perspective; see Evans, 1983. 
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structure of meaning: masculine is both masculine and neutral, and is 
active; feminine is only feminine, and is responsive. 
The masculine/neutral self is constructed as independent: complete, 
separate and active. Masculine/neutral desire is constructed as active 
and possessive. The masculine/neutral body is constructed as 
impenetrable, active and intrusive; its imagery is of muscular action 
and phallic penetration. The feminine self is constructed as 
dependent: incomplete, responsive, seeking merger. Feminine desire is 
responsive; it entails possession but threatens to engulf. The 
feminine body is penetrable: simultaneously weak and threatening, its 
imagery is of orifices: mouth, vagina, womb. 
As de Beauvoir points out, however, masculine and feminine are not 
polar opposites. Masculinity and femininity are defined 
interdependantly, through a series of differences (3) or oppositions, 
but a third category neutral intervenes. In our equal 
opportunities culture a non-gendered subjectivity is - formally at 
least - "available" for women, who are simultaneously non-gendered 
subjects and feminine objects. The superficial gender-neutrality of 
individuality masks its fundamentally masculine character. The social 
construction of masculine and feminine around difference means that 
being a man is not being a woman; being a woman is not being a man. 
Women who aspire to "non-gendered" subjectivity undercut this 
3 For a discussion of different uses of the concept of difference in 
sociology see Barrett, 1987. Here I am using the concept in Barrett's 
second sense: difference constructed through opposition. 
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structure of difference but rarely perceive it directly. Reconc i l ing 
the hidden incompatibility between individuality and femininity i s the 
central 'task of growing up female in comtemporary Western cult ure . 
It is this hidden incompatibility which lies at the heart of the 
anorexic symptom. The specific class and gender position of the 
"anorexic population" addresses the dilemma of individuality and 
femininity with particular acuteness. Her class position places 
expectations of educational and career success on the " pre-anorexic" 
girl ' s shoulders. (see Lawrence , 1984a) She must act in pursuit of her 
own interests. Her gender membership imprisons her within the 
constraints of femininity. She must respond to the needs and desires 
of others. The mutual exclusivity of these demands remains submerged 
in the ideology of gender-neutral individuality: their resolution, 
thus, is often covert, subconscious, indirect. 
Gender is created around three poles of difference: masculine , 
feminine and neutral. The social meanings of desire and the body are 
similarly constructed. In anorexia women take gender-neutral 
individuality seriously , working with the social constructions of 
feminine desire and the feminine body in an attempt to construct an 
anorexic body which resolves gender contradictions in being tru l.( y 
neutral. 
This resolution commonly takes place at adolescence, a time of 
transition from childhood to adult life , the time when a personal 
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assumption of an individual adult identity is required. Germaine Greer 
writes that "the girl": 
"struggles to reconcile her schooling along masculine lines 
with her feminine conditioning until puberty resolves the 
ambiguity and anchors her safely in the feminine posture, if 
it works." 
<Greer, 1971: 15) 
In the second era of public feminism the need to accept "the feminine 
posture" faces severe challenges. Anorexia is one of the responses to 
this new situation which refuses to deny individuality in femininity. 
The anorexic "solution", however, is an indirect and individuated 
response to a social issue. Anorexic women cannot, in their isolation, 
produce a real or lasting solution to the degraded social construction 
of the feminine. Their "solution" is at best temporary and precarious. 
As one articulation of the irreconcilable social demands on women, the 
anorexic symptom, in spite of its ultimate strategic failure, does, 
nonetheless, offer a startling illumination of the lived realities of 
oppression. 
In presenting a comprehensive and detailed analysis of the anorexic 
symptom I hope, therefore, to suggest a rather different 
interpretation to current medical and popular accounts. As we shall 
see, both psychiatric and feminist explanations of anorexia tend to 
undervalue the actual anorexic process in analysis, focusing on the 
"underlying" psychological dilemmas that are presumed to be expressed 
in anorexic behaviour rather than on the symptom itself. What this 
tends to imply is a rather arbitrary connection between the meaning 
and aims of anorexia and the activities through which those aims are 
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expressed. The nature of this connection remains unanalysed. Women's 
preoccupation with physical appearance in general and dieting in 
particular, plus their domestic responsibility for food "explains" why 
anorexic women chose food and the body as "coping strategies". "Aim" 
and "method" are, thus, relatively autonomous. 
What I hope to show through a detailed analysis of what anorexic women 
actually do is that the meanings of anorexia are expressed in, rather 
than "under" the symptom. Since the same structure of meaning 
constructs the body, the self and desire, it is no "coincidence" that 
the anorexic conflict is expressed through the control of appetite and 
the attempt to create a needless and inviolate body. The 
deconstruction of feminine appetite, then, is the central anorexic 
process: it is both aim and method. 
My argument will be pursued in three parts. The first three chapters 
look at existing accounts of anorexia, analysing the assumptions which 
underly them as well as offering an outline of how anorexia is 
understood. Chapter One discusses the "discovery" of anorexia by the 
nineteenth century physicians ~ and Lasegue and traces the changes 
and continuities in dominant understandings of anorexia since it first 
became the object of psychiatric interest. In addition, this chapter 
criticises the widely accepted assumption that anorexia has always 
existed, albeit in lesser "quanti ties", pointing out, as do Cameron 
and Frazer in another context, that: 
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"We need to know not just what was done, but what it meant: 
the same act does not always have the same significance and 
to interpret the events of the past through the categories 
of the present is to make the error of historical 
anachronism." 
<Cameron & Frazer, 1987: 21) 
Chapters Two and Three discuss, respectively, psychiatric and feminist 
explanations. Chapter Two looks at the work of Arthur ~. Hilde 
~. Roger ~and Mara Selvini Palazzoli. There are, of course, 
significant theoretical differences among these four writers. What 
they have in common is, however, the main focus of the chapter, which 
criticizes both "individual pathology" explanations of anorexia and 
the recommendations for treatment which arise from it. In chapter 
Three I look at the work of Marilyn Lawrence, Susie Orbach and Kim 
Chernin, suggesting that while they significantly extend the analysis 
of anorexia in sociological terms, their work is limited by an only 
partial recognition of the contradictions of individuality and 
femininity. 
In Part Two I outline, discussing my own interview material, the 
concepts through which anorexic women make sense of their experience. 
This leads on to the final section, in which a feminist and 
sociological analysis of anorexia is outlined. Chapter Five examines 
in detail the argument that the body should be seen as a social 
construction, relying heavily, though not uncritically, on Bryan 
Turner's introductory study. After a theoretical introduction 
historical changes in the concept of the body, focusing on the effects 
of the gender division and the transition from feudalism to capitalism 
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on dominant and oppositional body-concepts, will be analysed. Chapter 
Six looks in more detail at contemporary understandings of the body, 
with specific reference to the construction of the feminine body 
through objectification and the control of feminine appetites. Chapter 
Seven suggests that the meanings and practices which construct the 
feminine body are central to the anorexic experience. 
The analysis of the anorexic symptom is pursued through a discussion 
of anorexic women's responses to a questionnairre and the theoretical 
issues they raise. Here I argue that in anorexia women attempt to 
transform the degraded feminine body, disciplining its "chaotic" 
appetites in order to construct a desireless anorexic body. The final 
chapter attempts to draw some preliminary conclusions on the social 
meaning of anorexia and what it tells us about the position of women 
in contemporary culture. 
While historical changes in the made of production and class divisions 
are vital elements in a sociological analysis of anorexia, anorexia is 
fundamentally about gender. The social construction of the gender 
division thus takes centre stage in my analysis, and I make use of the 
contested concept of patriarchy. <see, i.e. Beechey, 1979; Barrett, 
1980; Segal, 1987; Rowbotham, 1979; Alexander & Taylor, 1980) The 
concept of patriarchy has been criticised as suggesting that the 
oppression of women is manoli thic and unchanging. This is not my 
intention, and I explicitly argue that the construction of femininity 
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and the social control of women vary with historical change, class 
divisions and racist categorizations. I use patriarchy, then, to 
signify the continuing oppression of women as a gender through changes 
in the mode of production and across divisions of class and ethnic 
background, rather than as a means of ignoring history. As Black and 
Coward argue: 
"The women's movement takes its existence from the fact that 
however differently we are constituted in different 
practices and discourses, women are constantly and 
inescapably constructed as women. 11 
<Black & Coward, 1981: 85) 
In Chapter Five I argue that the social construction of 11 woman" 
underwent a transformation with the transition from feudalism to 
capitalism. This definitional change took place, however, through a 
framework of continuity which constructs women, and specifically 
women's sexuality, as a threat to male order, however that order is 
constituted. Female "formlessness" is differentiated from male order, 
as Genevieve Lloyd argues, tracing the Western philosphical 
association of women with nature and male with culture, the 
"longstanding associations between maleness and form, femaleness and 
matter". <Lloyd, 1984: 5) In discussing the body, the patriarchal 
definition of woman as structureless matter is central. Mary Ellmann 
argues that: 
"The impression of woman's formlessness underlies the 
familiar ... acknowledgment of their superficial form. It is 
of course a physiological impression, and the sexual analogy 
is transparent: soft body, soft mind. The flesh of woman (as 
Sade would put it) is less resistant and le:;;s muscular than 
that of man. Pinched, it bruises more easily. And if it is 
impressionable, the impressionable mind must be not only 
beyond pinching but beyond form. It cannot maintain even so 
lax a hold upon itself as the body does. There, in the mind, 
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all is liquid and drowning. Solid ground is masculine, the 
sea is feminine." 
CEllmann, 1979: 74) 
It is one aim of the subsequent discussion to trace the continuity of 
the concept of formlessness in understandings of "woman" through 
changing concepts of the body. Patriarchal constructions of the 
feminine body, in opposing feminine matter to masculine form, 
understand the feminine body as weak and penetrable but simultaneously 
as potentially powerful and engulfing. A social constructionist 
approach to the body would argue, against Ellmann, that the body can 
be equally as "liquid and drowning" as the mind. It is the 
construction of the feminine body as limitless a patriarchal 
construction - with which the anorexic symptom engages. 
Since my argument is that in anorexia women attempt to transform the 
social meanings and practices through which the feminine body is 
constructed, a detailed analysis of anorexic meanings and practices 
must be central. Although the argument is pursued in the main 
theoretically, the two chapters which examine anorexic practices and 
the concepts through which anorexic women make sense of their 
experience rely on my own interviews with anorexic women and on 
replies to a questionnairre. (4) 
4 There are also a number of autobiographical accounts of anorexia -
see O'Neill, 1982; Wilkinson, 1984; Waugh, 1988; Roche, 1984; 
Havekamp, 1978; Garfield, 1986; and MacLeod, 1981. 
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I interviewed eight anorexic women and one bulimic woman, and this 
material forms the basis of Chapter Four. Here my intention is to 
start to uncover anorexic meanings, and I present the interview 
material in a modified "case-study" format. One case-study is 
discussed in depth, and the central concepts which emerge from it are 
followed up in the words of five other women. Here feelings of 
control, powerlessness, pride, guilt, pressure and shame emerge as 
central. 
In addition I used a postal questionnairre in order to discover the 
exact mechanisms of anorexia. This proved to be an excellent way to 
find out in detail what anorexic women actually do. Obviously talking 
about issues such as the kind of food women eat and don't eat, how 
they plan their eating, and what binges involve is extremely difficult 
for anorexic women, and the anonymity of the questionnairre form 
allowed many of the respondants to be remarkably frank. This material 
is analysed in Chapter Seven. In both chapters women's names have been 
changed. 
Approximately half of the women I interviewed had attended Anorexic 
Aid self-help groups. The others either replied to the questionnairre 
and lived near enough to be interviewed or were introduced by other 
interviewees. The women who replied to the questionnairre responded to 
an advert in the Anorexic Aid magazine; thirty-eight women replied to 
the advert and in the end all but three completed questionnairres. 
Obviously this material in no way allows generalised conclusions about 
anorexia to be drawn: the sample is non-random and fairly small. So 
- 13-
this material is not intended to "prove" a hypothesis, but is used to 
explore and exemplify a theoretical argument. A Elizabeth Frazer 
points out, with small samples - and, in this case, with non-random 
ones: 
"'findings' have to 
demonstrative; and 
inappropriate". 
<Frazer, 1988: 345) 








Further, as Mica ~points out: 
"whatever data you are working with it is actually going to 
be subject to your own translation ... as researchers we bring 
to the material that we are going to translate not only our 
own personal histories but also a very real politics. 
Nothing is neutral once we have put our hands on it and once 
we have put our minds to it." 
<Satow, 1987: 8) 
The words and writing of the women I quote appear, therefore, as 
translations rather than direct "realities". I chose which questions 
to ask and I edited the answers; the perspective which their ideas 
support is mine not theirs. From talking to the women I interviewed 
and reading their responses to the questionnairre I am aware that 
their individual understandings of anorexia differ, to a greater or 
lesser extent, from mine. I hope they will feel that their ideas have 
been treated with respect, especially in cases where the theoretical 
and political gulf between their perspective and mine was greatest. 
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Chapter One: Anorexia Neryosa: the history of the concept 
The term "anorexia nervosa" was coined in 1873 by an English 
physician, William G.ull. In an "aside" in the Address in Medicine to 
the British Medical Association in 1868 he had referred to some cases 
of emaciation occuring without evident organic cause in young women, 
terming this "apepsia Hysterica" (digestive problems of hysterical 
origin). <Gull, 1868: 175) Five years later he changed the term to 
"anorexia nervosa", the latter term "more fairly expressing the facts, 
since what food is taken, except in the extreme stages of the disease, 
is well digested". <Gull, 1873: 534) 
It is worth quoting Gull's original description of anorexia at same 
length, as apart from the obvious terminological updating, this 
description contains mast of the essential characteristics of anorexia 
recognized by contemporary psychiatry. 
In anorexia, for Gull, "the want of appetite is due to a morbid mental 
state", a "want of mental equilibrium", accuring in a group - young 
women between 15 and 23 - who were well known to be "specially 
obnoxious to mental perversity". (ibid.: 535; 1874: 25) No signs of 
organic disease were evident either during the illness or in post-
mortems. The patients complained neither of pain nor hunger, and were 
often "restless and wayward", and this, Gull argued: 
"was ... a striking expression of the nervous state, for it 
seemed hardly possible that a body so wasted could undergo 
the exercise which seemed agreeable". <Gull, 1874: 23) 
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The treatment Gull advocated was "moral control", through which the 
patient's "mental equilibrium" was to be brought back into balance. 
<Gull, 1873: 534-5) ":Medical" treatment as such did not contribute 
much to recovery, but a strict feeding programme, which paid no heed 
to the desires of the patient, was to be adhered to. <Gull, 1874: 24) 
Gull explains the necessity for "moral" treatment: 
"I have remarked ... that these wilful patients are often 
allowed to drift their own way into a state of extreme 
exhaustion, when it might have been prevented by placing 
them under different moral conditions. The treatment 
required is obviously that which is fitted for persons of 
unsound mind. The patients should be fed at regular 
intervals, and surrounded by persons who would have moral 
control over them; relations and friends being generally the 
worst attendants." 
<ibid.: 26) 
In advocating "moral" treatment, then, Gull was not suggesting any new 
or dramatic treatment for anorexic women. The idea that the mad could 
be cured rather than simply confined had arisen in the second half of 
the 18th century and in the next century cure essentially came to mean 
"moral management". Here, the complete control of the patient's 
behaviour and environment by the physician was intended to lead to the 
development of self-restraint and a return to mental equilibrium, lack 
of restraint and "extreme" habits and behaviour being held to be 
central in the development of madness. <Doerner, 1981; Foucault, 1965; 
Skultans, 1979; Scull, 1981) Foucault and Doerner both argue that the 
family was used as a "moral model" in this treatment. Doerner argues 
that "the insane asylum ... retained the aura of a simulated family" 
<1981: 81), and Foucault suggests that within asylums "the social 
structure of the bourgeois family" was reconstructed. <1965: 257) The 
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doctor and the asylum were to accomplish what the father and the home 
had failed to acheive the interiorization of bourgeois social 
morality. (ibid.: 257-260) 
Asked at the Clinical Society whether the line between anorexia and 
"real insanity" was difficult to establish, Gull replied that "there 
was perhaps no great amount of hysteria, but it could hardly be called 
insanity". CGull, 1873: 535) 
At more or less the same time, and independently of William Gull, the 
French phsyician Ernest Lasegue introduced the disease "hysterical 
anorexia" to the medical establishment. Lasegue sought to 
differentiate anorexia from the large category of hysterical 
disorders, proceeding through this "somewhat diagramatic sketch": 
"A young girl, between 15 and 20 years of age, suffers from 
some emotion which she avows or conceals. Generally it 
relates to some real or imaginary marriage proposal, to a 
violence done to some sympathy, or to some more or less 
conscious desire ... at first, she feels uneasiness after 
food, vague sensations of fullness, suffering and gastralgia 
post-prandium, or rather coming on from the comencement of 
the repast ... the patient thinks to herself that the best 
remedy for this indefinite and painful uneasiness will be to 
diminish her food. Up to this point there is nothing 
remarkable in her case, for almost every sufferer from 
gastralgia has submitted to this temptation ... With the 
hysterical things take another course. Gradually she reduces 
her food, furnishing pretexts ... at the end of some weeks 
there is no longer a supposed temporary repugnance, but a 
refusal of food that may be indefinitely prolonged." 
(Lasegue, 1873: 265) 
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This course is then pursued "with implacable tenacity", the patient 
claiming that she is neither ill nor has she become thinner. (ibid.: 
265) 
The central features of anorexia, for Gull and Lasegue, as for 
contemporary psychiatry were, then: emaciation, occuring without 
organic causation; a specific distribution, by age and by gender 
<although the class distribution was not noticed by Gull and Lasegue); 
the denial by the patient that she was ill, and the corresponding 
recognition of a degree of conscious choice in anorexia; and a view of 
anorexia as a non-organic disorder. In treatment too, there are broad 
similarities - refeeding and "moral" treatment under the direction of 
medical professionals in the 19th century, and refeeding plus 
psychotherapy for modern psychiatry - both courses in which medical 
control of the environment and behaviour of the patient is the object. 
However, one major difference should be noted. Gull, as we have seen, 
suggested that the anorexic girl had no appetite for food, and Lasegue 
argued that a positive aversion to food existed. The contemporary 
concensus is that "anorexia" - lack of appetite - is a misnomer, as 
the anorexic woman does still experience hunger, and her appetite 
remains "normal". 
After the initial articles by Gull and Lasegue appeared, while some 
comments and additions were made - including those of Charcot, Huchard 
and Janet <Palazolli, 1974: 6) - the accepted and unquestioned 
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definition of anorexia <still very much a rare "minority" disease) was 
theirs. As Palazzoli argues: 
"By the turn of the century it was widely agreed that 
anorexia was a mental illness. In particular most 
authorities believed that the patients' obstinate refusal to 
take food under all sorts of pretexts and the resulting 
inanition, were the sole causes of the severe and often 
fatal organic sequelae of the disease." 
(ibid.: 7) 
This view remained dominant until 1914 when Morris Simmonds described 
a case of death from starvation in which the pituitary was found to be 
damaged. This led to a labelling of the still infrequent cases of 
anorexia as "Simmonds' Disease", and the term anorexia and the 
acceptance of psychological causation all but disappeared. It was not 
until the late 1930s that the distinction between Simmonds' Disease -
starvation due to pituitary :malfunction - and anorexia - starvation 
deliberately chosen - was redrawn. <ibid.: 7-8) And it was not until 
the publication of the study by Sheehan and Summers in 1949 which 
showed that pituitary gland atrophy and hypothalamic symptoms were not 
causally related that the controversy finally ended. (see Morgan, 
1977) 
Up until the 1960s, however, anorexia was still viewed as a relatively 
rare condition, and it is really in the last 25 years that the vast 
increase of interest in and work on anorexia has occured. Hilde ~. 
for example, refers to anorexia as a "new" disease because of what she 
argues is a rapidly increasing incidence since 1960, an incidence 
which she relates to media pressures on young women to slim. <Bruch, 
1978: vii-viii) 
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In my own analysis I shall also treat anorexia as a "20th century" 
phenomenon, but, as the introduction has suggested, for somewhat more 
complex reasons. I shall argue that the social context in which 
anorexia can arise as a meaningful existential strategy, while 
originating in the late 19th century with the first "modern" wave of 
female aspiration to patriarchal individualism - in, especially, the 
demands for education and political rights for women - has only in 
the post-war period intensified and widened its social base to the 
extent that the contradictory pressures of "femininity" and "success" 
are felt by the majority of young middle-class girls. 
Is the history of the concept the history of the disease ? 
Part of the recent proliferation of research into anorexia has been an 
attempt to establish the existence of cases before 1873 by "re-
diagnosing" cases of voluntary starvation in young women as anorexia. 
This strategy can be seen to follow from the idea of a fixed and 
unchanging "human nature", the dilemmas of which are seen as 
universal. As Ritenbaugh argues: 
"the fact that biomedicine does not include culture in its 
basic explanatory model leads to ... a redefinition of 
syndromes from other cultures into biomedical terms so that 
potentially important cultural patterns <may) became 
irrelevant to diagnosis or treatment." <Quoted in Swartz, 
1985: 434) 
Specifically on anorexia, the current psychiatric view is that 
anorexia has always existed, but has only recently been "discovered", 
due to increased medical knowledge and/or increased prevalence. Bruch 
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points to media pressures on young women to slim, and ~ argues 
that better nutrition leading to earlier puberty combined with 20th 
century moral uncertainty can lead to anorexia. <Crisp, 1974) ~. 
~ and Wellbourne and Purgald all argue that anorexia has in all 
likelihood always existed <Slade, 1984; Crisp, 1974, Wellbourne & 
Purgold, 1984), and Sheila McLeod finds it hard to believe that there 
have not always been "emotionally isolated young girls like myself 
pursuing the same lonely course". <MacLeod, 1981: 13) 
This view, and the arguments that back it up, are founded not only on 
an essentialist but also on a behaviourist understanding of human 
psychology. All that seems to be necessary in this "re-diagnosis" is 
the presence of starvation without evident organic cause. The meanings 
of that starvation, and the possibility that such .meanings refer to 
and change with specific social contexts are conspicuous by their 
absence. 
I would argue that two misconceptions are operating here. Firstly, 
this view is ahistorical. Secondly, the distinction between action and 
meaning is crucially blurred. 
assumed to be more or less 
Human behaviour and personality are 
constant over time. The atomized 
individualism of bourgeois society is naturalized as eternally-
existing "human nature", and is seen as inherent, rather than created 
in social relations. Further, it is assumed that all non-organically 
based starvation, especially if voluntarily undertaken, is anorexia. I 
would argue, against this view, that the meanings entailed in the 
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control of food and the body can and do change, both historically and 
gender-specifically. 
It is, therefore, untenable to argue that, as a reaction to the 
problems of female adolescence, anorexia nervosa is a universal 
phenomenon. "Adolescence" is itself a historically specific category, 
as Philippe ~has shown <Aries, 1973). The "adolescent crisis" is 
a specifically 20th century problem, and is dependent on a specific 
social construction of individuality. 
To develop and ground the argument above, I would like to go on to 
look in depth at the "pre-concept" case most often said to be 
anorexia, <1> and then to consider Ball's arguement that anorexia was 
a striking feature of the medieval female religious experience. <Bell, 
1985) 
Anorexia in the 17th century ? Richard Morton's "Pthisiologia" 
Pthisiologia: or, a treatise of consumptions, written by Richard 
Morton, a fellow of the College of Physicians, was published in 1694. 
In this work Morton distinguished somatic and psychological 
consumptions. "Nervous" consumption was due, he argued, to "an ill and 
morbid state of the Spirits", a weakness or destruction of "the Tone 
of the Nerves". The fever, coughing and shortness of breath of 
ordinary consumption being absent: 
1 But see also Baglivi, 1723 and~. 1613. 
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"In the beginning of this Disease the state of the Body 
appears oede:matous and blouted and as if it were stuffed 
with dispirited Chyle; the face is pale and squalid, the 
Sto:mack loathes everything but Liquids." <Morton, 1694: 2-
4) 
The lack of appetite and bad digestion occur because the "morbid 
state" of the nerves hinders the "Assimilation, Fermentation and 
Volatilization" of gastric juices. This state of the nerves can be 
accounted for by "violent Passions of the Mind", drinking and bad air. 
<ibid.: 5) The patient should: 
"endeavour to divert and make his mind cheerful by 
Exercise, and the Conversation of his Friends. 
For this Disease does almost always preceed from 
Sadness, and anxious cares." 
(ibid.: 7) 
Also, various "stomach medicines" could be prescribed. <ibid.: 6) 
Morton details two case-histories, the first of which forms the basis 
for the claim that "nervous consumption" was in fact anorexia nervosa. 
He writes: 
"Mr. Duke's Daughter in St. Mary Axe, in the year 1694, and 
in the Eighteenth Year of her Age, in the Month of July fell 
into a total suppression of her Monthly Courses from a 
Multitude of Care and Passions of her Mind, but without any 
symptom of the Green Sickness following upon it. From which 
time her Appetite began to abate, and her Digestion to be 
bad ... she was wont by her studying at Night, and continual 
poring upon Books, to expose herself both Day and Night to 
the injuries of the Air, which was at that time extremely 
cold ... I do not remember that I did ever in all my Practice 
see one, that was conversant with the Living so much wasted 
with the greatest degree of a Consumption ... like a skeleton 
only clad with skin." 
(ibid.: 8-9) 
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Morton did not view "nervous consumption" as a specifically female 
disease. Indeed, in its association with sadness and studiousness, 
nervous consumption would have been more likely to have been 
associated with the IIta.l e disease of melancholy by Morton and his 
contemporaries. 
I would suggest that it is at the very least tenuous to describe this 
case as anorexia. There is very little actual evidence on which to 
base such an assumption; we are in no position to assume that the lack 
of appetite which Morton saw as central did not in fact exist. Even if 
one were to accept the logic of historically constant illness 
categories, unaffected by culture, there is nothing in Morton to 
distinguish his case as anorexia rather than one of the other 
psychiatric conditions in which lack of appetite or delusions about 
food feature. <See Morgan, 1977: 1652) 
Fundamentally, however, the central feature of anorexia the 
deliberate and conscious maint;{nance of food control is not 
mentioned in Morton's case history . It should not be "forced in" in 
retrospect, and without it, the case for re-diagnosing Mr. Duke's 
daughter as an early anorexic does not hold water. 
Anorexia in the lllth century ? - Bell's "Holy Anorexia" 
In a review of Holy Anorexia in the Observer (9/2/86), Lorna ~ 
tells us that Bell. "has looked into the lives of Italian female 
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saints, blesseds and venerables, to find evidence that they had this 
supposedly faddy modern disease". Bell himself is more cautious, 
arguing far a distinction between anorexia nervosa and "holy 
anorexia". He argues: 
"the modifier is the key; whether anorexia is holy or 
nervous depends on the culture in which a young woman 
strives to gain control of her life. In bath cases anorexia 
begins as the girl fastens onto a highly valued societal 
goal bodily health/thinness/self-control in the 20th 
century, spiritual health, self-denial and fasting in 
medieval Christendom ... Insecurity <I am no one/I am a 
worthless, debased sinner) gives way to absolute certainty 
... each pursues her externally different but 
psychologically analogous, culturally approved objective 
with fanatical, compulsive devotion." <Bell, 1985: 20-1) 
Looked at :more closely, then, the distinction between anorexias 
nervosa and holy is one of style rather than substance. Bell sees 
anorexia as arising from an "adolescent crisis", in which the young 
girl seeks an autonomy of action which her culture proscribes. (ibid.: 
40) The struggle for true autonomy in the outside world being 
unwinnable, the anorexic internalizes the struggle into one with her 
own body. Although it is disguised as a struggle to achieve a socially 
valued goal - holiness for the medieval, thinness for the modern 
anorexic - the real struggle is for autonomy, self-sufficiency and a 
sense of self, and "in this sense the anorexic response is timeless." 
<ibid.: 56) It is, then, in the intersection of this static and 
universal psychological need with changing "cultural imperatives" that 
the differing farms or styles of anorexia are created. (ibid.: 21) 
Bell identifies numerous cases, from the 12th to the 17th centuries, 
of Italian nuns starving themselves, sometimes to death, but in any 
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case to a degree far beyond the fasting recognized by the Church, and 
he argues that it was in the 14th century that this "holy anorexia" 
reached its peak. Of these women, the most famous, and the one which 
Bell treats in most depth is Catherine Benincasa, later St. Catherine 
of Siena. Her fasting, he argues, was renowned, became a model for 
others through the publication of her "Life", and was something of a 
thorn in the flesh of her confessors and the Church authorities, as 
Catherine frequently claimed that she could not moderate her 
behaviour, even when told it was vainglorious not to. When ordered to 
eat, she did, but she vomited if even a mouthful of food remained in 
her stomach, and for long periods she was reputed to eat nothing at 
all. It is from this evidence, then, that Bell treats Catherine as his 
paradigmatic medieval anorexic. <ibid.: 23-7) 
He suggests that Catherine's anorexia had domestic causes. Catherine 
was born a twin, and her sickly sister Giovanna was sent out to a wet 
nurse, while she herself was fed by their mother. The twin soon died, 
while Catherine, the favoured child, flourished. Further, when 
Catherine was fifteen, her older sister Bonaventura died in 
childbirth. Bell surmises that guilt at the first death, and the 
realization at the second of the possible consequences of a dutiful 
secular female life led Catherine to abandon the world, taking to 
"radical holiness" as an alternative to marriage as well as a penance 
to ensure that no more of her family would suffer an early death. 
(ibid.: 29-46) 
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After a struggle against her family's marriage plans, Catherine joined 
the Sisters of Penance, a Domenican Order of women who lived at home 
"in the world" rather than in a convent, and dedicated herself to the 
religious life. Her ascetic practices continued and intensified once 
she had achei ved her goal of the religious life. She continually 
limited her food, often eating only bread and water and sometimes 
fasting totally. However, it is clear from Bell's own description that 
starvation, far from being a goal in itself, was, for Catherine, 
merely one part of a life of asceticism. As Bell himself points out, 
all bodily urges were for Catherine "base obstructions in her path of 
holiness" (ibid.: 15); however, he persists in focusing on her 
attitudes to food, glossing over her other mortifications of the flesh 
- wearing an iron chain round her hips which cut into her flesh, self-
flagellation, drinking pus, and walking with 33 small stones in her 
shoes. Ci bid. : 19, 25, 43-4) 
This narrow concentration on Catherine's eating habits shows Bell's 
wish to explain her asceticism as anorexia. Similarly, and somewhat 
surprisingly for a religious historian, he all but disregards the 
religious rationale for asceticism, arguing that: 
"Notwithstanding the vast differences between Catherine's 
desire to be united with God and the modern day anorexic's 
quest for a sense of self, the psychological dilemma is 
similar." 
Ci bid. : 28) 
Bell explains Catherine's dilemma as having familial and psychological 
causes - as, he argues, does anorexia nervosa. The assumption here is 
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that the path from childhood via adolescence to adulthood is 
determined by an innate psychology whose effects far outweigh mere 
historical contingencies like belief in the supernatural. However, as 
I mentioned above, this is far from being the case. Aries. for 
example, in his influential Centuries of childhood, effectively 
demonstrates that social childhood, as distinct from biological 
development, is a cultural construct whose characteristics vary with, 
and are defined by, the wider social structure. <Aries, 1973) The 
category "adolescense" is a relatively recent one, and depends on the 
existence of an identifiable intermediate period between the complete 
dependancy of childhood and the i ndependance of adulthood. To argue, 
as Bell does, that the "adolescent" struggle to define the self as 
independent of the family unit is an essential feature of human 
development is, then, both ahistorical and misconceived. 
Further, Bell almost manages to ignore the deep and all-encompassing 
effects of religious belief in the medieval period. As Southern, for 
example, points out, the medieval church was "a compulsory society ... 
CSouthern, 1970: 16) Bell argues, however, that Catherine chose to 
join a tertiary order so that she could remain with her family - .. the 
only context that meant anything to her". CBell, 1985: 48) Does this 
suggest that her desire for union with God is not, then, to be taken 
seriously ? 
Bell seems to suggest that only those who thei!JSelves believe in the 
supernatural could give credence to a supernatural motivation for 
Catherine's asceticism - her expressed desire to transcend the world 
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and the flesh and be united with Christ. (ibid.: 29) The implicit 
argument seems to be that the real dilemmas of humanity are those of 
individualism, and that although the medieval ascetic believed herself 
to be seeking union with God, this was in reality but a cloak to her 
true desire for "individual autonomy". 
I would argue, against Bell, that it requires not a belief in the 
supernatural, but a respect for history to "take seriously" the 
religious motivations of Catherine and the other "holy anorexics". 
They did not create the system of meanings within which the body was 
deemed corrupt and trancendence accepted as a reality - rather, these 
were the social meanings of the medieval period, meanings in which 
ascetic practices of all kinds were framed. (2) As Bell himself points 
out of Catherine: 
"in the spiritual world her accomplishments are magnificent. 
She becomes Christ's bride. . . and regularly communicates 
with Him, with :Mary and with the Heavenly Host." 
(ibid. : 20) 
One does not have to accept that this "really happened" in order to 
accept it as her real motivation in the attempt to transcend the body. 
As B.M:. Bolton writes of medieval "holy virgins": 
"their physical detachment opens up an immense capacity for 
loving their Lord and the renunciation of temporal goads 
reveals an unassuaged desire for real and eternal goods." 
(Bolton, 1978: 266) 
2 Medieval constructions of the body are discussed in Chapter Five. 
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In short, then, I would argue that Bell's account is fundamentally 
misconceived. He abstracts from an entire system of ascetic practices 
one which can be interpreted through 
essentially a modern disease category. 
an analogy with what is 
Ascetic starvation is then 
"explained" without regard to the context in which it arose - the 
"well-marked ... path of saintly austerity ... <whose) ... rewards are 
ultimate". CBell, 1985: 13) It was the world, not just food, which 
Catherine rejected. Bell's argument relies on the acceptance of a 
universal psychological development process, and is thus ahistorical. 
Although there are interesting parallels between religious asceticism 
in the medieval period and anorexia as a modern asceticism, and 
although patriarchal constraint is central to both the medieval 
religious ascetic and the modern anorexic, anorexia and "holy 
anorexia" are not the same thing. 
For the modern anorexic, the path is lonely and the reward 
questionable. She does not have the social "back up" which Catherine 
of Siena had, and the "self" which is meaningful to her would be an 
alien concept to a medieval nun. The self is not a historical constant 
which "intersects" with an external culture, but rather itself derives 
its meaning from and is shaped by that culture. This is what Bell 
forgets, assuming as he does that the unique and self-contained self 
has always been the proper quest of humanity. 
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Chapter 2: The enigma variations: psychiatric explanations of anorexia 
Introduction 
In her article "Current approaches to the etiology and treatment of 
anorexia nervosa" Kelly M. Bemis outlines four main psychiatric 
approaches to anorexia: psychodynamic, family interactional, 
behavioural, and medical. The psychodynamic approach sees anorexia as 
a disorder of the individual psyche, in which the refusal of food is 
symbolic of some other, deeper fear or anxiety. The family 
interactional approach sees anorexia as a power-strategy within a 
system of family relations, concentrating on the perceived function, 
rather than the content of anorexic behaviour. The behavioural 
approach sees anorexia as a learned response which can be "unlearned", 
discarding any attempt to analse the meaning or dynamics of anorexia. 
Finally, the medical model concentrates on the somatic elements of 
anorexia, research aiming at the discovery of an underlying 
physiological cause. <Bemis, 1978) 
As outlined in the introduction, my own work will concentrate on an 
attempt to render anorexia nervosa explicable, to uncover how the 
dominant social conceptualisations of food and the body are 
transformed in anorexia. Since the psychodynamic approach is the 
strand in psychiatry which treats explanation of anorexia most 
centrally, my review of the psychiatric definitions of anorexia will 
concentrate on this strand, with some coverage of the medical 
approach. The family interactional approach looks at function rather 
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than meaning, and the behavioural approach concentrates an "cure" 
through reward and punishment. Bath, then, have almost entirely 
abandoned the search for understanding. I have chosen to look at the 
medical approach not aut of an acceptance of theories of organic 
causation but because consideration of the ways in which the somatic 
components of anorexia are given meaning will be central to my awn 
analysis. 
With this in mind, therefore, I will focus an the work of four 
psychiatrists- Hilde~. A.H. ~. Roger Slade, and Mara Selvini 
Palazzoli. Bruch and Crisp are leading authorities an anorexia in, 
respectively, the US and Britain, and have been working and writing on 
anorexia since the early 1960's. Bruch's work is almost entirely 
psychodynamic, in that she sees stringent food control as an attempt 
to impose in one area the personal control that the anorexic girl 
feels she lacks in her life as a whole. Crisp's work straddles the 
medical and psychodynamic approaches, explaining anorexia as a retreat 
into childhood from both the physical and social/psychological 
consequences of adolescence. Palazzoli, an Italian psychologist, has 
recently moved into the area of family therapy, but it is her earlier 
analysis of anorexia, focusing as it does on the bodily experience of 
the anorexic woman, which I wish to examine. Lastly, I have chosen to 
look at the work of Roger Slade because it contains an intriguing 
attempt to synthesise notions of both organic and psychological 
causation. 
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After outlining the main features of each of these explanations of 
anorexia, I shall attempt to make explicit the assumptions which 
inform them; to expose, in other words, what s.mi.1h. has termed "the 
invisible judgmental work" of psychiatric theorising. <quoted in 
Penfold & Walker, 1983: 42) I will argue that "scientific" 
psychiatric analyses contain an unquestioned and unanalysed set of 
"common-sense" assumptions about "normality" - that, in short, being 
"normal" or "sane" means being able to function appropriately in a 
bourgeois patriarchal culture. Here, "normality" is taken to be a 
naturally existing fact, rather than a socially constructed concept. 
(ibid.: 39) 
The dominant definition of mental illness in bourgeois culture is of a 
purely personal and internal phenomenon, resulting either from 
biochemical irregularities or internal psychological "maladjustment". 
The mentally ill person cannot adjust to the normal world - for a 
variety of reasons - and so must be institutionalised and "readjusted" 
- in a variety of ways. Failure to adjust is seen as a problem of 
individual deviance. What we must adjust to is unquestioned, seen, 
therefore, as natural, and, except for the deviant minority, as 
attainable and essentially unproblematic . 
However, acceptable "normal" behaviour is by no means a gender-neutral 
standard. Phyllis Chesler cites the Braverman studies to illustrate 
this point. <Chesler, 1974; Braverman, 1970; 1972) In these studies, a 
questionnaire was given to psychiatric clinicians which consisted of a 
list of behaviours and character traits which the clinicians were to 
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apply to the standards of "healthy male", "healthy female" and 
"healthy adult" behaviour. Chesler points out: 
"<their) concepts of heal thy mature men did not differ 
significantly from their concepts of healthy mature adults, 
but their concepts of healthy mature women did differ 
significantly from those for men and for adults .... women 
differ ... by being more submissive, less independant, less 
adventurous, more easily influenced, less aggressive, less 
competitive, more excitable about minor crises, more easily 
hurt, more emotional, more conceited about their 
appearances, less objective and less interested in maths and 
science". 
<Chesler, 1974: 65) 
The implication of this for women is that to be seen as mentally 
healthy they must adjust to a standard of behaviour that is held to be 
acceptable for women but not desirable either for men or for adults. 
Chesler argues from this that "the ethic of mental health is masculine 
in our culture" and that "only men can be mentally healthy". <ibid.: 
65; 64) However, that thP. standards of adult mental health are 
"adapted" for women does not mean that women are "immune" to the 
expectations of the unadapted adult/masculine standard. Women are, in 
effect, caught in a double-bind of having to fit in with both sets of 
expectations - to be an independent, self-contained individual as well 
as being feminine, and thus organising their activities mainly towards 
the needs of others. For women, there is "a double standard of mental 
health". (ibid.: xix) 
There is, I would argue, a constant tension between the bourgeois idea 
of the atomized and self-subsistent individual <an idea developed in 
the context of patriarchy) and the specific patriarchal demands on 
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women, expressed in the concept of "femininity". This tension is one 
which psychiatry, in viewing as "natural" and eternal the gender roles 
and personality structures of bourgeois patriarchy, cannot fully 
"see". 
In my discussions of the psychiatric explanations of anorexia, then, I 
will be focusing on the underlying assumption that "normality" is 
achievable - that the personal assumption of the conflicting demands 
of being both adult and female at adolescence is a process that only 
the ill or deviant individual will find seriously problematic - and 
the effect of this on subsequent theorising. As Penfold and Walker 
write: 
"once a person is suspected or diagnosed as mentally ill, 
she becomes someone who is not expected to make sense in 
terms of the social definition of rationality or normality." 
(Penfold and Walker: 1983, 42) 
Psychiatric explanations of anorexia, thus, start from the premise 
that anorexia as a behaviour will not "make sense" in any profound 
way, and this severely limits the extent to which any real 
understanding can be developed. Indeed, as we shall see, analysis of 
the anorexic sy.mpto111 itself takes a definite second place behind 
analysis of the psychological dilemmas and inadequacies which are 
presumed to underly it. These underlying issues, I will argue, are 
constructed through a taken-for-granted concept of individuality and 
individual development which is ahistorical and phallocentric. 
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Arthur Crisp: anorexia as biological regression 
Anorexia, for Crisp, is "a phobic avoidance stance", "a distorted 
biological solution to an existential problem for an adolescent". 
<Crisp, 1980b: preface, 91) 
The phobia for the anorexic is of herself at normal (average> 
adolescent bodyweight. Her often expressed fear of "fatness" hides the 
change in meaning of the word "fat" for the anorexic, to whom "fat" 
equals normal adolescent bodyweight. (1972: 395; 1967: 716; 1970a: 
493) The anorexic state represents a "psychobiological regression", a 
"flight back into psychobiological childhood", and is, as such, an 
adaptive state which protects the individual to whom puberty and its 
attendant "maturational crisis" have been experienced as overwhelming. 
<1974: 530; 1970a: 454; 1979: 149; 63) It is thus the control of 
weight and shape, not of eating or food, that is central, the aim 
being to regain and maintain a sub-pubertal bodyweight. Crisp argues 
that anorexic women, if they could eat without gaining weight, would 
do so, as the only significance of food in anorexia arises from its 
relationship to weight and shape. (1977: 63; 1980b: 14-5, 78) 
The anorexic girl, then, regresses into psychobiological childhood in 
order to avoid the "existential challenge" of puberty. C1980b: 48) It 
is puberty that introduces weight and shape as meaningful and 
threatening, as it is the crossing of a relatively precise weight 
threshold which causes the "qualitative biological and psychosocial 
changes" of puberty to occur. <1980b: 78) Of central significance are 
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the development of secondary sexual characteristics - in girls, the 
development of breasts, pubic hair, the laying down of fat on 
buttocks, stomach, thighs and upper arms, and the menarche - which 
result from increased production of "sex" hormones. This "normal" 
female "fatness" is profoundly significant both biologically and 
socially; biologically in that it signals that the girl is 
reproductively capable, and socially in that it arouses male sexual 
interest. (1980b: 38; 1979: 150) 
Concommitant to sexual development is an adolescent appetite surge, 
which provides the neccessary energy and growth to push the adolescent 
over this threshold weight at which the biological mechanisms in the 
brain governing sex-hormone activity are "switched-on". (1980b: 84) 
Thus, Crisp argues, "eating becomes particularly equated with emerging 
sexuality through its symbolic link ... (and) ... its biological primacy 
over the latter <sexuality)". (1980b: 46) Food control is, therefore, 
the obvious course for the adolescent who seeks a retreat from 
maturation. 
That, then, is the precise nature of this "maturational crisis" ?; and 
what is specific in it for girls in general and "pre-anorexic" girls 
in particular ? 
For Crisp, as we have seen, puberty is primarily a physiological 
event, with a secondary and dependant "social" element. Sexuality, for 
Crisp, emerges at adolescence as a result of the increase in hormonal 
production; sexual feelings and urges are a biological creation. 
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"Adolescent turmoil" is "an inevitable accompaniment of the processes 
of post-pubertal growth". <1974: 532) Puberty, then, as a primarily 
physiological event, "intrudes massively into the world of the child 
and demands that the sense of self enlarge so as to incorporate 
sexuality and decay". (1980b: 49) The adolescent must forge a sense of 
self which includes the integration and control of sexual and other 
impulses, independence from parents and a secure sense of his/her 
feelings and needs. <1972: 395; 1983a) This is a time of change and 
experimentation, the successful resolution of which results in "a 
well-developed sense of the self". <1980b: 58) 
The "social" element in puberty/adolescence is twofold. Firstly, the 
adolescent self must be developed "in ways adaptive to the available 
social matrix". (1980b: 49) Secondly, today' s adolescent is faced, 
Crisp argues, with a permissive society in which guidelines for 
behaviour and social rules are lacking, in which there is 
"philosophical and moral uncertainty and bankruptcy". (1974: 530; see 
also 1981-2: 213; 1979: 150; 1980b: 60-1) Thus, there is a need for 
greater structure and stronger controls within the self <1983: 857; 
1980b: 60), and while this is positive for most, for the few it is 
problematic: insecurity in values "may allow the more robust amongst 
us to develop to the maximum ... <but) ... for the more vulnerable it is 
probably very difficult indeed". <1979: 150) 
Thus far, 
adolescents, 
then, the maturational 









successfully negotiated. "Modern" is undefined here, but from its 
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context we can assume Crisp is referring to the 1960s onwards. <1967: 
715). 
For girls, however, there are extra problems. As well as the more 
complex hormonal and physiological processes involved in female 
pubertal development, there are specific psychosexual problems for the 
female adolescent. Unfortunately, Crisp assumes that these problems 
are so well known to the reader that, except for a brief mention of 
the risk of pregnancy, he does not list or explain them. <1968: 370) 
Neither does he expand on the "different, and often less immediately 
challenging psychosexual implications of adolescence for the :male". 
<1970a: 466) It is, however, safe to assume that, for Crisp, sexuality 
is seen simply as more of a problem for girls. It is these special 
problems, coupled with the very strong preoccupation among teenage 
girls with weight, shape and attractiveness, which make the anorexic 
retreat from :maturity - in which the central motive is, in Eardner's 
words, "to stalemate physiological growth in the sexual sphere" - a 
more "fe:male" course, adolescent turmoil becoming construed solely in 
terms of body shape. (1970a: 454; 1980b: 24-5, 142; 1980: 230) 
So, having accounted for the specificity of the adolescent 
maturational crisis for girls in general, how does Crisp then account 
for the differential experience of the crisis in non-anorexic and pre-
anorexic girls ? 
His explanation is twofold. Firstly anorexic women's families can be 
pathological in a variety of ways; and secondly, it can be the 
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anorexic herself who is deficient in some way: anorexia can be caused 
either by the two acting together, or by the second alone. (1977: 66) 
Firstly, then, in some families the crisis of adolescence can, for 
Crisp, be termed "the adolescent/family maturational crisis". <1979: 
151) The struggle for independence and the development of a sexual 
identity can, for example, rekindle for the parents old, unresolved 
uncertainties about their own identities, their sexuality or their 
social confidence. Further, in some families where the parents have 
agreed to stay together only until their children grow up, adolescence 
threatens the very cohesion of the family. C1980b: 66-9; 1977a: 232; 
1980: 229) Such families have, in short, "a <so far as the present 
problem is concerned) faulty way of life" C1980b: 137), and are often 
"pathologically enmeshed and on the defensive against the outside 
world and its turmoil". 0983: 857) These "faulty" families can then 
produce a shy, timid and dependent child for whom growing-up becomes a 
process so filled with anxiety that it is avoided in anorexia. 
It can, however, be a purely individual pathology which makes a girl 
anorexic. She may have a "major personality immaturity" C1980b: 65), 
very low self-esteem, be especially shy or compliant or sexually 
insecure <1970a: 494; 1974: 526), or have "major psychological 
developmental defects and an absence of other defense mechanisms". 
(1977: 62-3) This individual psychological vulnerability may be 
exacerbated by an earlier than usual puberty, but in any case the pre-
anorexic girl feels that she is incapable of becoming a competant 
adult, and her anxiety is such that she retains only "a marginal or 
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borderline sense of the self ... predominantly in terms of shape". 
<1980b: 55, 35; see also 1970: 16; 1970a: 463) Food is avoided and 
comes to be "hated and feared" because of its association with 
psychosexual growth, and the anorexic flight back into childhood 
begins. <1970a: 454) 
Crisp's explanation of anorexia logically results in a two-pronged 
treatment strategy. Firstly, it is essential that the adolescent 
regains enough weight to tip her over the point at which hormonal 
development will be "switched on", for she must actually reach 
pubertal weight in order to re-experience sexuality and get back in 
touch with "her more natural psychological self". C1980b: 140, 84-5, 
103; 1979a: 80) As well as this "re-exposure to the phobic situation", 
psychotherapy must help her to adjust better to and engage with adult 
life. <1967: 716; 1980b: preface) Autonomy, healthy independence and a 
sense of mastery over her destiny, plus the recognition that her 
feelings and needs are aspects of her personality that others value 
can all be developed through a psychotherapeutic relationship in which 
the therapist fills a "parental protective role", providing the secure 
interpersonal relationship that is neccessary for adolescent 
development and has in all likelihood been missing. (1967: 716; 1980b: 
142-7; 1983a) 
Crisp's work on anorexia is extremely influential; he has, in fact, 
been the major British authority for the past three decades. His 
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account of anorexia, however, remains unsatisfactory in a number of 
ways. 
Firstly, of course, as a psychiatrist Crisp assumes the fundamental 
psychiatric tenet that mental illness is "soluble" at the individual 
level. Why anorexics should want or need to avoid the "maturational 
challenge" and why female sexuality is especially problematical are 
questions answered by the definition of the anorexic girl as 
deficient. "Normal" women, it is implied, face adulthood with 
equanimity, in spite of the fact that sexuality is mare problematic 
for women. The socially created role of 20th century "femininity" is 
sa far naturalised as to disappear as an abject of analysis. Thus 
Crisp cannot fully analyse what I would argue are social institutions 
- the role of women in bourgeois partriarchal societies, and feminine 
sexuality in particular here because he views the process of 
becoming an adult as universal, ahistorical, natural and easy. 
Further, the very notion of the individual is only partially 
understood, I would argue, when personality is seen as an inherent 
possession, and not as a creation of social forces. Thus the class 
distribution of anorexia nervosa, while noted, is left unexplained. 
Why we should find sa many mare deviant girls and faulty families 
among the middle-classes remains an unanswered question. Related to 
this fundamental individualism intrinsic to psychiatric explanation is 
a biologically determinist view of human development specific to 
Crisp. In spite of brief references to social norms, such as the need 
for women to be slim and attractive, as specifically "modern" (1974: 
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526) Crisp assumes a biologically determined and universal path to 
adulthood to which the only social and historical "contributions" are 
moral rules and prohibitions - or the lack of them. 
His notion of the adolescent personal! ty' s need to "enlarge" to 
encompass sexual! ty seems to posit sexual! ty as a direct product of 
hormonal activity, only minimally affected by the need to be "socially 
adaptive". Further, he assumes the naturalness and universality of 
what I would argue is the currently dominant view of sexuality as 
naturally adult, heterosexual and genital, a sexuality which 
sociolgists argue is the result of the channelling of a fluid human 
sexuality through the conduits of bourgeois and patriarchal values. 
C1967: 714, 718; see Foucault, 1979; Weeks, 1986; Kitzinger, 1987) For 
Crisp there is a determinist connection between puberty, as marked by 
the pubertal weight threshold, and "adolescent trauma" centering on 
selfhood and sexuality, a threshold which must be personally and 
physically experienced to be understood. This determinism does not 
allow for any consideration of how the social construction of 
adulthood and sexuality make sense of and give meaning to biological 
processes. It is biologism taken to the extreme to argue, as Crisp 
does, that it is the adolescent body which "requires" the gender 
identity. <1977a: 232) 
It would seem, therefore, that Crisp's theory of anorexia is based on 
an unquestioned acceptance of the norms of a bourgeois and patriarchal 
society as naturally human norms. Further, this perspective also leads 
to a lack of recognition of how these norms apply differently to 
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women. Crisp aims to help the anorexic girl to "a new freedom to 
explore and develop herself as a person". C1980b: 147) Being a 
"person" means being independent, feeling that you own your own body, 
having a greatly reduced concern with weight and shape and seeing 
yourself and your needs as valued by others. <1980b: 142-7; 1983a) I 
would - and will, in later chapters - question the extent to which any 
of this is tenable for women, for whom dependance, a devalued social 
role, concern with appearance and, crucially in anorexia, an "open" 
concept of the body come as part and parcel of "femini ty". Indeed, I 
will suggest that individualism itself, while being presented as an 
asexual, gender-neutral category, is thus presented phallocentrically, 
having been developed on a masculine model of the individual which is 
itself defined in opposition to femininity. 
Finally, and following on from the above, I would argue that Crisp's 
focus on anorexia as an avoidance response fails to illuminate to any 
great degree the "common-sense" categories on which his analysis is 
based. My own analysis will focus on the social meanings of food and 
the body, how these are created and maintained, how they are 
experienced specifically by women, how they are transformed in 
anorexia and how they change over time. This is an approach which the 
psychiatric understanding as a whole and Crisp's version of it in 
particular precludes. When the conceptualization of the body is 
posited as a universal and basically unproblematic by-product of a 
naturalized sexual development, and when the only "meaning" food has 
is limited to a simple association with growth and comfort (1981-2: 
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213), it is difficult to treat either as concepts deserving of real 
analysis. 
In Crisp's analysis - as in most psychiatric work - what is deemed 
important is how anorexia nervosa is caused, not the meaning and 
significance of anorexic behaviour. After, "this is how it happens" 
explanation stops. This seems to me to be inadequate, both as analysis 
and, in Crisp's case, as causal explanation. Anorexic thinking and 
behaviour are not only deserving of analysis in their own right, but 
the question of how and why a process so fundamental as eating can be 
so radically transformed, if adequately answered, can explain not only 
the anorexic conceptualizations of food and the body, but will also 
illuminate other, more common conceptualizations and how these relate 
to wider social structures. 
Further, I would argue that it is impossible to so definitively 
separate "cause" and "effect", as Crisp claims to do in arguing that 
the root of anorexia is avoidance of adulthood, and that it is not in 
itself an "existentially fulfilling" experience. (1983a) I would 
differentiate experience as existentially fulfilling and experience 
as existentially :meaningful; Crisp does not and thus "loses" the 
meaning of anorexia which ought to be basic to its analysis. 
The "new'' or transformed meanings which food and the body come to have 
in anorexia will, in my own analysis, be compared with socially 
dominant ideas about food and the body in order to form what I hope 
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will be a fuller explanation of anorexia than that offered by Crisp's 
biologism. 
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Roger Slade: the intervention of the social 
Roger ~·s explanation of anorexia is constructed in the answer to 
two questions: how does the initial impetus to control food and lose 
weight arise ?; and how is it then maintained ? <Slade, 1984: 30) In 
focusing on these questions Slade argues that anorexia is a two-stage 
process. 
For Slade, the answer to his first question is to be found in social 
forces, in the combination of "the ethics of body regulation" and the 
female gender role. (ibid.: 147) He argues: 
"Belief in the value of hard work and consistent application 
is deeply engrained in our culture, as is the commitment to 
achievement through individual effort and the idea of 
deferring pleasures and gratifications until satisfactory 
ends have been attained. These are the values that were 
sanctified by Protestant sects in the early years of 
industrial capitalism." 
<1984: 135) 
Such values, Slade argues, emerge strongly in the middle-class 
family's commitment to personal achievement sought through hard work 
and disciplined self-control. Further, there is a strong connection 
between these values and body regulation, a link seen in the idea of 
sport as "an ideal mode of training for the moral and social behaviour 
that is central to the highest concerns of society", and this concern 
creates the potential for extreme forms of bodily control, such as 
anorexia nervosa. (ibid.: 138; 134-9) 
Slade then goes on to suggest that when the "ethics of body 
regulation", as described above, meet the female gender role anorexia 
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becomes even more explicable, for it is the latter, in emphasizing 
compliance and the need for women to be physically attractive, which 
causes the pre-anorexic girl to be highly vulnerable to both familial 
pressures to succed through personal effort, and social pressures to 
regulate her body through food control. (ibid.: 144) 
For women, the wider social values of assertiveness, independence, 
intellectual prowess and productiveness conflict with the female role 
values of passivity, dependence, helplessness and being decorative. 
:M:ost women adjust to this conflict by concentrating on "feminine 
values", but the anorexic girl cannot adopt this strategy as she is 
under strong pressure to succeed educationally. Her pursuit of 
educational success is undermined by the early lesson that 
assertiveness is inappropriate in women while being receptive to 
others' needs and demands is valued. (ibid.: 174-9) The anorexic girl, 
Slade argues: 
"feels obliged to respond both in a way that is generally 
considered socially desirable for males, and in a way that 
is considered socially desirable for females. It is, 
paradoxically, because of her 'female' receptivity that she 
feels obliged to take on 'male' tasks." 
(ibid.: 189-90) 
Faced with this confusion, her family's expectations become her 
personal burden, and she feels increasingly inadequate to fulfil both 
those expectations and the social expectations of the female gender 
role. (ibid.: 185) She is unable, faced with these conflicts, to 
develop a coherent sense of self. For Slade, decision-making allows 
the individual to influence events outside herself, and this sense of 
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influential action is "implicit in the idea of what it is to be a 
person". (ibid.: 166) He argues that: 
"the sense of the self is generated in those things the 
person can do. The most characteristically human quality is 
not only the capacity to make decisions, but the capacity, 
in so doing to create one's own being." 
(ibid.: 166) 
The anorexic girl's inability to act decisively prevents the 
development of "a stable set of preferences ... <or) core of personal 
values", and she therefore lacks a clear or enduring sense of self. 
(ibid.: 167) It is in this context that slimmndng, a common activity 
among teenage girls, assumes special significance for the anorexic. 
Food control is the one area of her life which seems to the anorexic 
girl to be amenable to her own controlling influence, and her success 
in this one area is what will eventually trap her into anorexia. 
Control of eating is reliable, does not involve other people, and 
becomes the only part of her life which is "consistently and 
uncomplicatedly good. 11 <ibid.: 160) Food control becomes for the 
anorexic girl 11 a last-ditch attempt to retain her sense of self 
through effective action, however limited". (ibid.: 112) This, then, 
is "stage one" of anorexia nervosa. 
In "stage two", Slade hypothesizes that the psychological consequences 
of starvation then work to change anorexia from a deliberate, 
conscious action into an "externally" maintained trap, a state of 
being which escapes the individual's control. Once the effects of 
starvation on her thought processes become established, the anorexic 
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girl is trapped "in the grip of processes that run away with her." 
(ibid.: 12) Vhat, then, are these processes ? 
Slade argues that starvation changes the way in which people think, 
and that these changes are just as predictable as are the physical 
changes of starvation. Reduction in the intake of food, it is 
suggested, produces a progressive decline in intellectual capacity. 
Instability in neural activity is a result of starvation which then 
:makes the conditions for the proper working of the brain 
unpredictable, and this instability results in the impairment of "the 
highest mental function of reason and abstract thought". (ibid.: 70-1; 
69) The capacity to engage in complex thinking is progressively 
diminished; the world is seen increasingly in terms of simple sets of 
categories - black and white, good and bad - with no intermediate 
stages. In short, Slade argues, thinking becomes polarized. Her 
restricted capacity for thinking means that food control becomes the 
anorexic's :main preoccupation; in fact, she is incapable of being 
anything other than obsessed with food and weight. This state could, 
in principle, be viewed either as positive or negative, but because of 
the conflict and confusion which has characterized her pre-anorexic 
life, restricted thinking is experienced by the anorexic as a welcomed 
withdrawal from day-to-day life. Furthermore, the high value that she 
places on control of food and her body also act to "set" the anorexic 
girl to interpret the effects of starvation in a positive way. (ibid.: 
72-8) 
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When weight falls to between 70 and 80 % of average expected body 
weight this "characteristic anorexic way of thinking" occurs, and it 
is here, Slade argues, that the "whirlpool effect" takes over: 
"by severely reducing the amount of food she eats, the 
anorexic simplifies her thinking. As her style of thinking 
changes, her decision not to eat is reinforced. As a 
consequence of this she grows even thinner and the cycle 
continues. The more emaciated she becomes the easier it is 
for her to make the decision not to eat. So she spirals 
downward." 
(ibid.: 77; 74) 
Slade's analysis raises a number of valid and interesting points. The 
explanation in terms of social forces of the initial stage of anorexia 
is useful, especially when compared to the biological determinism of 
Crisp. However, it is in explanations of this type that the need for a 
fully sociological analysis of anorexia becomes most clearly evident. 
Slade asserts a significant "input" into individual psychology of 
cultural values - and indeed, much psychiatric writing on anorexia 
follows this line - but these explanations should not be seen as 
sociological. They represent little more than a "flirtation" with the 
concept of socially constructed individuality, and in the final 
analysis revert to "individual pathology" as the fundamental cause of 
mental illness. 
In Slade's analysis, the effect of social forces is "grafted-on" to 
the individualist and psychologistic understanding of personality as a 
unique individual possession. In this perspective culture is external 
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to the individual and its "external" effects can thus only be 
secondary. As Slade puts it, the extreme behaviour of the anorexic 
:makes it clear that "the manner in which she behaves must be 
explained, not in terms of culture, but in terms of individual 
psychological constraints". (ibid.: 154) Thus, in spite of the at 
first glance promising, even near Marxist argument that the self is 
created through activity, it later becomes clear that for Slade this 
activity is itself not socially constructed but individualistic. 
Furthermore, his conception of the relationship of social forces and 
the individual is determinist. Part of the ultimate rejection of the 
notion of "social" causation for Slade <and others) is that not all 
young middle-class women, subject to more or less the same social and 
familial pressures, become anorexic. This assumes a remorseless cause 
and effect relation between circumstances and behaviour, and does not 
see that circumstances limit but do not determine the range of 
possible behaviour. Women respond to the pressures of a patriarchal 
and capitalist society in a variety of ways of which the anorexic 
response is one. 
There is a second determinist element in Slade's analysis. Although in 
my own analysis of anorexia I will argue that there are good reasons 
to see anorexia as a "two stage" process, the organicist explanation 
of "starvation stage" anorexia which Slade offers is far from 
sufficient. Slade suggests that in a culture which values bodily 
control the psychological effects of starvation on the brain can be 
interpreted positively; however, in themselves these effects are in no 
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sense socially constructed. Reduced capacity in the "higher" functions 
of the brain is posited as having a single and unitary cause - the 
effect of starvation on the hypothalamus which determines the 
outcome. As Slade himself points out, the hypothalamus remains poorly 
understood; thus, his arguement remains problematic on the organic 
level alone. (ibid.: 34) (1) Further, he does not adequately argue the 
case for mental incapacity in "stage two" anorexia; it could, 
alternatively, be argued that it is not the ability to engage in 
"complex" thinking but the will to do so which is lacking. Here, 
Slade is again operating on a simplistic "cause and effect" model of 
experience. Hypothalamic malfunction determines reduced thinking; 
bodily/food control already exists; therefore the anorexic can only 
think about food. The meanings food comes to have in anorexia, how the 
anorexic girl makes sense of her experience of eating does not need to 
be explained. If, however, we adopt an approach which sees the 
structure and concepts of thought as socially constructed in a 
dialectical, not a determinist, relationship with physiological states 
which themselves must be socially interpreted in order to be 
meaningful, the explanation of "stage two" anorexia should begin at 
the point where Slade's analysis ends. 
Further, the meanings of food, eating and the body can in this 
perspective be analysed as social products rather than naturalized and 
1 It is not helpful, I would argue, to pursue this point further 
since, as a sociologist, I am not competant in this area. While I 
cannot disprove organic theories of causation in anorexia on 
biological grounds, in Part Three I hope to provide bath an adequate 
critique of sociobiology and a more illuminating sociological 
explanation of anorexia. 
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accepted as completely unproblematical and existing only in one 
"natural" form. <See, for example, Slade's argument that ideas about 
food are the only ideas which are not "conflicting and confused". 
Cibid.: 173)) This would then allow anorexic food control to become 
the real object of analysis. In later chapters I will argue that in 
"starvation stage" anorexia food comes to be representative of all 
"external" influences on and connections with the inner self and that 
it is for this reason that food control dominates "anorexic thinking". 
Here, food rituals - what is allowed entry to, and kept in, the body -
are used to maintain a rigid psychic boundary around the self. The 
social meanings of food are transformed in anorexia into alternative, 
not merely "reduced" or "deficient", categorizations. 
In short, then, a fully sociological analysis of anorexia would see 
the social construction of physiological states, and the alternative 
constructions of anorexia as the objects of analysis. It is not only 
that anorexia exists, but what it means and how it is experienced that 
is important. This perspective further has the advantage of seeing the 
anorexic girl as actively creative of, and not simply passively 
controlled by her bodily functions. 
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Hilde Bruch: over-compliant daughters 
For Hilde Bruch, anorexia nervosa is "the relentless pursuit of 
thinness". <Bruch, 19'78: x; 19'74: 224) In anorexia, self-denial and 
discipline are seen as the highest virtues, satisfying needs and 
desires as "shameful self-indulgence". (1978: x; 1974: 268) Self-
denial in the form of food control is secondary to a struggle for 
identity and selfhood; food control and being able to stand hunger, 
and indeed training herself to value hunger, give to the anorexic 
woman "the feeling of a personality core" which she would otherwise 
lack. Thinness becomes her "supreme acheivement", the purpose of her 
existence. <1978: x, 4-7) The essence of anorexia, for Bruch, is 
therefore not centred on food and weight - these are respectively a 
method and a proof. The anorexic uses starvation and the domination of 
bodily desires in her search for control, identity and competence, and 
uses the resulting thinness as the sign that her control is effective. 
<19'7 4: 252) 
Bruch argues that three areas of "disturbed psychological functioning" 
lie at the heart of anorexia. <1978: x; 1974: 252-6; 1970: 12-15) 
Firstly, the anorexic woman has a "near delusional" body image. She 
will consistently claim that she is not, in fact, thin, and 
overestimates both her own size, others' sizes, and abstract 
distances. (19'78: 46, '78) Secondly, anorexic women cannot correctly 
identify bodily stimuli, especially hunger. Awareness of hunger, Bruch 
argues, is not instinctive, it is not "innate biological knowledge". 
Therefore learning is neccessary for hunger and indeed all 
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biological needs - to become "organized into recognizable patterns". 
(1969: 93; 1969a: 51) 
This process of learning, for the "pre-anorexic" child, is to be 
sought in childhood experience where the child's needs are not 
correctly recognized by the mother, who feeds the child to her own 
schedule, not on de:mand, and offers inappropriate responses to "child-
initiated cues" be those responses "neglectful, oversolicitous, 
inhibiting or indiscriminately permissive". <1969: 99) The child thus 
grows up with no sense of being in control of, or even properly 
recognizing, her own bodily sensations. Because of this, the anorexic 
wo:man suffers from a profound sense of ineffectiveness. She feels that 
she is living her life in accordance with the demands of others, and 
has no confidence that she could do otherwise. (1980: 170; 1977: 4; 
1975: 161; 1971: 241) Bruch argues that if the mother, and not the 
child, has constantly initiated action "her child :may grow up living 
entirely by responding to others ... he will never know that thoughts, 
feelings or actions originating in him can be effective." <1969a: 53) 
Bruch cites the case of "Sharon", who dated the real onset of her 
anorexia to a class in literature where a poem had a profound effect 
on her, revealing that she had no idea how to be "the captain of my 
soul" and "the :master of my fate". (1974: 263) 
The anorexic girl, then, arrives at adolescence with serious "ego 
deficiencies". She experiences her life as being under the control of 
others, and she has no coherent or self-directed identity. <1969: 100; 
1974: 285, 376) Adolescence, however, is a time when self-reliant 
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independence must be developed, and it is at this point that "positive 
self-assertion becomes unavoidable ... Cand) the severe deficiencies in 
the core personality become apparent". <1970: 15) The anorexic's ego 
simply cannot cope with the demands of adolesence and she withdraws 
into her own body as the only place she feels she can control and into 
food control as a an attempt to undo the bodily aspects of 
adolescence. (1980: 170> 
How, then, do these "ego deficiences" arise ? 
Bruch argues that the cause is to be found in "abnormal patterns of 
family interaction". (1978: 106) In the family histories of her 
anorexic patients the consistant description of the anorexic daughter 
is of the perfect child - well-behaved, academically successful, and 
compliant. Parents often told her that "the miserable, angry and 
desperate patient had been the best, sweetest, most obedient and most 
cooperative child ever". <1978: 38) But behind this rosy picture, 
Bruch argues, is a failure on the part of the parents to transmit to 
their daughters a sense of competence and self-value. The child is 
valued not as an individual in her own right, but as someone whose 
success would compensate for the parents's "concealed disatisfactions 
and disappointments" , especially those of the mother, who is often a 
"frustrated career woman". <1970: 20; 1971: 245) As such, then, the 
daughter is given no opportunity for "constructive self-assertion." 
(1978: 37) In the face of these excessive demands, which are 
intensified by her overconformity, the anorexic-to-be suffers the 
anxiety of feeling herself incapable of living up to her parents' 
expectations and thus fears the loss of their love. In spite of the 
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fact that they were treated as "special", they felt "undeserving, 
unworthy and ungrateful", both burdened by and incapable of achieving 
the success expected of them. 0978: 39) Frequently, they describe 
themselves as "blanks". <1978: 48) 
Further, Bruch argues that anorexic girls had always resented this 
parental over-control, and anorexia should be seen as part of the 
unacknowledged struggle for independence between them and their 
parents. In short, "they would rather starve themselves than continue 
a life of accomodation". <1977: 1; 2-3) 
Anorexia can be seen to serve two functions in this analysis. It is 
part of a very delayed attempt at independance, and is also an attempt 
to impose a personal control over the body. However, because of the 
underlying and continuing deficient awareness of and control over 
bodily sensations, food control itself "gets away" from them, and is 
experienced as an external control, as a "mysterious force that 
invades them or directs their behaviour". <1978: 55) Anorexia as an 
adaptational pattern does not work. 0970: 21) Therapy, therefore, 
should aim to help the anorexic develop a strong self-concept and 
identity in which she feels herself capable of self-directed action, 
self-regulation of her needs and desires, and that she owns her own 
body. She must be shown that it is wrong to feel ineffective and 
devalued, and that her own needs, thoughts and actions are of 
"fundamental importance". 0974: 63) Thus, and only thus, will the 
"golden cage" of anorexia be opened. 
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It would seem. therefore, that for Bruch anorexia nervosa is best 
understood as a kind of hysteria or conversion disorder, in which the 
physical symptoms are meaningful not so much in themselves, but as the 
manifestations of an underlying psychological disorder - the lack of a 
fully-developed sense of self. And following the psychoanalytic 
tradition, the causes of this disorder are located in infantile and 
childhood experience, centred on the family unit. 
Thus anorexia, it is argued, is fundamentally a disorder of the self, 
rather than a disorder of weight, food or appetite. This perspective 
leads Bruch virtually to ignore the possible role and meanings of food 
and the body in anorexia. Both are taken as relatively unproblematic; 
food is simply "available" to be used in the struggle for selfhood and 
control, and its possible social significance is ignored, apart from 
a brief consideration of increased food intake as the "fuel" of the 
pubertal processes, the reduction of which, as in Crisp's analysis, is 
used in an attempt to "undo" physical maturity. <1978: 59) 
Further, the significance of the choice of the body and the 
manipulation of body-weight as the main area of anorexic behaviour 
also remains an uninvestigated area of Bruch's thesis, thinness being, 
for Bruch, no more than "evidence" that anorexic control is working. 
In spite of noting media pressures on young women to be slim, the real 
significance of the anorexic body is, for Bruch, minimal. What having 
an adult female body means in a culture which simultaneously 
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eroticizes, degrades and devalues both women and their bodies, and how 
the transformation of the formally a-sexual child's body into the 
ambiguous icon of the female body is experienced, are questions which 
are simply left unasked her analysis focuses exclusiveley on inferred 
underlying psychological forces. And while in my own analysis I too 
will focus, as Bruch does, on issues of selfhood and control, I see it 
as one of the main benefits of a sociological analysis of anorexia 
that both the "underlying" and the "surface" facets of anorexia can 
fully become objects of investigation, phemomena whose meanings and 
interconnections are not assumed to be either prosaic or already 
understood. 
That having been said, what conclusions can be drawn from Bruch's 
analysis of the underlying psychological causation of anorexia ? 
For Bruch, as we have seen, anorexia is in essence a struggle for 
identity and selfhood, precipitated when the onset of puberty demands 
a move to independance and maturity of which the "core-less" 
personality of the anorexic is incapable. Here, I would argue, Bruch 
builds her theory on an unexplicated and assumed understanding of 
individual personality development which is both ahistorical, and 
while formally gender-neutral, is in fact a masculine model of 
development. Thus her understanding of anorexia is severely limited. 
Bruch's analysis of anorexia rests on the concept of the "integrated 
body-self", or "ego synthesis", in which the body and the self are 
experienced as a unity. and which is the normal outcome of personality 
development. <1969: 102; 105) In short, in normal development "a child 
-60-
learns to think of body and self as occupying the same space and 
forming a single functioning unit, separate from the units around 
him". <1969: 103) This process centres on the infant's demarcation of 
his own "body-self" from the primary object, the mother, a process 
which, as we have seen, is posited as being inadequately achieved in 
anorexia. C1969: 105) 
Thus, one aim of therapy in anorexia is to "clarify the disturbed 
interactional patterns so that the child can develop controls from 
within and become capable of experiencing himself as self-directed and 
as owning his body". <1971: 247) The body-self, then, is conceived of 
as a self-contained system of integrated sensations, needs and desires 
which is fundamentally separate from the environment, and in which 
both the body as a whole and its needs and sensations are experienced 
as self-directed and owned by the self. The self-contained system must 
be just that - a system, and not "a loose organization of (need) 
patterns and associated desires" in which incoherence makes 
disintegration an ever-present possibility. (1969: 100) 
Bruch's body-self concept is, as I think the summary above shows, 
fundamentally confused. The "integrated" body-self can only be 
integrated to a very limited degree (i.e. spatially) if the body and 
its needs and desires are seen to be "owned" by the self. Bruch seems 
to be working with two not entirely reconcilable notions here; 
firstly, of the ideal healthy individual who experiences the physical 
as so entirely "natural" and unproblematic that s/he sees him/herself 
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as a "physical" entity; and secondly, of the older notion of the self 
as separate from and owning, although contained within, the body. 
As well as this conceptual confusion the problems of analysing a 
feminine experience through a masculine model of the individual cause 
the analysis to crack further under scrutiny. In a culture in which 
the gender division is a basic organizational category, there are 
fundamental differences in masculine and feminine "selfhood" which 
patriarchal psychiatry obscures by positing a gender-neutral model of 
the individual. 
Independence, separateness and being self-contained, both physically 
and psychologically, are, I will later argue, characteristic of the 
"ideal :mart' not the ideal woman. The concept of absolute bodily 
integrity and separation is an unattainable ideal for women, as is 
that independence which rests on a conception of one's own needs, 
thoughts and actions as of "fundamental importance". (1974: 63) For 
women, physical and psychological and emotional openness is central. 
The dominant notion of the individual in a patriarchal culture coexits 
with an ideal of feminine receptiveness, both physical/sexual and 
psychological/emotional, which relates to the role of women as 
"complementary" to, and defined in relation to men. This 
receptiveness, however, is enforced but not valued. With a dominant 
concept of individuality in which separateness and bodily and 
psychological "integrity" are central, receptiveness is viewed as 
weakness, vulnerability and incompletion and is regarded with a 
mixture of fear, fascination and disgust. 
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Thus Bruch's uncritical acceptance of a "gender-neutral" concept of 
the individual, in terms of both body and psyche, seriously limits her 
understanding of anorexia. It leads her to analyse feminine 
receptiveness in anorexia, not as a central part of being an adequate 
woman in a patriarchal culture, but as "ego deficiency" arising from 
an "abnormal" family. (1978: 101; 1974: 78) She either simply does 
not, or chooses not to see that "separate-unit" psychology is far from 
being the gender-neutral standard of her theory. Her only "solution" 
is an attempt through therapy to help women better integrate the 
conflicting demands of individualism and receptiveness. Therapy, here, 
is a process which must take place without exposing the confusion and 
conflicts of these demands to the light of day, lest the goal of 
perfect adaptation to the demands of the culture be seen as being, for 
women, an impossible goal. 
Furthermore, the idea of the individual as a self-contained system is 
treated in Bruch's work as universally applicable. Bourgeois 
individualism, as well as being an essentially masculine concept, is 
also a historical concept. I hope to demonstrate later, through a 
comparison of the bourgeois concept of the individualized and atomized 
body with the medieval concept of the fluid and open body of the 
people, that conceptualizations of the body are not static but reflect 
and change with changes in the wider social structure. Similarly, the 
concept of the individual itself is also a historical concept, and is 
linked to conceptualizations of the body. 
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Some further minor confusions can be detected in Bruch's analysis of 
anorexia. The idea of "disturbed psychological functioning" - that 
anorexics do not properly recognize hunger, and do not "see" that they 
are thin - is contradicted by the argument, which we can also find in 
Bruch's work, that being able to "stand" hunger and sustain extreme 
thinness are used by the anorexic as a sign of her mastery of her 
body. (1978: x; 1974: 41) This confusion results from her attempt to 
introduce elements of biological causation into an essentially 
intrapsychic explanation, but it does not fundamentally affect the 
argument that anorexia nervosa is a struggle for selfhood through 
bodily control. 
Further, Bruch's inability to perceive how therapy, which she sees as 
wholly beneficial, could be seen by the anorexic woman as a threat to 
her precious and precarious control, leads her, like Crisp and Slade, 
to exclude the possibility that "rigid" thought and behaviour patterns 
could be adopted as a defence against the therapeutic attack. She 
therefore argues not that the anorexic must be rigid in what she will 
and will not allow in order to maintain her anorexia, but that she is 
- as Slade argues - incapable of any more flexible thinking, an 
assertion for which there is both little evidence and possible 
alternative explanations. (2) 
It would seem, therefore, that the most central and interesting 
2 In Parts Two and Three I will argue that "anorexic thinking" is 
better understood as a transformation of dominant understandings of 
the body, rather than as a simple "deficiency". 
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questions raised by anorexia remain unasked and unanswered in Bruch's 
thesis. Why anorexia is so overwhelmingly a fendnine experience is an 
issue which cannot be approached more than superficially - in brief 
references to "media pressures" which seem to exist independantly of 
the real world - if a phallocentric model of individuality is to be 
maintained. And the meanings of food and the body, both in society as 
a whole and specifically in anorexia cannot be analysed if they are 
seen as, respectively, "natural" and unproblematical, and a-historical 
and gender-neutral phenomena. However, although I have suggested that 
Bruch uses an over simplified separation of the physical and the 
psychic in her analysis and over concentrates on the latter, I accept 
the centrality of control in anorexia, and also see as significant, 
although for different reasons, diffuse "ego boundaries", and her 
focus on separation and boundaries in general. This will be explored 
further in later chapters. 
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Mara Selvini Palazzoli: the object body 
The work of the italian psychoanalyst Mara Selvini Palazzoli is 
similar to Hilde Bruch's analysis in many ways. Indeed, in her 
earliest writings, Palazzoli analysed anorexia as a disturbance of 
"body cognition", an inability to indentify or distinguish between 
different inner states, impulses and desires. This, she argues, arises 
out of a disturbed and confusing 
"impervious" to the child's needs, 
relationship with a mother 
which causes an inadequate 
perception of bodily needs when the child becomes an adult. This is 
essentially Bruch's thesis, and both agree that anorexia is deficient 
functioning caused by a faulty relationship to the body as "the basic 
source of experience". <Palazzoli 1969: 256; 1967: 312) 
Palazzoli, however, went on to develop her undererstanding of anorexia 
in her Self-starvation: from the intrapsychic to the transpersonal 
approach to anorexia neryosa. (1974) As the title shows, while 
Palazzoli was developing her analysis she was "converted" to family 
therapy, which sees the illness of an individual family member as the 
outcome of family "malfunctions", with the family seen as a "homeo-
static unit", that is, a self-regulating entity based on its own 
rules. (ibid.: 196-200; 228-231) While both her intrapsychic and 
intrafamilial explanations of anorexia have their problems, in her 
intrapsychic manifestation Palazzoli offers some interesting and 
enlightening notions on the meaning of food and the body in anorexia, 
and it is on these that I would like to focus. 
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Palazzoli starts her explanation of anorexia by using object-relations 
theory. She argues that the child's original experience with the 
primary object the mother, or food equalling mother is a 
"corporeal-incorporative" experience; the infant's inability to 
distinguish himself and the object means that incorporation is the 
only way he can relate to it. Now, the object has both positive 
Cpleasureable, nurturing) and negative <unpleasant, rejecting) 
aspects, and while the normal child in a satisfactory relationship 
with his mother will gradually learn to perceive his body as a 
separate whole, existing outside the maternal object, and. therefore 
not as the source of "bad" sensations, in "psychopathological" 
development: 
"the condition of being 'outside' is realized in part only. 
Most of the 'bad' experiences of his own body, which the 
child has met during the incorporative, primary 
narcissistic, phase of his object relationships, remain 
immured inside his body." <ibid.: 84-5) 
It is, therefore, the body itself that the anorexic fears: 
"the body of the anorexic does not merely contain the bad 
object but ... is the bad object ... the body is experienced as 
having all the features of the primary object as it was 
perceived in a situation of oral helplessness: all-powerful, 
indestructible, self-sufficient, growing and 
threatening ... there is an unconcious feeling that the object 
is far too strong to be destroyed." 
(ibid. : 87) 
The body is therefore equated with the negative and overpowering 
aspects of the incorporated object. 
Puberty, then, is the crucial moment in anorexia, when those negative 
aspects of the object are separated from the ego in order that they 
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can be opposed. Three processes are at work here. Firstly, it is at 
this time that an independent personal identity must be formed, and 
the anorexic woman, because of the faulty early learning which has 
made her dependant and compliant, feels herself unequal to this 
challenge and the ensuing trauma "reactivates the overwhelming sense 
of helplessness experienced during the infantile period". (ibid.: 89; 
56; 77) Thus far, Palazzoli follows Bruch. From here on, however, she 
moves onto new ground, using Arieti's concept of "concretization": 
"In the Freudian view, phobia is a form of displacement. 
Thus while little Hans was afraid of his father, his 
neurosis displaced that fear on to horses. According to 
Freud, such displacement serves to conceal a sexual threat, 
and therefore becomes symbolic of what it replaces... . the 
displacement is not neccesarily from one object to another. 
"What happens is not so much a displacement as a 
concretization. The patient lives in fear of vague and 
intangible threats that he may find difficult to define or 
that he refuses to recognize ... In patients suffering from 
serious phobias the psychiatrist can easily recognize the 
concretization of a more general anxiety-producing 
situation ... In my view, phobia is the expression of a 
general psychopathological principle, namely that whatever 
cannot be borne abstractly because it generates too much 
anxiety ... will eventually be concretized. This 
concretization of concepts and intuitions is not simply a 
reduction of the abstract to the concrete level. .. but an 
active process. i.e. an active translation of the abstract 
into the concrete." 
<quoted ibid.: 148-9) 
It is, therefore, at puberty that what the pre-anorexic girl fears and 
finds threatening becomes concretized into the newly developed adult 
female body as a phobic object. 
The second process of "anorexic puberty" is the transformation of the 
earlier psychic incorporation of the object into a physically concrete 
incorporation: 
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"because of the development of the breasts and other 
feminine curves, the body is experienced concretely as the 
maternal object ... <and) ... the patient considers and 
experiences her body as one great incorporated object which 
overpowers her and forces a passive role upon her." 
(ibid.: 90) 
The pre-pubertal sense of the bad object as invincible is also 
transformed at puberty, for now that the bad object is concretely 
equated by the anorexic with her body, it is newly amenable to the 
active aggression of starvation. However, because the body, like the 
bad object, is fascinating as well as overpowering, it cannot be 
simply abandoned but must be kept under control and its growth 
prevented. (ibid.: 90-2) 
Thirdly, it is at puberty that what Palazzoli terms the "passive-
receptive aspect of feminine life" is first experienced. (ibid.: 70) 
Not only is the physical aspect of puberty experienced as "a sudden, 
mysterious and humiliating bodily happening over which the poor girl 
has no control", but the adult female body must be accepted as "an 
essentially receptive-passive object". (ibid.: 69-70) Palazzoli argues 
thus: 
"the adolescent girl ... experiences her feminine sexuality 
in a passive and receptive way: she is exposed to lewd 
looks, subjected to menstruation, about to be penetrated in 
sexual embraces, to be invaded by the foetus, to be suckled 
by a child." 
(ibid.: 70) 
The new woman's body as a whole, then, also comes to represent 
concretely this passivity and receptiveness. It is rejected/controlled 
not only as the concrete manifestation of the negative and 
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overpowering aspects of the maternal object, but also as the concrete 
:manifestation of recepti veness/passi vi ty. The anorexic girl is 
attempting to become an autonomous adult "by rejecting those aspects 
of feminine corporeality that conjure up the terrifying vista of 
turning into a succubus and passive vessell." (ibid.: 72) 
The body, then, is ambiguously experienced as both alien and 
persecuting - in its status as phobic object in identification with 
the bad object and with feminine receptiveness - and as owned, and 
thus amenable to manipulation. (ibid.: 93; 63-4) Eating never having 
been experienced as personally controllable, food represents the loss 
of control as well as, in its material aspect, bodily increase. Bodily 
growth is then perceived as taking place at the expense of the self, a 
self which is identified "with an ideal that is ... desexualised, 
a carnal and essentially powerful", "a psychotic ideal of 
acorporeality", an ideal which eating threatens. (ibid.: 90; 150-1; 
86-7) 
For Palazzoli, then, the failure to perceive bodily signals which 
originally, following Bruch, she saw as central to the explanation of 
anorexia, is in the end downgraded. She concludes that a failure to 
perceive bodily signals, especially hunger, is consequent upon the 
rejection of the body as phobic object, and that it is the latter, not 
the former, which is the primary anorexic process. The anorexic girl, 
then, experiences stasis: she must contain and control the body 
without destroying it; she must continue to live but she cannot grow. 
-70-
Palazzoli, then, while ostensibly following the Bruch line, in fact 
branches off into areas Bruch leaves unanalysed. One of the most 
exciting aspects of her work is her reconstruction of some of the ways 
in which the transformation of the "a-sexual" child's body into the 
eroticized and degraded adult female body can be experienced, that is, 
what meanings the adult female body can come to have. 
However, once again the focus on the domestic and the familial as the 
centre of the female universe limits the possibilities of analysis, 
and leaves unexplored the social construction of meaning. The "bad 
object" from this perspective is, literally - and in more ways than 
one - the mother. For Palazzol i, as for Bruch, the root "cause" of 
anorexia is maternal failing - the mother fails to teach her child 
that she is a separate and autonomous individual, and so the girl, at 
adolescence, is unable to cope with the social demands to begin to 
become an independent adult. Once again, the underlying assumption is 
that a "good" mother will produce a "good" or "normal" - that is, 
non-anorexic - daughter; and that, consequently, it is the deviance 
of the individual, and not the conflicting demands of the culture that 
explain anorexia. 
The "psychiatric ideology", to use Penfold and Walker's term, .must see 
the masculine bourgeois ideal of the autonomous and separate 
individual as "natural", and therefore its attainment as possible for 
all but the deviant few, for if it does not it risks seeing 
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psychologically autonomous individuality as a socially created and 
historically specific concept rather than as the universal outcome of 
all "normal" development. 
Broadly the same criticisms, then, centering on the assumption that 
becoming a woman is psychologically unproblematic within the "normal" 
family, can be levelled at Palazzoli's work as were applied to 
Bruch's. However, what is different about Palazzoli's work is its 
continual threat to break out of its limits, a threat which gives her 
analysis the potential to be used in non-psychiatric explanations. Her 
explanation of how the adult female body is experienced contains a 
rich vein of ideas, two of which are particularly important. 
Firstly, Palazzoli argues that the newly developing adult female body 
is experienced by the adolescent girl in its association with the 
"bad" aspects of the primary object as "all-powerful, indestructible, 
self-sufficient, growing and threatening". (ibid.: 87) However, 
si111ultaneously the body is "an essentially receptive-passive object" 
which is irremediably open and vulnerable to invasion. (ibid.: 69-70) 
Palazzoli explains the overwhelming, powerful aspect of the female 
body as created through the association between the body-as-phobic-
object and the infant's perception of the mother. The passive, 
vulnerable aspect is a direct consequence of anatomical reality. 
Both conceptualisations of the female body are, however, open to 
alternative and wider explanations. The understanding of female power 
as threatening and overwhelming has more behind it, I would argue, 
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than simply literal description of the mother-child relationship. The 
"threat" of maternal power is a threat to the child's separation from 
the mother, a threat to individual autonomy and therefore a threat 
which can only exist in the context of an individualized psychology. 
Further, 11 :maternal 11 power should not be separated from feminine power 
as a whole. Fear of the suppressed power of an oppressed group can be 
shared by both oppressor and oppressed, and fear of the contained 
power of women is reflected in the conceptualization of female power 
as a threatening and encroaching force, subverting patriarchal power 
and patriarchal order, and threatening to overwhelm and destroy 
"feminini ty11 - that is, women's acquiescence to patriarchy. Thus one 
aspect of the social conceptualisation of womanhood is of contained 
power, and this is a concept which although given special emphasis and 
transfor:mative attention in anorexia, is "available" as a social 
meaning to all women, not merely to those suffering from a "deviant" 
upbringing. 
Further, feminine "openess" should not be viewed as an anatomical 
"given". The i:mage of the female body arises not directly from 
physical reality but is created in ideology and material practice. It 
is not the body itself which makes women "passive vessells", but how 
that body is socially constructed. The idea of the female body as open 
and incomplete is, as I will argue later, a reflection of women • s 
position as "secondary" to men and therefore incomplete. As I have 
suggested, the idea of an atomized and psychically coherent self is a 
masculine ideal, and the notion of women as physically open must be 
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seen in relation to the psychological receptiveness which is a central 
tenet of the feminine role in patriarchy. 
Therefore, while I would reject Palazzoli' s domestic and anatomical 
explanations for the degraded modern concept of the female body - in 
anorexia, as in the wider society - as simultaneously threatening and 
open to invasion, I do see these concepts as central to any adequate 
analysis of anorexia. Such an analysis would see anorexia both as an 
attempt to control and contain feminine desire and as a protection 
against the fear of psychological invasion. In later chapters, then, 
I will explore in greater depth the ideas about the female body which 
Palazzoli so interestingly raises here. 
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Crisp, Slade, Bruch and Palazzoli, then, while offering varying 
analyses of anorexia, share in common an individualist slant which 
sees anorexia as, in the last analysis, a problem of individual 
deviance or deficiency. Thus, the culture which produces anorexia all 
but disappears from their accounts of the illness. This, for the 
feminist as for the sociologist, is profoundly unsatisfactory, 
especially in its downgrading of the role of cultural meanings in 
anorexia. 
Two points, however, arise from this chapter. Firstly, desire is 
obliquely or directly present in the work of all four writers; 
anorexic women are understood as unable to accept their desires and 
needs as "normal", and are thus unable to act to fulfill them. It is 
this inability which accounts for their defective sense of self. 
Desire, thus, is central to being a person. Secondly, it is suggested 
that anorexic women need to be "retrained" to independence and 
autonomy. Dependance, which is central to femininity, is thus a 
problem in anorexia. 
In the psychiatric ideology the desiring self and the dependant woman 
simply exist, requiring no analysis. For the feminist and the 
sociologist their isolation in psychiatric analysis is the starting-
point rather than the end of theory. In Part Three, dependance and 
desire will form central axes of the analysis of anorexia. In the 
following chapter I will discuss the work of three feminist writers on 
anorexia, tracing their analyses of dependance and desire in the light 
of feminist theory's critique of the concept of natural femininity. We 
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would expect feminist analyses to locate anorexia in patriarchally 
constructed femininity rather than seeing it as an incomplete 
development of gender-neutral individuality. It is to the question of 
how far this expectation is fulfilled that we now turn. 
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Chapter Three: Women's oppression: feminist explanations of anorexia 
Feminist work on anorexia is better known than it is plentiful. In 
Britain, Marilyn Lawrence's book The Anorexic Experience was for 
several years the only major feminist work on anorexia. (Lawrence, 
1984) Recently, however, Susie Orbach's Hunger Strike was published. 
Susie Orbach is perhaps best knmm for Fat is a Feminist Issue, her 
work at the Women's Therapy Centre in London, and her writings, with 
Luise Eichenbaum, on female psychology. COr bach, 1979; Orbach and 
Eichenbaum, 1983) In America Kim Chernin has developed a feminist 
perspective on the iE;sue of body-size in her books Womansize: the 
tyranny of slenderness and The Hungry Self: women. eating and 
identity. <Chernin, 1983; Chernin, 1986) Both Chernin and Orbach, 
then, developed their interest in anorexia out of a concern with 
women, eating and body-size as a whole, while Lawrence worked with 
anorexic women as a psychiatric social worker. 
All three writers are critical of orthodox psychiatric explanations of 
anorexia, and of psychiatric treatment of anorexia. A feminist 
perspective leads them to analyse anorexia as an issue of women's 
position in a patriarchal culture. What I hope to show in this 
chapter, however, are the limitations of constructing feminist 
explanations of anorexia without a fully sociological perspective. 
While a committment to feminism pushes these theories towards seeing 
"psychology" as a changeable, and therefore social and historical 
phenomenon, the underlying retention of the bourgeois concept of 
"human nature" con,::;trains the extent to which feminism can overturn 
- 77-
psychiatric ideology. The fundamental assumption that an 
individualized self exists a-priori and in ungendered form, and that 
the social structure prevents women from fully developing this self 
crucially limits the analysis. Vhat results is the addition of a 
feminist view to underlying bourgeois patriarchal models of the self 
and of the body, rather than a feminist critique of those concepts. 
This creates a subliminal tension in these analyses, which Orbach and 
Lawrence deal with through suggesting a "two-stage" solution to 
anorexia - immediate individual therapy plus long-term social change -
and which Chernin deals with through a call to value "innate" "female" 
qualities. Obviously, and especially with Orbach and Lawrence, where 
the aim is therapy individualistic solutions are appealing. A more 
academic perspective encourages less optimistic conclusions. What this 
thesis argues is that in a bourgeois and patriarchal culture women 
cannot attain the socially-valued self, since that self, far from 
being gender-neutral, is in fact masculine, and depends for its 
existence on an opposition with the receptive feminine self. Thus, I 
will argue that the central issue of anorexia is not how women are 
prevented from fully developing a self which exists in embryonic form, 
but exists rather as a struggle between the ideologies of 
individualism and femininity. 
In spite of these limitations, however, Orbach and Lawrence provide 
compelling analyses of anorexia which, from the sociological 
perspective, are a significant improvement on orthodox psychiatric and 
psychological theories. Orbach and Lawrence discuss the concepts of 
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control and bodily and psychic boundaries which we saw in the work of 
Bruch and Palzzoli, but discuss them as feminists. Thus, they provide 
much more satisfactory analyses of the meanings of these concepts for 
women in a patriarchal culture, and of their centrality in anorexia. 
Chernin, although presenting the sociologist with more problems in her 
analysis of anorexia, does raise the vital issue of guilt, and makes 
some interesting points about anorexia as ritual behaviour. 
This chapter, then, exists as much to identify what feminists have 
argued are the central issues in anorexia as to offer a sociological 
critique of current feminist work, and the issues of control, 
boundaries, guilt and ritual which we find in the work of the three 
feminist writers will form central aspects of my own analysis of 
anorexia. 
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Kim Chernin: mothers and daughters 
In Yomansize: the tyranny of slenderness Kim Chernin looked at 
cultural pressures on women to achieve and maintain a single socially-
approved body-shape. (Chernin, 1983) In The hungry self: women. eating 
and identity she goes on to look at eating disorders, including 
anorexia, arguing that they should be seen not simply as illnesses but 
as a "hidden struggle for self-development". <Chernin, 1986: xiv) 
Chernin analyses the issue of women and eating disorders by looking in 
turn at four main areas: the search for "identity" and selfhood; the 
daughter's struggle to separate from the mother; food and its meanings 
for women; and the concept of the "rite of passage". Obsession with 
food is, for Chernin, a failed rite of passage. She argues: 
"a troubled relationship to food frequently hides a serious 
problem with female identity in an age when women are 
invited by social circumstance and individual inclination to 
extend the traditional idea of what it means to be a woman." 
(ibid.: xi) 
Extending tradition is however, far from easy, and it is the 
ambivalence and guilt which women feel as they move into "the male 
sphere of self-development and social power" which diverts the desire 
for change and self-development into the stagnation and misery of 
eating disorders. Ci bid. : xi v) Chernin then concludes with ideas on 
how the struggle for female identity could be less destructively 
effected. 
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She argues that it is only recently that women have claimed the right 
to participate in the public sphere in such large numbers. (ibid. : 
xii) She writes: 
"Yle are a unique generation of women - the first in history 
to have the social and psychological opportunity to surpass 
with ease the life choices our mothers have made. Yle come of 
age, we leave home, and we enter a world in which most 
social and political institutions have thrown open doors 
that for thousands of years were closed to women. Therefore, 
to many of us who have struggled for these very 
opportunities, it comes as a shock to realize that at that 
very moment when we might expect to step forward and harvest 
the fruit of a profound struggle for female liberation, 
ma.ny of the most gifted among us fall prey to a severe 
suffering that gradually consumes more and more of our life 
energy and finally causes what in many cases is a severe 
breakdown." 
(ibid.: 12) 
It is in the present generation, then, that women can reap the 
benefits of feminist struggle for equality with men after "thousands 
of years of suppression"; this, then, is a "historic moment" in which 
women can for the first time take as their own "the rights and 
prerogatives of male society". (ibid.: 19) For Chernin, the present 
generation of women have been brought up to take equal rights for 
granted, as a given. (ibid.: 28-9) 
For Chernin, however, women who suffer from eating disorders - and 
anorexia in particular - can't say "yes" to this offered opportunity. 
She argues that many women feel a "terror of female development", of 
taking control of their own lives, and that eating disorders, which 
occur at times of underlying developmental crisis, regardless of 
biological age, work subconsciously to prevent movement into the 
public sphere. (ibid.: 21) Life is consumed by the obsession with food 
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- and this obsession is chosen in place of freedom at a turning point 
in both the individual woman's life and women's history as a whole. 
Chernin identifies a number of factors in this collective female 
refusal of self-development. There is the residue of the historical 
oppression of women: 
" ... these echoes from history endure; perhaps they have 
entered so deeply into the fabric of our mind and being that 
they sound in our ears even today, the silent background to 
the silent question about the legitimacy of female 
development." 
(ibid.: 32) 
Further, women have not traditionally been seen as having the same 
developmental crises as men, and therefore the culture does not 
contain rituals with which to express female development. (ibid.: 169-
70) But far and away the most vital factor in women's failure to take 
up the promise of development is the mother-daughter relationship. 
For Chernin, the new opportunites for women open up historically 
unprecedented conflicts between mothers and daughters. For the first 
time, female self-development involves a radical separation from the 
mother - her values, her way of life, her resignations. The background 
to this separation, Chernin argues, is a "progressively growing crisis 
in the institution of motherhood". <ibid.: 77; 82, 104) In the 20th 
century, the concept of the neccessity of women sacrificing their 
lives to domesticity, especially motherhood, has broken down under the 
pressure of women's political struggles. The "suppositions that were 
taken for truths" - that women should live through their families, be 
confined to the domestic sphere and "give up the longing for their own 
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development and sacrifice it for their children" - have been gradually 
broken down. (ibid.: 78-9; 125) 
Crucially, however, the idea of neccessary motherhood has not been 
replaced with any new theories of womanhood, and without either the 
belief in domesticity as the inescapable and natural life of woman or 
a viable alternative, the miseries, futilities and discontents of 
domesticity "break ... through into consciousness". The mothers of the 
post-war era are, then, profoundly discontented. They have only the 
notion of "personal fulfillment" to which to refer their lives - and 
they are inadequate to the challenge. <ibid.: 80) New assumptions 
about women's possibilities, such as they are, have come too late for 
them; unable to accept the necessary sacrifice of their individuality 
in motherhood, neither can they enter the world of larger 
possibilities. There is, then, "a fundamentally new type of mother-
daughter bond": 
"Mothers and daughters of the modern era face one 
another ... as beings in a struggle for a self - the older 
woman having already failed in this quest as the younger 
starts out on it." 
(ibid.: 81) 
For the younger woman, then, self-development and self-assertion 
involve surpassing her mother. For the mother, she is ambivalent about 
her daughter's new opportunities: she wants her daughter to have what 
she has lacked, but also envies and resents her potential to do so. 
(ibid.: 87-8) Chernin argues: 
"there is a marked tendency among women to retreat, to 
experience a failure of nerve, a debilitating inner conflict 
about accepting advantages and opportunites denied to their 
mothers. The 'Cinderella complex', the fear of independance 
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from which they are supposedly suffering, is in reality a 
pervasive worry about our mothers' lives. This anguished 
concern about the mother is hidden just beneath the surface 
of the eating problem ... the contemporary struggle for female 
identity ... in relation to this fateful encounter between a 
mother whose life has not been fulfilled and a daughter now 
presented with the opportunity for fulfillment." 
(ibid.: 42-3) 
It is guilt, then, which is at the centre of today' s generation of 
young women's refusal to develop. The daughter is caught between the 
new images of female power and possibility and the image of "a fat 
mother hiding at home", and neither the culture nor her mother can 
support her. <ibid.: 45) The mother, having retreated from self-
development herself, cannot support her daughter through its crises, 
and the social expectations which allow men to see "this imperative 
developmental task, this neccessity to face the father at the 
crossroads and symbolically to kill him and take his place in the 
world" as a typical and universal "crisis" do not extend to women. 
(ibid.: 51-3) 
For women, then, the idea that "one generation must proceed inexorably 
beyond the next" is alien. Cibid.: 53; 170) The daughter faced with 
the possibility of surpassing her mother in developmental terms is 
plagued by guilt, and blames herself, rather than her culture, for her 
mother's wasted life. The daughters feel as though they themselves 
have "drained and depleted the mother with the intensity of their 
needs". (ibid.: 64) Here Chernin draws on the work of Melanie K.l..e..i.J:l., 
whose work on the oral-sadistic fantasies of infants suggests that the 
frustration of the child at its inability to control the food supply 
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lead to destructive impulses towards the mother. Cibid.: 117-8; see 
Klein: 1975) Here, Chernin argues, lie "the seeds of this hidden 
mother-rage and mother-guilt which are, at present, restricting our 
development". <ibid.: 118) Klein's idea that the child's desire to 
appropriate the contents first of its mother • s breast, then of her 
whole body, leads to a belief that it has really destroyed her is, for 
Chernin, rather than being a universal truth, dependant on the 
oppression of women in the institution of motherhood. The belief that, 
in weaning, the mother has in reality been finally drained dry is 
bolstered by the more or less simultaneous discovery of the mother's 
relative real powerlessness and depletion by her child's needs. There 
is, then, a propensity for daughters to feel guilt about their 
potential to "surpass" their mothers; the idea that they "drained" 
theri mothers in reality an unconscious "Kleinian memory" -is 
"reactivated" in later crises of growth and development. Cibid.: 64; 
78-93) 
Chernin argues: 
"the terrible guilt we see in a woman with an eating 
disorder, although it is usual! y focused on the number of 
calories consumed and the number of pounds gained, arises 
from the fact that the woman afflicted with this obsession 
cannot fargi ve herself far having damaged her mother in 
earliest childhood. Consequently, she cannot allow herself 
to move into the next stages of development, to turn her 
back on the older woman and leave her behind to the 
depletion and exhaustion she believes she has inflicted upon 
her." 
(ibid. : 125) 
While the son, knowing that he is to become like his father -
u independant, autonomous, involved in the world" - can accept the 
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self-sacrifice of his mother, the daughter, being herself a woman, 
cannot. Cibid.: 126-7) The son is, then, free from guilt, and through 
"aggressive fantsies of attack upon the female body" he can also 
"manage" his "mother-rage" without attacking himself. <ibid.: 129) The 
daughter, however, is trapped - her anxiety, guilt and anger are not 
culturally transformed, but remain "stuck" at the level of guilt over 
food, eating and growth. (ibid.: 124; 132-6) Eating remains "an act of 
violence against the mother" and this feeling is reinforced by a 
culture which, Chernin argues, "fears and dislikes large women". 
(ibid.: 6) Not eatingresolves many guilts - principally, however, the 
"primal crime" of imaginary matricide. <ibid.: 132) 
This, then, is the cause of anorexia: 
"the daughters of our time are turning against themselves 
... they torture themselves with starvation and make their 
bodies their enemies ... they attack their female flesh. This 
futile attack upon the female body, through which we are 
attempting to free ourselves from the limitations of the 
female role, hides a bitter warfare against the mother." 
(ibid.: 93) 
The guilt and hidden anger at the mother - anger, anxiety and loss at 
the separation from the mother in weaning - is turned against the 
female body shared with the mother: 
"in a stunning act of symbolic substitution, the daughter 
aims her mother-rage at her own body, so like the one which 
fed her and through which she learned to know the mother 
during the first moments of her existence." 
(ibid.: 93) 
She fears that food will turn her into what her mother is 
ambitionless and shameful: "with every bite she has to fear that she 
may become what her mother has been". (ibid.: 42) Anorexia, then, is 
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an attempt to remake the female body: it is "symbolic gender 
transformation". (ibid.: 52) The daugher hopes that in taking on the 
lean, male body, she will "escape from the mother's destiny without 
enduring all that remorse of leaving the mother behind", and will be 
able to surpass her mother with the "serenely cruel and self-
referring" attitude of a son. <ibid.: 56) This, however, is impossible 
- the body regains its natural weight and contours, and confronts the 
anorexic woman with "the fact of being fundamentally and irrevocably 
female". <ibid. : 53) She is trapped: she can neither retreat nor go 
forward. 
In eating disorders, then, women transform their bodies because of 
guilt over transforming their lives and personalities. Eating 
disorders should be seen, Chernin argues, as attempts to evolve "rites 
of passage" in which the traditional female identity of self-
sacrificial mother can be transformed and women can enter the culture. 
This, she argues, is the purpose of "tribal" rites of passage, but 
because the ritual here is not recognized socially, it is unable to 
accomplish this. Its "self-destructive excess" is not controlled, and 
its ritual thus "remains split off from its collective significance". 
(ibid.: 185; 169-186) The anorexic woman "cannot get beyond these 
trappings of transformation" - she remains stuck in the repetition and 
elaboration of dietary ritual without experiencing the transformative 
power of the true rite of passage. <ibid.: 175; 174) 
This, then, for Chernin, is what is needed: a collective ritual 
through which a new female identity can be created - "intentional 
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:r-itual" rather than "ritualized obsession". Ci bid. ; 185; 204) She 
"we are in urgent need of a ceremonial form to guide us 
beyond what may well be the collective childhood of female 
identity into a new maturity of female social development". 
(ibid.: 169) 
Only then will a "new woman" who can enter the public world without 
the finally impossible transformation into a "pseudo-man"" be born; a 
woman in whom female creative and nurturing power are integrated in, 
rather than separated from, her sense of indentity. 
Kim Chernin's work is popular, and The Tyranny of Slenderness is 
particularly well-known. This is unsurprising - her style is clear, 
her arguments accessible, and her subject relevant to many women. 
Indeed, Chernin's perspective on anorexia is stimulating and raises 
many important but often neglected issues - the disjunction between 
femininity and individuality, the "problem" of feminine appetites, the 
opposed orientations of men and women towards the "public sphere", and 
the importance of ritual in anorexia. 
Especially interesting from the present perspective are her 
discussions, drawn from Melanie Klein, of women's "inner space". In 
spite of the fact, as shall later be argued, that Chernin's focus on 
guilt in the mother-daughter relationship as the main explanatory 
factor in anorexia is misleading, the whole area of the imagery of 
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women's bodies as empty inner space is central to the consideration of 
the body as a concept rather than a simple biological given. 
The ahistorical character of her thesis, however, fundamentally 
weakens its central arguments. Firstly, arguing that the 20th century 
sees the overturning of thousands of years of unmitigated oppression 
of women is untenable. As Dale Spender, for example, has argued, many 
of the ideas of contemporary feminism can be traced back as far as the 
17th century, and is able to chart their emergence, suppression and 
reemergeance as "new'' . <Spender, 1983) Patriarchy, and women's 
resistance to it, are shaped in each period by the specific historical 
conditions of that time. It is historically more accurate to see 
women's struggles against patriarchal oppression as rising and being 
suppressed, as struggles both on the material and the ideological 
levels, rather than as one titanic victory over a monolithic and 
unchanging patriarchy which needs only to be "rounded-off" in the 
finishing school of female psychology. (1) 
I do not wish to suggest that the oppression of women is simply a "by-
product" of capitalism, however. Patriarchy is a useful but very 
general concept which should contain within it a wide-range of 
historical differentiation in how women are oppressed, and how the 
oppression of women as a gender intersects with other oppressions, 
1 To take only one example, feminist sociologists have detailed the 
split into private-female and public-male worlds during the transition 
from feudalism to capitalism, pointing out that that dichotomy is 
itself historical rather than universal. <See, i.e. ,Rowbotham: 1977; 
Hamilton: 1978) 
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principally those of class and "race". Chernin's arguments are based 
on an extremely simplistic definition of the concept of patriarchy. 
Her thesis rather than being informed by history, takes it for 
granted, and this leads her to vastly underestimate both historical 
change and the real constraints on the expression of female power, 
arguing that neither the material nor the ideological constraints of 
patriarchy retain any real cogency. <Chernin, 1986: 60, 78-80, 90) 
Thus Chernin downgrades women's continuing economic, ideological and 
political subordination and pays scant attention to the patriarchal 
control of the female body which must be central to any feminist 
analysis of anorexia. (ibid.: 115) But as Janet Sayers argues, in 
order to end women • s oppression we need more than a new attitude to 
mother-daughter relationships: 
" ... we have to do more than 'dream of the future, out of the 
transformed obsessions that presently rule our lives' as 
Chernin recommends. Ci bid. 204) We also have to take 
practical steps to actualize this dream in reality ... Sadlly 
Chernin ... fails adequately to detail the means whereby the 
solution she advocates to sex inequality might be realised 
in practice." 
<Sayers: 1987) 
In line with her theory that equality for women has been wholly 
achieved for the present generation, Chernin sees the social controls 
on women which continue to keep femininity and domesticity on the 
female agenda as mere "echoes from history" C1986: 32), and as 
relating solely to patriarchy. This latter strand in her argument is 
best seen in her treatment of middle-class women as representative of 
all women, the issues of their specific class a.nd gender position as 
issues affecting all women equally. Indeed it is the very fact that 
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young, educated, white Western women are in a specialized position 
both in terms of gender, "race" and class that access to the 
public/male sphere has become an issue for them. 
Vomen, for Chernin, then, seem to be a largely self-oppressing group 
- the constraints which keep women from moving fully into the public 
sphere exist primarily in the minds of women themselves and apply 
equally to all women, regardless of their class position or ethnic 
background. There is a glancing recognition that women may not be 
doing it all to themselves when Chernin writes of the anorexic woman's 
"brooding, half-conscious sense that her culture, after opening the 
doors to its most highly prized institutions, does not really welcome 
female development at all". Cibid.: 187> This point, unfortunately, 
remains unexplored, as does the question of whether the culture opens 
its doors wider for some women than for others. Guilt is seen as a 
purely internal and irrational mechanism, not as an element in the 
social control of women through which women "police" themselves. 
The "failure of nerve" is women's, the conflicts psychological. 
Cibid.: 43) To take one example, Chernin argues that there is a 
"battle of opposing imagery" between "the new image of female 
possibility" and the traditional image of mother-in-the-kitchen, and 
that it is women's "guilt" at surpassing their mothers which prevents 
them from embracing the new possibilities. (ibid. : 45) This 
perspective totally ignores the profound ambiguity in images of 
powerful women, informed by stereotypes of the wicked stepmother -
women's power is bad power - or the pseudo-man - powerful women are 
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unfeminine. The attitudes of both genders towards women who "make it" 
in a man's world are highly ambivalent. 
It is here that the central confusion in Chernin's argument begins to 
show itself. She argues that women often feel the lack of a "self", 
that women do not have the expectation of surpassing and therefore 
fully separating from their mothers in the way that men do, and that 
there is a basic conflict between femininity - sublimating the self to 
live through others - and individualism - acting as a separate and 
autonomous person. (ibid.: 20; 125-9) In spite of her caveats on the 
need to take into account woman-as-nurturer this latter also 
presented as a universal and ahistorical quality - the model of the 
self from which she works more or less uncritically is the atomized 
and self-contained individual of bourgeois and patriarchal ideology. 
Chernin does, as we have seen, argue that women cannot, or should not, 
attempt to solve their problems by becoming "pseudo-men" - here coming 
close to arguing that the dominant concepts of the self do not "fit" 
women's experience. However, this does not lead her to question the 
naturalness and universality of the atomized self, struggling to 
separate from and supercede the parent. This struggle is for Chernin 
expressive of "basic psychological needs" and is thus an "inevitable", 
"human necessity". Cibid.: 169-70) Indeed, in her discussion of pre-
modern "tribal" rites of passage she argues that 
separation/individuation has always been their main function. Cibid.: 
166-71) This ignores, however, the fundamental distinction, to be 
discussed in later chapters, between the pre-modern definition of the 
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self by social role and the modern self as defined by individualized 
"personality". 
Women's present position is described as "the collective childhood of 
female identity" (ibid.: 169), and we can have little doubt about what 
"a new maturity" would mean. Although same traits - aggression, far 
example - are seen to be male, and others - nurturing, creativity -
as female, Chernin retains the sense of the self acting upon an 
environment from which it is totally separated as gender-neutral, and 
as something "authentic" which can be discovered, rather than as a 
social, and therefore historical, construction. Cibid.: 195-200) 
A wholehearted cammittment to the social construction of personality, 
however, negates the need to pasi t a "natural" or "authentic" self 
existing independently of culture, history and the gender division. 
The dominant conception of the self as a self-contained entity 
organised around a care of needs/desires which are satisfied through 
the exploitation of an environment composed of objects is masculine 
and bourgeois, rather than gender-neutral and universal. Further, this 
construction relies upon, and is constructed in apposition to, a 
conception of woman as fundamentally "un-separate", as, indeed, part 
of the environment of objects through which the masculine subject 
expresses itself. 
The institution of motherhood, then, is one expression of the "lack of 
self" which women experience in the collision of bourgeois 
individualism and patriarchal femininity. The mother lives through her 
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children because responsiveness to the needs and desires of others is 
central to patriarchal definitions of feminine personality, but even 
the childless woman cannot achieve the masculine self. Self-
effacement is not solely the province of mothers, and guilt is not 
produced solely in the mother-daughter relationship. It is not women 
who confine themselves to the manipulation of the body, fearing to 
"take on" the public world. Rather, patriarchal power confines them. 
In essence, then, Chernin psychologizes and domesticates a social and 
political conflict - the control of women through patriarchal power 
realtions. Women's search for "identity" is stifled in a purely 
domestic psychodrama which "culture" merely "reinforces" from the 
"outside", there being in Chernin's thesis no real struggle to retain 
culture as patriarchal. The struggle is seen as psychological and 
domestic, rather than social, material and ideological, between the 
formal gender-neutrality of the concept of the individual and the 
patriarchal control of women through the ideology of femininity. 
Chernin's analysis of anorexia, in short, can only hold water if we 
accept that the patriarchal oppression of women is effectively over, 
and that the "masculine" self is the proper goal of women. If we do 
not, we will be forced to look outside of the mother-daughter 
relationship to the wider social forces which continue to oppress and 
constrain women - as mothers and daughters certainly, but also as 
wives, girlfriends, workers and citizens. If we do so we liberate the 
analysis of anorexia from its dependance on a particular "type" of 
mother - the discontented woman ambivalent about her daughter's growth 
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- and the control of feminine appetite can be understood as social 
rather than self-inflicted. 
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Marilyn Lahxence: control and containment 
Marilyn Lawrence is the mo:::;t widely read feminist writer on anorexia; 
her book The Anorexic Experience (1984) is frequently cited, and she 
has done extensive therapeutic work with anorexic women. 
For Lawrenc:e, anorexia is a strategy of control which operates at two 
levels. Firstly, at the physical level, the anorexic woman tries 
through her eating and non-eating strategies to gain and maintain 
complete control over the size and shape of her body. Secondly, at the 
moral level, the anorexic woman tries to gain and maintain control 
over her needs and desires through techniques of self-denial. These 
attempts to achieve "perfect and absolute control" are motivated by a 
feeling of being out of control, which also occurs at two levels: 
physically, as expressed in the fear of becoming fat; and morally, in 
seeing herself as "glutinous and debased". (Lawrence, 1979: 93) 
Anorexic women, Lawrence argues, want to control what happens in their 
lives, a control which is continually undermined by women's relative 
social powerlessness. The reality of this powerlessness means that it 
is very difficult for women to exert a controlling influence over 
their actual social position. Ci bid. : 93; 100) Self-control through 
control of the body is, however, possible, and it this turning inward 
of the attempt at control which anorexia effects: 
"In order for an individual to be free to direct herself and 
take charge of her own actions, it is necessary for her to 
engage with other people in such a way that the interaction 
allows her this control. It may be necessary for her to 
exercise some power in relation to other people. When 
2~norexics talk about control, they invariably mean the power 
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to regulate, command and govern their own lives and actions. 
They generally fail to do this by turning outwards and 
engaging with the world on their own behalf. Instead, they 
exercise self-control, which we might understand as power 
turned inwards. The battleground then becomes an internal 
one: the battle is fought within the individual rather than 
between the individual and the world." 
(ibid.: 93)" 
Anorexic women experience women's relative social powerlessness as "a 
total inability to control the environment", and "compensate" for this 
with rigid self-control. (ibid.: 94) This control of the self works 
through a sharp definition of boundaries: 
"Anorexics appear to need to separate themselves from the 
environment. They need to define their own limits and set 
boundaries around themselves. The setting of boundaries 
around the self is a difficult problem for women as they are 
at least in part regarded as an aspect of the environment of 
others ... Being very thin seems to say to the world 'I have 
sharp contours, I am not soft, I do not merge with you. I 
have nothing to give you'. A recovered anorexic vividly 
described her anorexic experience ... in terms of 'needing to 
be closed up for a while, and very small. Not receptive, not 
there for others'." 
(ibid.: 94)" 
Lawrence argues that anorexic physical self-control should be divided 
analytically into a control of weight and shape, and a control of 
intake, with the former functioning as "tangible proof" that the 
latter is working. (ibid.: 95) Self-denial, then, expressed in the 
rigorous control of appetite, is central to anorexia: 
"Anorexia is an attempt to deny appetite, to rise above 
appetite and everything which appetite implies." 
(1984: 89; see also Lawrence, 1987: 195) 
The anorexic woman fears that "her own feelings, needs and longings 
will be too much for herself and for other people to bear". (1984: 
100) 
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Anorexia is, then, a kind of asceticism. (1979: 94; 1984: 33) Lawrence 
argues that in our culture self-denial is regarded as a "'good' thing" 
for everyone, but especially for women, who are "more inherently prone 
to badness and moral weakness". <1979: 95; 1984: 18, 33-5) Anorexic 
women use "almost precisely" the methods of medieval female ascetics 
"to achieve the same ends". <1979: 96) 
The reasons why the search for control and denial is instigated 
through control of eating and the body are to be found in an 
examination of the subordinate social position of women. Firstly, food 
and eating are major female concerns, and anorexia can be viewed as an 
extension of the difficulties all women have with eating: 
"it (anorexia) is in fact at one end of a continuum of 
confused and conflicted responses which we as women have 
towards ourselves ... we do not just eat: we slim, we worry, 
we weight watch. We also spend an inordinate amount of time 
absorbed in the business of food: feeding others as well or 
instead of ourselves, shopping, cooking, and clearing-up the 
waste ... Food in our society ... is regarded as the 
responsibility of women. It is one of the few areas of life 
in which we are expected to be in control." 
<1984: 12; 18; 28; see also 1987: 12) 
Secondly, the control and manipulation of the body is also a major 
facet of female existence. Lawrence argues that appearance is central 
to women's acceptibility, and today sexual acceptibilty demands 
slimness. (1984: 33-42) Weight control, therefore, is a commonplace in 
women's lives, both in the attempt to conform to a cultural 
stereotype, and as an expression of the idea that if women experience 
problems, they should change themselves rather than their society in 
order to deal with them. (1979: 94; 1984: 21) Control of food and the 
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body is accessible to women, and because of the relative powerlessness 
inherent in women's subordinate position in society food and the body 
are two of the few areas open to female control. (1979: 100) 
The attempt to control eating and the body is, then, for Lawrence a 
method or strategy of control, chosen partly for its existing place in 
the culture of femininity and partly through lack of alternatives. But 
it is merely the method. Although "the key feature of anorexia is an 
unshakeable desire to control both food intake and weight" (1979: 94), 
for Lawrence, following Bruch: 
"in spite of outer appearances, this is not an illness 
of weight and appetite - the essential problem relates 
to inner doubts and lack of self-confidence". 
<1984: 77) 
The underlying conflict of anorexia, then - its real cause - is for 
Lawrence, as for Bruch, a conflict over independence and autonomy. 
0979: 97) At adolescence "issues about autonomy, independence and 
self-esteeem ... come to a head" <1984: 49). The anorexic girl, having 
always accepted the valued female qualities of compliance, passivity 
and unselfishness, has seen herself through others' definitions and 
lacks a clear sense of self. Thus: 
"when she reaches the 
independence and autonomy 
feel unable to cope". 
(ibid.: 65) 
point in her life at which 
are required, she is likely to 
She can neither achieve nor maintain "a sense of herself as a free and 
autonomous person". <ibid.: 66) 
Crucial in this crisis are the educational pressures which the usually 
middle-class anorexic girl faces, where pressure to do well 
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academically and subsequently in a career conflicts with the social 
pressures on women to be carers, "to find satisfaction through 
affiliation". (ibid.: 53; 1979: 201-5) (2) The conflict, then, is 
between two courses of action: pursuing individualistic success which 
is seen to involve a rejection of affiliation and femininity; or, by 
defining the self in relation to the needs of others, abandoning this 
course to become fully feminine and therefore subordinate. (1979: 204-
5) 
Anorexia is a way to step outside this conflict, and should be seen as 
"a retreat from independence". (1984: 67) The conflict is social 
rather than individual, as for Lawrence it is not the anorexic girl 
herself who is confused due to her own inadequacies, but rather the 
social world which is riven with conflicts over how adult women should 
behave. (ibid.: 74) Anorexia is thus "a disorder which springs from 
the very midst of women's experience of the world". (ibid.: 21) In 
summary, then: 
"One of the central elements in anorexia is the tendency to 
want to please and to comply with other people's 
expectations. It is when complying and pleasing others 
becomes incompatible with the demands of real maturity and 
autonomy that anorexia tends to occur. It is the failure to 
take into account the real needs of the self and to clearly 
differentiate these from the needs of others which heralds 
the onset of the rebellious symptom in the first place." 
(ibid.: 85) 
2 Lawrence argues that the middle-class bias in anorexia 
educational; it is this specific feature of middle-class 
rather than class position per se which fosters anorexia. 
1984a: 201-2) 
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is in fact 
experience 
<Lawrence, 
The anorexic girl tries to impose control - in the only way that she 
perceives to be possible - in response to conflicts and confusions 
which appear insoluble. Lawrence distinguishes the aim of anorexia -
in which the anorexic girl tries to retreat from confusion and 
conflicts between "success" <primarily educational) and dependant 
femininity and the method used to achei ve this aim, which she 
describes as the attempt, through physical and moral control 
strategies, to construct a "shell" around the self: 
"we can think of the symptoms of anorexia as a kind of 
protective outer shell. The shell is not the real person, 
but it hides and protects the real person. The important 
point is that the real self is still there, 
underneath ... using her anorexia <'Stella') ... created an 
outer shell which was strong and invulnerable. It did not 
need love, it did not need friendship, it did not need food. 
It had no connection with anyone or anything in its 
environment. It was complete and contained within itself. It 
had declared its independance." 
(ibid. : 22-3) 
Anorexia means living "within and behind the walls of your solution"; 
it is "in a real sense a 'No Entry' sign" (ibid.: 21): 
"the goal is self-sufficiency, the achievement of a steady 
state within a closed system. Nothing can change. Nothing 
must enter. " 
(ibid. : 202) 
The anorexic solution, however, cannot be permanent or total. :Most 
anorexic women eat at least something. The body can never come 
absolutely under moral control, and the anorexic woman lives with the 
constant need to increase control by decreasing intake. Lawrence 
argues thus: 
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"the road to self-respect through starvation is an endless 
one, because the goal doesn't really lie in that direction." 
(1979: 98) 
The anorexic woman is also terrified that her appetite will overwhelm 
her and that she will eat uncontrollably <ibid. : 97-9) and feels as 
though she is "in a state of siege". <1984: 19) Further, the anorexic 
process itself "gets out of hand", and instead of the woman herself 
controlling her eating, it seems to control her. One of Lawrence's 
clients described this feeling thus: ":My willpower is stronger than I 
am." <1979: 100) Lawrence writes: 
"what brings anorexics to therapy (and by this I mean a 
voluntary asking for help) is the conviction that they are 
out of control. Universally they claim that they cannot 
control what is happening to them, whether this be over-
eating, under-eating or a combination of the two. I have two 
clients (both of a religious disposition) who firmly 
believed that they were in the grip of some evil demon which 
tormented them whenever they attempted to eat." 
(ibid.: 98)" 
The anorexic strategy, put simply, does not work: 
"it is a solution which is symptomatic of the desperate 
situation it seeks to rectify. It is a solution which is 
essentially self-destructive and which seeks to substitute 
self-control for effective control of the world in which the 
woman exists." 
(ibid.: 100)" 
Criticism of :Marilyn Lawrence • s work on anorexia has to be 
distinguished from the earlier criticism of psychiatric definitions of 
anorexia. The latter, as has been shown, base their explanations of 
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anorexia on individualistic and phallocentric assumptions, arguing 
that anorexia is both explicable and curable at the individual level, 
and that the concept of the healthy, mature and psychologically 
"normal" adult is gender-neutral. I have argued that these assumptions 
are essentially ideological, and this point will be explored further 
in later chapters. 
Feminist theories of anorexia, however, are developed from a position 
which is potentially critical of these assumptions. Firstly, feminists 
seek explanations of anorexia not in the concept of the deficient 
individual, but in the social position of women as a group, arguing 
here, as elsewhere, that the personal is political. Secondly, much 
feminist work on gender roles argues that they are social 
constructions rather than eternal, biologically determined realities. 
(3) From both a sociological and a feminist perspective, therefore, my 
work shares the feminist critique of patriarchal ideology, and this 
analysis will deepen and develop, rather than undermine or reject, the 
feminist theories discussed. 
To return to Marily Lawrence's work, it should be clear that from a 
feminist and sociological perspective her analysis of anorexia 
represents a major theoretical advance. In seeing anorexia as a 
product of the. social position of women, in pointing out the 
3 For discussion on the extent to which this is the case see, i.e, 
Segal: 1987; Dworkin, 1988. 
-103-
importance of food and appearance in the female gender role, in 
questioning how far "independence" is a real possibility for women, 
and in arguing for a connection between the anorexic strategy and 
women's relative social powerlessness, Lawrence provides an effective 
explanation of anorexia as a female condition. After reading Lawrence 
we can see clearly, and for the first time, why the anorexic 
experience is meaningful almost exclusively to women. 
Nevertheless, Lawrence's work is not free from either conceptual 
confusions or the therapeutic tendency to "individualize" social 
phenomena. Although she explicitly argues for an explanation of 
anorexia grounded in analysis of the social position of women, this 
analysis remains largely undeveloped, particularly in its historical 
aspect. The feminist theoretical framework must, I would argue, be 
much more fully understood if we are to use such concepts as 
"independance", "dependance", and "powerlessness" in explaining 
anorexia. 
Further, there is a crucial ambiguity in Lawrence's acceptance of the 
social genesis of anorexia. In The Anorexic Experience she seems to 
suggest that, although it is understandable socially, anorexia is, to 
some degree at least, also explicable as individual psychological 
deficiency. The anorexic girl, not having "found a way of being in the 
world which is both comfortable and realistic", is unable to resolve 
social confusions in any more productive way. (1984: 55) The 
implication here, then, is that conflicting social expectations of 
women - to "succeed" as indi victuals and to subordinate themselves as 
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carers to the needs of others - can indeed be reconciled at the 
individual level. What is needed for women who have been unable to 
resolve these conflicts themselves is therapy which will set them on 
the way to that resolution which, we must assume, other women have 
already achieved. (1979: 100) It should of course be noted that 
Lawrence does identify critically one other "resolution" of this 
conflict giving up on individual success to concentrate on 
femininity. <1984: 54) 
Two points arise here. Firstly, as Lawrence argues <1979), anorexia is 
an attempt, however unproductive, to resolve conflicting expectations 
central in the lives of middle-class women. This view fits ill with 
her later argument that anorexia represents a "retreat" from conflicts 
over independence, a "regression" into dependance. <1984: 67) Further, 
anorexia is only one "resolution" among many, and it is important not 
to set up, albeit jmplicitly, a distinction between women along lines 
of their relative success in dealing with cultural expectations which, 
in varying degrees and in various ways, oppress us all as "members" of 
the gender-group "woman". 
Secondly extent to which individual therapeutic solutions can end 
anorexia as a social phenomenon is questionable. While therapy which 
takes seriously the political issues involved in anorexia, and allows 
the anorexic woman to retain control of her life, can be very 
effective, it treats the "effects" rather than the "cause". Therapy 
can help women as individuals come to terms with the reality of social 
powerlessness in hopefully less painful ways, but it does not attack 
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the social structure which produces that powerlessness. If we accept 
the analysis of anorexia as arising from women's position in the 
social structure , we must surely accept that therapy can help women 
who are already anorexic but cannot prevent other women becoming 
anorexic in the future. 
Furthermore, Lawrence's displacement of the anorexic method- control 
of eating - from the heart of her analysis is puzzling. While clearly 
a dependence/independence conflict lies at the heart of 
~norexic eating should not be seen simply as a "method" chosen 
because of its place in the lives of women to acheive a distinct 
"aim" . Why and how this specific " method" expresses the conflict 
between individuality and femininity are questions which will be 
central to later chapters . The relationship of "method" and "aim" 
needs to be more rigorously conceptualized. There are good reasons for 
the control of eating being "chosen" to express conflicts over 
dependance, reasons which shall be explored in later chapters . The 
argument , briefly , is that the active pursuit of self-interest and the 
satisfaction of desire are central facets of the bourgeois 
construction of the individual. In patriarchal ideology and practice, 
however , women are constructed as the passive objects of the desires 
of the masculine subject , rather than the active pursuers of their 
own desires. Feminine desire, feminine behaviour, is constructed as 
responsive to , and dependant upon , masculine action. Independant, 
unresponsive desire is expected of individuals but sanctioned in 
women, through , for example , the construction of autonomous female 
desire as dangerous , voracious and potentially overwhelming. It is 
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much more than lack of confidence which prevents women controlling 
their awn destinies. Thus independence and appetite, dependance and 
denial are inextricably linked. Indeed, it is the expression of these 
links in anorexia which excites sociological interest. 
To return to Lawrence, then; her analysis, while linking self-denial 
and gender, apprehends but fails to adequately conceptualize the links 
between individuality, desire and gender in a specifically bourgeois 
culture - the links, that is to say, between who we are, what we 
want, and what we can have. The issue of appetite in anorexia which 
Lawrence so interestingly raises in her earlier work remains 
unfortunately undeveloped in her later writings. 
We need to look at feminine appetite, then, as it is understood in 
bourgeois and patriarchal culture. The attempt to establish boundaries 
around the self, too, would benefit from a similar treatment. The 
notion of the individual as a coherent and self-contained unit is bath 
historically- and gender-specific, and is reflected in the social 
construction of the body. The pseudo gender-neutral ideology of 
individualism presents the goals of self-contained selfhood and bodily 
integrity to women as possible, while simultaneously the ideology of 
femininity creates the feminine self in response to the masculine 
self, the feminine body in relation to the masculine body, and thus 
continually undercuts any real possibility that women will achieve 
those goals. 
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The feminine body in bourgeois and patriarchal culture is understood 
as incomplete. Lawrence's argument that anorexia represents the 
construction of a psychic "shell" or boundary is thus a vital 
component in the development of theoretical connections between the 
cultural meanings of the female body and the anorexic experience. Yet 
Lawrence does not sufficiently detail either how the anorexic "shell" 
is constructed or how the social construction of the feminine body as 
open makes this construction meaningful. 
This level of argument, however, requires a specifically sociological 
perspective on personality development and on the body. From this 
point of view "personality", or "human nature", and the body are seen 
as social constructions rather than as universal givens, and thus 
incorporate the social divisions and categorizations of their era. To 
the extent that definitions of "personality" lack this perspective 
such definitions tend to be essentialist, in presenting the 
individualized self as universal, and phallocentric, in presenting the 
masculine self as gender-neutral. 
In spite of her feminist perspective Lawrence falls at least partly 
into the traps of phallocentrism and essentialism. Her description of 
the goal of treatment in anorexia seems implicitly to accept the 
individualized self as the model on which her patients should focus, 
an acceptance which seems to contain little recognition of either its 
historical or its gender specificity. 
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There is confusion in her work between the idea that the anorexic 
woman has no sense of self at all, and the idea that her "real self" 
is still there "underneath" . Further, the conflicts between 
"compliance" and "responsiveness" as gender-role requirements for 
women and the need for the patient to act according to "the real needs 
of the self", "the demands of real maturity and autonomy" <1984: 85; 
see also 1987: 203) are not theoretically resolved. Thus, the 
interaction between femininity and individualism is never directly 
addressed by Lawrence: we are shown its effects - i.e. in education 
<Lawrence, 1984a) - but must construe its nature and extent for 
ourselves. 
There is, then, an underlying ambiguity in Lawrence's view of 
individuality. Although her feminism leads her to criticise the 
effects of the female gender-role on personality, she continues to 
maintain that a "real" self exists independantly of such effects -
and, indeed, independantly of any aspect of social structure. This 
allows her to argue that recognizing the "real self" and its needs 
will solve the anorexic crisis of independance; unfortunately, it also 
allows her to ignore the extent to which self-contained individuality 
is a real possibility for women. Lawrence's long-term therapeutic aim 
is to enable the anorexic woman "to take a proper and reasonable 
control of her own life ... <and) to become an effective agent in her 
own affairs" (1984: 81), to encourage her to see that she "owns" her 
own body (ibid.: 93) and that she can act "according to internal 
rather than external demands". <1987: 203) She seems to suggest that 
women can simply "decide" - since this is what they "really are" 
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underneath to be autonomous individuals rather than dependant 
accessories. The conflicts between "individuality" and the 
constraints of the feminine gender role, however, are not soluble 
simply by adopting a different perspective, or in therapy <even 
feminist therapy) but require social change. 
At some level Lawrence does recognize this point, arguing that 
anorexia: 
"is really an attempt to hold together an identity, and to 
avoid the loss of one part of the self which growing up 
brings with it." 
<1984a: 206) 
Here she argues that during pre-puberty a girl can be both "pretty" -
that is, an acceptable female and "clever" a successful 
individual. At puberty, however, she has to choose: she hits "the 
friction-point of womanhood". (ibid.: 204) Although in her article on 
education <1984a) Lawrence implicitly presents "identity" itself as a 
social construction, elsewhere she seems to see it as universal, 
existing a priori, "under" the effects of the gender division. The 
assumption here seems to be that "underneath" the gender division we 
are all really the same, and would remain so were it not that 
different "tendencies" are "encouraged" in women and men. <1984: 49; 
53) 
The ahistoricism of Lawrence's analysis is also evident in the way she 
uses the concept of asceticism. Lawrence "lifts" the concept out of 
feudal culture and argues that anorexic women in contemporary culture 
use the same ascetic methods in pursuit of the same aims as did 
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medieval female ascetics, an argument already criticized in relation 
to the work of Bell. 
Lawrence's concept of "selfhood" remains somewhat confused. This 
confusion stems both from a committment to therapy over analysis and 
from a too uncritical acceptance of psychiatric definitions of the 
normal individual and the bourgeois and patriarchal ideology which 
creates those definitions. In spite of this confusion, however, 
Lawrence's definition of anorexia as a strategy of control, arising 
from a conflict between independence and femininity, pursued through 
the creation of a psychic "shell" is, to date, the most accurate and 
comprehensive analysis to be found in the literature. 
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Susie Orbach: mothers and daughters 2 
Susie Orbach's interest in anorexia is pre-dated by her work, both 
theoretical and practical, on "compulsive eating" in particular, and 
female psychology in general. Fat is a Feminist Issue, a bestseller, 
argues that women use body-size to express feelings which are 
otherwise inexpressible. <Orbach, 1978) Vli th Luise Eichenbaum, she 
isolates needinesss and dependancy as central issues in the psychology 
of women. (Orbach and Eichenbaum, 1983) Both aspects of her earlier 
work can be seen in her analysis of anorexia. 
In Hunger Strike, Orbach argues that anorexia consists of two 
processes: the pursuit of thinness, and the denial of emotional 
neediness. COr bach, 1986) The anorexic woman is engaged in a 
transformation of her body, the aim of which is to become thin. During 
the illness, however, the meaning of the symptom changes, and its goal 
becomes the control of eating and the body, rather than simply 
thinness. It is the loss of control which comes to terrify the 
anorexic, and Orbach argues that denial of food and bodily control are 
symbolic of the denial and control of emotional needs. Cibid.: 13-4) 
The anorexic woman "speaks with her body": 
"Her body is a statement about her and the world and her 
statement about her position in the world. Living within 
prescribed boundaries, women's bodies become the vehicle for 
a whole range of expressions that have no other medium. The 
body, offered as a woman's ticket into society ... becomes her 
mouthpiece. In her attempts to conform or reject 
contemporary ideals of femininity, she uses the weapon so 
often directed agaim:;t her. She speaks with her body." 
(ibid.: 48) 
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Anorexia, then, is a language and a protest: it expresses 
unconsciously a "solution" to problems which cannot be consciously 
articulated. (ibid.: 17) 
Orbach identifies three factors in the changing role of women in 
Western society which determine the formation of the anorexic symptom. 
In consumer society, she argues, women's bodies are "the ultimate 
commodity", and are, to women and to men, "objects of alienation, 
fascination and desire". Cibid.: 35; 37) Women's bodies and women's 
sexuality are seen "from the outside" as objects, and this has two 
effects. Firstly, the manipulation of the body-as-object in order to 
make it acceptable is a constant reality for women; and secondly, 
women cannot have "an unmediated or purely physical relation to their 
bodies". <ibid.: 361 Both manipulation of the body-as-object and a 
"mediated" relationship to the body are expressed in anorexia. 
The second factor is the post Second World War confusion over 
motherhood, where the concept of biologically destined motherhood has 
been challenged by women's increasing dissatisfaction with domesticity 
and their search for a life outside the home. (ibid.: 37-42) Orbach 
argues that for the mothers and daughters of this time confusion and 
uncertainty about what a woman should be and how mothers should behave 
was endemic; anorexia, then, in its rigid control of the body "is a 
symbolic attempt to forge a consistency where little exists, to 
provide a knowable, reliable way of being that can withstand the 
demand for change". (ibid.: 42) 
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Finally, and relatedly, the mother-daughter relationship is itself 
neccessarily ambivalent. The mother has to bring up her daughter to 
accept an inferior social position, to subsume her needs in the needs 
of others and to live a "circumscribed life", while at the same time 
wanting the best for her. (ibid.: 43) Anorexia is one way in which the 
daughter can express the ambivalent relationship to physical and 
emotional needs which she has learned from her mother. 
Needs, for Orbach, are central both in anorexia and in the development 
of a self. It is the development of a core of needs and desires, both 
emotional and physical, experienced as existing within the self which 
creates the individual as separate. The knowledge that what is felt 
inside, what is wanted and needed, is acceptable and can be 
consistently met and validated by the world outside the self/body is 
what gives the individual the sense of him/herself as a separate, 
self-contained entity, that is, "a corporeal sense of self", the sense 
of being "a physical/mental unit". (ibid.: 77; 76-88) Orbach argues: 
"the development of a corporeal sense of self is entirely 
related to the development of object relations <relations to 
others beginning with the recognition of the mother as a 
person, an object separate from oneself)". 
(ibid.: 77) 
"The capacity to experience oneself as a separate person, as 
a subject <to individuate) rests on the gratification of 
early dependancy needs." 
(ibid. : 45-6) 
The security that these needs can be satisfied readily is central to a 
sense of self; women do not have their early needs satisfied 
consistently and thus their sense of self is uncertain. (ibid.: 18) 
This inconsistency operates both emotionally and physically - girls 
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are fed less and weaned earlier - and creates confusion about the 
acceptibility of emotional and physical needs. Because her mother did 
not respond consistently to her "internal cues", the daughter 
experiences them as insatiable. Her ego does not "integrate" around 
her needs, and there is thus no "internal sense of continuity and 
security" around which the self can develop. (ibid.: 81; 108-9; 46; 
54; 91) The girl's self thus remains "embryonic". (ibid.: 109) 
She identifies three "basic demands" of femininity which undermine 
this self-development: women must defer to others, anticipate and meet 
others' needs, and seek self-definition through connection with 
another. Being successfully feminine results in "a shaky sense of 
self", where women "are unable to develop an authentic sense of their 
needs or a feeling of entitlement for their desires". (ibid.: 43) 
Women take care of others' needs and respond to others' desires but 
are fundamentally unsure and ashamed of their own desires, and thus 
find "psychosomatic unity" difficult to acheive. <ibid.: 104) 
Paradoxically, however, women must appear dependent, and thus their 
own needs "thwarted and unmet, go underground". (ibid.: 44) The mother 
transmits and the daughter receives the idea that women' s needs are 
often unacceptable, the mother failing actively to encourage the 
daughter's initiatives or adequately and consistently to meet her 
early needs. Thus, initiating action and satisfying desire remains 
fraught with difficulty for women, as does psychological separation. 
(ibid.: 45) Women "deny, ignore or suppress many needs and initiatives 
that arise internally" and because of this "grow up with a sense of 
-115-
never having received quite enough, and often feel insatiable and 
unfulfilled". (ibid.: 78) 
'When issues of separation and individuation are "re-evoked" in 
adolescence, then, "the struggle for an identity separate from the 
family is made on fairly shaky foundations". (ibid.: 46) The fact that 
in puberty her body changes in ways she cannot control "rock (s) the 
young woman's already tenuous psychic foundations" <ibid.: 47) and her 
insecurity with her self beomes transposed into an insecurity with the 
body, exacerbated by her mother's inability to convey unambigously 
the "positive aspects of female sexuality". <ibid.: 79) She seeks the 
external reassurance and control of dieting, and resolves the issue of 
unacceptable neediness through a rigid control of hunger, a 
transformation for which her early problems with eating had already 
prepared her. She denies and controls her need for food as a metaphor 
for her denial and control of a needy self. (ibid. : 48) Her aim is to 
"dissassociate herself from her body, not to be in her body or to 
exist as a non-corporeal being". The embryonic needy self/body is 
rejected, and a "false" self/body devoid of needs is projected. 
<ibid.:89) Orbach, following Winnicott, explains: 
"The self that one has put forward in the expression of need 
is implicitly rejected by the caretaker in her failure to 
respond appropriately to those needs. The psyche then 
protectively develops a more pleasing 'false self' ... devoid 
of the needs and the initiations which seemed to push the 
lll.Uch-needed caretaker away." 
(ibid.: 89) 








not had a chance to 
good, wholesome and 
essentially all right, it 
authentically experienced 
fashioned which conceals 
insescurity with regard to 
body'." 
(ibid.: 89) 
has little chance to live in an 
body. A false body is then 
the feelings of discomfort and 
the hidden or undeveloped 'inner 
Orbach argues, like Palazzoli, that the body, in object-relations 
terms, comes to represent the negative aspects of the mother-as-
object, the aspects that could not meet the child's needs, as well as 
the "bad" needs themselves. The anorexic woman's alienation from her 
body represents her alienation from both the bad object and her needs. 
But although she rejects her body, it is at the same time "all that 
she has". (ibid.: 90) 
The "unnurtured real self ... (is) split off and repressed", and the 
anorexic woman withdraws from the disappointing outer environment. 
(ibid. : 89-90) The body "has come to represent the existence and 
insistence of needs", and the emaciated anorexic body is "the tangible 
evidence ... that she has indeed done away with the unnacceptable self". 
(ibid.: 151) 
Anorexia, then, is an attempt to form a boundary around the self 
through the control of eating and the body. It substitutes for the 
boundary around the "stable core" of internal needs which would "arise 
spontaneously as a result of a smooth journey through the process of 
separation/individuation" (ibid.: 176). If those needs were 
consistently met, as they are for the non-anorexic child, whose needs, 
having been "correctly interpreted in early childhood" can be met as 
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an adult "without undue difficulty", the anorexic "solution" would not 
be needed. (ibid.: 91) Anorexia is a "so:matized solution" to the 
feelings of uncontrollable and chaotic neediness, "a much needed 
defence against the exposure of a very vulnerable nascent 1 me 1 ". 
(ibid.: 91) 
During the illness, however, the conscious denial of food is 
transformed, and food refusal becomes involuntary. <ibid.: 97) Eating 
becomes a dangerous and "illegitimate" activity, and food "a forbidden 
substance" to which the anorexic wo:man has no right. (ibid.: 99) 
Orbach explains: 
"For the anorectic wo:man there is both an active and a 
passive relationship to food. This is a complex idea. An 
originally active desire or decision not to eat or to reduce 
one's food intake soon melds into an experience in which the 
anorexic feels herself unable to eat ... the rituals and 
regulations that come to circumscribe her food intake tend 
to increase in number, gradually taking on a life of their 
own in such a way that it becomes impossible for her to 
envision eating in a spontaneous way. Thus the origical act 
of deciding consciously to intervene to reduce her eating 
becomes not so much a moment to moment act of refusal but 
rather the consequence of the labyrinth. of restrictive 
practices that in effect prevent her from eating." 
(ibid.: 100-1) 
The denial is never enough, and it is never over; its original purpose 
of thinness and acceptibility is overtaken by the struggle not to lose 
control. (ibid.: 107) Anorexia, then, is "only tangentially about 
slimness", the real function of which is to prove that denial is 
working. <ibid.: 109-110) 
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The anorexic girl hears the same social messages about the 
unacceptabilitly of female desire as do all women, but she hears them 
"in quadraphonic sound". (ibid.: 114) The individual's experience, 
Orbach argues, has "social roots", and the psychoanalytic account of 
the inner world of the anorexic woman must be read in the context of 
the sociological account of the position of all women, in which women 
are food-providers 
themselves food in 
but are at the same time expected to deny 
order to maintain a stereotypical body-image. 
Cibid.: 66-76) The anorexic "solution" depends on the central 
importance of body-image in women's experience; without this anorexia 
would not be "an appropriate response and protest". (ibid.: 66) Orbach 
argues that a woman's identity is dependant on her body, and that 
women's subjective experience of their bodies is mediated by "cultural 
factors outside themselves", by a "social overlay" of meanings and 
images. (ibid.: 70) In this, thinness is crucial, and she argues that 
the emergence of thinness as an ideal for women precisely at the time 
when women, in the second wave of public feminism, were demanding more 
public space, is no coincidence. (ibid. : 75) Bodily insecurity, then, 
is a reality for all women. 
Further, Orbach argues that in our culture, because of female 
nurturing, "the power of the mother is deeply embedded in each of our 
psychologies". (ibid.: 82) She uses Dinnerstein' s argument that men 
"reject the power of the mother through the political and 
psychological subjugation of women" to explain "the cultural 
propensity to control women's bodies". (ibid.: 83) The desire to 
control the mother denied to "the omnipotent infantile part of the 
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personality" is "somewhat assauged" by the control of women's bodies 
and female sexuality. Ci bid.: 84-5) 
Both at the psychological and the social level, therefore, what is 
needed is an acceptance of female desire as legitimate. The personal 
solution to body-image problems must go hand-in-hand with the 
extension of the scope of women's lives and the transformation of 
patriarachal social relations and the images of women they produce. 
Cibid.: 192) The anorexic woman must be helped, through therapy, to 
develop a "psychological and corporeal sense of self in which needs 
for contact, needs for hunger and other physical appetites could be 
acknowledged" and the acceptibility of their satisfaction established. 
Cibid.: 91; 134; 165) The therapist's aim is to show that desire and 
its implementation are not in themselves essentially fearful or 
negative, to provide an environment of "emotional reliability" in 
which needs get addressed and are thus seen as acceptable. (ibid.: 
170; 141). The anorexic woman will thus develop her embryonic self to 
a level at which she can satisfy her needs in a self-regulated way, 
and acheive psychosomatic unity - the experience of the body as owned 
and lived in. (ibid.: 145-53) She can then speak directly, rather than 
through her body. 
Orbach concludes: 
"The corrective emotional food then makes it possible for 
her to approach the wider environment differently as a 
potential source of self-expression and nurture. In allowing 
herself to feel and to act she reverses some of the key 
features of socialiazation towards femininity ... she becomes 
a person with legitimate desires and demands which she can 
now openly express." (ibid.: 179-80) 
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Hunger Strike is an i~~ensely valuable book. Susie Orbach's analysis is 
thoughtful, compassionate and helpful. Especially valuable is her focus 
on the issue of "needs" in anorexia: locating anorexia as an aspect of 
the social control of female desire is a significant step forward from 
the individual pathology standpoint of psychiatric ideology. The notion 
of anorexia as an attempt to create boundaries around a "self" 
experienced as fragile or absent, and of anorexia as a "two-stage" 
process, both of which, as in Lawrence's work, are central, and will 
be discussed further in later chapters. 
There remain, however, fundamental confusions in Orbach's analysis, 
which stem from her attempt to present a simultaneously psychoanalytic 
and sociological explanation. As we have seen, Orbach notes what she 
terms "the tension that exists betweeen the two modes of inquiry - the 
outside and the inside, the sociological and the psychoanalytic". 
(ibid.: 76) But if we look further we see not so much "tension" as 
irreconcilability. As Roger Gottlieb points out: 
"psychoanalytic theory takes as its goal the explanation of 
adult behaviour by reference to unconscious processes formed 
in early childhood." 
(ibid.: 105) 
A sociological understanding of psychology, on the other hand, has as 
its task the explication of "the manner by which the outer is 
reproduced in the inner, the way social structures become mental ones". 
(ibid.: 107) 
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Orbach tries to maintain the view that the "integrated ego" is the 
gender-neutral goal of psychological development in tandem with the 
feminist argument that "psychologies are gender-specific", and this 
confuses both her analysis and her therapeutic conclusions. C1986: 108; 
29) To provide a thoroughgoing feminist analysis of anorexia needs more 
than simply "adding-on" the feminist perspective to existing 
psychiatric orthodoxies. Rather, it requires that "psychology" be seen 
within a feminist perspective. 
These arguments can be pursued through three fundamental issues raised 
by Orbach's analysis of anorexia: the constraints which the therapeutic 
aim places on analysis; the issue of the social construction of 
biological "needs"; and the tension between the concepts of the social 
construction of psychology and the "universal" self. 
Analysis with a therapeutic aim can too easily disregard the symptom 
itself and its meaning in the search for "underlying causes". This is 
the main difference between the thesis presented here and Orbach's, as 
the exploration of the anorexic process in Part Three will show. 
A therapeutic aim pushes the theorist in the direction of presenting 
anorexia as "curable" on the individual level. Orbach does argue that 
political struggle as well as individual therapy is needed if the 
social structure which produces anorexia is to be changed. However, 
collective feminist action is heavily downgraded in favour of 
encouraging individual anorexic women to "accept their needs". Cibid.: 
141-157, 179-80, 192; see also Haw & Parker, 1977) While this approach 
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is both worthwhi1e and neccessary, it is a great deal more problematic 
than it appears to be here, and it is only on her last page that Orbach 
seems to recognize this. (ibid.: 192) For example, how is the ex-
anorexic woman who accepts and acts on her desires as legitimate to 
deal with a patriarchal society which emphatically does not ? In her 
"Afterword" Orbach seems to suggest that such acceptance will proceed 
"naturally" from what she calls the extension of the scope of women's 
lives (ibid.: 192), but she gives no clues as to haw this is to be 
achieved. This neatly sidesteps the reality of patriarchal power, the 
profound depth of change any feminist transformation of society would 
neccessitate, and the liklihood of resistance to such change. 
Further, although she argues that anorexia should be seen not as 
pathology but as on a continuum of attitudes to food and the body 
shared by all women she goes on to undermine this position by re-
presenting, albeit in a more understanding format, the idea, so famed 
in psychiatric ideology, of the pathology-causing mather. <ibid.: 24; 
48) In her suggestion that the therapist-as-good-mather can "undo" the 
underlying causes of anorexia by a positive presentation of female 
desire we are again working on the assumption that mothers "cause" 
anorexia, and "correct" mothering can prevent it. (ibid.: 170-9) This 
sits most uneasily with the argument that anorexia has social causes, 
and with Orbach's own criticisms of conventional psychiatric treatment 
of the anorexic woman as a moral child. (ibid. : 186) Further, this 
position seems to argue that the "legitimacy" of autonomous female 
desire can be subjectively accepted by women as individuals in a 
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patriarchal culture in which such a reappraisal is a profoundly 
political - and dangerous - act. 
As we have seen, Orbach argues that anorexic women feel a "particularly 
heightened sensi ti vi ty" to socialization in femininity - they hear the 
culture's messages "in quadraphonic sound". (ibid.: 19; 114) Further, 
the anorexic woman feels her needs more strongly. (ibid.: 142> So is 
their experience qualitatively different ? And if so, ho~ and why? Is 
this to be laid at the door of bad mothering too ? If so, how do 
feminists answer the contention that all that is needed is a return to 
good mothering ? The need for a transformation of social structure 
becomes tenuous if some - that is, non-anorexic - women can "balance" 
the tension between femininity and living independent lives. Ci bid. : 
29) We are again teetering on the brink of individual pathology 
arguments which legitimate individualistic solutions, teaching women 
how to "balance" irreconcilable social demands rather than changing 
them. 
The second issue raised is that of biological "need". In Fat is a 
Feminist Issue Orbach argues that if women were not subject to social 
pressure towards thinness they would attain a weight that was "natural" 
to them by listening to their body tell them what and how much food to 
eat. 0978) The suggestion here is that the body "knows" which foods 
and what quanti ties it needs; without social interference we could 
regulate eating and body-shape according to these internal mes~;ages. 
This idea of "natural" appetite existing outside of the social is also 
assumed in Hunger Strike. For example, Orbach argues, as we have seen, 
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seen, that because of the objectification of the female body in modern 
Western culture women cannot have "an unmediated or purely physical 
relation to their bodies" (1986: 36). She argues too that the body has 
"basic physical needs that arise quasi -independantly", needs which, if 
their "internal cues" were "correctly interpreted" in childhood would 
be unproblematic in adulthood. <ibid.: 91; 81; 91) 
What she assumes here is that without such objectification, or "wrong" 
interpretations, unmediated physicality is possible. 'We must assume 
that for men, and perhaps for properly brought-up women, this is how 
they experience their bodies. In Chapter Five the notion of the body as 
a social construction rather than a simple biological given will be 
more fully investigated, but briefly, if we look at the body 
sociologically, seeing that both social conceptualisations and 
subjective experiences of the body change historically and differ for 
different social groups, the ideas of a purely physical apprehension of 
the body, and of purely physical appetites which exist outside history 
and social structure, become questionable. <See Swartz, 1985 and 
Diamond, 1985) It is not that men have a "natural" relationship with 
their bodies and their physical "needs" and that sexism prevents women 
having the same, but that men's needs and women's needs, men's bodies 
and women's bodies, have different meanings in a patriarchal culture. 
The concept of the body as a self-contained psychosomatic unity which 
expresses itself through manipulation of the outer environment around 
its own desires is the dominant body-concept of our culture and, as one 
would expect in a patriarchal culture, is phallocentric. For women such 
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psychosomatic harmony does not exist, for the dominant body-concept co-
exists, for women, with the "sub-text" of femininity. In this, women's 
selves, as well as their bodies, are objects in the masculine 
environment, and their "boundaries" are fluid and penetrable rather 
than self-contained and invasive. This is the source both of women's 
"problems" with the body and men's "ease" with it. Arguing thus, we can 
reject the notion of a supposedly more "natural" masculine apprehension 
of physicality as well as the presentation of this natural physicality 
as the proper goal of "maturity". 
No experience of the physical is possible "outside" of social 
categorizations, definitions and imagery. The acceptance of natural, 
gender-neutral and ahistorical biological needs by Orbach is 
illustrative of the lack of sufficiency and depth of her feminist 
criticism of psychiatric ideas. It is not only psychology which is 
gender-specific; so too is the experience of physical needs. 
Finally, an unexplicated confusion between the notion of the self as a 
social construction and the idea of a "natural" self - of "human 
nature" - can be detected in Orbach's work on anorexia. Orbach argues 
that psychology is socially created; and in her discussion of the 
mother-daughter relationship she begins with the caveat that this model 
of parenting and her comments on it are "time and culturally specific". 
(1986: 42: 58) 
This historical and sociological focus, however, simply does not go far 
enough it is added on to rather than integrated with the 
-126-
psychoanalytic slant of her work. It seems that it is only feliiale 
psychology which is truly a social creation - the masculine self 
remains the invisible and unanalysed standard against which the 
"problems" of the insecure female self are measured, and the goal 
towards which therapy is directed. Orbach argues that the "individual 
psyche absorbs and interprets cultural values" and implies, therefore, 
that the psyche, at least in "embryonic" form as "the truncated person" 
exists outside of culture, which effects the self but does not 
construct it. (ibid.: 128; 130) She sees the concept of a self 
organized around a core of needs and desires which it satisfies through 
exploitation of "the facilitating environment" as both gender-neutral 
and ahistorical and, thus, a desirable goal. This is what the anorexic 
woman - and all women - would be if their "psychosomatic devlopment" 
were not "stunted". (ibid.: 148) 
A sociological perspective, however, would suggest that this conception 
of the self, and the related conception of the body, is far from the 
"natural" result of "correct" psychological development. If we argue 
that the self-contained self is explicable only in the context of 
bourgeois individualism in which the "individual" is masculine and the 
environment is there to be used and manipulated, we can see that women 
cannot simply decide to attain this form of subjectivity, since one of 
the conditions of its existence is the construction of a receptive 
female psychology and body-concept as its "opposite". Women are part of 
the "facilitating environment" as objects through which the masculine 
subject expresses itself. Women do not, as Orbach argues, "deny" 
selfhood; rather, it is denied them by patriarchal social relations. 
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The anorexic ritual, in attempting to create the body as an 
impenetrable barrier through control of intake is a response and a 
resistance to those relations. 
Women's receptive psychology is not, then, a result of "incorrect" 
development but is a result of the social control of women in 
patriarchal culture. And in focusing so heavily on the mother-daughter 
relationship, Orbach "psychologizes" and domesticates the social 
control of women, using much the same arguments as Chernin, albeit in 
more sophisticated form. Personality is not created in one 
relationship, but through all social relations. There is little point 
in replacing the isolated oedipal triangle floating in unsocialized 
ether with an equally isolated mother-daughter dyad. <See De leuze and 
Guattari, 1977; Gottlieb, 1984) It is not just mothers who do not meet 
daughters' needs appropriately; rather, those "needs" are socially 
unacceptable and threaten patriarchal order. 
Anorexia, and feminine psychology in general, is better analysed fully 
sociologically. The idea of a mechanical transmission of culture by the 
mother is partial, an abstraction which can too easily be seen as the 
only reality. Other relationships with women, and, crucially, the 
effect of relations with men in general, and the institution of 
heterosexuality in particular can all too easily disappear. Orbach 
concentrates on mothers' socialization of daughters' into a denial of 
desire but does not consider sufficiently why such denial is neccessary 
and how it is maintained outside of the mother-daughter relationship. 
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As Gottlieb points out, infantile experience - in Orbach's case, the 
experience of the mother-daughter relationship - "takes its social 
meaning from its place in an overall system of social relations". 
(ibid.: 111) He argues: 
"the experience of a child up to age two or three would be a 
great deal less important were it not reinforced throughout 
the rest of his or her life." 
(ibid.: 116) 
Mothering, then, is "at most ... part of the process by which male 
domination reproduces itself", rather than "the primary cause of 
patriarchy". (ibid.: 11'7; 94) 
Orbach accepts too readily the psychiatric frame of reference, and 
fails to take the feminist critique of gender-roles far enough. Both 
these features of Orbach's thesis obscure what is otherwise valuable in 
her work. 
The work of Orbach and Lawrence - and, to a lesser extent, Chernin -
represents a major theoretical advance on the psychiatric definition 
of anorexia as individual pathology. All three writers define anorexia 
as a cultural phenomenon, and point to continuities, in their 
relationships to food and the body, between anorexic and non-anorexic 
women. Further, the concepts of desire and dependence which appeared so 
obliquely in the work of Crisp et al are given a more prominent 
position and subjected to a more rigorous analysis by Orbach and 
Lawrence. 
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This theoretical advance is, however, partial, and is hampered by an 
incomplete acceptance of the social construction of the self and the 
body and, consequently, of the place of the gender-division in 
physicality and subjectivity. Vlithout a sociological analysis of the 
construction of desire and the body as gendered within a specific 
cultural context the anorexic symptom canmake only partial sense. Such 
an analysis will be pursued in Part Three. 
The theoretical issues involved in a sociological analysis of anorexia 
are, however, complex, and are more easily grasped if we have some idea 
of how anorexic women themselves perceive their bodies, their appetites 
and their illness. The following chapter, then, offers an initial 
investigation of these issues. 
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Part Two 
Chapter Four: Anorexic meanings 
Lucy is now eighteen. She was anorexic for one year between the ages 
of fifteen and sixteen, and now considers herself recovered. Her 
background is middle-class. 
"I suppose it started around January/February 1985, and it got 
gradually worse through the whole year... It happened when I was 
fifteen, sixteen, you know, and it was a real crucial time as far as 
school was concerned, right in the middle of my 0-Levels. I mean I sat 
through my 0-Levels weighing about five stone, and I managed to get 
seven A's and a B, you know, I just can't understand how ... ! gave my 
school a shock, because I was sitting my 0-Levels looking like nothing 
on earth basically ... ! just wanted to be thinner and it just got out 
of hand. 
I went on a diet, you see, and well it just went too far ... It's a very 
fine balance and if you go too far you really aren't responsible for 
what you're doing, you lose control ... I started to eat sort of less, 
sort of cut down to a certain level, and as I managed - because, you 
see, as you eat less and less your stomach actually shrinks and so 
eventually, if you're persistent enough, what you do eat makes you 
feel full, so you think, oh, I ought to eat less, and you just go on 
like that ... because your stomach does shrink. I mean when I went in 
Cto hospital) my stomach was about the size of a walnut. 
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Initially when I went on the diet, I mean it was a success, it worked 
and I thought, hey, this is brilliant ... I would have a piece of toast 
for breakfast, and to begin with I had sort of a sandwich and fruit 
for lunch, but then eventually I cut out the sandwich, and then when I 
got home from school, I would have something like a boiled egg and a 
piece of bread, something like that, baked beans on toast, something 
that would be classified as pretty light, but that would be it really, 
apart from perhaps - I used to have hot milk before I went to bed, but 
that would be it really ... that was in the week days, during the week I 
was in school, so that was moulded round the school day, but at the 
weekends I tended to eat a bit more, I used to eat with the family, 
sort of Sunday roasts and things like that, and that was at the 
beginning. I just started to eat less of everything. 
Sweets were the first to go, and chocolate I suppose. After that for a 
long while it was just sort of small amounts of everything ... I was 
eating tiny bits, right up until about the day before I went into 
hospital, but the weight was just falling off ... I mean at home, we eat 
very - healthily, is that the word ? I just sort of had little bits of 
everything - I remember once mum cutting up sausage into tiny little 
bits so that I could eat it, I was just like a little baby ... I'd try 
and get a bit of porridge down me for breakfast, with some milk and 
some brown sugar on, something like that. I don't know how much, it's 
very blurred ... Sort of bits of bread with Marmite on- I had glucose, 
you know that powdered glucose you can get ? Sort of stir that into a 
drink, lemon squash or something ... If I could avoid it I would, but if 
my mother approached me with the drink, I wouldn't say- well, in the 
-132-
last day I probably would have said no, but generally I took it 
because I knew it was right, I mean I'm not thick, I was just ill ... To 
begin with I ate on my own, so that no-one would see how little I was 
eating, but eventually my parents wised to it and realised that I 
wasn't eating much at all, and I ate with them ... you lie, you don't 
mean to but you just do. 
Once I'd eaten I'd feel really full, because my stomach was so small, 
but I wouldn't start to get hysterical about it, really. I would 
sometimes get a bit upset, because I felt so full - because nobody 
likes feeling bloated and full, and my parents couldn't understand how 
I could feel bloated and full on half a sausage and a mouthful of 
potato and 3 peas, but I really did. I mean I don't know whether I was 
full, but my mind was telling me I was over, and my mind was so locked 
in that it convinced me. 
I wanted to be a dancer, and I wanted to lose weight ... it was because 
of the dancing, I was prancing around in a leotard which shows 
everything anyway ... so I did, I lost about half a stone and it looked 
really nice, I looked really good, it was great, I mean I lost it off 
my thighs and my bottom and it was just right and I should have 
stopped just there, because I wasn't anywhere near anorexic at that 
point, I looked fine, but 
something, I just don't know. 
I don't know what made me go on, 
I never used laxatives, I never used diuretics either, I just stopped 
eating ... early on in the diet, I would feel really good ... I would have 
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a preconceived idea of what I would have in the day, and some days I 
would be so hungry, I was hungry to begin with, not eating so much, 
Cand) some days I did have an extra piece of bread or something like 
that and think it was the end of the world ... I was starving, I really 
was hungry, but I just had so much will, I'm a very willful person and 
I just had so much willpower I just fought it all the time until it 
went, and it did, it did eventually. 
It was a struggle, it was like a sort of internal struggle, I knew 
that I should have been eating, but again there was this other force, 
mind, whatever you want to call it that was telling me, no, I don't 
need it, and eventually the thing telling me mot to eat it, the thing 
inside me saying not to eat, took over completely, sort of blocked out 
any sense of reasoning at all ... I did try to <start eating), but half-
heartedly, I was too entrenched in it really, too engulfed by the 
whole sort of - it just overtook me. I mean once I'd - I did make a 
few attemtps at trying to <and) I found I just couldn't, and that was 
the beginning of the realization that I needed some help, to suddenly 
find that I couldn't do what I wanted, because this was the essence of 
it for me really, that I was doing what I wanted and I felt in 
control ... but when I wanted to eat more again, I couldn't, and that 
upset me, because I want to be able to do what I want, I like to feel 
that I can, but I couldn't, and it was quite upsetting. 
Throughout the whole Ctime), especially in the last few weeks I was at 
home before I went into hospital I was continually being told, look at 
what you're doing to yourself, you're killing yourself, and I ignored 
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it, really, because I was so ill ... It surprises me how long it took to 
connect that I had it. I remember someone saying to me once, before I 
got really bad, gosh, you've lost a lot of weight, better watch it, 
you'll go anorexic, and I remember saying, oh, what a joke ... It took 
me a long time to realise that I had it, because part of the illness 
is to try and ignore the fact that you are ill and carry on, no matter 
how thin or light you become. I didn't actually start admitting that I 
needed some help until I was pretty ill, you know. It took a long 
time ... But then towards the end I began to feel -you can sort of 
block it off, it's like if you have a bad cold, you can carry on, and 
ignore it, and just carry on and go out and do whatever you're doing-
that's what I was doing with the anorexia, but eventually I just 
became so ill that I couldn't ignore it in the end. I remember lying 
in bed, I think it was the night before I went into hospital and I 
just felt so ill . . it hurt to lie in bed because my bones were sticking 
out - just the most awful feeling ... At that point I realised I needed 
help, and I didn't really want to die. Because I was, I was dying. 
I couldn't eat, I just couldn't eat. I got to a point where I wanted 
to, actually, because I knew I was ill, and I wanted to - I just 
couldn't, I can't explain it, I just couldn't ... I felt very out of 
control, because the weight was just dropping off me ... Alright, you 
did start it, but once you get past a certain point, it is 
uncontrollable, and you aren't responsible for your own actions." 
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"I went down to about four-and-a-half <stones) which was just not on, 
you can't cope with it at home, when you're that weight, so I had to 
go to hospital ... I just lost so much weight that I had to go into 
hospital to have it put back on ... about early July C1985) I went into 
hospital for four months ... it was my decision. I went to the hospital, 
the physician examined me, and my parents came too. He spoke to me all 
the time, he di dn' t really talk to my parents, but my parents were 
there at that point. He said you're very ill and you need to come into 
hospital and you can either come in here, and he described what he was 
going to do if I came in, put me an a nasal-gastric tube, blah blah 
blah, or I could go back home, and if I went back home I would have 
been put in a psychiatric hospital. I didn't really think of it, you 
know, 'I don't want to go to a psychiatric hospital' -I was just so 
weak at that time, I just didn't want to go any where else, I just 
wanted to stay in that hospital, I didn't want to go anywhere, so I 
just said, I'll stay here. 
He explained exactly what was going to happen if I came in ... he said, 
we'll tell you everything that happens, what we're doing, but you must 
do as we say, as far as the drip is concerned. But as far as eating is 
concerned, he said, you can eat as much or as little as you want. If I 
didn't eat anything then they'd just put me on a full-strength drip 
all the time, and if I did eat, and put on weight they would gradually 
reduce the drip because I would be able to manage by myself. 
Vlhen I was first admitted, I cauldn' t eat at all, so I had a nasal-
gastric tube and I was drip fed with highly concentrated stuff, but it 
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was diluted to begin with, a quarter strength, then gradually it was 
half strength and then full strength. And then as I got stronger the 
amount was increased, and then as I put on weight the amount was 
decreased, because as I put on weight I began to feel I could manage 
to eat again. So first of all I had the drip, because I was totally 
dependant on it, but then as I managed to eat mare I could have my 
drip fluid reduced. But I had my drip throughout the whale time I was 
in hospital really, apart from the last week. 
At first I was pretty relieved actually Cta have the drip). But I did 
get frustrated because - I was still ill, I was still ill in my mind 
when I came out of hospital, I still, you know, thought I was fat ... 
Because I've got to understand that I was very weak and I wasn't 
aware, and as I put on weight it was like waking up, it was like 
coming out of a deep sleep, well not a deep sleep - everything was a 
bit blurred, <and) still remains a bit difficult to remember ... 
When I was in hospital I used to feel - all the old ladies or other 
people in the ward would say, what's wrong with her ? , you know, 
because I was so thin, cheekbones were out to here, bones were out 
everywhere really, and the drip was down me ... They'd find out some way 
or other - well, perhaps they wouldn't find out, but I felt threatened 
- hunching over what I was trying to eat, and getting as far back in 
my chair near the wall as possible so no-one would see ... 
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There was this one old lady on the other side of the ward and she was 
talking to one of the others in a loud voice, going on about this girl 
on the other side of the ward, going through my whole sort of eating, 
what I'd eaten that day and I just felt - that destroyed me for a 
couple of days, when my parents next came in to see me I was in 
tears ... 
Another thing I had to do in hospital was write down how much I ate. 
So when the consultant came round - he used to come round three times 
a week- he used to look and see ... 
'When I started to eat in hospital, I started on porridge, and soup, 
and that was it. It was pushed forward by the nurses to a certain 
extent, pushing forward things that were - easy to get down, you 
know ... I mean you don't have to chew them, do you? ... <they) weren't 
too sort of frightening, because food frightened me. Every time - you 
know these big metal food trolleys ? - every time they came into the 
ward in the first two weeks I used to just burst into tears, it just 
caused me so much stress and upset. So it was soup and porridge to 
begin with, then sandwiches with the crust cut off, that sort of 
thing. I mean, you really go back to being a little baby. That's the 
way I tackled it. 
Of course I got frustrated. I remember bursting into tears once just 
after I'd had my tea on the ward, 'I've eaten too much, I've eaten too 
much', and the nurse would say, of course you haven't, and would 
calmly get this chart out and show me that I was well below average 
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weight and that I really ought to eat a bit more anyway. <That was) 
reason coming back into it ... 
When I reached about six stone I was sent to a psychiatrist ... once a 
week I would ... have a chat with him. At first I hated him ... he was 
trying to get me to realise why I'd done it, and I didn't like that at 
all. And I felt he was sort of probing into my personal life, you 
know, he was asking me about my family and everything and I didn't 
like it at all. But there again, you see, I was ill, I was 
hypersensitive to those sort of questions. But eventually, you know -
we parted the best of friends. 
One of the great boosts for me actually in my recovery was to get my 
0-Level results, because I suddenly realised, hey, I've done something 
good. Because I remember the doctor came round the day the results 
came out and said to me of course you realise that you've probably 
failed them all ... when I told the doctors they were really amazed. It 
was just brilliant, and it gave me quite a bit of a buck up, it was 
really good. 
The first really good thing about it was that I wasn't in a 
psychiatric ward ... I went into this general medical ward which was 
much better - I mean I • ve no experience of a psychai tric ward, but 
just from reading about other people's experiences, it sounds 
horrific. 
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At the beginning the nurses wrote down what I was eating, and then I 
took over myself because they began to trust me, I suppose. Again, I 
was pretty unusual in there because I didn't become very devious, or -
I mean I know a lot of anorexics do, and are throwing food away, but I 
tried to be honest, and eventually I was doing my own drip as well, 
getting the cartons out of the fridge and filling it up ... 
It was acute, but it wasn't chronic, I was a lot more receptive to the 
treatment and didn't want to fight it, I was just very lucky." 
"I did improve a bit in hospital, I mean I had to, otherwise if I 
hadn't I would have left hospital and just stopped eating again. When 
I left hospital I was sufficiently well enough to realise that I had 
to eat ... I considered it <not eating), but I knew that it was just, it 
wasn't on. 
Xy reaction to coming out of hospital was gosh I'm so glad to come out 
of hospital I'm going to really try and eat enough to keep myself out 
of hospital and to persevere. When I came out of hospital it wasn't 
uphill all the way, I've got to admit, I did lose quite a bit of 
weight but not so much as to put me back in. I nearly did but not 
quite ... It was quite a threat to me for a while. 
I was ill in my mind, yes, when I came out of hospital it was a 
constant battle with reason and my sick mind, because my sick mind was 
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saying you don't need to eat, you don't need food, and my - reason 
would come back and would say to me, of course you must, because you 
can't survive without food. 
It was quite strange actually because my mind seemed to heal or get 
better as I was losing weight after I was out. I still can't 
understand it now. It was very strange - I think it was just down to 
stress and the different environment, coming from hospital. .. when I 
came out and was walking around a bit more active and going to school 
I lost a bit of weight, I ate about the same but I still lost it, 
because if you increase your activity level then you're going to, but 
the problem was that I didn't have any appetite, so I had no incentive 
to eat any more to compensate, but eventually my goodness it came." 
When Lucy came out of hospital she was very concerned with eating 
"normal" portions and eating what "normal" people ate but what was a 
normal portion on the plate looked enormous and she continually had to 
get reassurance from her parents that it was a normal portion. If she 
was helping herself to rice or potatoes, they would sometimes tell her 
that a normal portion was really a bit more, but at first she just 
couldn't bring herself to eat any more. 
"It took a long time, when I came out of hospital it was still an 
effort, and I didn't feel hungry for lii.Onths afterwards, months and 
months and months. 
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Well, it was strange, I used to have meals, have decent meals, you 
know, and not feel any different from when I went to the table to when 
I left it. And then I would get - eventually I did get periods of 
hunger, real hunger, and that used to be a bit frightening in a way, 
because I hadn't had them for so long. I used to- I didn't panic, but 
I felt a bit insecure really. 
It wasn't until I started to recover or try to put on weight that I 
started to feel revulsions against certain foods. I felt that it was 
wrong to eat some things. 
Once I was recovering, it took me a long time to get round to meat 
again, a long time, and then when I actually did, it was minced meat 
because it was easier to get down ... and it took me even longer to get 
round to puddings and things. 
It happened sa slowly. I mean you don't wake up one day and think, I 
like food, it happens sa slowly that you don't realise it's happening 
until suddenly you realise - suddenly you just think, oh good, it's 
suppertime, and suddenly you think, gosh, I just said good, it's 
suppertime. It's like training yourself again ... becoming anorexic is 
losing one of the basic functions, animal functions, animal instincts 
of being hungry, and this is why I think it's something physical that 
must trigger it, because it's a basic innate response, isn't it, 
inborn, and you actually train yourself out of it, and training 
yourself back into it is very hard. This is why some people die, 
because they just haven't the willpower to train themselves back- OK, 
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you need willpower to become anorexic, but you need about a hundred 
times more to come out of it again ... Only you can do it, you see. They 
can't do it for you. You have to want to do it as well. 
I didn't want to go back into hospital and I didn't want to become so 
ill again, because I had my school-work to get on with, and I began to 
realise that life wasn't that bad after all, and it was worth living. 
I still want to put on some weight ... I haven't had any periods 
yet ... I'm a bit worried about the fact that I haven't had a period 
since February 1985 ... They'll just come back eventually because I will 
put on weight, I know it will happen, but again you see it's really 
slow, and you just have to be patient with yourself. The slower it 
happens, the more likely the weight will stay on. If I go out with the 
specific aim of putting on, I don't know, half a stone, it'll be a lot 
harder than just letting it happen. 
I mean that's what I really want to happen, and once that happens then 
I'll know that I am categorically, definitely, fundamentally normal 
weight, you know, and that'll be it. And I know there won't be any 
real danger of me - well, I suppose I really ought to keep a check on 
it, there is the theory that once you have anorexia you'll never be 
the same again, and all that sort of stuff, but I don't think I'll 
ever slip back again, I really don't. I honestly feel that. 
It wasn't a very pleasant experience, but I learnt an awful lot about 
myself, and about other people, and about life in general, from it. CI 
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learnt) that I'm not perfect, that I do have some sort of contribution 
to make to the world. I mean, the whole thing of becoming anorexic is 
due to lack of self-esteem, I feel, because you don't like yourself 
very much, you want to destroy yourself, and you have to like yourself 
to keep yourself going. I mean you go through periods of thinking, 
gosh, I'm an awful person, but generally the other side wins through 
and you do carry on, but with anorexia you think that you're awful, 
and you're not worth anything to anybody ... (it's) setting yourself 
such high standards that they're just impossible to attain, which is 
why it happens to a lot of high-achieving people who seem to have 
everything going for them. 
I like food in general now, I mean I feel I'm totally cured - I think 
I've made an amazing recovery ... CI eat) whatever I feel like really. 
I mean I'm a fairly simple case to a certain extent." 
Lucy describes herself as a "simple case"; certainly her experience of 
anorexia neatly fits the stereotype of the anorexic woman as an over-
achieving middle-class teenage dieter who "goes too far". Her 
experience also, however, encapsulates the core meanings of anorexia. 
In the rest of this chapter I will compare Lucy's description of her 
anorexic experience and her explanations of it with those of other 
women whose illnesses do not fit the stereotype so neatly. Here I hope 
to show that although every woman's experience of anorexia is shaped 
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by her own personal biography, we can identify a set of core 
experiences and feelings whi•::h exist for all anorexic women. 
This definition of anorexia, then, centres around the meanings which 
women ascribe to being anorexic, and the central processes which all 
anorexic women go through, Focusing on core experiences and meaninp;s 
better describes anorexia than ;:;_ stereotype which "excludes" many 
women's circumstances and tends to tri vialise anorexia as teenap;e 
girls' excess. In this chapter an analysis of the meaninp;s throup;h 
which anorexic women make <partial) sense of the illness will be 
attempted. These meanings can be conceptualised by the linked terms 
need and desire, power and p;e:;s.ure, guilt and failure. Further, the 
limits of anorexic explanations will be shmm - most anorexic women 
say that although they can Iike suggestions. and can point to 
experiences which they feel an:: impot"tant in discussing why they 
became anorexic, ultimately they are themselves mystified about what 
their anorexia actually means, and how it can be explained. 
The task of Part Three, then, will be to analyse how experience which 
is mystifying on the individual level is meaningful on the social 
level. A sociological and feminist account of how women's bodies are 
constructed through culture - the meanings and practices which are 
central here sheds new light on the anorexic experience. This 
chapter will show how anorexic women describe and explain their 
struggle with appetite; subsequent chapters will argue that the 
anorexic struggle has social resonances in the cultural control of 
feminine desire, and will take up anew the issues of desire, power and 
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self-discipline. In the final chapters a detailed analysis of anorexic 
practices will be undertaken. 
Christine is now twenty-five; she beca:me anorexic SlX years ago when, 
in a way she cannot underst.arsdt' a ~post-holi(1a~<; cliet t1rr:ned into 
anorexia. Although she has recovered, she would still describe herself 
as anorexic in some important wa~3~ 
"I • m cured of the worst parts of it in as much as it doe:=n' t 
control my life, and I do e.at. and I am a healthy weig-ht, 
and have my periods back and that - but it's always at the 
back of your head, it's always there." 
Christine identifies the sense of pride and and achievement as central 
in her anorexia: 
"I didn • t have a problem. t!€•::au:E.e I wa::;:; 1Jappy. 1:!€cause I was 
thin and I was happy ... Everybody obviously felt sorry for 
me, because everybody else knew what was wrong, but I 
thought I was terrific ... You don't feel ill, you feel 
terrific, you feel really wonderfuL You've got energy, the 
adrenalin just flows, and t11e less you eat the better you 
feel." 
On days when she ate almost nothing, she felt: 
"fantastic. It felt absolutely brilliant days like that, 
that's when you had your most energy, that's when you could 
have run a mile, swum a mile, done ev·erything, that's when 
you felt best. The less you ate the better you felt." 
Vhat made her feel so great was her ability to resist food: 
"Sometimes people would co~nt; like so:rneti:rnes you'd be out 
at a social event, or at a friend's, and out would come the 
cakes and buns, and they'd all be sitting there eatinR two 
sandwiches and a biscuit and I'd be there with my black 
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coffee and they'd go, 'Oh you're great, I wish .I was like 
you, I wish I could say no, but I just can't resist it'. And 
I'd go, 'Oh that's great, other people have noticed how 
wonderful I am, that I can resist it, and they can't.'" 
Her standards were very high: 
"I was only ever proud of myself when I'd gone for long days 
and done millions of things and hardly eaten. Nothing to be 
really proud about, but nothing else matters except not 
eating, achieving not eating. And specially if you'd done 
millions of things that day as well, because you had used up 
millions of energy which means you actually knew it was 
coming off- what was already there." 
The satisfaction of denial was continually threatened by hunger. 
Christine always felt hungry: "you do, you deny the most amazing 
hunger. You'd be starved out of your brain, but you wouldn't eat". 
However, "sometimes I got myself so hungry that I did have to eat, I 
just bad to eat." Failing to resist brought dire consequences: 
"Before you were desperately trying to resist it - that was 
the main thing - resist it, overcome, willpower - you had to 
have willpower to fight it and control it. And when you did 
give in, you felt very bad- it had been a struggle and you 
lost - you felt guilty that you had given in to it, and you 
felt awful about yourself, that you didn't have the strength 
of character or willpower to resist - some little bit of 
food ... I thought if I ever had to eat normally I would just 
blow up like a balloon, that I couldn't stop, that once I 
did start I couldn't stop, that was the main thing. So I had 
to not start ... If I'd eat one biscuit, I • d eat the whole 
packet of biscuits ... <I can't) eat one, say that was nice, 
and put it down. " 
Resisting food is a never-ending cycle; it can never be secure, the 
anorexic woman can't rest on her laurels because the standard of 
denial spirals ever downward: 
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"You just always feel depressed because no matter how thin 
you get it's not thin enough, and even when I was like going 
down to about 6 stone, I still felt I was fat." 
Linda was diagnosed anorexic at eleven, and between the ages of eleven 
and thirteen she was hospitalized for anorexia three times. She is now 
twenty-five; since her first anorexic episode she feels that she has 
never been in control of her eating, and she has moved between 
"compulsive" eating and anorexia ever since: 
always being "on the fringes of anorexia ... whenever I start 
to lose weight I want to carry on losing weight - I want to 
capitalise on it." 
At the moment, she is: 
"on the slide downwards again ... the way I feel about food 
just now is largely controlling me." 
Linda feels intensely ambivalent about her anorexia; does she control 
it or does it control her ? Of her initial experience of anorexia, she 
says: 
"It was like my decision, or - but then again it wasn't my 
decision, because again, probably with all anorexics, things 
get out of hand, and then you can't really help your 
behaviour, it's just - it rolls on and rolls on and before 
you're really aware of what you're doing ... it's too late, 
and you just can't help yourself." 
During her first hospitalization she was able to exert a measure of 
control over her eating: 
"There came a point in my first hospital stay, I don't 
remember when, there came a point when I gave in ... and I 
started to eat all the meals - fully, not enjoying them at 
all and always it was an ordeal ... I hated being in 
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hospital, and it was my passport out ... I used to look 
forward to getting out of hospital ... because then it 
wouldn't be three meals a day and I had to sit down and eat 
them. Then I could please myself." 
She came out of hospital, immediately stopped eating and soon lost so 
:much weight that her doctor sent her back in. She was powerless to 
prevent this recurring a second and a third time: 
"By that stage, as I think any anorexic would understand, 
you're not in control, you can't make decisions, no matter 
how :much you want to. I didn't like being in hospital, I 
didn't like it at all. And no matter how much you want to 
stave off something that's really bad your anorexia's in 
control of you, you're not in control of it ... It takes over 
and nothing, nothing can stop it." 
At the time of the interview, Linda's ambivalent feelings about 
anorexia were at the forefront of her mind: on the one hand, it gives 
her a sense of control and power; on the other, she feels, it 
controls her, and this embarasses and distresses her. She is unable to 
fit her anorexia into her concept of herself as a person: 
"I'm quite a strong person, I like people and I like life, 
and I am in the grips of something I don't want to be in the 
grips of, and I'm embarrassed about that, and when I think 
about it, in sort of dispassionate moments, it's such a 
trivial thing, it's such an unimportant thing, really, food, 
to have such a control over your life and your lifestyle. I 
mean I do understand that, I do understand that it is a 
total nonsense for me to be so uptight about food and what 
I'm eating, and to think about it so much, it's a total 
nonsense. But having said that, to try and stop doing it is 
totally impossible for me." 
There are "good" things about being anorexic: 
"Now my feelings are sometimes positive feelings. 
Certainly I'm powerful in that I'm in control, it is a 
control thing, and it's me that's controlling it, my eating 
and my limit and all the rest, it's me in control of that 
and maybe in the end ... it's about the only damn thing that 
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you can be in control of in your life ... I do feel good at 
the control that I have, I feel good when I get to the end 
of the day and I • m at my limit, or I'm below my limit ... in a 
lot of ways this is a crutch for me, I depend on it, it's a 
control, it's a way of controlling things, it's a 
power .. . all I can say is that there's something good about 
being this thin." 
But at the same time anorexia is profoundly disempowering: 
"To me it's a question of the chicken and the egg thing, in 
so many ways my food compulsion is controlling me . •• I've got 
such ambivalent feelings towards it, I hate it, but at the 
same time, I don't want to give it up because I know, if I 
tried to give it up, if I try, if I do break out and eat 
something, I'm totally miserable ... I would be lost ... just 
the fact that you have relinquished control and let this 
'full feeling' happen. I feel again that I've relinquished 
the control that I had over my body ... you can't control 
anything else, you can't control other people, you can 
control your own body." 
Vanessa became anorexic at thirteen, but she feels that her illness 
only became serious at the age of seventeen. Although she has always 
hoped for that "miracle cure", at the age of twenty-nine she feels 
that she is in many ways anorexic still. 
The central feeling for Vanessa was ~: 
"I couldn't eat - if I ate I felt guilty. I did feel hungry, 
but if I ate I felt guilty .... it was this guilt that made me 
not eat, not the desire to lose weight. I didn't have this 
driving overwhelming desire to lose weight. I couldn't eat 
because I felt guilty." 
She discovered that she was anorexic when she read a "true life story" 
in the "Jackie" about a girl: 
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"who felt guilty when she ate and I said to my mum that's 
the way I feel. Because I couldn't put into words the 
terrible way I felt when I ate anything." 
At first she could cope with these feelings, but this changed when she 
was seventeen; she remembers one particular occasion: 
"I watched what I ate all the time. I hardly ate sweets or 
anything. I never ate cakes. And this night I didn't feel 
hungry and I didn't think I • d have any tea. But I ate an 
orange, and I felt really guilty after I'd eaten this 
orange. So I went and made myself sick. But I'd been making 
myself sick since I was fourteen, now and again. Once in a 
while I'd think, that was too much, I've eaten too much and 
I felt that bad about it, this terrible, terrible guilt if I 
felt I'd eaten too much I'd go and make myself sick ... I just 
would feel the compulsion to make myself sick and I'd feel 
better afterwards. But this night it was a driving, 
overwhelming guilt to make myself sick, I had to make myself 
sick." 
She was distressed by the effect her anorexia had on her family, and 
tried to eat, but quite simply could not: "it was awful hard to sit 
and see them all crying, and begging me to eat." When hospitalization 
was first suggested her family thought that this threat would be 
enough to make her eat: 
"I went to bed and my Aunt Mary came up and said, will you 
not eat now ? And I said Aunt Mary I can't. They thought 
that that would be enough and I would promise, but I just 
couldn't." 
Xedical intervention changed her behaviour to a certain extent. After 
her first hospitalization she was treated as an out-patient on a 
weekly basis; the appointments were on Vednesdays: 
"I used to go on the Wednesday, so from the Vednesday to the 
Saturday I hardly ate a thing, and then on the Sunday I 
would kind of buck my ideas up a bit and try and eat a bit 
for the Wednesday. I'd come out of there on the Wednesday 
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and feel as though I 1 d done my bit for the week, and I 
deserved to have like a rest- a reprieve." 
Eating was always an activity fraught with anxiety and guilt; 
starvation was preferable: 
"It was much easier for me not eating ... I felt more in 
control when I didn't eat, as if I was managing my life 
better ... I felt in control, I could do what other people 
couldn't ... I liked feeling empty ... I hated having food 
inside me, I always associated not having food with feeling 
lli.rul and ~· " 
Vhat was absolutely crucial was res~nsibility; did she choose to eat 
or did she have to ? In the hospital although eating was an ordeal: 
"The guilt wasn't so bad because I felt they were making me 
eat. So I felt OK about that, because someone was always 
watching me when I ate ... I couldn't eat unless I was told to 
eat ... I was glad they didn 1 t leave me alone, because there 
were a couple of times they did leave me alone and I didn't 
hide the food and I felt so guilty. I remember getting 
hysterical on Saturday afternoon because the nurse left me 
alone with soup and I ate the soup. " 
The real distinction was between food eaten for pleasure and food 
eaten because it was needed: 
"I remember I had this desire for somebody to show me how 
the body worked, and to show me that the body did need food, 
because I didn 1 t seem to be convinced it did need food. I 
used to think that it could go without food, and I wanted 
somebody to show me the systems of the body and how it 
really needed food." 
Anna is thirty-eight; she became bulimic at thirty, and for the past 
three years has swung between anorexia and bulimia. Her eating, she 
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feels: "consumes your whole life, it's not just a part of your life, 
it is your whole life". 
Anna identifies two kinds of pressure on her. Firstly, she feels that 
other people's behaviour impinges on her behaviour. She worries about 
her family worrying about her, "plus I was under pressure from them to 
eat . .. the conversation would revolve around trying to get me to eat, 
and I found that a great pressure". In a recent relationship with a 
man whom she had told about her eating he was "very very protective 
and to me was becoming like my personal jailor, and protecting me from 
myself ... I felt trapped, I felt caged-up and that ... control was being 
taken away from me." 
But the main pressure on her self-control comes from within, from 
appetite. Anna distinguishes between hunger and the pre-binge urge -
you don't have to be hungry to binge: it is: 
a "compulsion", an "addiction", a "lust for food": "nothing 
will stop you, nothing, you're like (a) wild animal". 
The point is not simply to control the binge, but to control the 
"temptation to do it": 
you think "I must stop this now, because if I do it again 
I'm not going to control it ever again, it'll take control 
of me and hold on to me far ... life". 
Afterwards the shame is dreadful: "self-disgust and recriminations". 
Being caught in a binge: 
"is as though you had been caught in murder", you feel "so 
guilty, so terribly guilty, I'd nearly faint with guilt at 
having been caught"; "the depression afterwards is 
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absolutely - it really is nightmarish, and I think if you 
have suicidal tendencies, that's when you'll do it." 
She can't eat the food she really likes - "forbidden food" - because 
if she ate one biscuit, one square of chocolate, she'd eat them all: 
"it's like one drink to an alcoholic". Alcohol itself is out - "it 
would weaken my resolve" - that is, the resolve not to eat. When her 
resolve holds, she feels in control; the less she eats the more in 
control she feels. Trying to control her bulimia - increasing her 
control by eating progressively less - is Anna's explanation of how 
she became anorexic: "inside every bulimic is an anorexic fighting to 
get out". 
She eats as little as she possibly can and then she feels proud, in 
control and "more at peace". She feels that anorexia means that she is 
controlling food, while bulimia means that food is controlling her. If 
she eats a strictly planned and controlled amount of food because she 
knows she needs some nourishment to live, that is acceptable; if she 
eats because she's hungry that means loss of control: 
"I think that the central word is control. When you are in 
control, everything else around is - the quality of your 
life feels much better when you're in control of whatever 
eating disorder you have. Whether it's anorexia, you're 
starving yourself, you're in control over it, you're happy. 
When it's bulimia, you're not hinging, you're in control 
over it, you're happier ... when you're not in control ... you 
hide away, you become a recluse, and your whole life is 
centred on this, trying to gain control, and in doing so, 
trying to control that, I feel I cannot control other parts 
of my life, and I feel awful. When I am in control I am 
walking a tightrope without a net - when I binge, I fall off 
and there's no safety net there. And I feel everything else 
just disintegrates round about me, my whole life 
disintegrates round about me, my work, my personal 
relations, everything falls to pieces." 
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Dierdre would describe herself as a bulimic; she is now twenty-five 
and was thirteen when her bulimia started, although she would not, at 
that age, have called it bulimia: "I just knew that there was 
something wrong with the way I looked at food." She doesn't understand 
"at all" why she became bulimic, and feels totally at a loss to 
control or end it. 
She identifies three distinct stages in her eating behaviour: the 
binge, starving herself after the binge to "make up" for what she's 
eaten during it, and eating "normally" in between the binge and starve 
cycle. The main feelings which characterize the three stages are 
guilt and shame when she's binging, control and recompense when she's 
starving, and a partial control coupled with dread of the next binge 
in between: 
"You go through stages of being fine for a couple of weeks, 
and then I go and have a real bad binge, and that puts me 
down and I think well what's the point in even trying, I'm 
just going to slip back." 
Christmas and Easter are particularly difficult times: 
"Well I fall down like at Easter, people buy me Easter eggs, 
and at Christmas, and birthdays, and meals out for different 
celebrations, I fall down then. I mean Christmas is 
absolutely hopeless, you get boxes of chocolates, and if 
I've got four boxes of chocolates I would eat them all in 
the one go, I just couldn't keep them. And if I've a packet 
of biscuits, I've got to eat the whole packet, I can't just 
eat, you know, two." 
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During a binge, she does "disgusting things" and thinks, "oh, you 
horrible person". She eats in secret, and although she would consider 
telling close friends about her illness, the idea of anyone seeing her 
binging, or seeing "the results ... two chocolate cakes and three tins 
of beans missing that were there ... an hour ago", is insupportable. 
The central feelings of the binge are self-hatred and disgust: 
"I hate my body, I hate myself for being so weak and going 
out and buying five bags of chips and eating them, I can't 
be stronger and resist ... I don't need these five bags of 
chips, I'm well fed, I'm healthy, I've got extra weight I 
could lose, I mean - I just hate, hate my body for a start, 
and hate myself for giving in to it, and wish I was stronger 
and could control it." 
But she cannot control it: 
"I just sort of - have an urge . .. oh, I've got to have 
this ... it's not hunger, it's just an urge." 
The urge to get food is stronger than her willpower, her eating is in 
control of her. She's decided "so many times" to stop and "then just 
slipped back." 
So Dierdre recognizes that she cannot control her bulimia, and sees it 
as in control of her; in spite of this, she blames herself for 
"slipping back", and after a binge she eats nothing at all for a 
certain length of time: 
"I would work out how much I'd had, and I'd say well maybe 
that's, maybe a day and a half's worth of food, so I'll 
starve for a day and a half, and cancel it out that way" 
When starving she feels good, that she is at least partially in 
control: 
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"And the longer I can starve the mare chuffed with myself I 
can feel, cos then I feel in control, whereas when I'm 
hinging I feel, ah, you've got no control, you're a useless 
person. When I'm starving I feel great, I feel that I'm on 
top of myself." 
She envies anorexic women: 
"it's to do with the control, they've got more control, they 
can starve for a long time and get as thin as they want." 
So for Dierdre eating is a secret cycle of discipline and strength -
getting "on top of" her appetite - and chaos and weakness - "slipping 
back"; a cycle which she feels is out of her control but still her 
responsibility. The "urge" to eat is overwhelming, irresistable, and 
"disgusting" in its effects. It is part of her and yet not part of 
her. Except for the tenuous periods of "normality", eating veers 
between all and nothing; between the virtue of starvation and the 
shame of appetite. 
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Part Three 
Chapter Five: The sociology of the body 
In earlier chapters it was argued that anorexia is best understood as 
an attempt to articulate, at the level of the body, contradictory 
cultural expectations of women, and that anorexia must, therefore, be 
analysed in the context of bodily meanings. The ways in which we 
perceive the self and the body, the meanings through which we 
understand them, are culturally constructed, and thus historical. 
Further, historical concepts of the self and the body contain within 
them the central categorizations of their culture. 
In this chapter, then, the argument that our perceptions of the body 
are imbued with social meaning will be pursued. After outlining the 
fundamental ideas of the sociology of the body, detailed historical 
examples of "body-concepts" will be analysed, showing the ways in 
which social structure and body-concepts interact. Of central 
significance for this thesis, of course, will be the construction of 
the body as gendered. 
The main task of the chapter will be to examine the constrasts between 
feudal and capitalist conceptualisations of the body. A dominant 
feudal body-concept, and a dominant bourgeois body-concept can be 
analytically isolated and shown to reflect the categories of feudal 
and bourgeois culture. However, resistance to cultural definitions can 
also be found at the level of the body, and this chapter will also 
explore haw "alternative" body-concepts work with and transform 
dominant bodily meanings. 
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The first historical example, then, will be what could be termed the 
"official" feudal body-concept, in which the ancient notion of the 
four humours is combined with medieval Christianity. This 
understanding of the body will be contrasted with the oppositional 
concept of the body which can be found in medieval popular culture. 
I will then go on to look at the "high bourgeois" concept of the body, 
focusing on Barker-Benfield's analysis of the male body as a 
"spermatic economy" and the female body as the terrain of 
gynaecological exploration. <Barker-Benfield, 1973; 1976) 
Finally, contemporary perceptions of the body wi 11 be analysed. The 
concept of the body used in the feminist and psychiatric analyses of 
anorexia which formed the subject matter of the second and third 
chapters will be taken up again, and their somewhat oblique discussion 
of the body will be expanded by a consideration of phenomenological 
writings on the body, sociobiological understandings, and the ideas 
about the body which we can discover in the "fitness boom" of the 
1980's. 
The meaning of the body in different cultures has formed, of course, a 
central element in much anthropological work. In spite of this, 
theoretical work on the sociology of the body is, to say the least, 
thin on the ground. Ted Polhemus argues that Hertz and ~ were the 
first to emphasize "the relationship of the physical body and the 
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'social body' of society". <Polhemus, 1978: 9; see also :Mauss, 1935 & 
1973; Hertz, 1960) The relationship of the body and society has only 
recently begun to interest sociologists again. 
The sociology of the body suggests that we cannot understand the body 
outside of culture, and thus contradicts common-sense understandings 
in which our knowledge of the body is seen to arise directly and 
uncomplicatedly from its physical reality. As Parveen ~ points 
out, in this perspective the body is "a given entity and follows the 
laws (of anatomy and physiology); our bodily experience is the 
perception of this pre-given entity". <Adams, 1986: 28-9) Thus, 
knowledge of the body varies only with the sophistication of medical 
technique. 
As Adams argues with Beverly ~. in common-sense: 
"the body is represented as being 
structure, practice or discourse, 
registered by making the body natural 
<Brown & Adams, 1979: 36) 
outside any existing 
Cas) an externality 
or pre-social." 
They point out, however, that "nature" can only be defined in relation 
to the social, as "that which is non-social", II the other of an 
already existing social". (ibid.: 37; 40) 
Our understandings of "nature", then, including our understandings of 
the body, depend on an opposition between nature and culture which is 
itself social. The sociology of the body suggests that our perception 
of the body is "filtered through" the structures of knowledge which 
categorize social life in a particular culture. Knowledge, including 
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knowledge of the body, is mediated through ideology, rather than being 
a direct description of an independantly existing reality. 
In The techniques of the body Mauss argued that the body could be 
properly understood only through a "physio-psycho-sociological" 
analysis which studies the body from the three separate perspectives 
of sociology, physiology and psychology. Each one of these 
perspectives used alone gives "dubious explanations" which need "the 
collaboration of two neighbouring sciences". <Nauss, 1973: 77; 73; 85) 
Following this approach, Polhemus calls for the "integration" of 
physiological, psychological and sociological work on the body, so 
that knowledge of each "level ... of experience" can inform the others. 
<Polhemus, 1978: 9) Accepting that the body must be understood 
socially, however, does not, for Polhemus, mean that we must "deny the 
reality of its electro-mechanical- chemical physicality and its 
psychological individuality"; sociological understanding of the body 
is an addition to, rather than a substitute for, physiological and 
psychological understandings. (ibid.: 21) He argues: 
"the human body does not exist and is not understandable 
apart from 'the social construction of reality'. Our bodies 
and our perception of them constitute an important part of 
our socio-cultural heritage. They are not simply objects 
which we inherit at birth, but are socialized <enculturated) 
throughout life and this process of collectively sanctioned 
bodily modification may serve as an important instrument for 
our socialization Cencul turation) in a more general sense. 
That is, in learning to have a body, we also begin to learn 
about our 'social body' -our society." 
(ibid. : 21) 
Polhemus hopes, then, to lay the foundations for analyses of the body 
which operate at a more general, theoretical level, and point:3 to the 
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work of the anthropologist :M:ary Douglas as one such example. (ibid.: 
9-10) Mary Douglas argues that the body is a metaphor or image of 
society, an image whose "main scope is to express the relation of the 
individual to the group" <Douglas, 1971: 389; 387) She writes: 
"The body is a model which can stand for any bounded system. 
Its boundaries can represent any boundaries which are 
threatened or precarious ... We cannot possibly interpret 
rituals concerning excreta, breast milk, saliva and the rest 
unless we are prepared to see in the body a symbol of 
society, and to see the powers and dangers credited to 
social structure reproduced in small on the human body." 
<Douglas, 1966: 115) 
The most comprehensive wholly sociological treatment of the body, 
however, is BryanS. Turner's The body and society, which is the first 
piece of sociology to focus directly on the body-as-concept. <Turner, 
1984; see also 1982) Turner argues that sociology's entirely 
legitimate preoccupation with the rejection of sociobiology has 
"submerged" the body as an object of analysis in sociology. <Turner, 
1984: 31) Such a rejection should be no more than a first step; what 
is needed is analysis of how we understand the body as social 
phenomenon. Turner attempts to use the work of Foucault to provide the 
general outline of this next step. He argues that the body is both a 
material organism and a metaphor. (ibid.: 8) He argues, following 
Marx, that : 
"nature constitutes a limit on human agency, since, as part 
of a natural environment, we are subject to growth and 
decay ... this limiting boundary is of course both uncertain 
and flexible, because the limits on human 'natural' capacity 
constantly change." 
(ibid.: 204; 229; 241) 
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The body, then, is both "social" and "natural". Turner argues that 
:Marx saw nature as an independent, objective reality, but as a 
reality which is transformed through human labour. The concept of 
"nature", like all concepts, is for M:arxists social, and as such "can 
only be grasped in a specific socio-historical context". (ibid.: 241) 
Turner is thus arguing against the perspective which would see the 
body as entirely constructed by ideology/ in discourse. He argues that 
this would ignore what he terms "embodiment" - that is, the personal 
sensuous experience of physicality - through which personal control 
of the body-as-environment or "corporeal government" is developed, and 
which, he argues, is "the phenomenological basis of individuality". 
(ibid.: 233; 245; 251) The body is thus, for Turner, both socially 
mediated and individually perceived. (ibid.: 251) 
Although Turner suggests some level of direct individual perception of 
physicality, he argues that our cultural understandings of the body 
are dependent on social structure. Biology, then, is for Turner a 
socially mediated classificatory system by which bodily experience is 
organised, rather than an "unmediated reality": biological "facts" 
exist through classification. Ci bid.: 29) He writes: 
"Human agents live their sensuous, sexual experience via the 
categories of a discourse of desire which is dominant in 
given societies ... (and which) is ultimately determined by 
the economic requirements of the mode of production." 
(ibid.: 14) 
Similarly, biological "needs", seen in bourgeois society as "natural" 
and grounded in the "natural" body, are nonetheless "thoroughly 
penetrated and consi ti tuted by culture", their nature, context and 
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timing being subject to symbolic interpretation and social regulation. 
(ibid.: 27; 39) Human biological presence "is socially constructed and 
constituted by communal practices"; "biology and physiology are 
themselves classificatory systems which organise and systematise human 
experience, and they are, therefore, features of culture not nature". 
(ibid.; 246) 
Here Turner follows and amplifies Foucault's argument that the body is 
an object of power. (ibid. : 35) In Discipline and punish, Foucault 
argues: 
"The classical age discovered the body as object and target 
of power ... the docile body ... <which> may be subjected, used, 
transformed and improved." 
<Foucault, 1979: 136) 
Turner argues that Foucault's work can be used to point to the 
historicity of the body. Power is commonly seen to repress desire, 
which therefore exists outside of it. For Foucault, however, power is 
constructive desire is created by power. Sexuality in modern 
societies is continually produced, reproduced and examined in, 
specifically, medical and psychiatric discourse:3. Desire, then, is the 
product of specific historical discourses rather than "a unified 
phenomenon". <Turner, 1984: 48) Turner argue:3 that the same can be 
said of the body, but suggests that in spite of his perspective on 
desire, Foucault appears to see the body as "a unified, concrete 
aspect of human history", a view at odds with his treatment of 
sexuality and desire and with the argument that the body is 
constructed in discourse. <ibid.: 48) 
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Turner, then, chases to follow what Foucault says rather than what he 
does. He argues against the notion that culture represses 
independently existing bodily needs - that there is a conflict between 
<rational) civilization and (irrational) physical needs and desires -
and for an understanding of the body developed along the lines of 
Foucault's concept of desire. The body for Turner, then, is also 
created through discourses of power, and is created in order to be 
controlled. (ibid.: 61-4; 83; 214) The body is a metaphor of society, 
and, consequently, illness and disease are metaphors of structural 
crisis. Social inequalities, Turner argues, "are fought out at the 
level of a micro-politics of deviance and desire". (ibid.: 114) 
The body, then, is for Turner "both a natural phenomenon and a social 
product", a cultural construct as well as a biological entity. 
(ibid.: 232). This perspective allows us to investigate and analyse 
the meanings contained in body concepts, whether dominant or 
oppositional, in our own and other cultures, and thus provides a basic 
structure for sociological analyses of particular historical body 
concepts. (1) 
Turner's notion of embodiment as "corporeal government" - the argument 
that our sense of being in control of our individual bodies is the 
basis of individuality - cannot, however, be uncritically accepted. 
While I would accept that the body exists objectively as well as 
1 Using Turner's framework does not, of course, force one to reach his 
conclusions, and I am especially critical of his arguments on 
patriarchy (ibid.: 120-156) and their conclusion that differentiation 
of bodies by gender is becoming increasingly irrelevant. (ibid.: 29) 
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symbolically, it is questionable whether the distinction between 
"natural", or individually perceived, and "cultural", or socially 
structured sensuous experience is quite so easily drawn as Turner 
supposes. His argument here seems to have something in common with 
Polhemus' suggestion, following Mauss, that the body has analytically 
discrete physiological, psychological and social "levels". 
It seems somewhat contradictory to argue that our perception of 
"personal" sensuous experience is not as much a product of culture as 
any other apprehension of the meaning of physicality, or to argue that 
physiological or psychological experience of the body can be 
understood outside of knowledge which is socially produced. Turner 
himself points out that phenomenological possesssion of the body 
through embodiment does not always entail ownership, especially for 
women, and points out that women can experience their bodies as alien. 
(ibid.: 233-4) Turner here undercuts his own concept of embodiment, 
demonstrating that "corporeal government" depends as much on cultural 
as on biological presuppositions. It is questionable whether any 
"direct" - that is, socially unmediated physical experience is 
possible. This is not to suggest, of course, that the body does not 
physically, biologically or objectively exist: rather, all knowledge 
of, ideas about, and feelings in that "objective reality" are 
constructed in ideology. This is what I understand Brown and Adams to 
be suggesting. 
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It is from this perspective on the sociology of the body, and bearing 
in mind this difference with Polhemus and Turner, that the historical 
examples of body-concepts in the remainer of the chapter proceeds. 
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Medieval concepts of the body 
How was the body understood in medieval culture ? This question can be 
discussed in two parts: firstly in terms of the "offical version", in 
which the body fits into a rigidly classified cosmology, organised 
around the dichotomy of soul and flesh; and secondly in terms of the 
oppositional body-concept of popular, or carnival culture, described 
brilliantly by Bakhtin, in which the body is celebrated as open, 
dynamic and regenerative. 
Bakhtin argues that "official" feudal culture "is founded on the 
principle of an immovable and unchanging hierarchy in which the higher 
and the lower never merge", and in which "hard, well-established lines 
are drawn between all phenomena". CBakhtin, 1968: 16~; 433) Within 
this rigid system of categorizations, it was the doctrine of the four 
humours which provided the immediate framework through which the body 
was understood. The four humours - black bile, phlegm, yellow bile and 
blood were held, as Klibansky, Saxl and Panqfsky explain, to 
correspond to "the cosmic elements and to the divisions of time; they 
controlled the whole existence and behaviour of mankind, and, 
according to the manner in which they were combined, determined the 
character of the individual". <Klibansky, Saxl & Panofsky, 1964: 3; 1) 
This schema, Klibansky et al argue, remained in force, with ~ as 
its outstanding proponent, for more than two thousand years, virtually 
unchanged from its ancient beginnings through the Middle Ages up to 
the Renaissance. (ibid.: 10; 48; 88) 
-168-
The doctrine of the humours formed the basis of physiology and later 
of psychology. It was based on a cosmology in which basic elements or 
qualities were identified, qualities through which "the complex and 
apparently irrational structure of both macrocosm and microcosm could 
be directly traced" (ibid.: 4; 3). At every level- cosmos, body, mind 
and soul - four basic elements could be identified. For example, the 
four elements of the cosmos were earth, air, fire and water, and for 
the soul, intellect, understanding, opinion and perception. 
Equilibrium of the four qualities was essential "to any value, moral, 
aesthetic or hygenicN. <ibid.: 4) 
In bodily terms: 
"each of these four elements had to be interpreted in terms 
of a quality which established, as it were, an apparent link 
between the original elements and the corresponding 
components of the human body, which could not, in their 
empirical actuality, be regarded as pure earth, pure water, 
and so on... certain real substances which appeared to 
correspond to those elements and qualities had to be found 
in the human body, for only then could the speculations of 
natural philosophy be reconciled with the empirical evidence 
of medicine and physiology." 
(ibid.: 5) 
Ve can trace the development of the doctrine of the humours from its 
ancient origins to the more complex form which, when viewed through 
the prism of Christian theology. Empedocles had described the human 
body as a simple combination of earth, air, fire and water, a 
categorization which was first was modified by Philistion, head of the 
Sicilian school of medicine. Philistion argued that each element 
possessed a corresponding "quality" - respectively, dryness, cold, 
heat and moisture. This new method led to many more differentiations, 
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of quality as well as quantity, and allowed a categorization which v<as 
freed from direct elemental linkage while still retaining strict 
correspondences. (ibid.: 7) In Of the Nature of Man, attributed to 
Hippocrates or Polybus, and written no later than 400 B.C., the system 
was developed thus: 
Season Qualities 
Blood Spring Warm and moist 
Yellow bile Summer Warm and dry 
Black bile Autumn Cold and dry 
Phlegm Winter Cold and moist 
Each humour, then, was described by an elemental relationship between 
two quali ti tes, and each was dominant in the body in a different 
season. The humours were the "surplus" left over after food had been 
converted by the digestion - what was indigestble. Blood, of course, 
did not fit this description of a surplus humour. The theory of the 
humours, in fact, depended on "two quite arbitrary assumptions" - the 
inclusion of blood in the system, and the distinction of the bile, 
previously seen either as one single fluid or split into numerous 
categories, into two types, yellow and black. (ibid.: 9· 
' 
8) Each 
humour was situated in a different part of the body - the brain, the 
heart, the navel and the phallus, and had its own means of exit - nose 
<blood), ears Cyello'r'i bile), mouth <phlegm) and eyes Cblack bile). 
(ibid.: 4; 58) 
Further, each season was :matched to one of the four ages of :man -
boyhood, youth, maturity and old age. Thus were connected the 
elements, the seasons, the ages of man, the four bodily humours, and 
-170-
also physical types, for, "heat made a man tall, cold short, moisture 
fat and dryness thin" <ibid.: 57; 10). 
Health was understood as the absolutely right combination in the body 
of the four humours. Since each humour was held to be dominant in a 
specific season, and since the absolutely heal thy man who was never 
ill at all was very hard to locate, perfect humoural balance was seen 
as an ideal which was hardly ever realised. Most people had more of 
one humour than perfect harmony required, and were thus predisposed to 
the specific illnesses which "their" humour caused. In Isidore of 
Seville's phrase, "the healthy are governed by these four humours, and 
the sick suffer from them." <ibid.: 12) 
The melancholy temperament, for example, related to black bile, and to 
air, and thus flatulence and stomach disorders were caused by black 
bile. The melancholy person was also said by Aristotle to be lustful: 
"For the sexual act is connected with the generation of air, 
as is shown by the fact that the virile organ quickly 
increases from a small size by inflation. Even before they 
are capable of emitting semen, boys approaching puberty 
already find a certain pleasure in rubbing their sexual 
organs from wantonness, the manifest reason being that the 
air escapes through the passage through which the fluid 
flows later on. Also the effusion and impetus of the semen 
in sexual intercourse is clearly due to propulsion by air ... 
That they contain air is obvious in some cases; for most 
melancholy persons have firm flesh and their veins stand 
out, the reason being the abundance not of blood but of 
air." 
Aristotle, Problem XXX,1 (ibid.: 22) 
Klibansky et al. argue that "what had of old been symptoms of illness 
came gradually to be regarded, at first unconsciously, as types of 
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disposition". The descriptions choleric, phlegmatic, sanguine and 
melancholy could mean "either pathological states or constitutional 
aptitudes", and came to describe character types. (ibid.: 12; 10-19) 
Klibansky et al. refer to the work of William of Conches in arguing 
that it was in conjunction with Christian dogma that the idea of 
temperaments being determined by the humours was revived after the 
twelfth century: "we might well speak of a revival of the ancient 
characterological doctrine within the framework of Christian moral 
theology". Ci bid. : 106) 
In William of Conches' Philosophia the doctrine of the humours was 
incorporated into Christian cosmology. He argued that when the waters 
receded from the earth after the Flood, moisture, fire, earth and air 
"prevailed" in different places and thus the substances which created 
the animals arose. This resulted in the differentiation of, for 
example, choleric animals like the pig, from melancholic animals like 
the ox and the ass. It was only when the elements were equally 
proportioned that man could be created. In the Fall, however, man lost 
his perfect balance, "through the privations imposed on him by life 
outside paradise". (ibid.: 103; 102) The animals could be melancholy, 
choleric or phlegmatic, but not sanguine; man, originally sanguine, 
had due to his corruption degenerated into the melancholy, the 
choleric and the phlegmatic. Cibid.: 105) 
This presentation of the doctrine of the humours, Klibansky et al. 
argue, served a double purpose: 
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"first to trace the variety and inequality of men back to 
the Fall, which destroyed the original perfection and unity; 
secondly, to establish and account for the inalienable 
nobility of hu:man nature." 
(ibid.: 106) 
The doctrine of the humours was thus fitted into Christain cosmology, 
and became "part of the common stock of knowledge", although the 
"popularization" of the doctrine, which took place in the fourteenth 
and fifteenth centuries, emphasized the link with diseases particular 
to each type, and how to avoid them. (ibid.: 113 
The dominant or official concept of the body in medieval culture 
relied on a rigid system of categorizations. All of nature was 
contained within the one system, and the revival of the ancient 
doctrine of the humours through the framework of Christian ideology 
gave to that cosmology its moral tone. Through the doctrine of the 
humours the body fitted into a sche:ma in which everything had its 
place. As Southern argues, "Christian medieval theology explained the 
purpose and place of :man in the universe through its description of 
the cosmos"; Bakhtin sees this description as a "narrow, vertical, 
extra temporal model of the world, with its absolute top and bottom, 
its system of ascents and descents". <Southern, 1970: 22; Bakhtin, 
1968: 405) The correspondences between this cosmological system and 
the feudal social structure in which ascriptive social positions from 
the king downward were fixed and immutable is clear. Power, like 
temperament both physical and moral, was fixed, unchanging and based 
on God's order and the order of the cosmos. As Gurevich argues, 
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"social categories ... are ... tied up with, intertwined with, the cosmic 
categories in the closest possible way": 
"Theology represented the highest generalisation of medieval 
man • s social behaviour; it provided a general semiological 
system in terms of which the members of feudal society 
apprehended themselves and saw their world motivated and 
explained." It explained "the irreducible contrasts of 
wealth and poverty, dominion and subjugation, freedom and 
bondage, privilege and deprivation". 
<Gurevich, 1985: 14; 9; 10) 
Further, medieval Christianity offered the eventual spiritual 
transcendence of worldly ills; as well as explaining feudal social 
structure, then, it provided "its sanction, its justification and 
sanctification": 
"the earthly feudal system is an isomorph of the hierarchy 
of God's creatures and the ranks of the angels." 
(ibid.: 10; 70) 
The doctrine of temperaments took on a moral character in its 
Christian revival - the melancholic, choleric and phlegmatic being 
corruptions of the originally sanguine. While all phenomena in the 
universe were understood as having fixed places in a single structure, 
the structure of nature was itself defined through a fundamental 
division between "the earthly world and the supernatural world" which 
Gurevich describes as "the ineluctable opposition between the sublime 
and the base". (ibid.: 6) Gurevich argues that the perception of all 
types of natural phenomena as similarly constituted - the "belief in 
the unity of the universe", "the inseparability of its various 
spheres", the idea of "the microcosm" as "a replica of the macrocosm" 
- coexisted with the fundamental constrasts "of eternal and temporal, 
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sacred and sinful, soul and body, heavenly and earthly" in the 
medieval Christian worldview. Cibid.: 9-10; 13) 
Here, Gurevich argues, we: 
"have to take into account the changes which the concept of 
'cosmos' underwent in its transition from the ancient world 
to the world of the Middle Ages. Antiquity saw the world as 
complete and harmonious; medieval man saw it as dualistic." 
(ibid.: 58) 
In this opposition the body, after the Fall, was fundamentally 
corrupted, linked with the world rather than with heaven. Thus, the 
body was seen in Christian theology as the prison of the soul, the 
symbol, as it were, of earthly corruption. 
Turner argues that in medieval Christianity the body was seen as the 
seat of unreason, passion and desire, and thus as the cause of sin. 
<Turner, 1984: 36; 13) The flesh was symbolic of the moral corruption 
which threatened the feudal order, and was to be controlled by ascetic 
techniques, in which diet and abstinence were basic elements of "a 
regimen for the control of desires". (ibid.: 166; 36) The aim of 
ascetic regimes, then, was "to liberate the soul from the cloying 
distractions of desire". (ibid.: 216) 
There was no firm line drawn between sin and disease at this time, and 
RJ Moore argues that an imbalance of humours not only caused illness 
but was simultaneously a manifestation of sin. Diseases, then, 
"could ... be classified according to the sins of which they were the 
bodily expression". <Moore, 1976: 4) Leprosy, for example, was seen as 
the bodily manifestation of heresy; Moore quotes Rhabanus Maurus: 
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"Lepra est doctrina haereticorum falsa atque varia ... leprosi 
sunt haeretici Dominum Jhesum Christum blasphemantes." 
(ibid. : 4) 
:M:oore points out that "the comparison of heresy and disease provided 
not simply a casual or convenient metaphor, but a comprehensive and 
systematic model", a coherent system of understanding in which "heresy 
was to the soul what leprosy was to the body". <ibid.: 9; 11) 
The body and the soul, then, were intimately linked, the state of one 
being mirrored in the condition of the other. The best conditions for 
the soul were realized in monastic asceticism, in which the world and 
the pleasures of the flesh were renounced. <Brooke, 1978: 81) Ascetic 
rules liberated the soul for prayer, being, in Leyser's term 
"structures for piety". <Leyser, 1984: 3) These best conditions, of 
course, were only realisable for the few, who laboured in their 
ascetic withdrawal from the world as "spiritual soldiers" on behalf of 
the many. <Southern, 1970: 224) As Southern points out: 
"the main centres of religious life in medieval Europe 
were communi ties specially endowed and set apart for the 
full, lifelong and irrevocable practice of the Christian 
life at a level of excellence judged to be impossible 
outside such a community. The :members of these bodies were 
known as viri religiosi: they were 'the religious' in 
contrast to all other men whether secular or clerical." 
(ibid. : 214) 
Monastic withdrawal from the world was based on the idea that life in 
the world could not be holy. Although since the Fall the perfect life 
could not be lived anywhere, the next best thing was the monastic life 
of discipline, prayer and self-abnegation.The world was "either 
meaningless or filled with evil" but the monasteries were "replicas of 
heaven on earth" (ibid.: 31; 28; 341>: 
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"they were institutions designed to stem the tide of change. 
the idea of a changeless society forever enshrined within 
the fleeting shadows of the world was written into their 
title-deeds and discipline ... they were snatching a small 
portion from the world of meaningless change to make it a 
replica of eternity. Outside there was visible aimless flux; 
within, the image of invisible immutability." 
(ibid.: 28-9) 
Within the monastery the rule was all, the individual nothing. As in 
the feudal order as a whole, every man had his station and was defined 
by it; spiritual perfection was to be sought through communal 
discipline and acceptance of the cosmic hierarchy. <ibid.: 33; 43; 
231) 
Withdrawal from the world was effected through (usually) poverty, 
chasitity and diet. Money, sex and food were therefore of the world, 
and Leyser tells us that although prohibitions varied, fats, meat and 
wine were often forbidden. Rules for fasting again varied; fasting 
could mean eating one meal a day, or eating only bread, salt and 
water. <Leyser, 1984: 66) Some Orders were also more scrupulous than 
others in the imitation of the holy poverty of Christ. 
But although wealth and overindulgence in food, drink and physical 
comfort as a whale were renounced, from the feminist viewpoint the 
proscriptions on sex are the most interesting, for it becomes clear 
here that the meaning of "the flesh" is highly gender-differentiated. 
While all flesh, regardless of gender, imprisons the saul, female 
flesh more profoundly imprisons the female soul. Further, female flesh 
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also endangers the male soul, since women and sexual pleasure are 
substantially the same thing. 
Fo;r St. Bernard "every woman was a threat to his chastity ... he saw 
vast and nameless dangers in ... <the) ... easy association of men and 
women". <Southern, 1970: 314) St. Francis warned against "the snares 
of female companionship" and in his "Life" it is claimed that he never 
looked a woman in the face. <Brooke & Brooke, 1978: 282) Women, ~ 
argues, were seen as "the instruments of temptation of the flesh", 
being more wicked and more lustful than men. <Smith, 1978: 177; see 
also Thompson, 1978: 227; Southern, 1970: 311) Sheila Rowbotham writes 
of "a repeated male complaint about the sexual insatiability of 
women." <Rowbotham, 1977: 7) And Eileen Power argues, St. Paul's 
conception of women as the "instrument of the Devil" was embedded in 
monastic ethics, philosophy and ascetic regimens. Women were "the 
greatest of all obstacles in the way of salvation", "the gate of 




The sins of the flesh, then, were seen to reside principally not in 
male desire but in the female body, and male salvation depended on the 
removal of the object of temptation. Female salvation, unable to rely 
on this tactic, was a little more complicated. On the ideological 
level the Virgin Mary existed as an alternative ideal for women, an 
ideal which women could to some extent use to counter their innate 
evil and materiality. <Power, 1973: 10) However, the monastic life 
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depended on wealth and status, and was thus even less available for 
women than for men. Further, as Power argues: 
":Monasticism may have offered a refuge for some women; but 
the refuge merely sealed the degradation of women in general 
by confining full approbation to those who withdrew 
themselves from the world. 11 
(ibid.: 16) 
Those who could withdraw from the world were aristocratic women. 
(Southern, 1970: 310) And these "cloistered virgins11 , Hamilton argues, 
removed themselves from the world "as objects of temptation for men11 • 
<Hamilton, 1978: 52) 
These economic and ideological constraints on the religious life for 
women did not, however, prevent women trying to withdraw from the 
world. The Cistercian Order especially attracted women, and in 12th 
century Europe there was an expansion of Cistercian nunneries 
established under the patronage of individual men. This expansion, 
Southern tells us, took place 11 Wi thout the slightest notice being 
taken of it in the official acts of the Cistercian Order11 and the 
nunneries had no formal position in the Order's structure. <Southern, 
1970: 315) Thompson points out that the Cistercians "at first ignored 
and then barely tolerated the ladies who wished to share their fervour 
and imitate their customs." CThompson, 1978: 242) 
In fact, when the infiltration of so many women into the Order was 
offically noticed, an effort to limit and control the female incursion 
took place. <Southern, 1970: 315-8) In the Premonstratensian Order, 
too, the twelfth century saw a crack down on women. Abbot Conrad of 
Marchtal wrote: 
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"We and our whole community of canons, recognizing that the 
wickedness of women is greater than all the other wickedness 
of the world, and that there is no anger like the anger of 
women, and that the poison of asps and dragons is more 
curable and less dangerous to men than the familiarity of 
women, have unanimously decreed for the safety of our souls, 
no less than for that of our bodies and goods, that we will 
on no account receive any more sisters to the increase of 
our perdition, but will avoid them like poisonous animals." 
<quoted, ibid.: 314) 
Women's vows of chasitity were not enough, then, to prevent them from 
being objects of temptation to their male counterparts. 
Although feminine flesh was the real seat of sin, and women's inherent 
sinfulness was hardly erradicable even through ascetic regimens, this 
did not prevent women from trying - they simply had to try harder. 
Women could define sexual pleasure as a whole, rather than their 
bodies alone as the sin, and indeed Southern argues that "disgust at 
the recollection or prospect of marriage seems to have played a very 
large part in recommending the monastic life to women". <ibid.: 311) 
Religious women renounced marriage, took a vow of chastity and 
dedicated their lives to Christ. (ibid. : 326; Brooke, 1978: 5; 
Holdsworth, 1978: 198; Bolton, 1978: 256) 
Women were allowed only a very minor role in the Church, and Southern 
argues that it was women's desire for a "spiritual importance" denied 
them by orthodox Chritstianity which led to their strong atttraction 
to heretical movements. The Beguines, for example, were an all-woman 
movement which began in Liege in 1210. Their name derives from the 
heretical Albigensians, and was a pejorative term given to women who 
rejected marriage for celibacy. <Southern, 1970: 321-2) Women's quest 
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to reject the world and the flesh on equal terms with men was attacked 
from both sides; neither lay society nor the Church could accept the 
divorce of the female soul from the female body and its desires. 
Bell has shown the lengths St. Catherine and other female ascetics 
went to to mortify their flesh, and how their excesses angered and 
perturbed their male confessors and the church authorities. <Bell, 
1985) BM: Bolton also writes of Mary of Oignies' "incredible feats of 
endurance in fasting, prayer and lack of sleep". Her contemplation of 
the Passion "induced in her such a loathing of her own body that she 
cut off pieces of her own flesh with a knife"; she was "filled with 
the holy food of Christ's flesh and purified and cleansed by his life-
giving blood". <Bolton, 1978: 363; 266) And Southern quotes Mechthild 
of Magdeburg: 
":My body is in great distress. 
My soul is in highest bliss, 
for she has seen 
and thrown her arms around 
her Loved One all at once. 
Poor thing, 
she is distressed by him: 
he so draws and delights her, 
she cannot withhold herself, 
and he brings her into himself. 
Then the body speaks to the soul: 
'Where have you been? I cannot bear it any more.' 
And the soul says, 'Shut up, you fool, 
I want to be with my beloved; 
You will never enjoy me any more -
I am his joy; he is my distress -
Your distress is, that you can no longer enjoy me: 
You must put up with this distress 
For it will never leave you." <Southern, 1970: 327) 
This feminine "super-mortification" can be directly related to the 
concept of the female body as "super-flesh" in medieval Christian 
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ideology. Although there existed sufficient ideological ambiguity for 
women to try in numbers to escape the prison of their flesh, this was 
an almost hopeless task, as flesh was what defined them. Men could 
escape the flesh by an avoidance of women; women were fundamentally 
trapned. 
~ ~ In the extreme physical asceticism of Catherine of Siena we 
can see an attempt to purify and transcend her female flesh: since her 
body was, as female, intrinsically more sinful, her efforts to escape 
the flesh had to be greater than those of her male counterparts. No 
wonder she so irritated her confessors with efforts which to them 
would have had a continual whiff of futility about them. 
The doctrine of the humours, then, seen in the context of Christian 
theology, gives us a body-concept dependant on rigid hierarchical 
categorizations in which, reflecting the cosmological dichotomy of 
heaven and earth, the central defining dichotomy is that of body and 
soul. As in the wider feudal culture, only an elite few could detach 
themselves from the world of matter, flesh, sin and flux through 
ascetic regimens which brought them closer to heaven's changeless 
realm of spirit. Spiritual perfection and union with God was 
achievable only through transcending the flesh. Membership of the 
elite was fixed - each person had his or her inescapable place in a 
god-given hierarchy. And membership of the elite was gender-specific; 
women's bodies linked them all but irrevocably with the world. 
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The concept of the body in carnival culture 
Although the ideological domination of the Church in the Middle Ages 
is often suggested - Southern, for example, argues that the church was 
"a compulsory society" C1970: 17), and Roberta Hamilton argues that 
its views "went almost unchallenged" <Hamilton, 1978: 50) - Bakhtin's 
work shows that a critique of the hierarchical power of feudalism and 
catholic ideology did exist in popular culture. His study of popular 
carnival culture reveals both an alternative and oppositional 
conception of feudal social structure and a corresponding alternative 
and oppositional perception of the body. It is to this we now turn. 
Bakhtin argues, of Rabelais, that popular sources - idioms, sayings, 
proverbs "determined the entire system of his i:mages and his 
artistic outlook on the world" <Bakhtin, 1968: 2). His writing is 
"nonofficial", in that it is isolated from literature, but is at home 
with popular culture. ·This foundation in medieval popular culture, 
Bakhtin argues, allows us to use the work of Rabelais as an expression 
of that culture. He argues that in feudal societies a "two-world 
condition" existed, in which the popular culture of humour and 
carnival scoffed at and parodied the official feudal culture. It is 
here that understandings of the body opposed to that of Christian 
ideology can be found. The consciousness of medieval man, then, 
contains both carnival and Christian understandings of life. (ibid.: 
3; 6; 96) 
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In "official" feudal culture, the body, occupying a fixed place in a 
fixed cosmos, was the prison of the soul. In carnival culture this 
understanding was overturned through the imagery of grotesque realism. 
Here, Bakhtin argues that the ideal and the spiritual are reduced or 
degraded to the material, physical level, "the sphere of earth and 
body". (ibid.: 19). We must be wary, however, of seeing the 
degradation of grotesque realism through modern eyes. In medieval 
carnival imagery "degradation" is not a negative term, but represents 
subsumption into "the positive, regenerating and renewing lower 
stratum" in which the body: 
"makes no pretence to renunciation of the earthly ... this is 
not the body and its physiology in the modern sense of these 
words, because it is not individualized. The material bodily 
principle is contained not in the biological individual, not 
in the bourgeois ego, but in the people, a people who are 
continually growing and renewed. This is why all that is 
bodily becomes grandiose exaggerated, immeasurable ... the 
leading themes of these images of bodily life are fertility, 
growth and a brimmming-over abundance." 
(ibid.: 23; 19) 
Degradation or debasement did not mean simple destruction or 
befouling, but a renewal on the material bodily level in an 
elimination of hierarchical divisions. So, for Rabelais, then, the 
subsumption of the ideal/spiritual within the material was positively 
renewing, drawing it into the body understood as the body of the 
people in which death and rebirth are inextricably intertwined, into 
"the fruitful earth and the womb". (ibid.: 21; 224) 
There are three central points to be understood here. In carnival 
culture the hierarchical order of feudal society is overturned; the 
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king becomes the peasant, the peasant the king, and fixed power 
relations are satirised. The hierarchy of body and soul is itself 
overturned: the body, from being the prison of the soul, becomes the 
locus of life and regeneration, and is celebrated rather than 
renounced. (ibid.: 19) And secondly, the body in carnival culture is 
not individuated but represents the community of all the people, the 
"social body", in a "material bodily whole which ... transgressed the 
limits of ... isolation" <ibid.: 23; see also Gurevich, 1985: 53-4). It 
is because the body is collective that death is part of fertility and 
rewewal rather than the individual tragedy of an absolute end. 
Grotesque realism "discloses the potentiality of an entirely different 
world" and thus "liberates humanity from neccessity". <Bahktin, 1968: 
48-9) The humour which is fundamental to it liberates the common 
people from fear of oppression by nature, death and of the consecrated 
and forbidden. (ibid.: 90; 226) It represents an overturning of the 
hierarchies of feudal power relations in a critique of the fundamental 
separations which structure and justify them. 
The conception of the collective body is expressed through the imagery 
of abundance, with "exaggeration, hyperbolism, excessiveness" being 
"fundamental attributes" of grotesque realism. Cibid.: 303) The 
central image is the huge size and appetites of Gargantua, where 
images of gluttony and drunkeness express not private appetites, but 
the appetite for life of the people as a whole, and their triumphant 
absorbtion in their environment. (ibid.: 301-2) 
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Finally 1 and relatedly 1 - carnival body imagery is essentially 
dialectic. <ibid.: 211-2) Bakhtin argues that the carnival body is 
process rather than product: 
"life ... is the epitome of incompleteness. And such is 
precisely the grotesque concept of the body ... (in 
which) ... the grotesque body is not a closed, completed unit: 
it is unfinished, outgrows itself, transgresses its own 
limits". 
(ibid.: 26) 
The image of the body is of "contradictory, perpetually becoming and 
unfinished being." (ibid.: 118; 316) Thus parts of the body open to 
the outside world are stressed: 
"the unfinished and open body <dying, bringing forth and 
being born) is not separated from the world by clearly 
defined boundaries; it is blended with the world, with 
animals, with objects. It is cosmic, it represents the 
entire material bodily world in all its elements ... as the 
swallowing up and generating principle." 
(ibid.: 26-7) 
Since, then, grotesque realism represents a collective body, the 
boundaries between body and world are seen quite differently to 
boundaries between the world and the individuated body. The focus on 
the grotesque body as open to the world, and as intruding into the 
world gives a central role to "that which protrudes from the body, all 
that seeks to go out beyond that body's confines ... all that prolongs 
the body and links it to other bodies or to the world outside". 
(ibid.: 316) 
The common characteristic between bodily orifices and protrusions is 
that within them the divisions of body and body, and of body and 
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world, are overcome. Grotesque imagery ignores the closed surface of 
the body, then, and concentrates on "excressences ... and 
orifices ... that which leads beyond the body's limited space or into 
the body's depths. Mountains and abysses, such is the relief of the 
grotesque body; or ... towers and subterranean passages." Cibid.: 318; 
317) 
Grotesque language, then: 
"was orientated toward the world and toward all the world's 
phenomena in their condition of unfinished metamorphosis: 
the passing from night to morning, from winter to spring, 
from the old to the new, from death to birth." 
(ibid.: 165) 
This essentially dialectical conception of the world and the body, 
Bakhtin argues, could only be expressed in "unofficial" culture and in 
opposition and critique of the founding principle of offical feudal 
culture - "an immovable and unchanging hierarchy in which the higher 
and the lower never merge", in which there are "hard, well-established 
lines between all phenomena", and in which the order of the world was 
static, unchanging and eternal. Cibid.: 106; 433) The official view 
could not be overcome by individual thought, only by popular culture 
as a whole. (ibid.: 275) 
Images of bodily life eating, drinking, copulation, birth, 
defecation - were central in Rabelais' work, and express these three 
central features of degradation as renewal, the body as collective, 
and the body as process. As Bakhtin argues, images of eating create: 
"an extremely dense atmosphere of the body 
which all the dividing lines between man and 
the consuming and the consumed bowels are 
erased ... these consuming and consumed organs 
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as a whole in 
beast, between 
intentionally 
are fused with 
the generating womb. We thus obtain a truly grotesque image 
of one single, superindividual bodily life, of the great 
bowels that devour and are devoured, generate and are 
generated. But this, of course, is not an 'animal' or 
'biological' bodily life. We see looming beyond Gargamelle's 
womb the devoured and devouring womb of the earth and the 
ever-regenerated body of the people." (ibid.: 226) 
Banquet imagery, then, represents eating not as a commonplace, 
privatized and individualized activity but as a popular feast, a 
"banquet for all the world" in which eating is a social event rather 
than a biological act. (ibid.: 278; 281) It is in eating that the body 
trangresses its own limits and "is enriched and grows at the world's 
expense". In eating, humanity encounters the world: 
"here man tastes the world, introduces it into his body, 
makes it part of himself ... Cfurther) ... Xan's encounter with 
the world in the act of eating is joyful, triumphant; he 
triumphs over the world, devours it without being devoured 
himself. The limits between man and the world are erased, to 
man's advantage." 
(ibid.: 281) 
What Bakhtin and Rabelais show, then, is the "laughing chorus" of 
official feudal culture, a chorus in which the body is open, 
collective and dialectic. (ibid.: 367) The point and counterpoint of 
medieval concepts of the body show how the body is understood and 
perceived through the framework of worldview. In the dominant 
understanding of the body, hierarchy and dichotomy, the central 
organising principles of Christian cosmology, define the body. In the 
oppositional carnival culture, these values are overturned, in a 
satire of the hierarchical social structures which underpin them. The 
body was seen as part of the dialectical cycle of life and death, a 
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unitary concept of material existence which negated the dichotomies of 
heaven and earth, flesh and spirit. 
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The medieval body; flesh and super-flesh 
The body-concepts of feudal and carnival culture come to us, it must 
be remembered, through the writings, almost exclusively, of men. We 
have very little material directly from women - even the "Lives" of 
Bell's "holy anorexics" are women's experiences translated through 
masculine frameworks. It is difficult to reconstruct with any 
certainty how women reacted to these conceptualisations of their 
bodies, what acceptances, rejections or negotiations took place. 
The devaluation of women in Christian ideology was resisted, 
certainly, in women's insistence that they too could live the 
religious life and transcend the body. But the discussion of a female 
perspective on the medieval concepts of the body can really only be 
speculative. What we Qall. identify are patriarchal understandings of 
women and their bodies. 
defined as "super-flesh" 
gender difference was 
I have suggested that women's bodies were 
in theology, and I would argue that the 
expressed quantitatively rather than 
qualitatively both in Christian and in carnival categorizations. The 
difference between the two concepts lies not in the structure or form 
of their expression of the gender difference of bodies, but in the 
different value they place on flesh and spirit. To put it crudely, if 
women equal super-flesh, their value is decreased in Christian 
cosmology but increased in carnival imagery. 
As we have seen, in the Christian concept the body was the fundamental 
symbol of earthly corruption. The most valued spiritual path resisted 
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physical demands and sought spiritual transcendence - the elimination 
as far as possible of the earthly and corrupt in order to approach 
union with the pure spirit of God. Xen and women, as we have seen, did 
not have equality of access to sal vat ion since the transcendence of 
the flesh was, for women, an almost impassible task. Women, through 
their bodies, were tied much more closely to the realm of earthly 
corruption than were men. But this was a difference of quantity rather 
than of quality: both genders were linked through their bodies to the 
material realm, and far bath this link was a negative one. 
Conclusions about the popular view of the female body will of 
necessity be mare tentative. Information is scarce, and Bahktin has 
little to say an the gender division in carnival imagery. The only 
sustained discussion specifically an women is his short analysis of 
the "querelle des femmes" - a sixteenth century French dispute an the 
nature of women and marriage. <Bakhtin, 1968: 239 ff.) Here he 
identifies contradictions in "the Gallic tradi tian" with regard to 
women between a profoundly negative Christian attitude, and the 
exaltation of womanhood in "chivalry": 
"the Gallic tradition is a complex and contradictory 
phenamenan ... it represented ... twa lines of thought: the 
papular comic tradition; and the ascetic tendency of 
medieval Christianity, which saw in woman the incarnation of 
sin, the temptation of the flesh." 
(ibid.: 240) 
Bakhtin argues that these apposing views of women, although frequently 
found intertwined, should be analytically separated as they are, in 
fact, "profoundly alien to each ather". <ibid.: 240) The unadulterated 
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popular view of women is, he argues, neither hostile nor negative, but 
celebrates women as part of the material world: 
"woman is essentially related to the material bodily lower 
stratum; she is the incarnation of this stratum that 
degrades and regenerates simultaneously. She is ambivalent. 
She debases, brings down to earth, lends a bodily substance 
to things, and destroys; but, first of all, she is the 
principle that gives birth. She is the womb ... the woman of 
Gallic tradition is the bodily grave of man. She represents 
in person the undoing of pretentiousness, of all that is 
finished, completed and exhausted." 
(ibid.: 240) 
It is, then, in the transition from the comic popular view to the 
serious ascetic view that "ambivalence" becomes entirely negative. 
When the material realm as a whole is devalued as that which keeps the 
soul from heaven, women, as "essentially related" to that realm, are 
devalued with it. But in true carnival imagery woman is the ultimate 
dialectical image: 
"The woman's bowels are inexhaustible and never satisfied. 
She is organically hostile to all that is old ... woman is 
naturally opposed to eternity." 
(ibid.: 242; 241) 
A number of obvious points need to be made here. Firstly, the 
"querelle" is, of course, a dispute between two masculine views of 
women, and we can have no idea what views women themselves held on the 
issue. Neither can we accurately gauge the participation of women in 
the generation of carnival imagery itself. However, I would suggest 
that the querelle does allow us a brief glimpse of differences in the 
conceptualisations of the male and female body in popular culture 
which the rest of Bakhtin' s work unfortunately obscures. <Booth, 
1982; Miller, 1986) Here again, I would argue, gender difference is 
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conceptualised as quantitative rather than qualitative. Women, as in 
the Christian view, are innately ~ material - more flesh than 
spirit. 
While the distinction is similar, however, its effects are 
dramatically different. With the profoundly differing views of the 
"degradation" of bodily life in popular and ascetic understandings, 
women's stronger connection with the material is negative in the 
latter but positive in the former. In popular culture the emphasis was 
on bodily openess and the fluidity of boundaries between the body and 
the world. The womb and the bowels are central images here, both 
acting to overturn and erase distinctions between body and world, life 
and death. Tentatively, then, we could accept Bahktin's view that the 
popular notion of degradation as positive formed a "pro-woman" strand 
in the socially dominant masculine view of women and the female body. 
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Bourgeois bodies 
Gurevich argues that in medieval categorizations people were part of 
nature, since "the laws of creation are to be found in analogy". 
<Gurevich, 1985: 57) Consequently, then: 
"the elements of the human body were identical, it was held, 
with the elements forming the universe. Man's flesh was of 
the earth, his blood of water, his breath of air and his 
warmth of fire." 
(ibid.: 57) 
The unity of humanity and nature was experienced too in the feudal 
mode of production: 
"Bound to the soil by his work, absorbed in the tasks of 
rural husbandry, man perceived nature as an integral part of 
himself instead of treating it as an object pure and simple 
to be manipulated, utilised or disposed of." 
(ibid.: 44) 
Thus, as Gurevich argues, a "subject-object" relationship between 
humanity and nature was impossible in feudal culture. The idea of 
human labour as "transforming" nature was meaningless. <ibid.: 54) For 
such a separation to be possible the "distance" - both ideological and 
material - between humanity and the natural environment "would have to 
increase". (ibid.: 67) This, of course, is precisely what happens with 
the transition to the capitalist mode of production, in which "nature" 
is manipulable by human labour, it is transformed. As Gurevich argues: 
"man's practical activity became more and more complex and 
his effect on nature more direct and purposeful, thanks to 
the development of new tools and the invention of machinery 
which came to adopt an intermediary position between man and 
his natural surroundings ... he detaches himself more and more 
from her <nature) and begins to look upon her as an object 
to be utilised". (ibid.: 90) 
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Capitalist production separates humanity from nature, constructing 
nature as outside of the human subject, existing in order to be used. 
With the transition from feudal to bourgeois culture we see a 
transformation not only in the relationship of humanity to nature, but 
also in social relations. Power, wealth and status, previously vested 
in social role, seen as entailed in the fixed place occupied in a God-
given hierarchy, come to be understood as the results of individual 
endeavour. Black and Coward argue that the modern bourgeois state: 
"emerged in the disintegration of the relatively diffused 
hierarchy of the feudal state. Previously, political 
responsibilities and rights were derived from particular 
status given in a very definite hierarchy. The capitalist 
state, however, increasingly addressed its political 
representations to a generalized 'citizen' sexless, 
classless, a citizen of the world." 
<Black & Coward, 1981: 83-4) 
The notion of the generalised citizen is formed in the framework of 
capitalist social relations which depend on private ownership of the 
means of social production, and the justificatory ideology of 
possessive individual ism. In feudalism, as we have seen, people are 
defined by their place in a rigidly hierarchical social order. In 
capitalism, "free" labour and private ownership combine to create a 
social structure in which each worker is forced to sell her/his labour 
power as a commodity in competition with all other workers, and in 
which each capitalist is in competition with all others in the rush to 
accumulate. Soceity is seen as the interaction of all these individual 
"units" whose main motivation is self-interest, defined in terms of 
ownership. The change, as Bakhtin argues, is from the person as one 
element in the controlling hierarchy of the cosmos, to the perception 
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of man <and I use the term advisedly) as the centre of the universe 
and its controller. <Bakhtin, 1968: 366-7) 
In bourgeois ideology the individual is king. Each individual acts in 
pursuit of his own interests; his social position is not fixed, but 
can with industrious effort be improved upon. Each individual is the 
agent of his own destiny, the centre of his universe. Consequent upon 
these material and ideological changes the concept of the body 
undergoes a transformation, in which separation and instrumentality 
characterise the bourgeois body. The chains that bound it to nature 
and to the collective body of the people having been broken, the body 
takes on a new meaning in the construction of nature as object and 
humanity as subject; it is used as an instrument in the pursuit of 
individual self-interest. 
As we have seen, Bakhtin argues that the exaggerated bodily imagery of 
the medieval carnival reflects a collective understanding of the body 
as the body of the people. He contrasts this with modern ideas of the 
body as private, separate and individuated, "the goal of egoistic lust 
and possession". (ibid.: 23; 19-24). The carnival focus on the parts 
of the body open to the world, and to the processes in which world and 
body intermingle is contrasted with the modern focus on the surface of 
the body as an impenetrable barrier between the individual and the 
environment. (ibid.: 27; 39; 317-8) He argues: 
"in the private sphere of isolated individuals the images of 
the bodily lower stratum preserve the element of negation 
while losing almost entirely their positive, regenerating 
force. Their link with life and with the cosmos is broken, 
-196-
they are narrowed down to naturalistic erotic images." 
(ibid.: 23) 
The modern body is product rather than process - closed and completed, 
its links with the material degrading in the modern sense, its imagery 
"of the finished, completed man, cleansed, as it were, of all the 
scoriae of birth and death". <ibid.: 25; 24-6; 113) The individual 
body, then, loses its link with the material seen as a whole, in which 
it is not individuated but is rather 11 a point of transition in a 1 ife 
eternally renewed, the inexhaustible vessel of death and conception". 
(ibid.: 318) In the popular medieval concept the body is irremediably 
a part of nature, and thus cannot be seen as an individual possession. 
The transition from feudalism to capitalism is in bodily terms the 
transition from the understanding of the body as a part and expression 
of nature, to the body as the vehicle through which the self 
expropriates and controls nature. 
Bakhtin argues: 
"the new bodily canon ... presents an entirely finished, 
completed, strictly limited body, which is shown from the 
outside as something individual. That which protrudes, 
bulges, sprouts or branches off ... is eliminated, hidden, or 
moderated. All orifices of the body are closed. The basis of 
the image is the individual, strictly limited mass, the 
impenetrable facade. The opaque surface and the body's 
'valleys' acquire an essential meaning as the border of a 
closed individuality that does not merge with other bodies 
and with the world." 
(ibid.: 320) 
The modern body is self-sufficient, an 11 individual, closed sphere", 
and the focus of imagery is on "individually characteristic and 
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expressive parts of the body" - head, face, eyes, lips, muscular 
system. <ibid.: 321) 
Turner also takes up the separation of the body from its place in a 
fixed cosmology, and its transformation, with the emergence of 
capitalism, into an individuated possession. He argues: 
"the concept of nature as a world of physical objects 
independent of man and the concept of man as a thing-link 
phenomenon (a machine, an hydraulic pump, or as a cog within 
a clock) both emerged at a specific point in history, namely 
with the growth of commodity production within a fully 
monaterized economy." 
<Turner, 1984: 232) 
The emergence of the concept of the body as thing or commodity is 
further linked to the secularization of the body, in which the body is 
transformed from "the object of a sacred discourse of the flesh" to 
the object of medical discourse which sees it as a "machine to be 
controlled by appropriate scientific regimens". (ibid.: 36> Turner 
gives the example of Cheyne, who described the body as a hydraulic 
system the equilibrium of which is maintained by correct inputs and 
outputs. <ibid.: 219> 
Xedical theory, Turner argues, was influenced in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries by Descartes's differentiation of mind as the 
defining characteristic of selfhood. The body was simply a machine 
owned by the self, or person-as-mind, and medicine "came to be 
markedly influenced by mathematical and chemical models of the body 
which was conceived as a complex machine" (ibid.: 77). For Hobbes the 
body was an "extension" of the mind and he argued that man Cas in man, 
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not humanity) had "a natural right to his own body" <and to the bodies 
of his wife and children) <ibid.: 87-9). 
Capitalist conceptions of the body are, then, instrumental. The self 
uses the body as an individual possession. Turner pursues this 
argument through the changing concept of diet. As we have seen, in 
medieval asceticism dietary control was part of an attempt to control 
desire and to overcome the flesh. Turner argues that with capitalism 
desire/the body are fostered rather than suppressed; the body must be 
disciplined in production but encouraged in its desires in 
consumption. This does not, however, represent bodily "freedom"; 
following Foucault, Turner argues that desire is created and 
controlled through medicalized power, and must thus be correctly 
channelled into consumption while being controlled in production. 
(ibid.: 159-170; 200) 
Although desire and the body are created through and controlled by the 
legal and medical discourses of capitalism, they appear as "natural" 
and the "suppression" of bodily desires at work and their expression 
in the private sphere are seen as natural occurances. The body, as a 
pre-given biological entity, and physical desires, as naturally 
arising from biological dictates or "needs", exist a-priori, to be 
used by the self as it chases; the social construction of the body and 
of desire are rendered invisible. 
Diet is used in the twentieth century, Turner argues, "in the 
preservation of life to enhance the enjoyment of pleasures". (ibid. : 
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172) Consumption is a virtue rather than a sin, and "diet is a method 
of promoting the capacity for secular enjoyments": "to be complete 
persons we have to consume, to overspend and to satiate desire". 
(ibid.: 216; 238) The body in consumer culture is, then, "a vehicle of 
pleasure". (ibid.: 172) 
In this section two constructions of the bourgeois body are analysed 
in order to explore the argument that the body is constructed as 
separate from, and acting upon, nature, as private property, 
individualized and owned. Further·, the construction of the body as 
gendered forms a central analytical link between this and the 
following chapter. As Black and Coward argue, the bourgeois concept of 
the individual citizen does not include women. <ibid.: 84) The 
subsequent argument seeks to show that the concept of the individuated 
body, with its central defining characteristics of separation and 
instrumentality, refers not to the ungendered individual but to the 
masculine subject. The feminine body, it will be argued, is 
constructed in oppostion to the individuated body - as merged, rather 
than separate, and as acted-on, rather than active. 
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Victorian bodies 
Barker-Benfield analyses the nineteenth century perception of the male 
body as a pseudo-economic system - "the spermatic economy". The male 
body was seen as a self-sufficient system of energies held in balance 
by reason. (Barker-Benfield, 1976; 1973: 378) Its energies should be 
accumulated and disciplined, expended only in production - either of 
wealth or of babies - and any other expenditure was wasteful. The 
proper aim of a man was to "discipline and utilise" his own bodily 
powers" under the "potent sway" of his mind. <1973: 386; 380) He 
argues that: 
"in working toward success one should conserve one • s 
energies: having attained it, one had to be eternally 
vigilant to avoid debilitating expenditure." 
(1976: 296) 
Work, then, used up physical energy, and the only other proper use for 
it was child production- the "natural destiny" of sperm. <ibid.: 267) 
He argues that the language of expenditure in 19th century 
masturbation phobia reveals "an economy of the body" in which the 
masculine body was "an economic system, whose fundamental orientation 
was the accumulation of resources": "the underlying :model for the 
operation of the whole man, psychological and physiological, was 
economic." (ibid.: 169; 195; 1973: 374) 
The wasteful expenditure of sperm in masturbation or "excessive" 
i. e. non-procreative - sex, both of which were the subject of major 
public and medical concern in the second half of the century, "drained 
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the physical vigor otherwise available to the will", and first 
diverted and then removed men from the pursuit of success. <1976: 176; 
234; 171) Energy, like capital, should be "developed, restrained, 
governed, not abrogated, destroyed, unrecognized". (ibid.: 235) 
The masculine bodily economy was naturally self-sufficient - excessive 
"drainage" of sperm upset its "autonomous accumulation of energy". 
Cibid.: 178-9) Amariah Brigham explained the system: 
"a fundamental law of the distribution of vi tal 
powers ... Cis) that when they are increased in one part they 
are diminished in all the rest of the living economy ... to 
increase the powers of one organ it is absolutely neccessary 
that they should be diminished in all the others." 
<1973: 375-6) 
The proper aim of man was "the hoarding and concentration of 
energy ... in an obsessively self-sufficient system." (ibid.: 377) 
Spermatic expenditure should be productive, and there was much 
discussion on exactly how much intercourse could safely be seen as 
productive. The "expenditure" of sperm should take place only under 
the guiding principles of the spermatic economy. C1976: 181). 
The rules could be quantified. Barker-Benfield discusses the anonymous 
author of Nocturnal Emissions, writing in the American Journal of 
Psychology in January 1904: 
"From 1895 to 1903 he calculated that he averaged 3. 43 
nocturnal emissions each month. Since he was a bachelor and 
did not masturbate, he felt that this was an accurate 
measure of permissable expenditures, and while 3. 43 would 
vary for different men, it did represent the physiological 
limit that should be a warning to both 1 unmarried 
masturbator and married incontinent 1 • His article is 
complete with statistics and a graph." <1973: 397) 
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Intercoun:;e in the sunshine was also recommended, so that "the 
copulators would be recharging their batteries even as they were 
discharging". <1976: 297-8) 
We can see, then, how the neccessi ty to accumulate capital and value 
production over consumption in "high bourgeoL::;" culture provided the 
framework of social :meanings through which the masculine body was 
conceptualized as a spermatic economy. Further, each bodily system is 
a strictly individual unit - each man :must conserve and accumulate his 
own energy/capital in a body which is fundamentally self-sufficient. 
The :mind :must discipline and control the body in order that its 
energies can be used in production and accumulation. Bodily energies 
were men s constant capital; they were owned as absolute possessions, 
and were to be directed to work and the public sphere. The body was 
the vehicle through which reason acted on the environment. 
To boldly go ... : gynaecologists as pioneers 
In The horrors of the half-known life Barker-Benfield argues that the 
nineteenth century view of women was of creatures simultaneously :more 
like the angels and "naturally closer to the animal . 0976: 85; 1973: 
382) The two ideas coexisted in a "dual view" of women. One 
ideological strand argued that women were sexually disinterested by 
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nature and delicately shrank from sex; the other saw women as 
dominated by the body, especially by the womb and the sexual 
appetites, to the extent that if not strictly controlled these 
appetites could "extinguish" men and the social order. <2> 
Feminists have argued that this dual view was expressed by women in 
hysterical symptoms - from the fainting fit or "swoon" to the violent 
fit or "paroxysm" - as well as in explanations for hysteria. <See, 
i.e., Ehrenreich & English, 1973 & 1979; Showalter, 1981; Skultans, 
1979; Smith-Rosenberg, 1972) The swoon was thought to be caused by the 
sexual repression which resulted from women's natural delicacy. On the 
other hand, however, Ehrenreich and English discuss tales of the 
sexually voracious hysterical women who made unseemly advances to 
impressionable young doctors in the privacy of medical consul tat ion. 
<Ehrenreich & English, 1973: 36) 
Both ideological strands motivated the gynaecological surgery of the 
second half of the 19th century, and Barker-Benfield argues that this 
surgery must be seen as part of "a defensive, emergency ideology" in 
the face of the first wave of :modern feminism with its pressure for 
female education and reproductive control. <Barker-Benfield, 1976: 84; 
239) Gynaecology here, he suggests, functions as social control: "the 
assertion of male supremacy seems to have been a response to fears of 
female encroachment." <ibid.: 87) 
2 For an alternative view see Degler, 1973; as Degler correctly points 
out, social prohibitions do not necessarily describe actual behaviour, 
and we should not assume an absence of resistance. Here, however, it 
is the ideology which interests me. 
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From 1870 onwards, Barker-Benfield argues, America witnessed "a spate 
of gynaecological activity ... characterised by flamboyant, drastic, 
risky and instant use of the knife". Britain followed the same 








theories and the invention of new surgical instruments and techniques 
all flourished. Surgical treatment of the "psychological" disorders of 
women was central in this expansion, and Barker-Benfield argues that 
"the most spectacularly revealing of these surgical techniques were 
excision of the clitoris ... and female castration". <1976: 89> 
One of the most important figures in the new science of 
gynaecologicsal surgery was J Marion Sima, the inventor of the 
speculum. Sims' aim was to facilitate reproduction, and in this aim he 
believed himself hampered both by women's natural lack of sexual 
interest and the recalcitrant interior of her body. (ibid.: 111; 116) 
He aimed to effect by surgery the sexual and physical openness which 
reproduction needed, and to which women, he believed, were naturally 
inimical. Sims also brought to medical attention and named the 
condition "vaginismus" - spasmodic and involuntary contraction of the 
vagina. <ibid.: 113) His cure for his new condition was to 
anaesthetize woman before intercourse in one case two or three 
times weekly for a year. Other "Sims' specials" included hymen 
removal, incisions of the vaginal orifice followed by dilation with 
wedges and incision of the cervix to "facilitate" the passage of sperm 
and menstrual blood. (ibid.: 114) 
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The theoretical background to his surgical work was the perception of 
female reproductive organs as resistant to impregnation; one of his 
theories postulated "a kind of spermatic rebound from a recalcitrant 
canal wall". (ibid.: 112) Barker-Benfield argues that Sims "could not 
construe therapeutic action apart from preparing women for pregnancy": 
Sims contrasted "the sterile unimpregnated uterus" with his "ideal 
womb" - "open to impregnation ... <having) a gagging, graceful form". 
(ibid.; 111; 113) 
It was the speculum which made Sims' reputation; as Barker-Benfield 
puts it, "Sims raised himself from obscurity to the dazzle of success 
by the elevation of women• s organs from darkness into the light". 
(ibid.: 94) Speaking of his invention, Sims presented himself as an 
intrepid pioneer: 
"I felt like an explorer in medicine who first views a new 
and important territory." (ibid.: 95) 
Sims, then, opened to masculine penetration by eye, speculum and 
penis the hitherto mysterious feminine interior; Barker-Benfield 
suggests that Sims saw himself as Columbus, the vagina as his New 
'World. <ibid.: 95) 
If women's sexlessness legitimated this brand of surgery, it was the 
opposite ideology of feminine voraciousness which legitimized 
eli tordectomy and female castration. Cli tordectomy, invented in the 
West as a surgical technique by the English gynaecologist Isaac Baker 
~. at first co-existed with and was then superceded by castration 
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Cin turn overtaken by hysterectomy). The first recorded castration 
took place in 1872, and from 1880 until the turn of the century the 
operation flourished. (1973: :389) Although it became markedly less 
common thereafter, women were still castrated for psychological 
disorders as late as 1946. Cl976: 121) 
The aim of both castration and eli tordectomy was to make "rebellious" 
women domestic and demure. The operation was used to counter an 
increase - real or imaginary - in female masturbation, "an activity 
which men feared inevitably aroused women's naturally boundless but 
usually repressed appetite for men". Ci bid. : 120-1; 122) Barker-
Benfield argues that male gynaecologists "without exception" were 
deeply concerned with feminine sexual appetite; even those who opposed 
wholesale castration agreed it should be used on women "manifesting 
uncontrollable desire". (ibid. : 125; 1973: 388) Gynaecologists 
"tested" women "for indications of the disease of desire by inducing 
orgasm, manipulating clitoris or breast:3". o.nd presented sexual 
surgery as an aid to feminine self-control, and the preservation of 
feminine fertility as a "nationally-owned resource". <1976: 126; 132) 
Underlying nineteenth century sexual surgery, then, we can see a 
perception of feminine sexuality as potentionally overwhelming and of 
the feminine body as dangerous to men. In The Young Man and Ih.e. 
Student's Manual, the Rev. John I.Qdd_' s popular and much reprinted 
anti-masturbation tracts, he describes a young man visiting a brothel 
as "entering the door of woman whose house is the gate-way of hell". 
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(ibid.: 171) Barker-Benfield argues that this image was intended to 
suggest entering the vagina in intercourse: 
"Todd perhaps used a common image hot, deadly and 
ubiqui taus holes - for both masturbation and elicit sexual 
intercourse". 
(ibid. : 171) 
Here the feminine body is understood as draining masculine active 
energies. Women's uncurbed appetites, as well as masturbation, could 
keep men from production, success and wealth. Ejaculation weakened 
men; both in masturbation and in intercourse with women, with their 
"sperm-sucking propensities". (ibid.: 131). The open genitals of 
women threatened the "closed self-sufficiency" of men. (ibid.: 128) 
The common association of sperm and money was mirrored in the sexual 
overtones of women's financial incontinence: 
"Todd suggested her spending action was insatiable, and that 
she absorbed man's earnings, man's heart's blood, into her 
own absorbing system" ; her spending was ' the horse-leech 
which continually cries, Give, give, and which never says 
enough'." 
(ibid. : 194) 
In the sexual and the financial sphere, then, woman could "drain" men 
of sperm and money, through her "interiorized draining power", her 
"insatiable absorbtiveness", her "bloodsucking" nature. (ibid.: 195-6; 
1973: 378; 381) The vagina and the womb were both seen as "a consuming 
mouth", and "the food it demanded was sperm". <1976: 271) The only way 
to effectively contain women's sexual appetites outside of surgery was 
to give them a little of what they wanted. (1973: 379) 
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The medicalized social control of women sought to contain her 
dangerous body and sexuality and return her to her proper status as a 
"reproductive machine" , an "inexhaustible and undemanding resource". 
(1976: 305; 198; 1973: 383) Barker-Benfield concludes that the aim of 
this control was for men to "assimilate women's power to the:mselves 
just as they attempted to do with the rest of the resources of the 
earth": women's bodies and nature's body should both be subject to 
masculine mastery. C1976: 202; 1973: 382; 391) 
It is clear, then, that the contradictory notions of women as passive 
domestic beings naturally "shrinking" from sex, and as insatiable 
"drainers" of masculine sexual energies coexisted in Victorian 
ideology. The purity of womanhood, argued to be natural and innate, 
seemed to require a vast network of legal, medical and ideological 
controls to maintain it, controls which acted to contain the shadow-





appetitive ... a 
intercourse was 
(1976: 276-7) 
men's wish that their women be delicate, not 
frigid, was the apprehension that women were 
always on the verge of being sexually 
woman's physical capacity for sexual 
umlimited, in direct contrast to a man's." 
The suppressed and contained power of women and of women's bodies was 
felt to be dangerously powerful and threatening to men; uncontrolled, 
women became "all appetite", their bodies tranformed from passive 
vessel to pump, a dark, hot and open space which perpetually 
threatened to engulf and extinguish the self-contained masculine body 
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and patriarchal order itself. (1973; 384; 374; 293) Men's bodies were 
spermatic economies; women's bodies were simultaneously the terrain of 
productive labour and of an uncontrolled consumption which threatened 
to swallow-up the stockpiled energy of man. 
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Twentieth-century bodies 
Sociobiological explanations define the twentieth century body. Here, 
the body is presented as a purely biological organism, and the aim of 
discussion is to determine how organic/biological properties, seen as 
innate and natural, effect social life and human behaviour. 
Sociobiology explains the body as an individual possession which is 
the basis of biological accumulation, with sperm and egg representing 
the constant capital on which that accumulation is based. 
The sociobologists Iriyers and Dawkins, following the work of the 
biologist W.D. Hamilton, argue that the motivating force behind human 
behaviour is the pursuit of individual genetic self-interest: the aim 
is to maximise the reproduction of our "own" genes. Women, they argue, 
"invest" more biological matter in an egg than men do in sperm and 
thus naturally immerse themselves in chasitity and childcare; men, on 
the other hand, seek to impregnate as many women as possible, without 
being trapped into childcare and sexual faithfulness. <Sahlins, 1977: 
4· 
' 
Sayers, 1982: 51-3) Competition, male promiscuity, female 
faithfulness and male aggression are all "explained" in this handy 
system. 
There are, of course, a number of problems with this thesis, as 
Sayers and Sahlins point out. <Sayers, 1982; Sahlins, 1977) Even if we 
accept the theory on its own terms, we might well ask whether the loss 
of male reproductive fitness in the competition for females, plus the 
weakening of women's position by male mass abandonment might not be 
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counterproductive to individual genetic interests. Further, 
anthropological evidence amply demonstrates that the gender roles of 
chaste female and promiscuous male which sociobiology argues are 
direct products of biology are far from universal. If we accept that 
"innate" biological drives shape human social institutions, how do we 
explain cultural diversity and historical change in human societies ? 
For present purposes, however, it is the fundamental circularity of 
sociobiological arguments which are relevant. Sociobiological theories 
rely on social presuppositions: it is only within a system based on 
private property that certainty of paternity is neccessary - in order 
to pass on property ; and it is only within a free labour system that 
trying to secure help with childcare would be either possible or 
neccessary. Sociobiological explanations of human behaviour naturalise 
existing social relations, maintain privilege, and thus operate as 
social control. As the ESSES Sociobology Group point out: 
"because most of them <sociobiological arguments) provide a 
'natural' explanation for the existence of social practices 
that appear unjust, they can be used to justify the 
practice." 
<BSSRS Sociobiology Group, 1984: 132) 
Sociobiological theory is, however, a crude instrument on which to 
practise the skills of sociological critique. The ideology of the body 
as individual possession reappears, however, in much more 
sophisticated analyses. Turner, as we have seen, isolates the notion 
of "embodiment", which he defines as our direct sensual experience of 
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our bodies and argues that it is our sense of embodiment or "corporeal 
government" which is the basis of individuality. <Turner, 1984: 251) 
In a thoroughgoing sociological view of the body this line of 
reasoning is problematic; why do we except "individual" sensual 
experience, or embodiment, from culture ? 
In The problem of embodiment Richard M. ~analyses the writings of 
Marcel, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty on embodiment. He argues that 
consciousness is only possible as a result of embodiment, and that the 
body only becomes animate organism rather than mere physical :matter 
through consciousness' "intentiveness to it as its own animate 
organism" <Zaner, 1971: viii; vii) Zaner seeks to distance this 
understanding· from Cartesian dualis:m, or the "mind/body proble:m" in 
which the mind is seen to exist "in" the body - he argues that 
consciousness is embodied "by" rather than "in" the physical body. 
(ibid.: vii). He suggests that his three chosen writers attempt to 
"overco:me", or "undercut" simple mind/body dualism by addressing the 
problem Descartes himself recognized, and which led to the original 
opposition of mind and body: 
"the peculiar circumstance that, though my mind is not like 
my body, nor my body like my mind, nevertheless I am not 
"in" my body like a boatman is "in" his boat". 
Ci bid.: 240) 
We act through the body; it is the "means of having a world and of 
acting within it". (ibid.: 240). Objects in the world, including other 
people, only exist meaningfully as objects which have a relation to 
the person-in-the-body: 
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"objects in the world, in so far as they are for :me only in 
virtue of :my being embodied in the :midst of them by my body-
proper, and are thus disclosed as essentially connected to 
my possible bodily action on and with them". 
(ibid.: 240) 
Mechanical conceptions of the body as matter animated and owned by a 
:mind conceived of as separate from that body are here undermined. To 
what extent, however, do such arguments affect the concept of the body 
as individual possession ? 
One could argue that philosophizing at this level has effected common-
sense understandings very little. The fine distinction between having 
and being in a body is not widely understood. Further, while Zaner's 
argument does undercut the very crude :mind/body dualisms of, for 
example, Cheyne, it remains dualistic itself in its distinction of 
mind and body. Finally, the individuality of embodiment is 
unquestioned: the perception of the body is of an object separate from 
the world and acting upon it. 
This issue is also discussed in the psychological concept of 
"separation-individuation", as we saw in Chapters Two and Three. Here 
in which the sense of the self and the body as separate - first, from 
the mother - is argued to develop as the infant begins to perceive 
itself/its body as having boundaries which distinguish it from the 
environment. This process develops through the baby's gradual 
perception that food/the breast is given and taken away, and thus is 
not part of itself. This process gradually extends so that the infant 
understands her/himself to be an individual entity or subject 
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distinguished from the world of objects, and with desires to 
appropriate or act on that world of objects which originate within the 
self and the body. 
In this view, as Parveen Adams points out, the body is constructed 
through libidinal desires. <Adams, 1986: 29) The development of a 
"secure" identity as an individual dependss on the construction of a 
sense of the self and the body as separate from the world - having 
strong "ego-boundaries" - and in the ability of the self to act upon 
the separated world of objects in order to fulfill desires and needs 
which arise within the self and the body. 
An example of how the integrated self is held to develop can be found 
in the work of :Melanie K.Jgin. <Klein, 1975) As Janet Sayers points 
out, Klein argues that the fear of annihilation is the infant's 
primary anxiety, and that this arises from the "death instinct". When 
the child's wishes - for food, or for comfort - are frustrated by the 
mother, the child's sense of itself as integrated or whole is so 
unformed that it cannot distinguish the object of that hatred <the 
mother) from itself, and thus fears that it will be destroyed by its 
own frustration. The defense against this anxiety is projection, 
through which the mother is seen as the attacker. Sayers explains: 
"This gives rise to persecutory anxiety ... against which the 
baby defends itself by splitting off and denying its 
experience of the mother as frustrating and persecuting. 
Instead it idealizes her as totally good, loving and 
gratifying - in sum, as the very embodiement of the Life 
instinct". 
<Sayers, 1987: 28) 
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This situation, however, should be temporary. Klein argues that 
integration is an innate human tendency, in which Life and Death 
instincts increasingly fuse, and a sense of the self and the mother as 
whole and separate, containing both good/loved and bad/hated elements 
is constructed. As the sense of the self as whole develops, the 
confidence that the self contains within it the possibilities for 
fulfilling its own needs develops, and the self is constructed as 
independent and able to control its own life without dependence on an 
all-powerful other. (ibid.: 28-30) 
Eichenbaum and Orbach also adopt a perspective in which 
separation/individuation is seen as the crucial step in the 
development of a healthy personality. They argue that: 
"The first two years of life are the most important time for 
the development of the inner core of the person, the psyche 
and the personality together ... the ego ... Part of the 
appropriate empathy and nurturance is the ability of the 
caregiver to provide a structure, a containment, and a sense 
of boundaries for the baby ... Because the baby is in the 
process of developing a sense of self and does not yet have 
any boundaries, the mother must bring the boundaries into 
the relationship; she must relate to the baby as a separate 
person ... When secure ego development occurs, we see the baby 
beginning to maintain a sense of self even when its 
caregiver is not present". 
<Orbach & Eichenbaum, 1983: 14-6). 
Developing boundaries, then, depends on a proper response to needs by 
the caregiver/mother. This shows the infant that (inner) needs can be 
met through the <outer) environment which is essentially benign. If 
needs are not met consistently, psychological separation is hindered 
since the infant is still "yearning" and has no secure sense that its 
needs will be met. (ibid.: 17). Proper development, however, gives "a 
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sense of wholeness" and "authentic experience of selfhood" (ibid.: 
197). Maturity, thus, depends on a secure sense of the self and the 
body as separate from the environment, or world of objects, and as 
capable of fulfilling needs and desires through the manipulation of 
that environment. This is the result rather than the precondition of 
development; its acquisition, however, is to be expected, all being 
well, as the result of a normal upbringing. 
Such discussions set formal limits to our conceptions of the body. We 
can argue about how consciousness and matter, mind and body are 
interrelated, but both mind and body remain individualised and 
separate; Zaner argues: 
"This quest, then, in each of their works turns toward 
subjectivity, or consciousness, or, as with Marcel, the 
human self. And here we have seen that each of them is 
struck by a peculiar characteristic of human being, one so 
fundamental that for each it is considered the very essence 
of human reality: for man, to be is always and essentially 
to be aware of himself as such, to be able to withdraw into 
himself and put himself into question" 
<Zaner, 1971: 242) 
Consciousness is fundamentally and naturally self-consciousness; the 
body is fundamentally and naturally my body. The body is a synthesis 
rather than a pre-existing unity, since the variety of ways through 
which we perceive the world - sight, touch, taste - are automatically 
united into the body-as-a-whole as the centre of perception. (ibid.: 
254-5). "I" am the centre of experience, not one element in the 
structure of the cosmos, or part of the collective body of the people: 
"My body, as Sartre stresses, is the orientational centre, 
0, in terms of which the world and its multiple objects are 
structured and organised." (ibid.: 250) 
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Perceiving the self/body as the centre of the universe depends not on 
social structure and ideology but on the phenomenological given that 
we experience our own body uniquely - and differently from our 
perception of all other objects- from within. (ibid.: 249, 259) 
Theories which attempt to distinguish the body as the owned matter of 
the mind and the mind as existing "in" the body should not be seen as 
rejections of the idea of the body as a possession. Rather, they argue 
about how the body is owned - not about whether "ownership" exists at 
all. The body remains the vehicle through which 
consciousness/mind/self acts on an environment understood as 
fundamentally separate from it. That separation is seen as constructed 
in a process of psychological development, however, rather than as 
existing a-priori. And this physical and psychical individualism is 
seen as the basis of the development of the normal personality. 
Similarly, although the theory of the unconscious can be used, as 
Lacan does, to challenge the dominant conception of the subject as "a 
unified self-present subject, an "I" who exists unproblematically in 
and for itself" <Burniston, 1978: 114) it is more commonly used to 
maintain that conception, albeit in more sophisticated form. The 
argument is that an imposed unity, or integration of separate "parts" 
of the self - conscious and unconscious, Life and Death instincts -
will occur naturally. 
The body, as Turner argues, is both "natural" and "cultural": it 
exists both as a biological phenomenon, the perception of which is 
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only possible through social categorizations, and as a "natural" 
phenomenon. (3) Thus the body as living - or as "animated organism" -
places its own strictures on its incorporation into the ideology of 
possessive individualism. The body is viewed as a co:m:modity, but not 
as a co:m:modity exactly like all other, inanimate, co:m:modities. As 
:ar:mm_ and Adams point out, "possession" of the body cannot entail its 
total control. CBrown & Ada:ms, 1979: 47). 
Our understandings of the body are social, representing an 
articulation of the social and the organic. This is essentially 
Turner's position, but his distinction within the concept of 
embodie:ment between "phenomenological" individuality and individuality 
as a social institution remains questionable. This distinction :must 
always be analytical - it does not exist empirically. 
In short, what is at issue is the notion that it is part of "human 
nature" to perceive the body as individuated. The very different 
:medieval concepts of the body provide some evidence that it is not, 
and in the next chapter it will be argued that the :modern concept of 
the feminine body further undercuts the equation of individualism and 
nature, since the feminine body is constructed as part of the 
environment on which the masculine separated subject acts. 
3 Here I use "natural" in Marx's sense in which nature is continually 
transformed through human social labour, the "natural" limits on which 
are themselves transformed through the labour process. 
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At this point, however, the dominant bourgeois body-concept can be 
identified as that of an individuated and completed possession of the 
self through which we pursue pleasure and satisfy our (internal) 
desires by acting on the <separated) environment. As we saw in Part 
One, desires are thought to form the "core" of the person. The 
autonomous pursuit of individual interests is, then, the model for 
both the body and the self. 
The fit bodyi vehicle or environment ? 
The concept of the body at the centre of the "fitness boom" of the 
1980s also understands the body as the vehicle for the pursuit of 
individual self-interest. 
Fitness and health are major issues in comtemporary culture. Jogging, 
aerobics, anti-smoking/drinking/drugs campaigns and concern with 
chemical "additives" to food all represent an increased concern with 
bodily health. Originally a middle-class phenomenon, the fitness boom 
has been taken up by capital, the mass media, and the state and its 
market is expanding. Turner calls such practices "forms of secular 
asceticism" or "calculating hedonism", and argues that anorexia is one 
of them. CTurner, 1984: 201; 205) In "body-maintainance" practices 
people are offered "pseudo-liberation" through consumption - the body 
is disciplined in order to be able to consume more and comsume better: 
"the new hedonism ... is not oppositional, being perfectly 
geared into the market requirements of advanced capitalism 
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... hedonistic fascination with the body exists to enhance 
competitive performance. We jog, slim and sleep not for 
their intrinsic enjoyment, but to improve our chances at 
sex, work and longevity." 
(ibid. : 112) 
The healthy body is, then, "the basis of the good life". <ibid.: 172) 
"Heal thy living", in the words of "Cosmopolitan" magazine, allows you 
to "maximise your potential". <Cosmopolitan, September, 1988) We 
become fit for consumption and have a positive duty to be fit: 
"personal responsibility for health through exercise, diet 
and avoidance of drugs, reduces the tax-drain of curative 
medical intervention. There is consequently an alliance 
between the state, the medical profession and the healthy 
citizen. The monogamous j agger is the healthy citizen." 
<Turner, 1984: 221) 
The social meanings and "functions" of body-maintenance are, however, 
somewhat more complex. An increased concern with the body encapsulates 
two views of the body in an ambivalent fashion. Further, the meaning 
of body-maintainance is gender-variable. 
We can identify a concern to perfect the body-as-vehicle for 
consumption and individuation in body-maintenance strategies. If the 
body is fit the self can realize itself more efficiently - do more, 
enjoy more, produce more, consume more, in short, act on its 
environment more intensively and for longer, and this is the most 
commonly expressed rationale for fitness - to live longer and get more 
out of life. 
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However, body-maintenance strategies also encapsulate a sense of the 
body as the "last resort" of a purely individual control of the 
environment. If we, as individuals, are relatively powerless to effect 
social structures we can at least control the environment of our own 
bodies. This process can be characterized, as Herzlich argues in her 
work on illness and health as social constructions, as a move from an 
understanding of health as that which makes activity possible to 
health as an activity in itself. <Herzlich, 1973) This process also 
represents a move from the body as the centre "0" from which we act to 
the body as the locus in which we act, where the self acts on the body 
rather than on the world, living in rather than through the body. 
Both meanings refer to the idea of human agency. As capitalist 
production eats further and further into "nature" as a limit on human 
activity, social life as a human creation "emerges" more and more as 
an issue. We can see more clearly what Turner calls the human capacity 
for "transformative labour". <Turner, 1984: 229) The obvious social 
power to control and alter the environment, however, sits uneasily 
with the bourgeois ideology of capitalist social relations as 
"natural", that is, expressive of a fixed human nature which is 
biological/genetic in origin and thus outside of agency. On the level 
of the body, body maintenance strategies express this contradiction in 
seeing the body simultaneously as the vehicle for expansive 
action/consumption and the only environment over which the 
individualized self can exert any meaningful control. 
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For women, furthermore, the ideology of femininity modifies both these 
meanings. Firstly, in bourgeois patriarchal culture, the feminine body 
is constructed as the environment within which the masculine subject 
acts, as the acted-on rather than the actor, as the consumed rather 
than the consumer. Women's arena for action is limited to the private 
sphere. Thus, women's ambit of personal control is fundamentally 
constrained, and in this context control of the body takes on a 
particular significance. Wendy Chapkis argues that "the exercise of 
control over the body compensatCes) for a basic sense of a life out of 
control": 
"The pursuit of beauty is also one of the few avenues to 
success over which a woman has some measure of personal 
control. You can mould your body much more easily than you 
can force access to the old-boy networks or get the job you 
want, the promotion you deserve, the salary you need, the 
recognition you are owed." 
<Chapkis, 1986: 12; 95) 
Secondly, as Chapkis argues, fitness for women means being fit to be 
looked at rather than fit to act. She points out that: 
"Clearly the appeal of Jane Fonda's Workout, Linda Evan's 
Beauty and Exercise Book and Raquel Welch's Total Beauty and 
Fitness Program lies in the promise that they can get you in 
shape"; "While muscles may be in, pretty clearly only 
certain kinds of muscles on certain kinds of recognizably 
feminine bodies are really acceptable. The model of the 
youthful and physically fit woman ultimately is not a symbol 
of power so much as it is a symbol of the beauty of feminine 
control over appetites and age."; "the final product should 
never suggest that the ... woman on display is anything but 
inviting, available and welcoming". 
(ibid. : 9 i 13; 51) 
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The feminine body is constructed as "inviting, available and 
welcoming" in opposition to the masculine body as self-contained, 
active and invasive. The two body-concepts are interdependent; we 
cannot meaningfully discuss them apart. This chapter, however, has 
focused primarilly on the masculine or individual body, discussing the 
feminine body only obliquely, as derivative of it. In the next chapter 
this focus is reversed, and the construction of the feminine body in 
bourgeois culture will take analytical centre stage. 
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Chapter Six: The feminine body 
In the previous chapter the broad changes in the dominant 
understanding of the body over the transition from feudalism to 
capitalism were outlined. The central conceptual shift identified was 
from the medieval understanding of the body as one element in a 
hierarchically interlinked cosmology to the bourgeois perception of 
the body as instrument. The analysis of Bakhtin's writings was used to 
show that dominant ideas about the body can be challenged. Dominant 
body-concepts are not the only ideas with significant social currency, 
but alternative conceptualisations are constructed in relation to 
dominant concepts: the medieval carnival degradation of the powerful 
by subsumption within the material depends on an existing hierarchy of 
elite and mass, heaven and earth, super-lunary and sub-lunary. 
The task of this chapter is to analyse in more detail contemporary 
understandings of the female body. I will argue that masculine bodily 
integrity - or closure/separation - is constructed in relation to, and 
depends on the maintenance of feminine bodily openness. Similarly, 
masculine bodily instrumentality is defined in relation to the 
construction of the feminine body-as-environment. Dominant <masculine) 
and subordinate <feminine) body-concepts are created through a set of 
oppositions - open/closed, active/passive, hard/soft, muscle/flesh -
and that consequently resistance to or changes in one effects or 
undermines the other. 
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A further conceptual change in body-concepts with this transition is a 
different conceptual relationship between "male" and "female". The 
feudal understanding of gender difference is one of quantity: the 
bodies of men and women are understood as flesh in opposition to 
spirit, but women's far closer identification w1 th the flesh is all 
but inescapable. The radical splitting of the sexual division of 
labour which occured with the transition from feudalism to capitalism 
Csee, i.e., Rowbotham, 1977; Hamilton, 1978) had, of course, 
resonances on the level of the body. Vith the separation of male and 
female experience broadly along the lines of the public/private 
dichotomy, gender roles polarized, and in the realm of understandings 
of the body flesh,sex and bodily functions became fundamentally 
female. In the ideology of the body the gender difference, then, 
becomes a difference of quality: woman as body, man as mind. 
This argument will be pursued here through a feminist analysis of the 
body. While the transition from feudalism to capitalism sees a 
conceptual shift in the understanding of the body as gendered, this 
shift takes place within the wider context of a continuous thread of 
patriarchal ideology which constructs women and the female body as a 
threat to male order - however that order is understood. 
To return briefly to Turner; the notion of women as threatening is, 
for him, central. He argues that the female body is the main challenge 
to property and power it is what needs to be controlled. 
Consequently, the sociology of the body is, in essence, the sociology 
of the control of female sexuality. <Turner, 1984: 37; 114) He points 
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out that in patriarchal social orders women do not control their 
bodies, which, as "productive bodies" are possessions: "although women 
have a phenomenological possession of their bodies, they have rarely 
exercised full ownership". Cibid.: 120; 233; 57-8) In patriarchy, 
then, women experience their bodies "as objects which are ruled 
externally" (ibid.: 233). 
For Turner, however, the term "patriarchy" has a strictly limited 
meaning. His argument is that patriarchy has dwindled into "patrism"; 
since, with possessive individualism rights are given to people rather 
than to fathers, and since, with capitalism, household property loses 
its central importance to social stability , property rights in women, 
too, are weakened, losing their "systematic legal and political 
backing". <ibid.: 155; 135-141). For Turner masculine property in 
women's bodies fits into this history of the decline of patriarchal 
power; feminism uses the ideology of possessive individualism against 
patriarchy and patriarchal property rights in women's bodies change, 
in response to this attack, from a real, material power into "a 
defensive ideological reaction". (ibid.: 137; 248) 
It will be one task of this chapter, then, through a detailed 
consideration of patriarchal property rights in the feminine body, its 
reproductive power and its sexuality, to try to put patriarchy - in 
the feminist sense - back into the argument. 
Further, the second major absence in Turner's thesis is the masculine 
body. To equate the sociology of the body with the control of the 
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female body alone is phallocentric; in presenting the female body as 
"the issue" Turner naturalizes the male body as the unanalysed norm 
against which the "abnormal" or different female is defined. In so 
doing, it is all too easy to lose sight of why and how feminist 
attacks on patriarchal concepts - including that of the feminine body 
- are resisted. If, as has been argued, the two concepts are defined 
in opposition to one another, then feminist redefinitions threaten 
patriarchal power. The struggle over social constructions of the 
feminine body cannot be adequately understood unless the masculine 
body too is seen as a social construction. If the active male is 
constructed in opposition to the passive female, her struggle to 
become active threatens him. If the female body becomes the instrument 
of the feminine self, it is lost as an environment for the masculine 
self. 
The construction of gender difference should not be seen as the 
definition of female difference in relation to male normality, but as 
the creation of two genders defined through a set of oppostions. 
1fasculinity is a construction every bit as "social" and every bit as 
contentious as femininity. 
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Feminine bodies: the female body in bourgeois culture 
The gender division in the bourgeois body-concept can be made visible 
through an examination of the ownership and the representations of the 
female body. Here the central argument is that the concept of the body 
as the separated and owned instrument of the self is phallocentric, 
presenting as human an understanding which expresses gendered 
experience. Analysis of the perceptions and representations of the 
female body in bourgeois culture reveals a partially hidden sub-text 
of the feminine body as unfinished, incomplete, and potentially 
limitless. Further, this sub-text is intrinsically unstable, being 
understood simultaneously as a symbol of vulnerability and 
powerlessness on the one hand, and voraciousness and threat on the 
other. 
This sub-text is, however, hidden beneath the formal extension, 
beginning in the late nineteenth century, of the rights of the 
autonomous individual 
individualized body 
and, therefore, of the concept of the 
to women. This obscures the continuing 
oppression of women, and places two fundamentally contradictory sets 
of expectations on women's shoulders: to be independent and separate 
while still remaining dependant and responsive. For women there is a 
hidden and unresolvable tension in social expectations, expressed at 
the level of the body in the Virgin/Whore dichotomy, a representation 
which feminists have long placed at the heart of the patriarchal 
control of women. 
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In this chapter patriarchal property rights in women's bodies will be 
analysed in terms of the control of women's reproductive capabilities 
and sexuality. Here the feminine body is understood as a marketable 
commodity, and as part of the environment on which the masculine 
subject acts. 
The tensions between surface and interior in representations of the 
feminine body will then be explored, contrasting the ideal of the 
flawless exterior of the ideology of beauty with the empty and 
voracious interior of pornography. The dichotomies of open/closed, 
Virgin/Whore, autonomy/dependance remain central in the concept of the 
feminine body and define women as objects in relation to the masculine 
subject, and as simultaneously representative of submission and 
threat. 
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Wine, women and song: the female body as property 
"In contemporary patriarchies the male's de jure priority 
has recently been modified through the granting of divorce 
protection, citizenship, and property to women. Their 
chattel status continues in their loss of name, the 
obligation to adopt the husband's domicile, and the general 
legal assumption that marriage involves an exchange of the 
female's domestic service and <sexual) consortium in return 
for financial support." 
<Millett, 1977: 34-5) 
Kate Millett argues that the changes in patriarchy achieved by 
nineteenth century Western feminism were reforming rather than 
revolutionary, attaining "notable reform in the area of legislative 
and other civil rights" and attacking patriarchal society's "most 
obvious abuses" but failed to "penetrate deeply enough 
into .... patriarchal ideology". (ibid.: 64) (1) The central ideological 
tenet of patriarchy - that the male equals "the human norm, the 
subject and referrent to which the female is 1 other' and 1 alien'" -
reasserted itself after the feminist challenge. <ibid.: 46; 85) 
The patriarchal opposition of subject - masculine - and object -
feminine - is the main axis of social meaning around which gendered 
bodies are constructed. Its continuing social salience surrounds 
women's "ownership" of their bodies with ambiguity, and the "second-
wave" of feminism this century has seen as central to women's 
oppression both the definition of women solely through the body and 
1 Millett sees "human consciouness" <ibid.: 63) as the basis of 
patriarchy and thus, I would argue, too readily dismisses patriarchal 
institutions and material practices, slipping into idealsim. <see 
Kaplan, 1986) In discussing patriarchal ideology, however, her work 
was pioneering and remains extremely useful. 
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the control of women through patriarchal control of reproduction and 
sexuality. Adrienne Rid, for example, writes of "the implaccable 
political necessity for women to gain control of our bodies and our 
lives" <Rich, 1980: 221>. And Rich further points out the hidden 
nature of women's bodily oppression, arguing that: 
"The understanding that male-female relationships have been 
founded on the status of the female as the property of the 
male, or of male-dominated institutions, continues to be 
difficult for both women and men." 
<Rich, 1980a: 195) 
This difficulty in understanding arises from the phallocentrism of the 
ideology of individualism, which offers women a spurious and 
supposedly gender-neutral individuality which is continually undercut 
by the ideology of femininity and its construction of the feminine as 
the responsive complement to the :masculine-as-norm. These ambiguities 
can be explored through the issues of abortion and ~· In struggles 
over abortion rights and the definition of rape both the status of the 
feminine body as the passive environment through which patriarchal 
property rights are expressed and the hidden nature of the 
articulation of the discourses of individualism and femininity are 
central. 
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Abortion: a woman's right to choose ? 
Control of their fertility by women is a central issue in modern 
feminism. The campaign for reproductive autonomy was one of the 
resuscitated movement's initial demands, and was from the first 
couched in terms of women's right to control their own bodies. As 
"Shrew" of February 1971 explained: 
"Vie de:mand that women have control over their bodies. Vie 
believe this is denied until we can decide whether to have 
children or not and when we have them. This requires free 
and available contraception and free abortion on de:mand." 
<Quoted in Brunsdon, 1978: 21) 
It is often popularly supposed that the 1967 Abortion Act gave British 
women abortion on de:mand, but in fact it did not, allowing only for 
termination of pregnancy with the permission of two doctors if the 
continuation of that pregnancy would endanger the wo:man' s life or 
health. Abortion while possible is not, then, "free on de:mand". Women 
do not have the absolute right of disposal over the contents of their 
wombs, and this limits the extent to which women can be said to own or 
control their bodies. Further, abortion rights are by no means secure; 
there have been several attempts to limit access to abortion since 
1967 in Britain, and Adrienne Rich writes of the American situation 
that abortion law is "everywhere in jeopardy", threatening women with 
an "elemental loss of control" over their bodies. <Rich, 1980a: 196). 
As Rosalind Pollack Petchesky argues, legal abortion in Britain and 
America "hovers tenuously" in a patriarchal culture. <Petchesky, 1986: 
vii) 
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Further, legality has ensured neither actual access to abortion nor 
its legitimation. As Lynne Segal points out, in spite of women's 
greater control of their fertility: 
"we have yet to win the necessary feminist battle to 
establish women's right to choose to terminate an unwanted 
pregnancy: only 50% of women now manage to obtain an NHS 
abortion, and this government has prevented research on a 
new abortion pill which could be taken in the early weeks of 
pregnancy." 
<Segal, 1987: 228; see also Oakely, 1987: 53) 
The intense public debate over abortion has come to centre around 
"inalienable" rights: the "right" of the foetus to life; the "right" 
of women to have reproductive control; and occasionally the "rights" 
of men to "have a say" in the decision to terminate a pregnancy. Ellen 
Willis argues that this shift in focus represents "a psychological 
victory" for anti-abortionists. Writing in 1979, Willis pointed out: 
"Two years ago, abortion was almost always discussed in 
feminist terms as a political issue affecting the 
condition of women. Since then, the grounds of the debate 
have shifted dramatically; more and more, the Right-to-Life 
movement has succeeded in getting the public and the media 
to see abortion as an abstract moral issue having solely to 
do with the rights of foetuses." 
<Willis, 1919a: 92> 
This position, Willis points outs, rests on "a crucial fallacy" - that 
the rights of women and of foetuses can be isolated from each other. 
(ibid.: 92) Petchesky, too, argues· that "the symbolic fetus" and its 
rights as autonomous from those of the pregnant woman, has displaced 
women from the centre of the abortion debate. <Petchesky, 1986: viii) 
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The rhetoric of rights masks the political nature of the struggle over 
reproduction. That the rights of the foetus are presented as 
independent of women's struggle for control of their bodies obscures 
the place of abortion in the power struggle over women's "productive 
bodies"; presenting "foetal rights" as an abstract moral issue hides 
the question of whose interests are served by such "rights", and whose 
"rights" they curtial. 
Underlying that rhetoric lies a debate about the ownership and control 
of women's sexuality and reproductive capacity which has changed its 
focus from contraception to abortion as the political struggle 
continues. Partial control of reproduction through contraception being 
substantially won in the West, women now seek absolute control and 
public acknowledgement through the law of that control. The object of 
reproductive control in contraception is the unfertilized ovum; in 
abortion what is at issue is the fertilized ovum - the evidence that 
a woman's body has been masculine "territory". While women have won 
control over their "own" biological matter, ownership of the 
fertilized egg is seen as more contentious: in spite of the arguments 
from sociobiology that women's childcare responsibilities are the 
result of a much great primary biological "investment" in children, 
this greater investment does not automatically lead to greater rights 
- or ownership. (see Gallagher, 1987) 
Willis quotes from an interview with Ken ~. an anti-abortionist 
even in cases of rape: 
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"You don't plow under the corn because the seed was planted 
with a neighbour's shovel." <quoted in Willis, 1979a: 95-6) 
Women's bodies and reproductive capacities are, in the last, instance 
masculine property, or, as Petchesky puts it, "passive vessels" in 
reproduction. <Petchesky, 1986: xv) She argues that in the abortion 
debate, as in the debate over new reproductive technologies, "it is 
primarily the fetus, or embryo, which is the object of intervention; 
the pregnant woman, "whether as 'donor' or 'recipient', becomes merely 
the 'site'." (ibid.: xvii) As Ann Oakely points out: 
"The specific reproductive definition of women as mindless 
mothers appears to have emerged simultaneously with the move 
towards a centralized technological control of pregnancy 
which has taken place over the last thirty years ... It has 
now become technologically possible to ignore the status of 
pregnant women as human beings." 
<Oakely, 1987: 39; see also Corea, 1985; Arditti, Duelli 
Klein & Minden (eds.), 1985) 
Here Turner's argument that "family" property becomes increasingly 
less important as property rights are lodged in individuals as 
individuals rather than as fathers is again relevant. However, even an 
acceptance of the argument that children as property become less 
important in a fully individualized society does not lead us to 
conclude that this is the only "motive" for the patriarchal control of 
women. Patriarchal control of feminine sexuality as responsive is 
crucial here: women's struggle for autonomous control of reproduction 
can be interpreted as a struggle over female sexuality, bodily control 
and ownership as a whole. Behind the rhetoric of foetal rights lies a 
struggle to control female sexuality. On the one "side" we find the 
struggle for abortion on demand, sexual freedom and physical autonomy, 
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in which women claim complete rights of ownership in their bodies; on 
the other control through self-policing and fertility restrictions on 
sexual freedom for women. 
As Willis argues, without abortion on demand, women who have not 
chosen to be pregnant face a loss of control over their lives and 
bodies; she writes: 
"However gratifying pregnancy may be to a women who desires 
it, for the unwilling it is literally an invasion ... abortion 
is by normal standards an act of self-defence." 
<Willis, 1979a: 94) 
The anti-abortionist response to this argument, reveals, Willis 
argues, that "the nitty-gritty in the abortion debate is not life but 
sex." <ibid.: 94) Pregnancy is seen as "just punishment" for sexual 
activity - for women, that is; women have "no right to selfish 
pleasure at the expense of the unborn" and must remain "continually 
vulnerable to the invasion of their bodies" (ibid.: 94) The 
restriction of abortion, then, contains and controls female sexuality. 
The abortion debate is one area in which the tension between 
individuality and feminity as social roles for women is expressed. As 
Petchesky argues, the ideology of individual rights is part of what 
keeps abortion legal - as the individual's "freedom of choice" in an 
area of "private morality". <Petchesky, 1986: ix) But if the formal 
consideration of women as individuals helps keep abortion legal, the 
sub-text of femininity continually undermines that "individuality" by 
presenting women as masculine property, and threatens abortion rights. 
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Women are not fully "individuals" in the abortion debate, but the 
foetus, ironically, lS. Petchesky argues that images of the foetus 
suspended in amniotic fluid now so "saturate" the debate that not even 
feminists question their authenticity, and the distortion and 
decontextualization entailed in the presentation a foetus "as if 
dangling in space, without a woman's uterus and body and bloodstream 
to support it." <ibid.: x-xi) 
She argues thus: 
"Chaste silhouettes of the foetal form, or voyeuristic-
necrophilist photographs of its remains, litter the 
background of any abortion talk. These still images float 
like s.piri ts through the courtrooms, where lawyers argue 
that foetuses can claim tort liability; through the 
hospitals and clinics, where physicians welcome them as 
'patients'; and in front of all the abortion clinics, 
legislative coiD.ID.ittees, bus terminals and other places that 
'right-to-lifers' haunt. The strategy of anti -abortionists 
Cis) to make foetal personhood a self-fulfilling prophecy by 
making the foetus a public presence". 
<Petchesky, 1987: 57-8) 
The image, Petchesky argues, 1::3 neither, as is suggested by Dr. 
Bernard Nathanson in The Silent Scream, the view "from the vantage 
point of the victim (fetus)" or the perception of the pregnant woman. 
Rather, it is the view of "a male onlooker" <Petchesky, 1986: xi; 
1987: 60-3). She quotes Barbara Katz Rothman: 
"the fetus in utero has become a metaphor for 'man' in 
space, floating free, attached only by the umbilical cord to 
the spaceship. But v;here it=; the mother in that metaphor ? 
She has become empty space." <Rothman, 1986: 114; quoted in 
Petchesky, 1986: xi) 
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Such imagery, and the rhetoric of the obstetric "advances" which made 
it possible, eerily echoes the rhetoric and practice of nineteenth 
century gynaecological surgery which Barker-Benfield analyses. 
Petchesky argues that it presents the womb "as a space to be 
conquered", and quotes from an interview with Bernard Nathanson in 
}Jewsweek: 
"'With the aid of technology, we stripped away the walls of 
the abdomen and uterus and looked into the womb.'" 
equated in Petchesky, 1987: 69) 
Similarly Oakely argues that ultrasound acts as "a window on the 
womb". <Oakely, 1987: 44) Dr. Michael Harrison, discussing the use of 
ultrasound techniques, writes: 
"The fetus could not be taken seriously as long as he 
remained a medical recluse in an opaque womb; and it was not 
until the last half of this century that the prying eye of 
the ultrasonagram ... rendered the once opaque womb 
transparent, stripping the veil of mystery from the dark 
inner sanctum, and letting the light of scientific 
observation fall on the shy and secretive fetus." 
Cquoted in Petchesky, 1987: 69) 
Twentieth century obstetrical technology, then, like nineteenth 
century gynaecological surgery, allows masculine penetration of the 
"dark inner sanctum" of the feminine body, and this penetration, 
clearly, entails control. It allows, as Oakely points out: 
"the treatment of women as objects, as biological systems 
manipulable in the interests of patriarchy, and only rarely 
themselves capable of manipulation." 
COakely, 1987: 51) 
Petchesky relates such imagery to "the Hobbesian view of ... human 
beings as disconnected, solitary individuals, paradoxically helpless 
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and autonomous at the same time". <Petchesky, 1986: xi) Thus "abstract 
individualism" embraces the foetus but blanks out the woman and the 
dependance of the foetus on her. It could be argued, further, that it 
includes the symbolic male foetus in an individualism to which women 
do not have full access, suggesting that although entirely dependent 
physically the foetus and its "rights" take priority over autonomous 
reproductive control for women. The foetus in this imagery, as 
Petchesky suggests: 
"is not the image of a baby at all but of a tiny man, a 
homunculus". The foetus is "a 'baby man', an autonomous, 
atomized mini-space hero." 
<Petchesky, 1987: 61; 64) 
The symbolic foetus, as masculine, is represented as "primary and 
autonomous"; the pregnant woman, as feminine, is "absent or 
peripheral". (ibid.: 62) 
Women's bodies, then, are controlled as "productive bodies" and as 
feminine bodies; the "abstract individualism" <ibid.: 63) of the 
abortion debate seeks to prevent the autonomous sexual action of women 
as well as to control the "products" of the female body 
-240-
Rape: the right to say no ? 
Feminists working in the area of sexual violence against wo:men have 
long argued that the dominant legal and popular understandings of rape 
are seriously flawed. Feminists argue that rape, far from being the 
rare act of a psychopathic stranger, is in fact an extre:mely common 
act which takes to the "extreme and logical conclusion" "normal" 
heterosexual relations in which coercion is present to a greater or 
lesser degree in the majority of sexual encounters. <LRCC, 1984: 5) 
Box, for example, argues that rape "is not the opposite to normal sex 
but a grim, grinning caricature of it" <Box, 1983: 150) and Clark and 
l&Hi.a argue that rape is the "price" we pay for a coercive standard in 
heterosexual relations. CClark & Lewis, 1977) Rape, then, is one 
expression of a sexual politics in which patriarchal power is played 
out: it depends, for its :meaning and existence, on unequal power 
relations which exist across the spectrum of the social relations of 
the genders. As Andrea Dworkin argues: 
"men are a privileged gender class over and against women. 
One of their privileges is the right of rape - that is, the 
right of carnal access to any woman." 
<Dworkin, 1982: 40) 
Lynne Harvie argues that public abhorence of the cri:me coexists with 
an underlying and widespread belief that much of the responsibility 
for rape can be found in the negligent or provocative behaviour of 
women. She suggests that public abhorrence is based on the 
stereotypical stranger-in-a-dark-alley rape which is, in fact, 
comparatively rare. CHarvie, 1986: 1) In the majority of rapes which 
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do not fit this stereotype much, if not all of the blame is placed on 
the woman attacked; the stereotype acts to distance rape from "normal" 
heterosexual relations. Harvie argues: 
"the basic premise is that 'normal men' do not rape. 
Therefore if a woman is raped by an 'ordinary man' then she 
herself must be to blame." 
(ibid. : 19) 
Largely because of this, reporting rates are low - 8% in Hall's 
survey - conviction rates are very low and sentences rarely approach 
the maximum allowable by statute. <Hall, 1985; Chambers & Millar, 
1987; Clark & Lewis, 1977: 57) Rape is the only crime in which going 
to trial is a better option than pleading guilty; sentences at trial 
are considerably lower than sentences from guilty pleas - the reverse 
of what happens in other crimes - because rape trials give defence 
lawyers the opportunity to argue that the real explanation for the 
attack is to be found in the behaviour of the woman. <Chambers & 
:Miller, 1987) 
Feminists argue, then, that rape in reality and as ideology act as a 
form of social control. Susan Griffin describes rape as a male 
protection racket (Griffin, 1971; 1979) and Jacqueline Dowd ~ 
compares the effect of rape on women with that of lynching on American 
negroes in the earlier part of this century - "an instrument of 
coercion intended to impress not only the immediate victim but all who 
saw or heard about the event"; both rape and lynching, she argues, 
serve the political function of "psychological intimidation". <Hall, 
1984: 341; 340; see also Clark & Lewis, 1977: 23; Brownmiller, 1978) 
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What does the debate over the meaning, extent and function of rape 
tell us about the social meaning of the feminine body ? Legal 
discourse on rape - both statutory and in practice - reveals that 
sexual autonomy is not one of women's rights: women are the sexual 
property of men. Rape law, indeed, originated as an explicit property 
law, as Clark and Lewis point out: 
"Under Anglo-Saxon law rape, along with most other offences, 
was punished by orders to pay compensation and reparation. 
If a woman was raped, a sum was paid to either her husband 
or her father, depending on who still exercised rights of 
ownership over her, and the exact amount of compensation 
depended on the woman's economic position and her 
desirability as an object of an exclusive sexual 
relationship. The sum was not paid to the woman herself; it 
was paid to her father or husband because he was the person 
who was regarded as having been wronged by the act." 
<Clark & Lewis, 1977: 115-6) 
Rape, then, was initially an act of trespass on a woman's body as male 
property, and Clark and Lewis argue that it "has not lost the shrouds 
of these historical origins" (ibid.: 116). Their study shows that 
there exists an informal and extralegal distinction of women into 
"rapable" and "unrapable" categories; to be a "credible" victim of 
rape women must be clearly dependant on one male "owner-protector", 
being either "virgins under the ownership and protection of their 
fathers, or chaste wives under the ownership and protection of their 
husbands". (ibid.: 117) (2) They argue that what this implies is that 
women are sexual property, their sexuality is owned by the man they 
2 Griffin points out that "chastity" is not the only criterion for 
distinguising "rapable" and "unrapable" women; black women tend to be 
categorized as "unrapable" regardless, due to their racist 
categorization as "impure". <Griffin, 1971: 5-6) 
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are dependent upon, and that the value of :::;e:xuali ty-as-commodi ty rests 
on its potential for exclusiv-e ovrner:::hip. Their study found that "the 
primary determinants of pol ice clss:::;if icati on are variables which 
describe the victim - her age, her marital and occupational status, 
her emotional and physical condition when she reported the crime". 
(ibid.: 77; 117) The two most recent comparable studies in Scotland -
Investigating Sexual Assault and Prosecuting Sexual Assault - found 
exactly the same; it is the characteristics of the woman which form 
the main criteria on which the decision on whether to proceed, and the 
trial itself, hinges. <Chambers & Millar, 1983 and 1987) The central 
criterion here is the woman's "past sexual history"; if she is, or can 
be argued to be, anything other than a virgin or a faithful wife her 
"credibility" is significantly reduced. Clark and Lewis argue that in 
practice, if not in statute, decisions on women's value as sexual 
property lie at the heart of legal action on rape: "in effect, the law 
is saying that some women can be raped. and some women can't". (Clark & 
Lewis, 1977: 92; see also Griffin, 1971: 2J 
As we saw, originally all women were treated as property. Clark and 
Lewis explain the modern distinction thu:::;: 
"Women who voluntarily give up that which makes them 
desirable as objects of an exclusive sexual relationship are 
seen as 'common property', to be appropriated without 
penalty for the use, hm,rever temporary, of any man who 
desires their services ... the voluntary granting of sexual 
access outside the parameters of sanctified matrimony leads 
to the loss of sexual and physical autonomy. Once a woman 
parts with her one and only treasure, she never has the 
right to say no again." !ibid.: 121) 
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Clark and Lewi::; arg·ue that women who live outside of marital monogamy 
can be described as "fair-game", or "open-terri tory victims". (ibid.: 
123; 94) Rape law is sti 11 in essence property law, and does not 
provide women "any guaranteed right to sexual autonomy". <ibid.: 124) 
As Griffin argues: 
"One begins to suspect that it is the behaviour of the 
fallen woman, not that of the male, that civilization aims 
to control." <Griffin, 1971: 4) 
The law in England and Wales states that husbands cannot rape their 
wives, since marriage represents continuous and irrevocable consent to 
sexual intercourse. (3) Having once consented to intercourse with her 
husband a woman has no legal right to withdraw that consent. As Sally 
Vincent arguec::: 
"A man cannot rape his wife because he cannot steal what he 
already ownc::." 
<Vincent, 1984; see alc::o Dworkin, 1982: 29) 
This situation is mirrored in the "extra-legal" standards of 
common-sens:e and legal practice which imply that once a woman has 
willingly had extra-marital sex she is unlikely ever to refuse sex 
again - and has little real right to. In Investigating Sexual Assault 
Chambers and Millar quote from police case notes on rapes which were 
reported but not proceeded with: 
.. This self-admitted whore came out of a close at about 
midnight and hailed two passing beat cops and told them she 
had been raped." 
3 Scottish law formally allows prosecutions for rape in marriage; in 
recent years there have been several attempts at prosecution, none of 
which have as yet resulted in conviction. <ERCC: 1988) 
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"She had had sex on a number of occasions in the past" and 
was "a bit of a loose female". 
<Chambers & Millar, 1983: 33; 42) 
But if women do not have ownership rights over their sexuality, they 
do have responsibilities. Women are responsible for protecting the 
property, and preventing rape-as-trespass: Harvie argues that the 
police "see a genuine rape as involving a high degree of physical 
violence and expect a woman to fight to the end to protect her 
honour"; she quotes one detective: "she didn't resist to the 
last ... then of course it's not rape." <Harvie, 1986: 20; 91) As well 
as physically resisting an attack, women are also expected to prevent 
it arising in the first place by "unprovocative" dress and behaviour, 
by restricting their mobility and by not "leading men on". A Detective 
Sergeant interviewed by Chambers and Millar explains the argument: 
"I think it's a crime <in) which a lot of young men ... can 
find themselves genuinely raping someone ... being 
overcome ... led on to a certain point where there's no going 
back . " 
<Chambers & Miller, 1983: 93) 
Feminine sexuality, then, acts as a stimulus to masculine desire; 
dominant discourses on rape imply: 
"that it is women who cause rape by being unchaste or in the 
wrong place at the wrong time - in essence, by behaving as 
though they were free". 
<Griffin, 1971: 6) 
Women must police their sexuality in order to protect themselves from 
rape. As Griffin argues, women thus learn "to distrust ... <their) own 
carnality". <ibid.: 6) Women learn to fear their own sexuality and 
what its exercise may provoke. Once it has been aroused, the male sex-
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drive is seen as uncontrollable; responsibility for unleashing it lies 
with women. <Harvie, 1986: 4) 
Women, then, act as caretakers rather than owners of their bodies and 
their sexuality. As Clark and Lewis argue: 
"Prior to marriage, a woman's sexuality is a commodity to be 
held in trust for its lawful owner. Making 'free' use of 
one's sexuality is like making 'free' use of someone else's 
money. One can act autonomously only with things that belong 
to ones-self." 
<Clark & Lewis, 1977: 122) 
Women do not have rights of disposal over their sexuality; while 
virginity is property held in trust, marital monogamy equals 
exclusive ownership. However, what cannot be bought can always be 
stolen. Dominant discourses on rape construct the feminine body as 
patriarchal property, and relate rape to women's sexual behaviour. 
This has three main effects. Firstly, the identification of women's 
sexual behaviour as the true cause of rape alienates women from their 
sexual desires, which they must "self-police". 
Secondly, women are alienated from their bodies which are, in the last 
instance, the sexual property of others. In rape, feminine subjecthood 
is annihilated; women's bodies are directly treated as objects. Diana 
Russell, in her study of rape, quotes one of her interviewees: 
"'There's something worse about being raped than just being 
beaten. It's the final humiliation, the final showing you 
that you're worthless and that you're there to be used by 
whoever wants you. ' " 
<Russell, 1975: 77) 
As Griffin argues: 
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"Rape is an act of aggression in which the victim is denied 
her self-determination"; she becomes "the object and not the 
subject of human behaviour. It is in this sense that a woman 
is deprived of the status of a human being. She is not free 
to be." 
<Griffin, 1971: 8; 6) 
Finally, the obligation to maintain a physical integrity of which 
virginity is the only true expression leads to a tension in the 
relationship of surface and interior. If physical integrity is to be 
maintained the body must be impregnable; if women wish to be 
heterosexually successful the body must yield. 
In the next section the contradiction between bodily surface as 
impregnable and bodily interior as receptive will be explored. This 
contradiction, it will be suggested, interacts with the obligation on 
women to construct their bodies as attractive objects, as, in 
Stannard' s term, "articles of conspicuous consumption in the male 
market". <Stannard, 1971: 123) 
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Surface tension: skin as symbolic virginity 
"'Virgins must be boring to go to bed with' said Chloe, 
looking directly at Simon. 'They don't know first base from 
second. ' 'When I was a child I liked popping balloons, and 
fuschia buds,' said Simon softly. 'I always like putting my 
finger through the paper on the top of the :Maxwell House 
jar. I like virgins. You can break them in how you like, 
before they have the time to learn any bad habits.'" 
(Jilly Cooper, Harriet, 1977: 22-3) 
Bahktin argues that the defining characteristic of the bourgeois body 
is the understanding of its surface as an 11 0paque" and 11 impenetrable" 
facade. Thus the bourgeois body is understood as non-merging and 
totally individual. CBahktin, 1968: 320) The presentation of this 
body-concept as gender neutral is, however, phallocentric, since it 
refers to a dominant masculine "text" and ignores the feminine "sub-
text" which constructs women's facade as paper-thin. Total bodily 
"closure" is a specifically masculine possibility. (4) This, however, 
does not prevent closure being presented as a goal for women. Striving 
for closure is, however, undercut for women by their simultaneous duty 
to be open and receptive. Ywsculine closure and feminine openness are 
not, of course, equal in value. Recepticity is fundamentally 
ambiguous, and represents weakness, vulnerability, and, as we shall 
see, potential voraciousness. The articulation of separation and 
openness is a basic task of femininity; in feminine bodily self-
4 The closed masculine body is, it should be pointed out, a 
specifically heterosexual construction. It is, however, a construction 
in relation to whose dominance alternative understandings are defined. 
How the concept of closure affects the body concept of gay men is an 
interesting area which is, of course, outside the scope of this 
thesis. 
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discipline the articulation of impenetrability and receptivity is the 
central task. 
The cosmetic exterior 
One expression of the tension between integrity and openess is the 
obsession with the surface of the body, with, in Bardwick and Douyan's 
term, "the cosmetic exterior". Women construct their bodies as 
attractive objects, as stimuli for masculine desire, and Bardwick and 
Douvan argue that the function of the cosmetic exterior is "to lure 
men, to secure affection, to succeed in the competition of dating". 
<Bardwick & Douvan, 1971: 150-1) 
Una Stannard in The mask of beauty, argues that: 
"Little girls look endlessly at beautiful women. They hear 
and read about them too ... <the girl) compares herself to the 
media ideal of beauty and is usually found wanting. She then 
begins woman's frantic pursuit of beauty ... in this culture 
women are told that they are the fair sex, but at the same 
time that their 'beauty' needs lifting, shaping, dying, 
painting, curling, padding." 
<Stannard, 1971: 118-122) 
Attractiveness is central to femininity, and is also a billion-dollar 
industry. The standards aimed at are never really achieved - an 
airbrushed and retouched studio image can never really be replicated, 
even if the raw material of the 5 foot 10, size 8, 17-year-old model 
were not a world away from the body of the average woman. Beauty is an 
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unachievable ideal which fuels consumption. Not only do women have to 
spend to maintain their looks, but there is always the possibility 
that the latest new product or "scientific" cosmetic discovery will be 
the one to help them really acheive the unacheivable. As Marjorie 
Ferguson points out in her study of women's magazines, the ideology of 
beauty "presents the desirable as though it were possible": 
"second only to messages of female obligation to maximise 
physical attractiveness are promises of its attainability." 
<Ferguson, 1983: 58; 59) 
The frantic pursuit of unattainable beauty and the frantic pursuit of 
profit walk hand in hand. The effects of this objectification have 
been well-documented by feminists. Ann Oakley, for example, argues 
that women experience alienation from their bodies, expressed in "the 
careful watching of one's body and its fabrication as a public viewing 
object". <Oakley, 1981: 82; see also Chapkis, 1986) Women's bodies are 
"on show" ; they are obliged to produce their bodies as adequate and 
acceptable "spectacles", as objects external to their selves. 
Two meanings of the social obsession with female appearance are, then, 
obvious, and have become, to an extent, feminist cliches. Women's 
bodies provide a continually expanding market for capitalist 
production; women's bodies are the "lure" which attracts male sexual 
interest. Women produce the cosmetic exterior as an object for men and 
for capital; the beauty obsession colludes with femininity, dependancy 
and consumerism. 
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Some :more complex contradictions can, however, be unearthed in the 
:messages of the beauty industry. The idea of the pursuit of beauty as 
simply passive acceptance of stereotypical femininity can be 
questioned. 
"Improve your outline": smooth. firm and tight 
"With the pips of an apricot, women can slow down the seeds of time." 
<Kanebo Sensai Skincare)(5) 
The cosmetic exterior functions both to attract and to discipline. (6) 
While creating the body as a "beautiful" object is geared to 
attracting the interest and approval of men, it also constructs a 
"finished" exterior, a mask, a barrier. If we look at beauty messages 
about female skin we can see that the dual ai:ms are receptivity, 
expressed as softness, and closure, represented as "flawlessness". 
Vo:men work on the skin as surface from the outside with make-up, 
cleansers, depilatories and surgery, and from the inside with diet and 
exercise; the aim of both processes resembles with remarkable 
exactitude Bahktin' s "new bodily canon" - the opaque and impenetrable 
bodily surface, cloaked in the acceptable and expected feminine goal 
of being soft to the <masculine) touch. 
5 Quotations in this section are taken from skincare adverts in 
women's :magazines, and are identified by product. 
6 Tickner (1976) and Henley <1977) also explore the restriction of the 
female body in, respectively, clothing and movement. 
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The enemies of smoothness, firmness and tightness are legion - spots, 
wrinkles, viens, stretch marks, hard skin, dry skin, sweat, hair and 
flab. Fortunately, however, they can all be dealt with- with a little 
help, of course. 
Preparation 
"Skin looks lumpy, bumpy, dingy ? Uneven in tone and texture 
? Don't panic - it's surprising what a daily dose of 
friction rubbing and a dollop of moisturiser can do to 
neglected skin. With a soapy loofah or friction sponge, 
scrub skin til it tingles, particularly the areas that get 
rough and 'goose-pimply' ... a good scrub like this bucks up 
sluggish circulation and also gets rid of any dead surface 
cells, so skin not only feels instantly smoother but is all 
set for a smoother suntan too." 
<Carol Grant "Give your skin the works" Woman's World July 
'87) 
There's a lot of work to be done before women put on their make-up. 
Although the focus is often on the face, the entire surface of the 
body must be worked on, made smooth and flawless. Louis Marcel's 
"Smooth Operators" range is produced in different packages for the 
whole body - extending right down to the feet: 
"Remember feet ? Those neglected things at the end of your 
legs ?" 
Xoisturisers prevent dry skin's attack on the smooth surface; 
exfoliators expunge the danger of "dead surface cells"; Louis Marcel 
can eliminate hard skin from your feet; anti-perspirants keep you "dry 
and silky", banishing sweat depilitories help you "say goodbye to 
fuzz" and Vichy helps you "fight back at wrinkles - iron out surface 
lines- tighten up the skin". 
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For women who need just that bit more Biotherm and Chanel are waiting 
in the wings with a new range of "scientific" products which will 
actually affect muscle "tone": 
a Chanel Lift Serum Antrides-Raffermissant" with II Plastoderm" 
will "gradually fill ... out laughter lines and 
wrinkles ... tone, tighten and smooth". 
Biotherm' s "skin-firming range" hits all those problem areas with 
"Exfoliating Body Scrub", "Active Body Skin Firmer", 11 Stomach Firming 
Treatment" and "28-Day Bust Firmer". And Clarins' "Skin Firming 
Concentrate" both identifies and solves "the problem": 
"Slackening skin ? Be firm with your face ... Throughout the 
day the highly effective, active ingredients will be working 
to tone and firm skin tissues, helping to smooth out fine 
lines, improve the texture of your skin, and restore firmer 
facial contours." 
Approaching the same goal from the opposite angle, diet and exercise 
erradicate "flab"; Carol Grant, skin evangelist, tells us how: 
"Fight the flab. Spare tyre, flabby thighs, bulging tum ? No 
miracles promised, but 20 minutes a day of exercises, 
combined with a quickie diet, will definitely improve your 
outline." 
(Grant, 1987; see also Coward, 1984: 40) 
The surface has been primed; the next stage awaits. 
Presentation 
The basic principle of the cosmetic exterior is a smooth foundation -
from this all else flows. ~ magazine explains: 
"The purpose of foundation is to provide a better-looking 
skin, both in terms of colour and texture. The film it 
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leaves on your skin hides minor blemishes and gives you 
colour too." 
<"Woman", 5/9/87) 
"Even" skin-tone has two meanings: skin has to feel smooth <texture) 
and look smooth (colour). The aim of cosmetic labour is to look as 
though there has been no work done at all: 
"Barbara Daly shows you how to create the perfect natural 
face ... the face you can put on in the morning and stay happy 
with all day." 
<"Woman", 5/12/87) 
Elizabeth Arden "Simply Perfect :Mousse :Make-up" "gives you incredible 
coverage to even out skin tones ... Result ? A perfect, fine-textured 
finish that looks natural, glowing, fresh for hours." Clinique "Pore-
:Minimizer :Makeup" can go even furtheri it's not just "flaws" which 
disappear but pores too: 
"Women wanted a make-up that gives any skin a flawless 
finish. One that makes pores seem to disappear." 
Repair 
If all this still doesn't work, women can relinquish the "natural" 
apricot seed for electronic technology and cosmetic surgery. If 
Plastoderm, exercise and diet can't tone and firm your skin, "don't 
panic" - there's always ":Minitone": 
":Minitone gets right down to the face-shaping muscles 
beneath the skin ... the first effect you'll see is a gradual 
lifting and firming of the chinline. Then, as the facial 
muscles really start responding the lines around the mouth 
should begin to fade." 
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Or "Speedshaper": 
"Turn belly flab into a super flat stomach ! Tummy muscles 
slack and out of shape ? ... you can discover the new method 
of trimming away ugly embarrassing flab ... to reveal a brand-
new firm, trim and shapely body." 
Or the new portable "Stomach Trimmer": 
"Gives you a slim, trim stomach in just 5 to 10 minutes a 
day ... Pull up - relax, pull up - relax, to tone and firm 
those muscles ... whenever you've got a spare moment use it to 
trim that stomach down." 
The function of muscle then, is not to move or to act, but to maintain 
the firm, taut outline - to "keep it in". <See Coward, 1984: 21) And 
if "do it yourself" is unsuccessful, there is always cosmetic surgery. 
Wrinkles can be "filled out" by "collagen" injections <"Sky", 
21/8/87), and if that won't fit the bill you can always go the whole 
hog and have a face lift. 
The perfect end product, then, is smooth, flawless, tight and firm -
or, impenetrable, opaque and closed. As Ferguson points out, it is 
both sexual and a-sexual: 
"It is sexual in defining the female state 
attractive ... it is a-sexual in offering 
perfected, depilated, deodorised object". 
<Ferguson, 1983: 63) 
as pleasingly 
a polished, 
Its unattainabili ty in reality provides the impetus for a continual 
proliferation of products, going progressively deeper into the body, 
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and seems to impinge not at all on the energy devoted to its pursuit. 
Real female skin will always have "flaws" - wrinkles cannot be kept at 
bay forever, pores can't really disappear, and under the make-up 
uneven skin-tone lurks. The image, however, can and does remain 
everlastingly flawless, reaching its zenith in a recent Chanel make-up 
advertisement where the eyes and mouth, sporting the "latest" colours, 
appear isolated on the white page - skin so perfect it has vanished 
altogether. 
The perfected skin offers no way in; its boundaries are firm and clear 
they do not yield. The perfected skin covers the body as a 
protective barrier, its image and its symbolic value existing to 
create the impenetrable facade of the bourgeois body for penetrable 
woman; the reality, however, real skin, wrinkled, flawed, fuzzed and 
sagging, haunts the facade like a spectre at the feast. 
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The passive vessel ?: virgins and whores 
"However justified men may believe their social position to 
be, they are nonetheless aware, at some level, that women 
are oppressed and do not always accept their oppression 
willingly. Misogyny is caused by fear as well as resentment, 
and as the Orpheus legend tells us, many men fear women 
deeply. There is always a possibility that the submissive 
housewife may turn into a bacchante or Medea, or (according 
to a more modern legend), a 'castrating' female ... Xen's fear 
of women, and the misogyny it produces, rests on the 
awareness that women have good reason to seek revenge." 
<Clark & Lewis, 1977: 139) 
That men hate and fear women seems almost to be taken for granted by 
many feminists; discussion of misogyny, further, frequently raises the 
idea of female sexuality and the female body as a threatening 
environment for men. <Greer, 1971; Dworkin, 1974; Millett, 1977) Susan 
Lipschitz, for example, argues that popular images of prostitutes 
relate to "an unconscious image of a feared, evil and sexual woman". 
(Lipschitz, 1978: 56) Underlying ideologies of female sexual 
passivity, it is suggested, lie deep anxieties about the social 
control of a force which continually threatens disorder and chaos. 
Katherine Arnold argues that women "are not seen as able or willing to 
control themselves. They are suspected of harbouring desires which are 
inimical to the smooth functioning of patriarchal society". <Arnold, 
1978: 57; see also Hirschon, 1978: 69) The message seems to be that 
female sexuality is a seething subterranean force which must be 
brought under stringent discipline if it is not to overwhelm the 
social order. 
This message is to be found not only in feminist theory. It lies at 
the heart of many cultural forms, both "high" and "popular", as Kate 
-258-
Millett points out in Sexual Politics. <Millett, 1977) To take one 
example: "Fatal Attraction", a currently popular film, owes its appeal 
to the titillation and fascination of flirting with female sexual 
danger. In the film wife and mistress represent, respectively, 
disciplined and uncontrolled female sexuality, and it is significant 
that Alex Cthe mistress) uses a carving knife as her weapon 
attempting a symbolic "castration" using a phallic symbol to which 
she, as a woman, is not entitled but which, as the current 
representative of the archytypal dangerous woman, she usurps. And it 
is interesting that Alex - note the name - is finally killed not by 
the "hero" but by his wife; the evil woman's attempt at power is 
defeated by female virtue. In "Fatal Attraction" women provide both 
protection and threat; the self-policing of female danger, at first 
undercut, is in the end sufficient. 
Katherine Arnold, it would seem, is not entirely correct - women can 
be seen as both willing and able to control themselves. Creating and 
maintaining feminine self-discipline is the central aim of the 
ideology of femininity. CSee, e. g. Ferguson, 1983) Self-policing is 
certainly, however, not sufficient to meet the danger of female 
sexuality, v<hich is also controlled by law, physical force and through 
patriarchal ideological constructions of women as weak, dependent and 
endangered not only by sexual violence but by their own sexuality. The 
threat, hm;ever, remains, and it accounts for the ambivalence of 
contemporary images of femininini ty; the virgin and the whore are 
inextricably connected, and every passive form casts a voracious 
shadow. Following Kate Millett, it can be argued that the latter 
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element in this construction comes to the fore when feminist struggles 
directly challenge the social order. 
Underlying both the discourse of feminine sexual disinterest and 
romantic love lies a discourse rather than a reality - of a 
potentially chaotic feminine sexuality, in which penetration is an act 
fraught with danger. While the behavioural content of this 
Virgin/Whore dichotomy has changed considerably this century, its form 
remains the same - discipline threatened by autonomy-as-chaos. On the 
level of body-concept this dichotomy is expressed in the perception of 
the inside of the female body simultaneously as empty, open and 
penetrable space, and as dark, dangerous and engulfing energy. 
The feminine object-body, then, has dangerous qualities - it is not 
wholly passive. This is especially relevant to the current discussion 
- how the object is presented. Eleanor Stephens is among many who have 
written on female passivity, arguing that women "have been brought up 
to play a passive role, and, like Sleeping Beauty, wait patiently for 
:Mr. Right to turn the key to our hearts and sexuality". <Stephens, 
1976) While this is undoubtedly the case, the construction of women as 
passive objects is only one side of the story. Looking at strategies 
of control does not make sense unless we also look at what they are 
supposed to control. There is a hint of this in the presentation of 
women as the stimulus or precipitator of rape, as an indirect and 
insidious power/danger. But in representations of sexuality, and 
especially though not exclusively in pornography <Coward, 1982) we 
find the most direct articulation of the hidden female bodily power 
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which ideologies of passivity and practices of objectification exist 
to control. 
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Kate Millett argues that the misogynst representations of feminine 
desire which she identifies in the work of Miller, Mailer and Lawrence 
formed part of a "counter-revolution" to the feminism of the late 19th 
and early 20th centuries. <Millett, 1977) Her argument here is in many 
ways similar to Barker-Benfield's analysis of the birth of 
gynaecological surgery in the late 19th century, and has areas of 
agreement with the feminist analyses of the new reproductive 
technologies and sexual violence discussed above. What Barker-Benfield 
and Petchesky argue about medical penetration of the dark interior of 
woman is essentially what Millett argues about sexual penetration: 
that :masculine penetration of the feminine interior is understood as 
conquest. 
Barker-Benfield and Millett, further, share in common the argument 
that this penetration responds to a specific feminist threat to the 
patriarchal social order, and is justified through a definition of 
women as potentially sexually voracious. Further, both argue that such 
penetration is understood as an act fraught with danger: a heroic 
journey into the unknown. 
Cora Kaplan questions :Millett 1 s historical periodization; she argues 
that Millett 1 s "dating of the disappearance of overt misogyny is 
fuzzy" and asks "Did it ever disappear?". <Kaplan, 1986: 20) She goes 
on to suggest that Millett oversimplifies not only in her timing of 
revolution and counter-revolution but also in her too close 
identification of "author, protagonist and point of view" and her lack 
of acknowledgement of textual ambiguities. All of this allows Millett 
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to suggest that the sexual representations in her chosen texts form a 
conscious and conspiratorial response to feminism. <ibid.: 24; 29) 
Thus, Kaplan argues, Millett posits mechanical and determinist 
relationships between politics and ideology, ideology and literature. 
Much of Kaplan's critic ism is justified. It would be crude and 
simplistic to argue that their male characters can be read as direct 
expressions of these writers politics or behaviour, or that such 
representations form a conscious anti-feminist conspiracy. Further, it 
is somewhat problematic to argue that perceptions of feminine sexual 
danger and feminine sexual passivity can slot in and out of history 
as simple alternatives, since such perceptions are conceptually 
interdependent. Millett's position on these points is ambiguous, and 
her use of the literary evidence is somewhat mechanical at times. 
However, she does also argue that the sexual representations under 
discussion should be seen as "power fantasy" rather than simple 
reflections of actual behaviour; she describes them, indeed, as 
"illusory". <Millett, 1977: 21) 
Millett's analysis, then, is better viewed as a discussion of one 
possible "resolution" of, rather than iha patriarchal reaction to, the 
tensions and upheavals feminist struggles cause in a patriarchal 
society. While it is simplistic to suggest that misogyny "appears" and 
"disappears" from culture we can argue that the usually covert 
perception of feminine sexuality as dangerous is more directly evident 
at times when feminism seeks to challenge women's social 
powerlessness, and that literature is one place where we might look 
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for such evidence. With these reservations in mind, then, :M:illett• s 
analysis can be used to illuminate the social meanings of feminine 
sexuality and the feminine body, especially in showing us how the 
virgin/whore dichotomy resonates on the level of the body. 
Before returning to Millett, however, it is worth exploring in more 
depth the argument that the virgin/whore dichotomy, usually associated 
with specifically Victorian values, is still central in the 
construction and control of feminine sexuality in contemporary 
society. 
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Nice girls do: a sexual revolution ? 
Lucy Blarui argues that since the last century there have been 
significant changes in the categories through which female sexuality 
is understood: 
"By the late 1960s, with its so-called sexual revolution 
pre-marital sex <lesbianism was still taboo) was more 
possible, more legitimate for young women and girls. As 
Vanity Fair put it in 19'71: 'Nice girls do.'" 
<Bland, 1981: 62) 
Bland, like Barker-Benfield, argues that the 19th century ideal of 
"asexual" womanhood "co-existed with other representations, giving a 
highly contradictory construction of female sexuality". (ibid.: 5'7-8) 
She argues that "the central polar! ty virgin/whore", through which 
female sexuality was understood, changed in focus in the 19th century, 
suggesting that the polarity previously seen as innate in all. women 
was then used to distinguish the pure, asexual bourgeois wife and "the 
impure whore", with the latter being "the repository of those 
unacceptable desires and sexual behaviour whose displacement kept the 
virtuous woman and the home she inhabited pure and unsullied". (ibid. : 
59) 
It would be more accurate, however, to see the virgin/whore 
distinction as a differentiation between women as an addition to, 
rather than a replacement of, the idea of the virgin and the whore in 
perpetual conflict for the possession of each female body. Women's 
greater moral and sexual purity was posited in spite of their greater 
"animality", or domination by their reproductive capacities. Women 
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were thought to be continually under the threat of a complete 
reproductive "take-over", but were simultaneously held to be 
passionless creatures by nature. <ibid.: 58; Ehrenreich & English, 
1979: 108) What Barker-Benfield's work shows, however, is that 
feminine animality could mean not only domination by the womb but also 
referred, in a more covert fashion, to a potentially insatiable 
feminine sexuality which underlay even the bourgeois woman's sexless 
state. 
Bland argues that the sexual revolution must be seen in the context of 
the Victorian Virgin/Whore dichotomy. What changed is content rather 
than form - to the "new-style virgin/whore dichotomy ... Cof) the 
monogamous woman versus the promiscuous". <Bland, 1981: 62) 
Contemporary ideas about feminine sexuality express the same 
polarities of discipline/chaos, integrity/openess, subject/object, 
since female sexuality is still created as heterosexual, dependant and 
responsive. 
Bland argues that monogamy/responsibility is understood as the 
opposite to promiscuity in "a reconstructed double standard around 
promiscuity". (ibid.: 62) The monogamous one-man woman must be 
sexually responsible - that is, faithful - in controlling fertility 
and the "health" risks of non-monogamous sex. Here, Bland argues, the 
"cleanliness/filth" polarity central to the distinction of virgin and 
whore is expressed in medicalised terms. (ibid.: 63) Discussing the 
"Yorkshire Ripper" she points out that he used the polarity very 
directly, describing the prostitutes who were his main victims as 
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"scum" and "mucky women"; further, she argues that his distinction of 
innocent and guilty victims went more or less unquestioned, showing 
that: 
"the motive for killing prostitutes was self-
explanatory ... it was only the killing of 'innocent' women 
which presented a comprehension problem." 
(ibid. :64; see also Warde-Jouve, 1986; Hallway, 1981; 
Caputi, 1988) 
The virgin/whore dichotomy is still central to the construction of 
feminine sexuality. Sue ~ has explored its effect on girls' 
behaviour. <Lees, 1986) She argues that the term "slag" is significant 
in the control of girls' sexuality and behaviour; a "slag" is a girl 
who is sexually promiscuous, who sleeps with boys she does not "love", 
for: 
active female sexuality "is rendered safe only when confined 
to the bonds of marriage and wrapped in the aura of 'love'." 
(ibid.: 28) 
The only sure protection against this stigmatization is to have, or 
quickly get, a "steady" boyfriend Cibid. 36); that is, to validate 
<possible) sexual activity by becoming exclusive sexual property. 
Girls cannot themselves initiate sex, but are responsible for boys' 
sexual behaviour. (ibid.: 164) If a girl is known to have slept with 
"too many" boys, her property value falls: she becomes "second-hand", 
(ibid.: 46) probably sexually voracious (ibid. 46-8) and definitely 
indiscriminate; she is a girl who will "go with anyone anywhere". 
(ibid.: 150) 
The term slag, however, often bears little or no relation to actual 
sexual behaviour, and is used to constrain girls' actions in non-
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sexual situations too; its "vacuousness and ambiguity" allows the term 
to be used as a general mechanism of control. (ibid.: 25; 34; 138-9) 
It is a sanction which, furthermore, operates indirectly, as self-
control; Lees argues: 
"'Slag' is present as sexual censure even when boys are out 
of sight and out of mind. Such is the power of male 
dominance that its exercise is not dependant on the presence 
of the oppressor ... ! am reminded of the concept of power as 
1 self-carried' , which has been elaborated by Foucault, a 
power of male dominance which is not 1 exercised' by boys 
over girls, but which girls carry with them and which 
penetrates their lives and their recreations." <ibid.: 82) 
Although girls must avoid being stigmatised as slags, they must not go 
too far in the opposite direction and be labelled "tight", that is, 
"unapproachable, sexually cold - a tight bitch". <ibid.: 37) Lees 
quotes "Pat": 
" ' It's a vicious circle. If you don't like them, then 
they'll call you a tight bitch. If you go with them they'll 
call you a slag afterwards.'" 
(ibid. : 37) 
Lees concludes that in spite of an increase in pre-marital sex, "the 
double standard of sexual morality is just as strong today". (ibid. 
167) Bland argues that the distinction goes "beyond" common-sense to 
institutional use - she cites the centrality of supposed promiscuity 
and "moral danger" in understandings and treatment of adolescent 
girls' "delinquency". <Bland, 1981: 64; see also Hudson, 1984) It is 
these categorizations which also operate in the area of sexual 
violence. As Hirshon points out, the social control of women is 
exerted both externally, through social convention, and internally, as 
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a moral force expressed in the concepts of "shame" and "modesty". 
<Hirschon, 1978: 67) 
Women are responsible for sexual control, and can "precipiate" sexual 
action through the "presentation of herself as promiscuous, as 
sexually available" but are not themselves independently sexually 
active. <Bland, 1981: 65) Bland concludes: 
"Thus, in effect, women are not only held responsible for 
their own sexual behaviour, the consequences of that 
behaviour, the potential 'health risk', the potential 
'dysgenic' breeding ... they are frequently also held 
responsible for male sexual behaviour." 
<ibid.: 64) 
Women do not - or ought not to - instigate sexual activity; women 
should function as sexual stimuli for masculine action, and are 
responsible for controlling access to the female body as a stimulating 
environment. Dominant representations create women as sexual objects 
for men. (ibid.: 65-6) Further, Bland argues that in <many) 
pornographic representations, "women's bodies are used as objects of 
humiliation and loathing", their genitals especially being "filthy and 
polluting". (ibid.: 66) 
Dangerous bodies 
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The following discussion of ideas on sexuality in general and 
pornographic representations in particular seeks to make a number of 
points. 
Firstly, the central issue of sexuality remains an understanding of 
man as subject and woman as object. Sexual liberation, as many 
feminists have pointed out, has not resulted in sexual autonomy for 
women, and women's bodies remain an environment on which the masculine 
subject acts. The threat of independent female sexuality and female 
ownership of the body are, however, of central significance in 
representations, especially pornographic representations, of women, 
where they are represented as voraciousness and promiscuity. What has 
changed, I would argue, is the response to the threat of feminine 
"openness". In place of the 19th century control through denial of the 
existence of female sexual desire and sexual surgery we can uncover 
the control of voraciousness through a conceptualisation of 
penetration as possession, exhaustion and repletion. Instead of 
controlled infusions of sperm, feminine sexuality is contained by 
exhausting it. 
To return, then, to Kate Millett: what does her work tell us about the 
perception of the feminine body as housing dangerous sexual energies ? 
:M:illett argues that in "counter-revolutionary" literature women, and 
especially women's bodies, were defined as "a terrible void, a lack, a 
deficiency of being within" which only phallic penetration could fill. 
OHllett, 1977: 263; 24-1) One of the texts :Millett discusses is 
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Miller's Sexus; she argues that its feminine character::; are presented 
as objects, that Miller: 
"converts woman to 'cunt' - thing, commodity, matter. There 
is no personality to recognize or encounter ... the perfect 
woman is a floating metonomy, pure cunt, completely 
unsullied by human mentality". 
(ibid.: 297; 300) 
The perfect woman, however, is the result of phallic action; before it 
she has a will, however degraded - she acts. Afterwards she is the 
perfect will-less, passive object. In "Sexus" the hero, "Val", 
recounts his conquest and humiliation of "Ida", a friend's unfaithful 
wife. Ida is a vain, deceitful and souless "monster" who: 
"'lived entirely in the body, in her senses, her desires -
and she directed the show, with her tyrannical little 
will ... Ida swallowed everything like a pythonness. She was 
heartless and insatiable.'" 
<quoted in Millett, 1977: 4) 
The intention of the episode, is, however, to show the limits of 
female insatiability - it can be conquered: in sex with Val Ida 1 s 
"tyrannical little will" entirely disappears and she is totally under 
his control: 
"'she was just like a bitch 
panting, gasping, wriggling 
<quoted, ibid.: 3) 
in heat, biting 
like a warm on 
me all over, 
the hook. 1 " 
Ida aims to control Val and fails; Val aims to humiliate her, to 
punish her far her "nymphomania" and destroy her will, and succeeds. 
Millett argues that "his penis is now an instrument of 
chastisement ... Ida's genitalia are but the means of her humiliation". 
(ibid.: 7) Her will is destroyed in her reduction to "paroxysms of 
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sensual ca. pi tula.tion". (ibid. : 8) She is reduced from human to animal 
status. Since, however, Ida., as a. nymphomaniac, "'lived entirely in 
the body, in her senses, her desires'" destroying her will and 
removing her potential to act independently merely reduces her to her 
true status. (quoted, ibid.: 4) 
As Andrea. Dworkin points out in Intercourse, the assertion of will, or 
active and independent desire cannot co-exist with the status of 
sexual object, for "objects do not will, and want, and search, and are 
not subjects in a human quest for love or affection or sex". <Dworkin, 
1987: 17-8) Ida's independent will is annihilated in sex - she wants 
only what he wants - her dependant desires make her a helpless object. 
Dworkin points out that "the eroticism of the female exists within the 
bounds of :male sexual imperatives". <Dworkin, 1981: 34) Crucially for 
the present argument, however, this annihilation of feminine will is 
not easily accomplished; it depends on an elaboration of sexual acts 
which are impossible in reality but realisable in fantasy the 
fantasy of a. "potency ... superb and overwhelming" <Dworkin, 1987: 7-8) 
In this fantastic resolution of danger, masculine sexuality is, 
Millett argues, "clinical", "fastidious", a "self-conscious 
detachment". (Millett, 1977: 306; 297) She quotes Miller's "Val": 
"'except for the part of me that was in her I was cool as a 
cucumber and remote as the Dog Star'". 
Cquoted, ibid.: 297) 
He is all self-possession; in contrast, she: 
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11 
'wasn't any longer a woman in heat, she wasn't even a 
woman; she was just a :mass of indefinable contours wriggling 
and squirming like a piece of fresh bait'". 
<quoted, ibid.: 297> 
Afterwards: 
11 
'She went into a convulsion, delirious with joy and pain. 
Then her legs slid off my shoulders and fell to the floor 
with a thud. She lay there like a dead one, completely 
fucked out.'". 
<quoted, ibid.: 306) 
Feminine sexuality is, when exercised autonomously, non-human. Xillett 
picks random quotations from Killer's novels which describe feminine 
desire as animalistic: 
"'squealing like a stuck pig'; 'like a crazed animal'; 'like 
a she-animal' or 'a bright voracious animal'". 
<quoted, ibid.': 306) 
Her "autonomy", then, is not real: her sexual energies are not 
exercised by a fully human subject - they control her rather than her 
controlling them. Feminine animal voraciousness and masculine sexual 
self-possession exist in the relationship of nature to culture: the 
latter defines itself through the subordination of the former. 
Phallic penetration takes the sting out of feminine desire; its puny 
attempts at autonomy destroyed, the feminine body is returned to its 
true object status. Feminine genitalia is a "crack", a "wound", a 
"gash", "a slimy hole" - "but really only emptiness, nothingness, 
zero". <ibid.: 307-8) If that emptiness had properties, if it 
independently desired, its status as passive penetrable object would 
be in danger. Penetration - in which, paradoxically, the :masculine 
body remains entirely separate and detached - exhausts active feminine 
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desire, showing women that they really want to be Hhat they really 
are: objects which exist to be used. 
It is in pornography, however, that the exploration and resolution at 
the ideological level of the threat of the sexually active woman, 
expressed in the concept of female sexuality as voracious, appears 
most explicitly.. The focus here is on openings: the mouth/throat, 
womb, anus and especially vagina. Penetration is the central act of 
pornography, functioning as action, conquest, humiliation, control and 
containment. In Pornography; men possessing women Andrea Dworkin 
argues that the narrative of resistance then capitulation which 
characterizes heterosexual pornography acts to contain a female threat 
by representing female desire as ultimately responsive rather than 
autonomous: what she really wants is what he wants - "the object is 
allowed to desire if she desires to be an object." <Dworkin, 1981: 
109; 128; 205) This is one way in which the danger of feminine desire 
is "resolved" - rendered dependant and responsive, women do desire, 
but their desires conveniently and unthreateningly dovetail with 
"masculine" desire. 
This "resolution", however, is no longer seen as sufficient. To the 
issue of what women want sexually is added the question of how JIJUch 
they want. In pornographic representations the threat of "nymphomania" 
is presented as titillation, flirting with a danger that the endless 
repetition of pornographic "plots" has resolved a thousand times 
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b<=:!fore. Dworkin's analysis shows that one penetration is rorely 
sufficient - variation and repetition forms the sexual ' -" crescenc .. o 01.. 
pornography. It is this feature of pornography which Kate Millett 
notes - the species of fantasy which Steven ¥.arcus calls "pornotopic", 
the "shower of orgasms". (:Millett, 1977: 7) One orgasm is never enough 
to "satisfy" - insatiability needs "a shower of orgasms" to render it 
safe through exhaustion. 
Constructing feminine desire as the desire of an object to be 
possessed is only half the resolution which women's "insatiablity" 
now requires. To this must be added exhaustion and repletion, and the 
agents of exhaustion are those staple ingredients of pornography, the 
unnaturally large and inexhaustible penis, and the repetition of 
sexual acts until both protagonist and audience can be certain that 
the woman's desires have been exhausted. In The Art of Dominating 
~. for example, we are offered "intimate details of a thoroughly 
submissive female and the incredible excesses she requires for total 
satisfaction". <quoted in Dworkin, 1981: 160-1) 
An example from Dworkin's work on pornography will clarify the 
argument. She analyses Black Fashion Model by John Wilson. The 
"heroine" of the book is Kelly, the richest and most famous black 
model in America, who although she appears on film as "a wanton, lusty 
woman" is in reality - or so she thinks - innocent. (ibid.: 210) The 
plot, such as it is, hinges on Kelly's abduction and repeated sexual 
abuse by two men and one woman. The innocent Kelly at first struggles 
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and protests, but she is ultimately unable to resist the pleasure of 
forced sex: 
"Kelly is 'beginning to go out of her mind with the powerful 
affects (sic) of cunt-licking lust ! ' ... an inner voice with 
masochistic urges is telling her that she loves being 
forced." 
(ibid.: 212) 
Voyeurism and lesbian rape form the hors d'oevres; penetration is the 
entree: 
"Robert Gray fingerfucks her. He keeps withdrawing. He 
spreads the fluid from her cunt on his cock with his 
fingers. He tells her it excites her. His monstrous white 
shaft is between her black thighs. His fingers pinch her 
clitoris. He puts his finger in her. Robert Gray's 'blood-
filled cock would soon be ramming into her body' ... when his 
cock is buried in her belly she feels as though she is being 
stretched apart. She loves it ... She is hopelessly impaled". 
(ibid. : 213) 
The excitement comes from her continual attempts to resist - at first 
to resist the acts, then to resist enjoying them. Of course, both 
prove impossible: her "hot little gash seemed to gape in greedy 
desire". Robert Gray, by contrast, remains completely in control - he 
can stop and start at will and keep going for as long as he chooses, 
indeed, until Kelly "finally goes limp .. her body was beaten and 
bruised and satiated from the ravishment". (ibid.: 214) 
Unsurprisingly, however, it soon becomes clear that she is not yet 
wholly satiated. The final course is a black man with a penis "too big 
for any natural orifice" (ibid.: 214). Robert Gray - now not quite 
"monstrous" enough, it would seem - having dealt with her vagina, 
"Bart Kurtis" takes over: 
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11 He makes her suck ... His cock keeps sticking at the bottom 
of her throat. She feels lust ... Bart lunges viciously in her 
throat but she is sucking with wild abandon. Her pain is 
horrible but her lust is overwhelming." 
(ibid.: 214) 
Anal rape finishes Kelly's humiliation: 
11 It is like a crucifixion, "the nail pounding into 
her ... defiling her asshole". Then she starts to get excited 
and like it ... Kelly cums and cums and cums." 
(ibid. : 215) 
In her discussion of Whip Chick, a story of female sadism, Dworkin 
argues that "in fantasy, the male can experiment with the consequences 
as he imagines them of loss of power over women". (ibid.: 35) 
Experimentation with fear and danger does not rely on the explicit 
presentation of feminine sexuality as openly sadistic. What the 
discussion of Black Fashion Model shows is that even the superficially 
innocent one-man woman presents a threat; all feminine desire is 
dangerous and must be made dependant, its active, willed elements 
removed and its potential exhausted. As Dworkin points out, ~ 
Fashion Model is a profoundly racist text; its "heroine", as a black 
woman in a white milieu, is doubly powerless as well as doubly 
sexualized. In spite of this, her "desire" is dangerous, and must be 
exhausted. 
Independent female desire, even when not openly sadistic and 
castrating, by its very existence still threatens the gender order of 
subject and object, actor and environment. On the level of the body 
insatiability and the threat of disorder rest in bodily orifices -
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hot, gaping and greedy "gashes". Represented as fundamentally open 
and penetrable, openness lS the bodily locus of weakness, 
vulnerability and incompletion, the passive orifices through which 
women are conquered and possessed by the active male - as The Art of 
Dominating women tells us, "' fucked by a big dick until there was 
hardly a hole left'". (ibid.: 163) However, the deeper meaning of 
openness and incompletion, seldom articulated, is what makes conquest 
to the point of exhaustion neccessary. Feminine incompleteness 1s 
ambiguously constructed so that masculine desire, represented by the 
penis, is all that is needed to complete it - but this completion is 
far from secure. The pornographic fantasy of the inhumanly large and 
inexhaustible penis shows us the insecurity of masculine conquest and 
ownership as well as the definition of feminine bodily openness as 
weakness. The other side of penetration is, as Dworkin describes, the 
fear of being engulfed in "the burying, enveloping, suffocating, 
killing quality of sex with a woman" CDworkin, 1987: 24), in "the 
voracious cunts of pornography" CDworkin, 19<'31: 224) 
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The feminine body; objectification, discipline and chaos 
The definitions of active/masculine and passive/feminine operate in a 
dependant opposition; if one changes, both change. As Dworkin argues, 
"the first rule of masculinity is that whatever he is, women are not." 
<Dworkin, 1981: 50) Feminine desire must be contained by 
responsiveness, and the danger of independent, active and autonomous 
feminine desire controlled in reality by stringent sanctions and 
social disgust, and resolved in fantasy by annihilation of the will 
and exhaustion of desire. Women's empty inner space must be policed in 
actuality and filled up in fantasy. Women's bodily appetites, if not 
controlled, threaten chaos. As Dworkin argues, "in the male sexual 
framework the sadistic whore whose sexuality is murderous and 
insatiable ultimately ... is also the exquisite victim, fulfilled 
through annihilation." (ibid.: 176) She is fulfilled; she wants no 
more; she wants only what he chooses to give. Penetration equals 
conquest and possession, but a conquest and possession so insecure 
that they must be forever repeated. 
Feminine desire responds to something outside of itself, while 
masculine desire comes from within and satisfies itself through the 
responsive feminine environment. The masculine body is complete in 
itself. The feminine body is empty until filled by men. And emptiness 
represents both weakness and danger. 
Women, however, strive to be both female and human. Thus, they must 
act, but still respond. They must be independent but still dependant, 
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active, but not too active, passive, but not too passive, self-
contained but still open. The ultimate irreconcilability of acting 
like a woman while thinking oneself an individual is expressed on the 
level of the body in the struggle to impose an impenetrable cosmetic 
facade and an autonomous sexuality - a sexual boundary - on a body 
whose definition centres on orifices: the open mouth of advertising, 
the voracious vagina of pornography, the Freudian genitalia as wound, 
the inner space of Erikson's psychology. 
The struggle is to contain the desire and the chaos which those 
orifices symbolize, to remain on the right side of the virgin/whore 
divide, and to show that self-control is possible and adequate. Women 
:must safeguard their bodies, their emotions and their sexuality as 
masculine property, as caretakers of objects produced for masculine 
consumption. They must maintain a physical integrity which the 
definition of their bodies as open continually undercuts. The smooth 
surface must look impenetrable but can never really be impenetrable. 
The i:mpossi bility of ever really becoming "persons" must stay hidden 
in the continual struggle to be both person and woman. 
As we saw in Chapters Two and Three, reconciling individuality and 
independence with femininity and responsiveness in the "correct" way 
is presented by psychiatry, and, to a lesser extent, by feminist 
therapists, as the ultimate cure for anorexia. The next chapter argues 
that articulating the demands of individuality and femininity is 
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precisely what the anorexic woman aims to do through her control of 
eating and appetite which she describes in exactly the terms used to 
describe feminine sexuality as animalistic and potentially 
overwhelming. She does this during, rather than after, the illness. In 
this chapter the definition of the female body in bourgeois culture 
has been shown to centre around the concepts of object, discipline and 
~; in the final chapters the articulation of these concepts in 
anorexia will be analysed. 
-281-
Chapter Seven: The anorexic symptom 
Nicky Diamond argues that our ideas about the body "are not simply 
references to properties of anatomy, but produce a social phantom 
body-anatomy which is structured in form and inscribed with magical, 
imaginary properties". <Diamond, 1985: 57) Some "imaginary properties" 
of the feminine body were analysed in the previous chapter which 
attempted to outline the dominant social meanings which construct that 
body in bourgeois patriarchal culture. There the three central axes of 
meaning were explored. 
Firstly, the feminine body is created as an object on which the 
masculine subject acts, and which he owns; women maintain their bodies 
as objects through dietary, cosmetic and behavioural practices as 
caretakers rather than owners. Thus Turner's assertion that women have 
a "phenomenological possession" of their bodies sits uneasily with 
women's alienation from their bodies as the objects of masculine 
sexual desire and the site of personally uncontrolled reproduction. 
Secondly, self-control is, as we have seen, an essential feature of 
femininity and of women's relationship with their bodies: women watch 
what they eat, how they dress, talk, sit, walk and behave. Finally, 
there is the other side of the coin of self-control - fear and disgust 
at the appetites which neccessitate that control: women's potential to 
overwhelm the boundaries of femininity and restricted feminine space. 
Diamond goes on to argue that the ideas about the body "in social 
circulation" are actively constructed, rather than passively accepted: 
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"worked with - reproduced and reworked by each specific site of image 
production". Ci bid.: 54) In this chapter anorexia will be analysed as 
a "site of image production". I will analyse the reproductions and 
reworkings of the concepts of the body which take place in anorexia 
through the concepts of objectification, discipline and chaos. 
In anorexia feminine self-control takes on new dimensions. "Weight 
watching" becomes the major, and eventually the sole activity of the 
anorexic woman. This chapter will examine the ritualized eating 
pattern through which anorexic self-control is effected, primarily 
through analysis of the responses to a questionnairre completed by 35 
anorexic women. What will be argued here is that anorexic rituals 
attempt to create secure defenses against appetite, and that the 
ultimate goal is the construction of the body as desireless and 
inviolate. Eating nothing - allowing nothing into the body - is, 
therefore, the end towards which anorexic rituals aim. 
The enemy of anorexic control is appetite. Appetite is the chaos which 
makes discipline so necessary; appetite is the danger from which 
ritualized eating tries to protect the self; and appetite is the force 
which undermines and makes so precarious anorexic self-control. 
Through an analysis of anorexic women's descriptions of eating I will 
argue that the concept of feminine insatiability is translated, in 
anorexia, from sex to food, and the characterization of feminine 
desire as non-human intensified. Further, the danger that feminine 
desire will encroach upon masculine space is expressed internally in 
the anorexic body as appetite (feminine) threatening self 
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(masculine). Thus a public and social inter-gender conflict, in which 
feminine desire is understood as threatening patriarchal order, is 
transformed into a private and individualized intra-gender struggle. 
Here the central argument is that in anorexia the body and its 
appetites are transformed in an attempt to eradicate desire. This 
splitting process is defined by anorexic women in a variety of ways -
either the body, food, or the anorexia itself come to be seen as 
alien. Further, the distinction is one of oppression and control; the 
conscious strategy of not eating comes to control and oppress its 
creator. The sense of control by an external force is mirrored in 
hospitalization, where the anorexic woman becomes the object of 
medical control. Women's bodily alienation and objectification, then, 
are transformed in anorexia with the construction of an absolute 
opposition between appetite and "self". Here the body is split into 
two: the desiring body, in which appetite is lodged; and the 
desireless body, which needs nothing and wants nothing. 
In anorexia the social construction of the feminine body through 
objectification and the discipline/chaos dichotomy is taken to its 
logical conclusion. Socially these meanings are primarily expressed as 
sexual, with a secondary expression in dietary self-control versus 
"naughty" indulgence as especially meaningful for women. In anorexia 
control and insatiability centre primarily around food and eating, 
with a secondary expression in sexuality. This reversal can best be 
explained as accessibility in the privatized reworking of the 
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dominant social meanings of the body which anorexia effects, eating is 
controllable. The sexual body, as an object, is not. 
Anorexia, however, does not simply express and transform social 
meanings - it also attempts to resolve their contradictions. The 
anorexic women aims, through a ritualized eating pattern, to create 
the surface of the feminine body as an absolute barrier and the body 
itself an an absolute object. In anorexia the concept of 
receptivity/penetrability as weakeness and incompleteness is overcome 
by creating the body as a self-contained object which takes in nothing 
from the external environment. Food, here, represents external 
intrusion: the aim is to eliminate it completely and create a pure, 
empty and static inner space free from contamination. 
The anorexic "shell", then, functions in two senses: to prevent 
intrusion and to contain emptiness. A barrier constructed in ritual 
"non-eating" completes feminine incompleteness by allowing nothing in, 
signifying bodily integrity by the end of penetrability. Feminine 
bodily openness, however, means more than simple weakness. 
Penetrability represents both incompleteness and voraciousness, and 
both meanings are reworked in anorexia in the split between the body 
as desiring enemy and desireless ally. Hunger in anorexia is symbolic 
of all desire, and the insatiability of feminine desire is expressed 
in anorexia by the construction of appetite as a force which must be 
eliminated if it is not to destroy the "self". The barrier-body in 
anorexia aims, then, at desirelessness and needlessness. Not just 
food, but the desire for food is dangerous and threatening: the 
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object-body is created to eliminate both. The desiring body, however, 
continually threatens the elimination of appetite by its longing to 
take in, to encompass. 
The ultimate aim of anorexia is the destruction of the desiring body 
in which dangerous appetite is lodged, and its replacement by the 
object-body. The aim is to create the body as an absolute object -
inviolate 1 complete and inactive - wholly owned and controlled by the 
self. The irony of anorexia is that the object-body comes to control 
the self. As we shall see, in "second stage" anorexia starvation as a 
conscious strategy is itself transformed into an oppressor - the 
anorexic woman feels powerless to stop a process she herself began. 
Before going on to look in detail at the questionnairre responses, 
however, it will be helpful to consider the theoretical issues they 
raise. This can be initially approached through a consideration of 
Turner's analysis of anorexia. 
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In Turner's sociology of the body, it is argued that each society has 
four "tasks" in relation to the body: the reproduction of populations 
through time; the regulation of bodies in space; the restraint of 
desire through disciplines; and the representation of the body in 
social space. <Turner, 1984: 2-3; 91) Here illnesses, he argues, 
especially those of subordinate groups, are "cultural indications of 
the problem of control" (ibid.: 2-3). He argues thus: 
"since the government of the body is in fact the government 
of sexuality, the problem of regulation is in practice the 
regulation of female sexuality by a system of patriarchal 
power." 
(ibid.: 91) 
"the control of bodies is essentially the control of female 
bodies". 
(ibid.: 249) 
For Turner, certain characteristic illnesses are associated with the 
four dimensions of the social control of bodies. Women's illnesses 
especially are diseases of dependancy: "the medical problems of 
subordinates are products of the political and ideological regulation 
of sexuality" Ci bid.: 92). And this dependency is reinforced and 
legitimated in treatment. In this system, then, anorexia, as well as 
being a disorder of dependency is a disease of presentation, 
associated with the fourth dimension of the regulation of bodies. 
(ibid.: 95) He argues that in modern societies the representation of 
the body/self is a particularly acute issue, since it is no longer 
lodged in fixed social roles but is symbolically highly flexible 
Cibid.: 92; see also 174); anorexia thus becomes "an anxiety directed 
at the surface of the body in a system organized around narcissistic 
consumption" Ci bid.: 93). 
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As middle-class women enter public society in the twentieth century 
female illnesses become increasingly presentational, and are "symbolic 
of anxieties about the surface of the body" (ibid.: 108). Anorexia 
"most dramatically expresses the ambiguities of female gender in 
contemporary Western societies", in that it expresses both the 
"representational crisis" of the individual in late capitalism through 
the modern view of beauty as thinness and the struggle of women 
against dependency. The anorexic woman suffers from "protective 
parenting in the confines of the privatized family". (ibid.:113) 
Anorexia and bulimia are, then, "two individualized forms of protest 
which employ the body as a medium of protest against the consumer-
self". Cibid.: 180) Turner suggests that anorexia is a struggle within 
the middle-class family "where over-protected <girls) seek greater 
control over their bodies and therefore their lives", an ascetic 
control through subordination of the flesh which paradoxically results 
in the dominance of the body when eating, dieting. food and getting 
rid of food become "all consuming passions". (ibid.: 184) Further, 
anorexia entails a "contradictory" sexual symbolism. The anorexic 
woman rejects sexuality by her suppression of menstruation but at the 
same time conforms to cultural norms of female attractiveness in her 
pursuit of thinness. (ibid. : 185) 
Refusal to eat is, then, for Turner "an oppostion to parental feeding 
which gives the child some control over bodily functions". (ibid.: 
191) He argues that the "anorexic" family is characterized by the 
contradictory demands it places on its daughters. While competitive 
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success, usually educational, is emphasized, compliance, rather than 
the independence through which success might be gained, is promoted. 
The "overpowering, dominant mother" brings up her children to fulfill 
her interests rather than their own, and thus inadequately prepares 
the child for adolescensce by stifling individuation. (ibid.: 192) 
The anorexic daughter chooses her illness as a defence against this 
confusion. On the one hand, she "gives in" to compliance by 
suppressing sexuality and maturity through her suppression of 
menstruation and adoption of "a permanently childlike body and 
attitude to the mother". On the other, she gains a sense of 
independent control through her control of food and her body - "this 
is her peculiar compelling path to selfhood". <ibid.: 193) It is, 
then, the mother's control, effected through nurturing, which the 
anorexic woman seeks to escape - since the anorexic family has a 
dominant mother and a father who is either weak or absent, it "suffers 
from matriarchal not patriarchal control" (ibid.: 196; 195) 
However, once she has chosen anorexia, biological processes take over: 
"it becomes increasingly difficult to control, interupt or redirect 
the process of weight loss, absence of appetite, overactivity, 
insomnia and amenhorroea" <ibid.: 193). As well as this, the logic of 
denial leads to a "moral spiral": "the anorexic pattern of asceticism 
requires obligations which cannot be met so that lapses into self-
indulgence are regarded as imperfections which drive her into further 
reinforcements of the regimen". (ibid.: 194) The anorexic woman chases 
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her symptom, but then the body takes over: her choice for autonomy 
results in "the dominance of nature over culture". (ibid.: 202) 
For Turner, however, anorexia is not wholly explicable in the familial 
context . He argues that a feminist perspective which points to the 
control of women's bodies through the ideals of beauty and thinness 
and their commodi tization is valuable in that it locates anorexia 
historically and socially as an illness which, like hysteria in the 
nineteenth century and depression in the twentieth, expresses "the 
structural limitations" placed on women who are at the same time, 
especially in the middle-class, expected to be both feminine and 
"successful in the public domain". <ibid.: 196) Anorexia, then, 
results both from matriachy in the family and patriarchy in the wider 
society. <ibid.: 197-8; see also 200; 203) There is "a contradiction 
between the achievment orientation within the home and the public 
restraints on female success outside". <ibid. : 201) 
This is an interesting if somewhat confused analysis of anorexia. 
Firstly, it works from a number of questionable assumptions about the 
illness itself. Turner appears to assume that ammenhorroea is one of 
the main conscious aims of anorexia, and that it expresses a 
suppression of sexual maturity. Not only is it unlikely, as Wellbourne 
and Purgold point out, that the "pre-anorexic" girl knows enough about 
biology to realise that starvation will stop menstruation before she 
embarks on the anorexic process, but further, ammenhorroea can in fact 
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lead to the "discovery" of anorexia when the anorexic woman becomes 
concerned about her lack of periods and goes to the doctor. 
<Wellbourne & Purgold, 1984: 35-6) Further, Turner posits a rather 
simplistic and biologistic link between menstruation and sexuality; 
menstruation is only one of the signs, both social and biological, to 
which an adolescent girl must adjust herself in attaining adult 
feminine sexuality. 
Turner also accepts rather unquestioningly for a sociologist the 
psychiatric explanation of anorexia as a "biological take-over", in 
which the body rather than the woman maintains the illness. It is 
unfortunate that his more promising idea of a "moral spiral" is not 
expanded. He argues, quite wrongly, that anorexia entails loss of 
appetite, and thus suggests that remaining anorexic is a not 
particularly difficult process. The existing literature, as well as my 
own material, contradicts both these assumptions. He thus needs to 
explain only why the anorexic girl begins, and not why she persists in 
her illness. This is one reason why his explanation of anorexia as a 
disease of presentation is advanced, since her anxiety about self-
presentation and the cultural valuation of feminine thinness provide 
ample explanation of why so many women diet. We seem almost to be back 
again with anorexia as "dieting gone too far". 
Even more alarming, however, is his almost wholesale acceptance of the 
Bruch theory of pathological families, which was criticized above. 
Again we find the implication that in a "proper" family - presumably 
one with a dominant father and a weak mother ? - the conflicts which 
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produce anorexia would be avoidable and "independence", educational 
and career success achievable. Although Turner argues that family 
structures are "determined" by social structure, and mentions in 
passing that the "dominant mother" is herself a product of patriarchy, 
this social perspective is added-on to the Bruch thesis rather than 
used to criticize it. 
If we accept the ideological contradictions between independence as 
individuals and dependence as women which produce anorexia as a 
central feature of women's social experience in a patriarchal and 
capitalist society we would expect to find expressions of that 
contradiction both in the family and in the wider society. As Boskind-
Lodahl points out: 
" ... the feeling of not having any identity is not a delusion 
or a misperception but a reality which need not be caused 
solely by the stereotyped protective mother but by other 
cultural, social and psychological pressures as well." 
<Boskind-Lodahl, 1976: 347) 
There are, then, alternatives to attributing "achievement orientation" 
to the "pathological" family with its domineering mother and "public 
restraints" - does this mean femininity ? - to "outside" society. 
Turner downgrades the issue of desire in anorexia by defining it as a 
disease of presentation. Of course, this analysis allows anorexia to 
fit very neatly into his four-point plan; however, if the plan did not 
encourage an either/or choice between the regulation of desire and the 
representation of the body, anorexia could usefully be analysed as 
expressing both. Turner himself argues that anorexic women "suppress" 
sexuality but also argues, rather contradictorily, that an 
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individualized rejection of sexuality conforms to the ideology of 
sexual expression through personal choice. Quite how anorexia can be 
seen to make the body "a vehicle of desire" is not clear. But because 
Turner thinks that anorexic women are not hungry he ignores the 
continual struggle with the desire for food which is central in 
anorexia. Further, he sidesteps the whole issue of what sexual 
"choice" can really mean for women in a patriarchal culture. 
Turner has followed Foucault throughout his analysis of the body, but 
he seems not to see the potential of this perspective for analysing 
the differences between masculine and feminine experiences of desire 
in bourgeois culture. Foucault argues that it is simplistic to see 
structures of power as suppressing a natural and inherent sexuality; 
rather, sexualties are produced through power/knowledge. <Foucault, 
1979; 1980) We could use this perspective to argue that masculine 
desire is produced as active, feminine desire as responsive. Thus, for 
men being fit for pleasure is being fit to act; for women it is being 
fit to be acted on. Further, such a perspective could be used to 
prevent us treating masculine sexuality as the unanalysed norm from 
which feminine sexuality deviates. If we see desire as a socially 
created force rather than a socially repressed natural appetite then 
we can see that masculine as well as feminine sexuality, male as well 
as female bodies, are regulated and controlled by culture. 
Presentation is vital and anxiety producing specifically for women, as 
women must produce desirable bodies, but so also is the self-control 
of feminine sexuality as responsive rather than active. Here the 
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conflict between individuality and femininity is again central: the 
formal gender-neutrality of the ideology of inddi vidual ism suggests 
that women, as well as men, can be independent, active and pleasure-
seeking. However, this is undercut for women by the ideology of 
femininity which represents women as dependent. Desire, therefore, is 
fundamental but problematic for women, who must reconcile as persons 
and as bodies these contradictions. Anorexia is one such attempt to 
reconcile the irreconcilable at the level of the body, and is thus 
explicitly a disease of desire as well as a disease of presentation. 
Turner's general perspective on the sociology of the body can 
nevertheless be used without neccessarily reaching, on anorexia at 




The need to achieve a sense of mastery or control has been seen, 
particularly Hilde Bruch and Marilyn Lawrence, as central to the 
development of anorexia. Bruch locates the need for control in faulty 
upbringing, Lawrence in a social structure which denies women autonomy 
in many areas of their lives. We can now look at anorexic women's 
views of control, the ritualized eating pattern through which the 
attempt to maintain control is organised, and the threat of chaos 
against which the attempt struggles, and which explains, for anorexic 
women, its neccessity. 
In the questionnairre, I asked the women to explain, if they coUld, 
why they became anorexic. Their explanations were offered tentatively 
in the main, against a background of uncertainty not infrequently 
amounting to bafflement. However, the need to exert some control over 
something in an environment in which the woman feels powerless was a 
dominant explanatory strand. (1) 
The conscious aim of the control of food and weight is achievement; 
through that control mastery, power and success will, it is expected, 
1 The other main explanation was that the anorexia was her way of 
coping with "deeper" difficulties and problems, usually seen as 
familial; while not a direct control explanation the two are obviously 
related. 
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be gained, and will be evident to the world around her and especially 
to the people she feels are trying to dominate her. The question, 
then, was "Why do you think you became anorexic?": 
"Throughout my childhood, I had done exactly what was asked 
of me, and was held up to be the 'perfect' child. At about 
1'7, there was conflict about my future (school, college, 
career etc.) and I gave in to parents' wishes, but started 
my own social life, with my first sexual encounters, and at 
this time, the dieting also began." 
<Sophie) 
"I felt my younger sister was the apple of my <warring) 
parents' eye and that I was a failure. I had to take a stand 
and control so:mething." 
<Sheila) 
" ... a streak of perfectionism ... probably family 
expectations, fear of growing up, academic pressures, and 
the need to do something well all played a part ... Often I 
still feel I somehow have to be slimmer than all my friends. 
This is irrational I know." 
<Irene) 
"an excessive case of self-discipline ... a need to control 
something when my whole future <career, relationships, etc.) 
broke down and a move away from home which coincided with 
all this." 
<Andrea) 
"I felt unsafe and insecure in a big and threatening 
world ... the anorexia was a way of coping and an escape from 
a world that I felt I couldn't cope with." 
<Jane) 
"I. .. felt that only being super-slim and attractive would 
warrant my success as a person." 
<Barbara) 
The cause of the sense of powerlessness, which leads to control is 
explained most often as parental control and expectations, but also as 
pressure from friends, the school, the anorexic woman • s own high 
expectations of herself and "the world" itself. 
Feminists <and others) have argued that the family is the primary 
location of the social control of women, the social institution in 
which patriarchal constraints are transmitted and are most directly 
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felt. An acceptance of this argument, however, should not lead us to 
argue that the family is the only source of patriarchal control and 
the "cause" of the oppression of women. Rather, the family is one 
institution through which patriarchal social control operates; the 
expectations and worldviews of friends, school and the culture in 
general, the sexual division of labour and the institution of 
heterosexuality all produce and reproduce the ideology of femininity. 
It is perhaps understandable, though, that in an individualist culture 
explanations of powerlessness should be sought in personal and 
familial relationships rather than in a social structure which 
constrains women's power, economically, psychologically, socially, 
sexually and politically. 
Once a need for control has been identified, how is that need acted on 
? For the respondents diet is the obvious arena of control for women ; 
the questionnairre responses simply take it for granted, and not 
surprisingly also take thinness as a feminine ideal as read: 
"The only independence I could have was to be independent of 
food and no-one could make me change." 
<Anne) 
"I became anorexic as a result of dieting which I couldn't 
stop. However much weight I lost I just wanted to lose more. 
I am 5' 6~" tall, amd my goal weight was 6 stone <I never 
achieved this weight) I felt more attractive the slimmer I 
became, and felt more confident and controlled. I felt I was 
displaying supreme self-control. The slimmer I became the 
more successful in everything I felt." 
<Paula) 
"I needed to have something in my life which I was in 
control of ... I felt that by limiting my food intake I was 
gaining a sense of power." 
<Frances) 
"I feared failure and felt my life was out of control. All I 
could control was my weight. I think those are the reasons 
but therapy might lead me to new possibilities." 
<Patricia) 
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Dieting, as has already been argued, is a :major element in feminine 
self-control, and as well as expressing the value of restraint for 
women, in dieting the body is also worked on as a :major element in the 
construction of a "cosmetic exterior". The concern with eating and the 
body shows what areas of their lives women can control. Women's 
involvement with food shows the extent and the nature of the 
responsibilities of the female role. Ardener describes this as women's 
"petty time-consuming activity" <Ardener, 1978: 16>; part of the 
powerlessness of women lies in their restriction to activities seen as 
trivial. 
In the previous chapter we looked at the importance of "beauty" in 
femininity, and the role which dieting plays in its achievement. But 
food is more generally women's business. As Rhian 1ll.l.ia argues, "from 
an early age girls are taught to cook for and how to serve food to 
men". <Ellis, 1983: 165) And as Murcott points out, cooking is women's 
responsibility: 
"cooking is securely anchored as the responsibility of 
women as wives and mothers ... the kitchen was their domain." 
CMurcott, 1983b: 181> 
It is not, :M:urcott points out, that men never cook; as Oakley also 
found in her studies of housework <Oakely, 1974), men "help" with what 
is primarily a female responsibility. However, "it is always women who 
daily, routinely, and as a :matter of course are to do the cooking". 
CMurcott, 1983c: 82) 
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The convention of who cooks for whom expresses, Ellis argues, "wider 
issues of male authority"; women cooking for men expresses men's power 
over women's time and labour, and Ellis quotes a remark from the 
Dobash study of marital violence to illuminate her point: 
"She' 11 have my tea ready when I go into this house, not 
when she feels like it." <Ellis, 1983: 166; 169; Dobash & 
Dobash, 1980) 
Food is women's responsibility, then, but women's responsibility as 
subordinates. M:urcott found in her research that women cook mainly 
according to their husband's preferences rather than their own, and 
argues that "their responsbili ty in this sphere is tempered with 
references to their husband's, not their own, choice ... in a literal 
expression of wives' deference to husband's authority". CMurcott, 
1983c: 79-80; 89) Although buying, preparing, cooking and serving food 
is women's work, women do not control their labour; Murcott argues 
that while women are responsible for doing the work of cooking, "they 
are answerable to the person in whom the power to delegate is 
originally vested" (ibid.: 89) 
Food, then, is one of the ways in which, in Gamarnikow and Purvis's 
phrase, men are "the recipients and controllers of female servicing". 
<Gamarnikow & Purvis, 1983: 3; see also Imray & Middleton, 1983: 23) 
For women cooking is primarily a service for others, principally men 
and children. M:urcott found that her respondents felt that cooking for 
onself was not worth the time and effort, and that when women are 
alone they: 
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"'pick' at something that happens to be in the house, have a 
bar of chocolate or packet of crisps later in the evening or 
a snack." 
<Murcott, 1983c: 84) 
A "proper" dinner - a cooked meal of meat, potatoes, vegetables and 
gravy is prepared primarilly for other people; the labour it 
neccessitates is not worth it for women alone. Murcott concludes that 
"if husbands and children are absent, women alone will not 'cook', 
indeed many may not even eat". (ibid.: 85; 80-4) Food for women, then, 
expresses the priority of others' needs and wants rather than personal 
desire. Cooking is labour for others; the dictates of personal taste 
is unimportant; and dieting is normal. 
With this in mind, the "choice" of anorexic women to seek control of 
themselves through control of their eating is perhaps as obvious to 
the reader as it is to them. Once diet has been "chosen" as the way to 
achieve mastery and success, a complex set of rituals around food and 
eating specifically, and the body and its environment generally, are 
developed. 
Mary Douglas defines ritual as "an attempt to create and maintain a 
particular culture, a particular set of assumptions by which 
experience is controlled" <Douglas, 1966: 128) Ritual frames 
experience; "the marked-off time or place alerts a special kind of 
expectancy ... framing and boxing limit experience, shut in desired 
themes or shut out intruding ones". (ibid.: 63) 
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She argues that ritual behaviour in "primitive" societies should be 
differentiated from modern ritual acts not on grounds of 
sophistication or the "real" knowledge of scientific truth, but 
because primitive societies possess and express a unified culture, 
while modern cultures are fragmented. (ibid.: 2; 35; 68-9) In 
primitive cultures "the same set of ever more powerful symbols" is 
used in every context; what is included and excluded, what is seen as 
dangerous or polluting is the same for the whole society. In modern 
societies, experience is fragmented, rituals express different 
inclusions and exclusions and create "a lot of 1 i ttle sub-worlds, 
unrelated". (ibid.: 69) 
:Modern justification for purification, or dirt avoidance rituals as 
caused by "hygiene" is often, Douglas argues, based on "fantasy" 
(ibid.: 69); the fundamentals of modern cleanliness rituals were 
established before bacteriology. Douglas argues thus: 
"if we ... abstract pathogenicity and hygiene from our notions 
of dirt, we are left with the old definition of dirt as 
matter out of place ... where there is dirt there is system. 
Dirt is the by-product of a systemmatic ordering and 
classification of matter, in so far as ordering involves 
rejecting innappropriate elements. This idea of dirt takes 
us straight into the field of symbolism". 
(ibid.: 35) 
Dirt, then, represents disorder, matter out of place; its elimination 
is thus "a positive effort to organise the environment" in order to 
conform to the dominant categorizations of experience; "our pollution 
behaviour is the reaction which condemns any object or idea likely to 
confuse or contradict cherished classifications". Ci bid.: 36) Ritual, 
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then, "arises from the interplay of form and surrounding formlessness. 
Pollution dangers strike when form has been attacked.". (ibid.: 104) 
This understanding of ritual can fruitfully be used in the analysis of 
anorexia. Three features of Douglas' thesis are especially relevant: 
ritual, she suggests, frames and controls experience through the 
inclusion of what is safe and valued and the exclusion of what is 
dangerous or polluting; it does this by defining as 
polluting/dangerous that which crosses the lines between order and 
disorder; and in modern societies rituals express the fragmented 
experience of discrete social groups. In anorexia, the ritual 
practices with which women surround the act of eating function to 
allow into the body/system "safe" food and exclude "dangerous" food. 
The restricted list of allowed food, the control of time, place and 
manner of eating impose order on a threatened chaos of appetite which 
is most directly present in the act of eating. 
Douglas argues that "transitional states" are dangerous because 
transition is "neither one state nor the next, it is indefinable". 
Cibid.: 96) Eating in anorexia is precisely such a transitional state 
- between, on the one hand, emptiness and purity and, on the other, 
fullness and shame, between the denial of appetite and surrender to 
it. The order which anorexic rituals impose on each act of eating is 
an attempt to control the formlessness of appetite. Now, while it 
would be wholly innacurate to define "normal" or non-anorexic eating 
as "unritualized", it is clear that anorexic eating is ritualized in a 
profoundly different fashion than the norm. While "non-anorexic" 
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eating is certainly not determined by response to a "natural" appetite 
- we do not eat only when we are hungry nor consume exactly what we 
want - it does all ow for some "responsive" eating - snacks or eating 
between meals. Non-anorexic eating is disciplined, for example, by the 
structure of the working day, but it also allows some flexibility. For 
the non-anorexic the world will not come to an end by eating between 
meals, or by eating something new or unusual. For the anorexic woman 
all eating is dangerous and transitional, and ri tualization is an 
attempt to make it progressively safer by divesting it as far as 
possible of sponteneity and response to desire. It is, in fact, 
appetite or the desire for food which, by virtue of its formlessness, 
is dangerous. The anorexic woman fears that once she starts to eat she 
will be unable to stop. The daily plan of eating the same food in the 
same place at the same time in the same way reduces the possibility 
that the chaos of appetite will disturb her order. 
If it were simply that all food was wholly negative the anorexic 
dilemma would be simple and fatal. Appetite, however, is both 
dangerous and pleasureable. At the start of the anorexic process only 
certain foods are defined as polluting usually "fattening" or 
"forbidden" foods. Foods defined in the dominant discourses of 
nutrition and diet as allowable and virtuous are "safe" - that is, 
non-polluting. The distinction here is between food as fuel and food 
as pleasure. Thus far, anorexic categorizations follow dominant social 
ideas about food, albeit far more rigidly. But the category of "safe" 
food is difficult to maintain. 
-303-
The anorexic woman is continually hungry, and the danger of that 
hunger is too great to be wholly contained by the exclusion of the 
conventionally "forbidden". Douglas argues that "the quest for purity" 
pursued through a rejection of disorder is paradoxical; experience is 
not amenable to "logical categories of non-contradiction", it does not 
"tidily fit into accepted categories". She argues that absolute purity 
in experiential categories is impossible, and that we must either 
accept this, or blind ourselves to the inadequacy of our concepts to 
totally contain experience. (ibid.: 162; 163). 
For the anorexic woman, purity in food categories can never be wholly 
maintained, for it is not the inherent properties of the food itself 
which are dangerous, but her desire for it. She can reduce the danger 
of that desire by eliminating the foods she desires most, but she can 
never totally eliminate the desire expressed as hunger. As she eats 
from a more and more restricted list of foods, appetite attaches 
itself to originally less dangerous foods which themselves must then 
be eliminated. The aim is to reduce the danger by cutting out more and 
more foods; the "dangerous" category, therefore, continually expands 
while the safe category contracts. Ultimately the aim of anorexia is 
to eat nothing at all, and the fact that few women ever attain this 
does not make it less of an ideal. For most the rituals are far from 
perfect; they lessen the danger of appetite rather than abolish it. 
Host anorexic women are forced to accept that not eating at all is not 
a real possibility: the aim of anorexia is not death, but the 
establishment of complete physical integrity through the abolition of 
desire. 
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To that degree, then, in spite of what is said about their "inability" 
to perceive complexities and 11 gray" areas, <see Chapter Two above) 
anorexic women do tolerate ambiguity. But this tolerance is never 
comfortable. No matter how little they eat, or how virtuous and 
pleasure-free their allowed foods, 
perpetually threatens their control. 
hunger still remains and 
The central difference between anorexic ritual and ritual as Douglas 
defines it is that the latter is collective and public in both meaning 
and practice, while the former's collective meaning is hidden and its 
practice private. 
The previous chapter suggested that when patriarchal power is 
threatened, female desire is defined as dangerous and/or polluting. 
Indeed, Douglas notes this, arguing that when patriarchy is secure, it 
is maintained by sanctions rather than pollution rules. When dominance 
is threatened, the sense of its precariousness is expressed through 
definitions of danger and pollution. She argues that this "Delilah 
complex" - the idea that women and female sexuality weaken and betray 
men/society - occurs in cultures where women do have the power to 
weaken men, in the culture "at war with itself". <ibid.: 140-154) It 
was suggested in the previous chapter that the 11 Delilah complex" is 
currently a dominant strand in sexual politics. 
For the anorexic woman dangerous sexuality and its potential to 
overwhelm is transformed into desire for food, an arena in which 
control and containment is, as we have pointed out, both accessible 
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and, it seems initially, possible. But while belief in the potential 
danger of feminine desire is socially created and maintained in 
ideology the anorexic woman maintains her transformed definition of 
danger alone. Collective danger is not counteracted by collective 
ritual in anorexia; rather, collective danger is counteracted by 
individual practice. This is why Douglas' argument that formlessness 
is seen both as dangerous and potentially creative of new order 
Cibid.: 94-5) is not applicable in anorexic ritual, where the danger 
of formlessness and the protective order of ritual occur in the one 
body. 
In anorexia the threat of formlessness, or a chaos of appetite, is not 
a threat to the self from "outside", but operates within the self, 
where its social power appears as individual. It is the anorexic 
woman's integrity which desire will destroy, since that integrity 
rests on the absence of desire. Operating against social definitions 
of the feminine body as incomplete, this construction is inherently 
precarious. The struggle between feminine desire and patriarchal 
order, carried on internally, represents only danger, devoid of 
creative potential. 
The anorexic system is a system at war with itself. The struggle takes 
place inside one body which represents both order and chaos. In social 
ritual, the fear of dangerous impurities entering the social system 
express a fear of danger from without Cibid.: 121-2); in anorexic 
ritual the impurity, as appetite, is internal and can only partially 
be externalised as food in order that it can be resisted. Mary Douglas 
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argues that the body can represent any bounded system; its surface can 
represent the categorical limits of any set of relations, and its 
orifices indicate "its especially vulnerable points". <ibid.: 115; 
121) In anorexic ritual the woman is trying to construct and maintain 
a bounded system through the exclusion of appetite, defined as 
dangerous and polluting and partially externalized as food. The mouth 
is where danger can get in, and the "bloated" stomach is where the 
pollution is evident to the anorexic woman and, she believes, to 
others. But because what is polluting comes from within, resisting it 
is both difficult and contradictory. 
Douglas argues that in small persecuted minority groups "social 
conditions lend themselves to beliefs which symbolize the body as an 
imperfect container which can only be made perfect if it can be made 
impermeable". Cibid.: 158) This is precisely what anorexic women are 
trying to do, but since appetite continually undercuts the impermeable 
body, this strategy cannot succeed. 
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The central anorexic food categories are "safe" and "dangerous" foods. 
All the respondants had a list of specific food and drinks, sometimes 
as small as one-item, that they would allow themselves to eat. <See 
also Wellbourne & Purgold, 1984: 3) Further, they also have a 
prohibited list - foods and drinks they would rarely, ideally never, 
eat. The categories for the most part fall into line with what is 
currently considered nutritionally good/healthy/wholesome - ie fruit 
and vegetables, bran, wholemeal bread, yoghurt and 
bad/unhealthy/"empty" of nutritional value - cakes, sweets, fried 
foods, fats, fizzy drinks, sugar. As well as the discourse of 
nutrition, or food as duty, the discourse of diet, or "slimming" 
foods, is important in anorexic categorizations - diet coke, low-fat 
cheeses, krispbreads, slim soups, skimmed milk, Outline and that 
staple of all diets, black coffee, all figure prominantly. Although 
reliant on wider social categorizations of food, anorexic catgegories 
are both much more rigid, and subject to erratic transformations. 
<Palmer, 1980: 74) 
Cultural rules and meanings are transformed in anorexia, and to 
understand the transformations we must first take a brief look at the 
dominant cultural meanings of food. Anne Murcott argues that practices 
and ideas about food should be seen as "part and parcel of the culture 
and structure of the societies in which they occur". <Murcott, 1983a: 
1) She argues that cooking and serving food refers to social 
relationships, and cites the priority of men in food distribution as 
an example. Food and eating, too, have symbolic significance as well 
as a material and social organization. Ci bid. : 2-4) She identifies 
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morality as a major symbolic theme in food, suggesting that eating the 
"right" food for the "right" occasion "conveys a message that the 
proprieties are being observed". Cibid.: 2) 
Paul Atkinson, too, identifies food as a "code" in· which "cultural 
oppostions, puzzles and paradoxes may be expressed, and may achieve a 
symbolic resolution". <Atkinson, 1983: 10) Food and ideas about food 
convey meanings - including virtue, propriety and nature - and in 
eating we ingest symbolically as well as concretely, taking in the 
qualities seen to reside in the food as well as the food itself. 
(ibid.: 10; see also Twigg, 1983: 26) Atkinson analyses "health 
foods" to explore the meanings encapsulated in their imagery, finding 
that "naturalness" is central, He argues that the main characteristic 
of health food is that it is seen as natural as opposed to artificial, 
simple as opposed to adulterated - pure and whole. Health food is 
healthy because it is natural. <Atkinson, 1983: 12-4) Atkinson argues 
that this imagery is part of a wider ideological strand which 
contrasts modern urban society with a more "natural" past - the "urban 
pastoral dream" of a past era in which self-sufficiency, personal 
autonomy and control were possible in a less complicated way of 
living. <ibid.: 15) 
Through the expression of "health" and "virtue" in the "natural", our 
culture expresses an oppostion of nature and culture, here through 
food. (ibid.: 12) As Twigg points out, raw food "in its freshness and 
newness ... stands for an uncorrupted reality prior to the distortions 
and evasions of civilisation". CTwigg, 1983: 29) Eating health food, 
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then, allows a resolution at the symbolic level of the pastoral dream 
and the urban reality. Eating health food equals eating nature, 
simplicity, wholeness and purity, and gives the sense of personal 
control which is central to all body-maintenance strategies. We 
express cultural disatisfactions by the rejection of "artificial" 
food, and resolve the disatisfaction by eating "natural" food. 
<Atkinson, 1983: 14-7) 
What is healthy about health food is far more, then, than mere 
"nutritional" value. In the nature/culture opposition nature is seen 
as virtuous, and eating natural food is "a morally desirable act". 
(ibid.: 16) Eating nature means eating virtue and moral superiority. 
Eating the unnatural can mean decadent self-indulgence. 
Eating as self-control versus eating as indulgence is a central 
opposition in anorexia. One strand of anorexic food categorization is 
precisely in line with what Atkinson identifies - food as either "good 
for you" or "bad for you" as defined by its degree of healthiness. 
Anorexic "safe" food is often health food, but these wider social 
categories are not simply adopted wholesale by anorexic women. Not all 
healthy food is safe: Atkinson argues that milk and honey are 
"classic" natural foods, conveying purity <ibid.: 11), but whole milk 
is commonly excluded in anorexia as "fattening". Eating health foods 
in anorexia is the translation of a positive value - taking in nature, 
health, purity and virtue - into a negative value - not taking in 
pleasure. Here the adulteration of food which is not natural lies more 
in its attempt to make food more exciting and pleasureable than in the 
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invasion of nature by culture - and it is this which anorexic women 
avoid. 
Food in anorexia is separated into two strictly separate categories. 
"Safe" food, which is nutritionally valued, low calorie, and not 
"fattening", is sanctioned as either doing the body good ("health" 
foods) or at least not causing any harm ("diet" foods). "Dangerous" 
food, food which is off the list, is dangerous because it is food 
consumed only for pleasure. Because its only value is pleasure, it 
does all harm and no good. The aim is to eat food as fuel: 
"I wanted foods that were light and didn't fill me up." 
<Jane) 
"They <allowed foods) are crispy and tasty, but light, and 
do not :make me feel heavy and full." 
<Sophie) 
Here Dally and ~·s distinction of hunger and appetite is relevant. 
Dally and Gomez define hunger as a physical response to a disparity 
between food intake and energy output, and argue that hunger develops 
"when physiological changes in the body signal that more fuel is 
needed ... (it is) basically concerned with energy balance". <Dally & 
Gomez, 1980: 14) Appetite, along with habit, determines choice and 
pleasure in food; it "dictates what food we fancy or reject ... appetite 
anticipates pleasure - from the meal or from the next mouthful". 
(ibid.: 13) Hunger is a physical, appetite a mental force. (ibid.: 14) 
Hunger is concerned with nutritional requirements, but in appetite 
food is imbued with symbolic powers and can give symbolic 
satisfactions: 
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"Appetite links food with memories and fantasies; with magic 
and superstition; with love, power and prestige; with 
happinness and also with misery." 
(ibid.: 14-17; see also Palmer, 1980: 78-9) 
It is not only hunger and appetite which motivate us to eat, however: 
"Much of our eating depends on habit and routine quite apart 
from whether we feel hungry. We eat either because everyone 
else is doing so, or a meal has been prepared at home, or 
because we are due for a break from work." 
<Dally & Gomez, 1980: 22-3) 
Dally and Gomez posit hunger as primary, appetite and habit as 
secondary - appetite and routine are built onto an already existing 
hunger which has to be satisfied before the secondary forces come into 
play. 
Nicky Diamond is critical of the idea of a "natural hunger mechanism" 
or "natural appetite". <Diamond, 1985: 46; 57) She argues that the 
social structuring of eating transforms physical needs and that hunger 
is "patterned by social response", gastric juices being produced in 
accordance with regular food intake and the capacity of the stomach to 
take in food by regulated amounts. She concludes that "the experience 
of 'hunger' cannot be freed from meanings, since it is meaning that 
defines the experience as such." (ibid.: 58) Dally and Gomez see the 
desire to eat as biological with a social "overlay" which affects but 
does not create it; Diamond, on the other hand, argues that hunger, 
appetite and routine are all socially structured. 
From the sociological perspective, and bearing in mind our earlier 
criticisms of sociobiological reasoning, the latter perspective seems 
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preferable. The Dally and Gomez position is outlined here, however, 
because it corresponds to a widely accepted "common-sense" view of 
eating in which hunger equals "need" and is biological, and appetite 
equals desire and is social and/or psychological. This common-sense 
view is also expressed in anorexia, where a distinction between hunger 
as physical need and appetite as desire can be detected in the 
distinction between safe and dangerous foods. Food which can be 
defined as serving nutritional "need", empty of pleasure is Cat first) 
allowable; food which socially or personally is defined as 
pleasureable and "empty" of nutritional value must be eliminated. 
Although the specific categorizations are to an extent subject to 
transformations dependant on individual biography Ccf Palmer, 1980: 
23; Atkinson, 1983: 11), there is a great deal of similarity in 
anorexic women's allowed lists. I asked my respondents what they ate, 
and why they chose those particular foods: 
Fiona eats fruit, wholemeal bread and "'Light' philadelphia 
cheese (in limitation)", black and decaffinated tea and 
coffee and mineral water; "The fruit makes me feel clean and 
fresh and so do the drinks. The bread and cheese are 
consumed to keep my parents happy." 
"I eat more or less the same each day ... two tablespoons 
yoghurt and a banana, two crispbreads and tomato, lettuce, 
two tablespoons cottage cheese, an apple, cornflakes." 
<Laura) 
" ... even now as I recover ... I tend to stick to low calorie 
food and drinks. I eat bran, oats, vegetables. fruits and 
things that I can calorie count ... at my worst I ate one 
Farley's rusk per day for weeks. As I declined I ate All 
Bran, cottage cheese, meat, fish and vegetables .. I know they 
are low calorie foods, I know how to keep charge of my 
weight. It means that they take longer to eat and make me 
feel full. I feel better about eating them as I don't feel 
guilty." 
<Anne) 
Tracy eats low calorie foods and drinks, salad and fruit -
"I don • t feel so threatened by the prospect of eating food, 
if it is low in calories." 
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Lynne eats bread, cheese, yoghurt, fruit, coffee, tea and 
pasta- "It has nothing to do with taste. It is just I know 
their calorie content and feel safe with these foods. There 
are loads of things I have never tried, I wouldn't feel safe 
with them ... they feel 1 ike unknown terri tory." 
I asked the women to describe what they would eat in a typical day if 
they kept to plan, and how they would then feel: 
"Breakfast -coffee 
Lunch - 1 sachet slim soup. 1 small apple 
Supper- 1 sachet slim soup. 1 chinese leaf (1 oz.) 
Evening - 1 shape yoghurt 
Bed - 1 small apple 
<Sundays: 1 slice toast for supper instead of soup) 
Relieved and calm but hungry ... I stick to a rigid timetable 
and panic if I am out and can't eat at exact times." 
<Patricia) 
Sharon eats two meals daily, either one meal of all-bran, 
fruit and yoghurt and one of vegetables, or two of 
vegetables- "I rarely, if ever, eat what I've not planned." 
"1 weetabix and l4 pint skimmed milk, 1 low-fat yoghurt and 
apple, 5 oz. jacket potato and bowl of salad. 
On a high." 
<Margaret) 
"I eat the same food every day and I drink the same drink, 
no change, except if I am having a binge: 
Daily: 5 tins Diet Coca Cola 
4 apples 
2 oranges 
8 Krispbread with shape cheese 
3 black coffees 
Sometimes 1 bowl of bran with water. 
I like these foods and drinks because they are not fattening 
and do not have any carbohydrate in them and above all they 
feel safe to me." 
<Karen) 
I asked what food the women rarely or never ate, and why this should 
be so: 
Sarah never eats full-fat milk, oranges, tuna, cheese, 
butter, bread, cakes - "They make me frightened - that I've 
done something wrong eating them - 'forbidden' foods to 
mother and sister. They see it as a sin to eat them and 
instant fatness." 
Sharon never eats fats, meat, fried food, carbohydrates, 
sweet things or alcohol - "I feel that they're unhealthy <I 
-314-
know that carbohydrates such as bread and rise aren't - but 
I avoid eating them." 
Tracy never eats milk, cakes or sweets- "I feel threatened. 
I feel they will make me fat." 
The allowed foods require minimal cooking in any, and very little 
preparation. Karen eats cottage cheese and apples because "I like the 
taste of cottage cheese and apples plus they are low calories and come 
in small sizes". One reason for cooking is to enhance the pleasure of 
eating; here food is the result of creative labour, is intended to 
produce pleasure for others, and expresses women's domestic role. 
Pleasure in eating being precisely what the anorexic is trying to 
eliminate, preparation and cooking are excluded from anorexic eating. 
I asked if the women had favourite foods, and if they did, did they 
eat them ? : 
Beatrice's favourites are hard cheese, grapes and milky 
coffee; grapes are a "safe" food, coffee sometimes 
allowable; cheese is the real danger - "I'm careful with 
hard cheese - eat it just on Friday and Sunday evening when 
I'm at my mother-in-law's as if I have it in my home I'd 
never be able to leave it alone until I'd eaten the lot. I 
allows myself a treat on these days and feel 'safe'." 
"Toast and marmalade. Roast meat and roast potatoes. Fruit 
crumble. Greek yoghurt. Chips. Once a year, at Christmas, I 
have meat. Once a week I have a piece of toast. The rest -
never." 
<Patricia) 
Even after women feel they have recovered from anorexia <in so far as 
they see recovery as possible ), they still rigorously restrict their 
favourite foods strictly. Anne now eats some of the food she likes but 
never eats deserts; Sarah eats her favourites - egg.s, butter and 
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cheese - "all the time ... three times a week ... (and) once a week" 
respectively. (2) 
Food that gives pleasure is dangerous food; the aim is to eliminate 
the pleasure with which it is associated by eliminating the food 
itself: 
Alicia never eats biscuits, cake, crisps, alcohol, fried 
food, cereals and chocolate - "I have completely got out of 
the habit - I cut them out of my diet years ago and now 
refuse them automatically. I'm also petrified of eating too 
much carbohydrate." 
"At first I wouldn't allow myself to enjoy food, but then it 
really did become sickening and abhorrent. I can't remember 
what I enjoyed before I was ill." 
<Jane) 
"I have got to the point where I have no favourite foods." 
<Zoe) 
"I'm not sure what a hungry feeling is any more." 
<Verity) 
Annette never eats "milk ... and most food"; "I never ever 
fancy them. I never seem to feel like anything." 
The safe category contracts as the dangerous category expands; the 
distinction between "hunger" and "appetite" loses its force as the 
"forbidden" expands to take in all food. C3) The ultimate aim, usually 
unfullfilled, is to eat nothing at all: 
"Before, I was pleased (if she ate to plan) but must make 
more effort to eat less and look for ways to cut down and 
this I did gradually by reducing meals and then cutting them 
out one by one." 
<Anne) 
I asked the women what they would do if they could eat nothing at all 
and yet stay healthy - would they do so, and how would this feel ?: 
2 For a discussion of recovery see Hsu, 1980. 
3 Crisp points out that in his experience carbohydrates are 









"Yes- fantastic- so alive, healthy and clean." 
<Fiona) 
"Yes. It would have felt a great relief and freedom." 
<Jane) 
"Yes, this would be the answer to my dreams ! I feel elated 
even now just thinking about it. I really feel my body does 
not need food and can function on what I allow it ... I 
wouldn't eat even if I didn't put weight on. There is 
nothing I would crave to eat 1 " 
<Annette) 
"I would love to abolish food and eating and yet stay 
healthy. I would feel in control and not guilty." 
<Paula) 
"It would be the best solution to the problem, no more 
worrying about weight or calories or food at all. When I 
starve myself I always want to continue as long as 
possible." 
<Barbara) 
"Yes. I always look forward to the time when energy can be 
obtained through tablets of a certain calorie-value thus 
avoiding any contact with food or cooking and planning 
food." 
<Andrea) 
In reality, the nearest the anorexic woman can get to this ultimate 
state is to reduce her intake of food, and consequently her weight, to 
as low a level as possible. In this closest approximation, she feels 
wonderful: 
"elated and triumphant" <Patricia); "such an ego-
booster ! ... happy, proud, feel successful, feel completely 
in charge of everything" <Frances); "GREAT ... thin and clean 
at 4 stone 13 lb." CCelia); "elated and very triumphant ... my 
blood pressure is high which gives me headaches but I feel 
fine". <Annette) 
:Most anorexic women do eat, at least a little, and cope with the 
anxiety of eating in a variety of ways. Some get rid of the food as 
soon as possible. Marie exercises after eating, to "burn up" the food, 
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Annette while eating minized her panic by working out how many 
laxatives she would need to take, and what was the best thing to take 
them with, in order to get the food out of her body, and Hannah 
writes: 
"Before I eat <or ate) I felt afraid that I had held out too 
longi while eating my main idea was how I could get rid of 
the food in one way or another - and this thought filled my 
head until I felt empty again." 
Una explains that while binging she felt that she must keep eating 
until she could vomit i if she didn't she was "obsessed with the idea 
of the food being absorbed by my body". Sheila writes that: 
"I just regurgitate stuff sometimes and spit it out without 
chewing. What is regurgitated goes in fads/cycles. At 
present it is peanuts and 'Lion' bars." 
When Frances has food in her stomach she is really 
frightened- "it has to be got rid of as soon as possible." 
For the women who don't or can't bring themselves to purge or vomit, 
and in cases where what is eaten is the allowed daily minimum, food 
that stays in the body is hemmed in and controlled through a 
ritualized eating pattern. The most common ritual which emerged from 
the survey was eating exactly the same foods, in the same amount, in 
the same order and usually at the same time and in the same place 
every day: 
"Every day I eat exactly the same food and exactly the same 
amount (I) eat exactly the same amount of Krispbread and ... 
cut the same amount of cheese to put on the Krispbread." 
<Eve) 
"I break certain shapes of crisp bread etc. off to eat. I 
arrange my food <which is the same every day) in the same 
way on the plate, and eat it in the same order, at exactly 
the same time." 
<Sophie) 
"Eating at a set time, in the same place and exactly the 
same food each day." 
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<Margaret) 
"My eating pattern is so rigid and controlled. I don't 
consciously plan, but I automatically eat virtually the same 
food each day." 
<Polly) 
Similarly, Wellbourne and Purgold quote "Della": 
"Barriers of time lock in on you. Clench you in their iron 
fists. You cannot eat if it is not the right time 
exactly." 
<Wellbourne & Purgold, 1984: 25) 
Controlling the anxiety by "thought-rituals" also featured: 
"I always keep recalling it <her plan) to my mind just to 
check I haven't eaten anything I might have forgotten." 
<Lynne) 
"I organize my eating as the day unfolds; counting calories 
after every mouthful and giving myself a calorie intake for 
each day ... I have to keep a constant watch on my eating 
during all hours that I'm awake. I'm often too exhausted to 
feel any sense of achievement until the following day when I 
can look back and think: 'Yesterday was a 'GOOD' day.'" 
<Andrea) 
"'Staple' foods ... somehow they seem safe. There was a time I 
would mentally break down everything I ate into the 
equivalent 'staples' - calculating if I'd just eaten more or 
less than if I'd had, say, my usual bowl of muesli, or piece 
of bread and cheese." 
<Irene) 
The actual process of eating is also ritualised; food is separated 
into tiny and precise quanti ties, eaten in small mouthfuls, chewed 
with extreme thoroughness or timed: 
"I cut my ryvi tas up into five bits each 
lasts while I read one page of a book. 
vegetables followed by fruit. I only eat in 
<Beatrice) 
slice. Each bit 
I then eat my 
bed." 
"I eat by the clock - still very much the same type of food 
for each meal." 
<Laura) 
"I tend to eat things in exactly <the) same order and I do 
cut up bread into fingers. I have to have the same plates, 
cup and cutlery." 
<Alicia) 
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"I used to have to eat at set times and cut my apple in 
quarters, then take each piece and cut paper thin slices to 
eat as slowly as possible." 
<Carol) 
Celia chews every mouthful seven times, Yvonne cuts her food into tiny 
portions and pushes it around her plate, and Sarah eats "tiny 
mouthfuls" and chews her food "to an absolute pulp". Jane writes: 
"I would cut food into very small pieces, take very small 
mouthfuls, and take a very long time chewing .. I used to time 
how long it took to eat certain things, eg a pot of yoghurt, 
then I had to keep to these times." 
The "point" of this behaviour is two-fold. Firstly, as we have seen, 
food for the anorexic women is dangerous, and its principal meanings 
centre around the chaos and insatiability of appetite. Rituals of 
content, time, place and method, therefore, impose order on chaos and 
act to contain its threat. Secondly the rituals postpone the actual 
act of swallowing; they make eating unlike "ordinary" eating since 
ingestion is allowable only as part of a ritualized pattern which 
encompasses the total environment of the "meal". The ultimate aim is 
not to swallow at all, and the ritualized eating pattern attempts the 
closest possible approximation to this goal. Sometimes it comes very 
close: 
"CU would feel as if I was going to vomit. Sometimes I 
would have to force myself to swallow after chewing the food 
for a long time." 
CMarie) 
Anorexic eating rituals, then, connect not only to the direct act of 
swallowing but to the total "food situation", as Polly and Sharon 
explain: 
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"They've <her rituals) varied over the years - but they 
apply both to my surroundings when I eat <eg clean, warm, 
comfortable etc.) and to the actual food <eg biscuits whole 
not broken; cheese cut into neat slices, everything 
'perfect'). I try to keep these rituals to a minimum, even 
to the extent of deliberately not washing my hands 
because they are a nightmare." 
11 I do cut food into very small pieces. I always wash up any 
dirty dishes and pots (used in preparation) before I've 
eaten. Also, I like to drink a large glass of diluted fruit 
juice while I eat - it can take up to forty-five minutes for 
me to complete eating a one-course meal. I almost always 
have a cup of coffee once I've cleared away all the 
utensils." 
Getting herself ready for the day also formed part of Irene's rituals: 
"I did have other 'rituals' though - silly things like the 
way I dressed, or the order I'd do things when I got up in 
the morning." 
As we've seen, exercise after eating figures in anorexia, and many 
anorexic women also weigh themselves frequently, often daily, and 
sometimes more: Paula weighs herself every two hours, Yvonne twelve 
times daily. 
Although food, weight and eating are the principal areas of anorexic 
ritualized control, the body as a whole is treated as a 11 protected 
zone". (4) I asked women about their feelings about sexuality - which 
is a common feature of the literature on anorexia - and also about 
physical intimacy/touching as a whole. :Many, possibly most, anorexic 
women not only avoid sex but prefer not to be touched at all. The 
avoidance of sex is borne out by the literature Cie Hsu, 1980: 1044; 
Anderson, 1977: 14), and also by the responses to the survey, which 
4 I am indebted to Caroline 0' Toole of Glasgow Anorexic Aid for her 
suggestion that I asked respondants not simply about sex but about 
touching and closeness as a whole. 
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also suggested that anorexic women prefer not to be touched at all, 
and like to have "space" around their bodies. Out of the thirty-five 
women thirty either disliked or feared sex, or described themselves as 
having no sexual feelings during the anorexia: 
"I was very afraid of sex and thought of it as something bad 
and wrong." 
(Jane) 
" <I) used to split off from myself during sex with my 
husband, couldn't be both a good little girl and a mistress 
at the same time." 
<Marie) 
"I have become very cold and hate being touched, I have no 
sexual desires." 
<Sandra) 
"(anorexia) completely numbs those feelings". 
<Anne) 
Some explicitly categorized sex as heterosexual, some talked in the 
abstract, and none defined sex as involving other women. 
With only six exceptions the women either disliked or feared non-
sexual touching too: 
"I feel threatened, sometimes almost claustrophobic" 
<Irene) 
"I cannot cope with anyone coming close or touching me even 
if someone touches me on the shoulders or back, the 
emotional pain hurts I cringe so much I want to curl into a 
ball and hide I feel like barbed wire." 
CEve) 
Some women saw their avoidance of physical contact as imposed on them 
by the illness, and wrote poignantly of their wish that they could let 
people get close to them: 
"I resent people being physically close to me, but I yearn 
for one special person to hold me and comfort me." 
<Frances) 
" ... I like space around me. I used to be a very cuddly 
person and hate being so detached." 
<Norma) 
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If the elimination of physical pleasure is the central aim of 
anorexia, and the body is created at the symbolic level as need-less 
and involiable, then physical detachment is neccessary. In anorexia 
eating and food become symbolic of all desires and their objects. 
Desire as a whole is crystallized into the desire for food, the arena 
in which satisfaction/fulfillment of desire is most possible for 
women. 
The ultimate aim and purpose of anorexia is the denial of appetite, 
and at the height of anorexia, when the illness can still be seen in a 
wholly positive light, denial is itself equated with pleasure, 
achievement, mastery and virtue, with hunger becoming the internal, 
and emaciation the external, "sign" of that denial (cf Palmer, 1980: 
21): 
"If I didn't eat I felt very high and full of energy, very 
proud of myself for having self control." 
<:Marie) 
"Absolutely great- a huge sense of achievement." 
<Fiona) 
"I feel completely happy, confident, able to go out and talk 
to people - I feel in total control. I feel as if I have 
achieved something." 
<Eve) 
"I do so less and less (eat) because the vague sense of 
satisfaction is both short-lived and far-outweighed, when 
faced with fat and food or a sense of virtue and tautness 
and no food ... it's a fairly easy choice." 
<Sheila) 
Vellbourne and Purgold argue that it is this sense of achievement 
which explains why anorexic women keep on and on losing weight long 
after the original target weight has been reached. Losing weight comes 
to mean control, success and competence, while weight gain means 
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failure. Consequently, the "target" is progressively lowered. 




In spite of what one reads in the psychiatric literature of the 
stubborn invincibility of anorexia, the anorexic woman's "wilful and 
covertly triumphant pursuit of thinness" <Casper et all, 1980: 1030), 
the denial and control of anorexic ritualized eating, which gives such 
a sense of safety. power and virtue, is, in fact, highly precarious. 
This state is only ever achieved temporarily, and even when on an 
anorexic "high" the anorexic woman feels the threat of insatiability 
lurking around her. The threats to her control are two-fold but of far 
from equal value. The subsidiary threat - the interference of other 
people - will be briefly discussed before turning to hunger itself as 
the principal harbinger of doom. The threat of control by others also 
figures in the discussion of the anorexic woman's perception of 
herself as the object of medical control; her sense of control by 
parents, friends and social values in general before the onset of the 
illness has been discussed above. It is this sense of persecution, 
coupled with the function of anorexic ritual in excluding disorder, 
rather than "retarded cognition" or "limited thinking" which in fact 
make the anorexic woman stick rigidly to her eating pattern. <Crisp, 
1972: 405) 
Anorexic women are immensely anxious about situations in which they 
have to eat with other people, or, even, worse, have to eat a meal 
someone else has prepared: 
"If I have to go out and eat more than my 'ration' I feel 
very depressed, fat, miserable and resentful ... to keep my 
friends I have to eat normal meals at least once in ten 
days. That is a great source of conflict and resentment, and 
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is an area where I feel I am out of control, though I 
attempt to control how much they give me and what." 
<Patricia) 
"Sometimes I can't stand eating (especially if forced to eat 
something because it's sociable to eat different courses in 
someone' s home)." 
<Andrea) 
" ... I have a husband who has to be deceived in order for 
life to carry on peacefully"; she would be completely in 
control of her eating- "but people try to interfere". 
<Annette) 
When asked if she would give up eating entirely if it were possible, 
and how this would feel, Margaret replied: 
"Yes - terrific as there would be no pressure on me by 
others to eat for my health's sake." 
Other people, then, are perceived by anorexic women as a threat to 
their control of food; what is seen as concern by family and friends 
is seen as interference by anorexic women. As Wellbourne and Purgold 
point out, the intervention of others is experienced by anorexic women 
as "assaults on anorexic integrity". <Wellbourne & Purgold, 1984: 96) 
The principal threat to the control of food intake, is, however, 
appetite itself. Wellbourne and Purgold argue thus: 
"the sufferers feel that if their control slipped just once 
and they ate food not sanctioned by their private rule-book 
they would 'lose control' or 'go to pieces'." 
(ibid.: 3) 
They live, then, "in a state of constant anxiety lest a momentary loss 
of control may lead to ... disintegration". <ibid.: 94) And it is in 
this context that the "tricks" and deceptions of anorexia <Dexter, 
1980: 326-7) are meaningful. 
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Only six of the women who replied to the survey felt that they were 
totally in control of their eating. Every "meal" is an ordeal; fear 
and ambivalence are its characteristics: 
"<When eating I am) ... sometimes extremely panicky <always 
take the phone off so I can get through the ordeal). other 
times I feel desperate and eat too fast and fill up quickly. 
I think about food from the moment .I wake at 5. 30 - 6 a.m. 
until bedtime at about 11. I am anxious to eat and basically 
enjoy the tastes when I'm eating but often get very full and 
feel I shouldn't have eaten it." 
<Sandra) 
"Tense, guilty, frightened of retribution and disease ... I 
look forward to eating, though with apprehension. While I'm 
actually eating I usually feel good about the food at first, 
and about the nourishment it's giving me. But gradually as I 
eat, guilt takes over, and I feel over-indulgent, bloated 
and miserable." 
<Polly) 
"Tremendous tension, should I, shouldn't I, very guilty at 
every mouthful. No sense of enjoyment at all." 
<Lynne) 
"I usually wind up thinking, 'I love this, I hate this, why 
am I doing this?" and stop then and there." 
<Sheila) 
Sheila adds that before she eats she feels "frantic for food", while 
eating she feels simultaneous satisfaction and guilt, and afterwards 
"remorse and panic" . Sarah writes that before she eats she feels 
"something like terror - it feels like it is doing the wrong thing 
eating it and wanting it". Each day represents a "battle" with food in 
which eating is staved off until the evening. The struggle is between 
the terror of eating and the pleasure of food, of giving herself "what 
I wanted and needed". 
Eve also expresses the struggle between needing food, which can be 
acceptable, and wanting to eat, which is not: 
"Before I eat anything I always contemplate whether I really 
need to eat it because I feel so good when I am empty. 
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During eating food I always feel guilty and think about how 
many calories the food I am eating contains. After I have 
eaten I always worry and say to myself 'maybe I have eaten 
too much'." 
Any pleasure that remains is, as Norma writes, "soon spoilt by guilt, 
was I eating too much ... would I stop eating?" 
No matter how small the amount, and how rigidly controlled the eating 
becomes, anxiety remains. Asked how she feels when eating to plan, 
Verity writes that she feels "in control but still disatisfied, 
leading on so you keep cutting down looking for the day when being 
thin is going to make you happy." The plan does not in itself 
represent sufficient security 1 and keeping to it is in any case 
difficult: 
"I feel angry with myself because most times I haven 1 t 
intended to eat and then I find myself eating something." 
<Fiona) 
"If it's my 'safe' foods OK. If not - my heart's beating ten 
to the dozen and I feel panic stricken- unless I'm having a 
binge and know I'm going to get rid of it later- but while 
I'm eating I'm telling myself what a disgusting pig I am and 
wonder what damage I'm doing to my health." 
<Beatrice) 
"I lose control regularly despite all my efforts to combat 
it." 
<Andrea) 
Having "given in" to extra-plan eating, the danger of the loss of 
control can be symbolically contained by some by getting the food out 
of the mouth as soon as possible: 
"Sometimes I swallow quickly just to get it over and done 
with." 
<Irene) 
" ... I want to swallow it to get it out of the way" 
<Lynne) 
" ... it's something I've got to swallow as fast as possible" 
<Margaret) 
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More typically, however, this is no real solution; even if the food 
can no longer be tasted in the mouth it is still felt in the stomach; 
almost all the women reported feeling simultaneously over-full and 
hungry after eating. The almost inevitable choice of word to describe 
this feeling is "bloated". Being bloated is both an internal sign of 
over-indulgence to the anorexic woman, and, it is thought, a very 
obvious external sign to other people. The guilt and depression that 
the anorexic women has "over-eaten" can become unbearable; some women 
take steps to get rid of the evidence. I asked the women how they felt 
with food in their stomachs, and how they dealt with their feelings: 
Margaret's "solution" is no solution at all -"Guilty and 
that I've to remove it by some means or other as quick as I 
can. 
"I feel about nine months pregnant. My stomach feels so 
bloated I think that people must notice Therefore I have 
to get it out as soon as possible ! 
<Annette) 
"I feel when I've eaten that I look fat and bloated and want 
to get rid of the feeling by taking laxatives etc." 
<Sandra) 
" ... sometimes if I feel too bloated I make myself sick." 
<Eve) 
"I used to feel guilty, bloated, 
absorbed, longing for it to go. 
empty." 
<Norma) 
obsessed by the food I had 
I felt better when I was 
"Bloated. Worried that I might gain weight. Feel a lack of 
control. Sometimes the feeling is so intolerable I have to 
go and vomit, though this usually only happens when I have 
eaten more than just fresh fruit and vegetables." 
<Paula) 
The act of eating is the arena in which the precarious nature of 
anorexic control is most directly experienced. Rigid planning and the 
ritualizations which surround eating serve to create a partial control 
which alleviates but only rarely contains hunger. The fear of a chaos 
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of appetite is the context in which anorexic food control is 
meaningful; Paula when eating feels: 
"··.worried that I might gain weight and worried that having 
started to eat, I may be unable to stop." 
Norma writes that when she managed to eat to plan - "I 
remember feeling great temporarily (mentally> but still 
hungry, and terrified of having to eat more, to let go and 
eat." 
The fear of insatiability surrounds eating: 
Sophie fears "that it will go totally out of control, and I 
will not be able to stop." 
And Lynne writes - "I feel if I let go of my controls, 
anarchy would set in, and my body would rebel - Would I 
suddenly turn into a ten stone animal ? ... what I worry 
about, is the 'full' feeling, when you ought to know you 
have had enough food, I don't seem to be able to recognize 
that feeling. So I feel if I started to eat when would I 
stop ?" 
Norton quotes a patient saying much the same thing: 
"If ever I've been forced to eat anything on my plate, I 
feel myself getting bigger and bigger, expanding like a 
balloon." <Norton, 1983: 312) 
The loss of control which so terrifies anorexic women centres around 
eating and getting "fat", but it can be extended to cover other areas 
of their lives: 
"I felt that if I let go the control, then everything would 
fall apart and be chaotic, and I would be completely 
overwhelmed by it all." 
<Jane> 
Marie feels that if she gave up trying to control her eating 
"I wouldn't be in control of anything then". 
"If I broke that control, would self-control in other areas 




The denial of firstly pleasure and subsequently of appetite itself, 
which is the ultimate aim of anorexia, can give intense satisfaction 
but is always insecure. I found little evidence of what Casper et al. 
describe as the anorexic woman's "unusual ability to suppress or 
tolerate hunger feelings". <Casper, 1980: 1030) Again this would seem 
to be a case of psychiatry taking for granted as true what is part of 
the anorexic defence against psychiatric intervention. The anorexic 
control envied by others and struggled over in the psychiatric 
encounter is maintained only with extreme difficulty and in a context 
of constant set-backs. Falling into chaos is both a real experience 
and a psychic terror. It is to this loss of control that we now turn. 
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Twenty-five of the women said that they used to, or still did binge. 
Only one, however, described herself as bulimic. For the others, 
binging is part of anorexia, the other side of the coin of control, 
what makes it neccessary, and what endangers it. 
Psychiatric opinion is divided on whether bulimia and anorexia should 
be considered "different entities" <Vigersky & Andersen, 1977; Chiodo 
& Latimer, 1983), whether they are essentially the same disorder 
<Wellbourne & Purgold, 1984: 2) or whether bulimia is a "sub-group" of 
anorexia. <Casper et al, 1980: 1030; Garfinkel et al, 1980) 
Casper et al. set the scene for the debate by arguing that; 
"the occurence of bulimia <rapid consumption of large 
amounts of food in a short period of time) is a perpelxing 
phenomenon, because its presence contradicts the common 
belief that patients with anorexia are always firm in their 
abstinence from food." 
<ibid.: 1030) 
In their study, 47% of the respondents admitted to hinging, and they 
suggest that, while bulimia was neglected in the older psychiatric 
literature, "those who looked for it have generally found it". <ibid.: 
1031; 1034; see also Morgan, Wellbourne & Purgold, 1983) Casper et 
al. argue that "bulimics" can be distinguished from "fasting patients" 
chiefly by a stronger appetite and a lesser capacity to tolerate 
hunger, characteristics which lead to "impaired control" in eating and 
in their lives in general. (ibid. : 1034; 1030-4) However, they are 
further distinguished by being older, are more "extrovert", and suffer 
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more depression, anxiety, guilt and obsession with food. Cibid.: 1031-
5) They argue that bulimia is associated with a longer illness, 
repeated hospitalizations, and "a less successful social adjustment". 
(ibid.: 1034) 
These findings lead Casper et al. to hypothesize that bulimia may be 
"a sign of chronicity", or, that to become bulimic the patient may 
need greater "physiological and psychological maturity", or, and this 
is their preferred thesis, that bulimia may represent "a more serious 
psychopathology". (ibid.: 1034-5). They argue that for these more 
disturbed women, binging is "emotionally soothing" Cibid.: 1034), and, 
followed by vomiting, forms: 
"a complex defensive maneover in which food is 
employed to relieve profoundly disturbing 




This analysis is remarkable for its mixture of perspicacity and 
obfuscation. Initially Casper et al. sense that the presence of a 
significant amount of binge/vomiting in patients defined as anorexic 
threatens the idea that anorexia involves a transcendence of appetite. 
This insight could lead to a recognition that anorexia is rarely, and 
then only temporarily, a transcendence of appetite, and is more 
correctly seen as an extended struggle with appetite, in which the 
ritualized control of eating is the weapon and hunger the enemy. And 
in arguing that "fasters" cherish hunger and obtain from it "a sense 
of mastery" they come close to recognising that anorexia is far from 
easy and "triumphant" but is in fact a desperate struggle with a 
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powerful internal enemy. (ibid.: 1034; 1030) Instead, however, the old 
answer of a particular psychopathology is invoked to explain that 
while "fasting patients" can "suppress" "deny" "ignore" or "tolerate" 
appetite - in short, transcend it - the especially disturbed and 
unsuccessfully adjusted bulimic is "just" a failed anorexic. 
Similarly, although they note that bulimics have been ill longer and 
hospitalized more often, the explanation of bulimia as a development 
of anorexia is given short shrift. Al thought they point out that 
whether or not the women binge, they still experience "a similar 
perpetual fear of not being able to stop eating" (ibid.: 1034) this 
does not lead them to see the fear of insatiability and the fantasy of 
hinging as just as important as the actual binge. 
This point is taken up by Vellbourne and Purgold, who argue that what 
defines anorexia is a characteristic way of thinking, in which fear of 
weight gain, and control of weight, rather than emaciation, are 
central. <Vellbourne & Purgold, 1984: 25-9) They argue thus that 
bulimics are anorexics, that there are "no characteristic bulimic 
ideas". (ibid.: 6) All anorexics, as they point out, are interested in 
food, and feel that their appetite is "too powerful", "insatiable and 
demanding" and "must at all costs be curbed". (ibid.: 3) This 
"anorexic thinking" can lead to either starvation or binge/vomiting 
and "effectiveness" is the only real difference. <ibid.: 6) 
The fear of hinging was an ever-present worry to the women in the 
survey, and it is this which inspires anorexic control. The reality of 
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buli~ia could ~ore plausibly be explained by the realisation that the 
i~ense difficulty of ~intaining anorexic control ~eans that the 
longer the illness the ~ore likely it is that control will 
periodically slip. (See Pal~er, 1980: 29). And since control of 
appetite is the central aim of anorexia, it is not surprising that 
depression, anxiety and guilt accompany its loss. 
Further~ore, if we look at psychiatric intervention fro~ the anorexic 
perspective, it ~ght be argued that buli~a could well be a response 
to the disruption of control which hospitalization entails. Buli~a, 
defined as binging and vomiting, is better seen as an expression of 
the "disturbing impulses" of controlled appetite than relief of those 
impulses. The idea that women who binge experience stronger hunger 
than those who do not is based on the women's response to psychiatric 
questioning and does not consider how careful wo~n are about what 
they reveal to such questioners. Denial of hunger is, of course, one 
of the ~in anorexic strategies in ~intaining control when other 
people intervene in their eating. Further, the argu~nt that bulimics 
suffer fro~ "i~paired control" contradicts the argu~nt that they are 
naturally hungrier - is it that they have less control or is what they 
are trying to control a stronger i~pulse ? 
In the discussion and analysis of anorexic wo~n' s descriptions of 
binging which follows I hope, then, to show that the binge as an ever-
present threat to anorexic control is a central feature of anorexia. 
The fear of insatiability which necessitates that control beco~s a 
reality in the binge. The question of how much women actually eat in a 
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binge, while it is, as we saw in Chapter Four, experientially 
significant for women is not an element which meaningfully 
distinguishes groups of anorexic women. Rather, it is the meaning of 
the binge, however large or small it might be, which is important. 
I asked the women whether they ate different foods during a binge, 
and, if so, how they would explain their choice: 
"I drink fruit squash. I eat mostly sweet things, sometimes 
crisps and occasionnally I'll cook some meat but not often. 
Usually it's marmalade out of the jar (about * lb.), 
mincemeat <1 lb.), 2 litres ice-cream, ~packet biscuits, ~ 
cake, ~ lb. cheese, ~ lb. pickle, a swiss roll - this would 
be fairly typical. Sometimes I vomit and return to the 
kitchen again." 
<Paula) 
"I drink gallons of milkshake, I eat ice-cream, cakes, 
pastries, pork pies, chips, sweets, chocolates, bread, roast 
potatoes. I can eat half a loaf of bread, 15 fish fingers, 6 
fried eggs, 2 platefuls of chips, 4 doughnuts, 6 chocolate 
cakes, 2 large bars of chocolate, 10 bars of Mars bar etc., 
I litre of ice-cream, and probably more. 
Because they are foods I forbid myself on my days of 
dieting." 
<Tracy) 
" ... for me a binge usually consists of: 4 caramel chocolate 
bars, liquorice toffees, cream cakes, ~ loaf of bread. 
Because these foods are really naughty - full of fat and I 
never allow myself these things, so if I binge I might as 
well lose control and eat all the worst things possible." 
<Eve) 
Binge foods - muesli, whole milk, butter and sugar mixed 
together, jam, raisins, orange JUl.ce, bread and butter -
"something to do with them being forbidden, 'naughty' - in a 
desperate attempt to be nicer to myself - to make up for 
something, someone - possibly my mother ... for not being 
accepted as my own person as I am." 
<Sarah) 
All but one of the women who binged ate mostly, although not 
exclusively, carbohydrates and sweet things. <See Boskind-Lodahl, 
1976: 351-2) The main explanation given for this was that these are 
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"forbidden" foods the rest of the time, but the accepted psychiatric 
explanation of a purely physical craving was expressed by two of the 
women: 
"I think it is because I crave these foods and yet forbid 
myself to eat them." 
<Fiona) 
" ... before a binge I would have a deep craving <like an 
addiction) and I felt I just had to eat them." 
<Karen) 
Practicalities also constrain the choice of binge foods; Frances 
explains her choice of foods as being "easy to eat/swallow and when 
mixed with enough fluid, are easy to bring back up". Barbara • s 
explanation also centres on convenience: 
"They're always convenient, easy to eat and read, or eat and 
watch TV. Can take them to my room. Quick to prepare, no 
cooking involved." 
The choice of food that needs cooking, or any amount of preparation is 
as rare in binges as in the anorexic plan. Barbara's explanation 
reveals a further, central facet of binges: in spite of the fact that 
forbidden and pleasure-laden foods are being eaten, the attention is 
directed away from the taste of the food. As Palmer argues, in a binge 
food is eaten "rapidly and avidly but with little pleasure". <Palmer, 
1980: 26) 
I asked the women if they ate in a different way when hinging: 
"All the food is laid out and I just attack it; tearing at 
the packaging like an animal. My hands are working all the 
time to get handfuls of food into my mouth, working 




"In a mad panic to stuff the food down me as quickly as 
possible, hardly tasting or chewing it." 
<Fiona) 
"Yes I used to eat without even noticing I was doing it - my 
eyes fixed on the TV or staring into space. I used to eat so 
messily too that it would make me furious with myself." 
<Una) 
"I feel like an animal, dipping in with my fingers or 
tipping the carrots into my mouth. I usually crouch down by 
the fridge to do this." 
<Sandra) 
"When I feel a binge coming on I feel so tense I eat 
anything without even tasting it, at very high speed, 
towards the end of the binge I am usually just throwing the 
food into my mouth and even into my face with such speed 
that sometimes I swallow things whole, uncooked, frozen." 
<Eve) 
"I never use knife and fork and a plate at the table - just 
a spoon and my hands. I certainly eat very fast and hardly 
chew it, just swallow it." 
<Paula) 
"Like a maniac that hasn't eaten in years ! I ram one food 
after another into my mouth, hardly having time to butter 
the next slice of bread beforehand." 
<Tracy) 
The main characteristics of binge eating which emerge from the survey, 
then, were ~. animalistic manner, and a sense of compulsion. The 
women ate as fast as they possibly could, in a manner they describe as 
irrational, usually animalistic - "like a scavenging animal" <Sophie), 
"like a wolf" <Una) - , and with compulsion but not pleasure - "I eat 
quickly almost in a panic - don't really taste it" <Laura), "(I) 
cannot stop" (Sophie). Although they are giving themselves what is 
usually denied them, indulgence, I would argue, does not equal 
pleasure. Rather, they fear being at the mercy of their appetite, 
which they feel unable to control. The binge is unstoppable; it ends 
only when the food runs out. Cooking, preparation, laying the table 
and relishing the meal are all conspicuous by their absence. The 
opposite of denial in anorexia is compulsion and chaos, not pleasure. 
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Boskind-Lodahl argues that women gain pleasure from being out of 
control in the binge, and that shame and guilt come afterwards. 
CBoskind-Lodahl, 1976: 351-2) She argues: 
"the binge brings about a union between the mind and the 
body. One gives one's self to the food, to the moment 
completely. There is a complete loss of control Cego>. It is 
an absolute here-and-now experience, a kind of ecstasy." 
(ibid.: 352) 
But far from union and ecstasy the binge means failure and surrender. 
Anorexia is an attempt to create a self, or ego, out of the control of 
need; in the binge control is swallowed up and destroyed by appetite. 
Boskind-Lodahl argues that "bulimarexic" women are involved "in a 
struggle against a part of the self rather than a struggle towards a 
self" (ibid.: 352), and implies that the "unification" of the two 
"halves" in the binge is therefore pleasurable. Unity, however, is 
impossible for anorexic women; either the controlling ego or the 
insatiable flesh can dominate, but they cannot be integrated, since 
the dominance of the former over the latter is the point of anorexic 
control. 
Boskind-Lodahl implies, Leslie Swartz argues, that the "pleasure" of 
the binge comes from "the woman's 1 natural 1 wish to be in tune with 
her body's desires". Boskind-Lodahl suggests that "the body is 
'correct 1 in its desires whereas the mind is warped" in trying to 
block "the forces of nature". <Swartz, 1985: 431) Similarly, Orbach 
and Eichenbaum see binging as an assertion of "natural" desires and 
argue that the binging "part" of the anorexic woman is the part 
therapists can work with in the return to normality. (ibid. : 431; 
-339-
Orbach & Eichenbaum, 1983: 90) This biologistic reasoning is 
irrelevant if one interprets both "mind" and "body" as aspects of 
social relations. The anorexic woman while hinging is not surrendering 
to "nature" - unquestionably good and virtuous - but to an appetite 
which both she and her culture define as dangerous and disgusting. 
What hinging in its extremity reveals is the insatiability which the 
anorexic feels to be an ever-present danger. Wellbourne & Purgold's 
"Della" writes that: 
"breaking out of control, out of the order means no order. 
To break out of the strictly-imposed regulations means one 
has no limits. It means that one will move to the extremes 
of human indulgence." 
<Wellbourne & Purgold, 1984: 25) 
The binge is a furtive business conducted in solitude; the terrifying 
possibility of being "caught in the act" of insatiability is, as far 
as possible, eliminated: 
"I had to be alone in a room with the curtains closed so 
that no one could possibly see me." 
<Paula) 
But any eating has the character of a guilty and secret activity. <See 
also Dally & Gomez, 1980: 17) Out of the 35 respondants, 31 preferred 
to eat alone if at all possible. Beatrice only eats at night, in bed, 
"away from others"; Annette writes that "no one must see me swallow" -
before she eats she worries "in case anyone catches me". Fiona writes: 
"I find now that I can only force myself to eat in the 
presence of my parents but I hate this and if I see them 
watching me eat, I stop immediately and become embarassed. I 
cannot, however, eat in front of other members of my family 
or in front of my friends." 
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Vli th food inside them anorexic women feel: "afraid, dirty and weak" 
<Karen); "bloated, guilty, greedy and a failure" <Una); "greedy and as 
though I am guilty of some misdeed" <Fiona). When they are alone, this 
is bad enough. In front of others it is insupportable: 
"CEating) In front of my family: guilty- bact' 
<Sarah) 
"When I eat and have food in my mouth I feel dirty, guilty 
and fat. If someone is present - which I cannot help 
sometimes - my mouth feels as if it is numb and paralysed 
and I have difficulty chewing or opening my mouth." 
CEve) 
Eating is a sin. When it is indulged in both the internal judge of the 
anorexic conscience, and the external judge of others' opinion punish 
it with guilt and shame. The anorexic women feels caught out, her 
hidden insatiabil ty revealed. The "bloated" stomach is symbolic of 
"fat": the sign of insatiability. 
Well bourne and Purgold argue that "fat" for anorexic women equals 
"moral decay"; being fat means being "lazy, greedy, selfish, sloppy, 
stupid, unattractive, uncaring, untidy and disgusting". <Wellbourne & 
Purgold, 1984: 4) I asked the women how they would feel if they were 
very fat: 
"I often imagine being very fat and I would have to hide 
away in bed for protection. This would be the only way I 
could hide my body away from people again I would not be 
able to cope." 
<Eve) 
"Awful, I would hide myself from the world." 
<Celia) 
"It would be absolutely awful. People would always be 
looking at me. I feel as though I would get in everybody's 
way. I feel as though my bust would stick out too much." 
<Annette) 
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Similar feelings emerge at the prospect of reaching the weight deemed 
medically correct for their height: 
"I would be full of self-loathing. I would be depressed. I 
wouldn't be able to face people for fear of their reactions. 
I would just hide away, disgusted with myself for being so 
fat." 
<Frances) 
"Couldn't stand it. Would hide away and not let people see." 
<Lisa) 
Being at the approved weight, or heavier, means that the secrecy and 
shame of the act of eating extends to cover the whole body; the 
"evidence" in both cases - food and fat - must be concealed. The 
bloated stomach is the representative of fat-as-sign for the 
controlled anorexic woman: 
"I think I dislike having food in my stomach more than 
having it in my mouth. I'm always worried it will make my 
stomach rounded and hence feel 'heavy' and bloated after a 
meal." 
<Andrea) 
Asked if they wanted to change anything about their bodies, most 
focused on stomach, hips and thighs: 
"I'd like to be thinner all over but in particular I'd like 
my tummy to be less pronounced. It sticks out." 
<Carol) 
Anne wishes she had "no bulging stomach". It's here that food is seen 
to wreak its worst effects: 
"I feel heavy, self-conscious, frightened of putting on 
weight, scared of my stomach being bloated, unhappy that 
I • ve succumbed ... Once I have eaten them (forbidden foods) I 
feel dirty and heavy, and fatter than ever - it's as if I 
can almost feel the fat from them piling itself up on my 
hips and thighs etc." 
<Barbara) 
"I have always feared becoming fat, when I was afraid that 
my body would never stop expanding." <Una) 
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Thinness is a physical demonstration of denial; fat is the sign of 
indulgence: 
"To me, control and thinness go together. Being even a 
little overweight spells excess and indulgence." 
<Andrea) 
The stigmata is always there, however, even if its external sign is 
absent. Lisa writes that if she were very fat, she would feel "more 
honest, but ugly". And Sheila explains why she "eats" only coffee and 
diet drinks: 
"Terrified of getting even fatter than I am and therefore 
hating myself even more - feel so bulbous and insecure fat. 
Slimmer I have confidence and I love feeling 'empty'. 
Terrified too of other people realising how fat I really 
am." 
This, then, is the central irony of anorexia - even when the anorexic 
woman is thin "outside", she is "really" fat "inside". Every time she 
eats this awful truth hovers around her, waiting to be revealed. 
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Object 
The feminine body is socially created as the object on which the 
:masculine subject acts, and women act as "caretakers" rather than 
owners of their bodies. Further, women's relationship to the body-
object is a relationship of hidden alienation, concealed both by the 
idea of the body as a "given" in nature, and by the formal gender-
neutrality of the ideology of individualism. The previous chapter 
explored these issues through sexuality and reproduction; in this 
section, and in the concluding chapter the transformations of and 
negotiations with the object-body which anorexic women :make are 
explored. 
A further aim of this section is to point to ways in which anorexic 
women feel themselves and their bodies to be the objects of the 
control of others, especially the medical establishment. This 
experience of powerlessness contrasts sharply with perceptions of 
anorexic women as domestic tyrants. However, if we accept analyses 
which see anorexia as itself a strategy of control we can see clearly 
why attempts to make her eat - benign or otherwise - appear to the 
anorexic woman as threats to her control. 
The alienation of the self from the body, and, especially from bodily 
appetities is expressed in a usually obscurely but occasionally 
clearly perceived split between the desiring and the desireless body. 
As argued in Chapters Two and Three, anorexia can be described as a 
two-stage process, in which the symptom is at first consciously set in 
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motion by a strongly perceived self which imposes control on appetite 
but subsequently "escapes" the conscious control of the anorexic woman 
and "takes her over". Anorexia itself, then, comes to be perceived as 
a force separate from, but internal to the anorexic woman. "The 
anorexia" controls her behaviour; she is powerless in the face of her 
illness and cannot reverse the process which she herself set in 
motion. 
Noelle Caskey, discussing the work of Hilde Bruch, points out that 
none of Bruch's patients felt that they could control her illness: 
"at a certain critical point during the process of weight 
loss, something at once alien and interior to them took 
over." 
<Caskey, 1986: 184) 
This alien something is described variously: "a dictator who dominates 
me", "a ghost who surrounds me", "the little man who objects when I 
eat". <Bruch, 1978: 55-6) The dominant explanation for this process in 
psychiatry is, of course, biological - organic processes "take-over" 
and the search for meaning is abandoned. <see Slade, 1984; Bemis, 
1978: 611) From a sociological perspective in which "organic" 
processes are understood as created in frameworks of social meaning, 
the anorexic woman's sense of powerlessness clearly must be related to 
social structure, and in the present context to definitions of the 
feminine body as an object and of feminine desire as potentially 
overwhelming the social order. Anorexia, thus, starts from social 
meaning, and transforms, rather than creates ex nihilo an existing 
definition of the feminine body and of feminine desire. 
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Rejecting the "pathologizing" of anorexia puts meaning back into the 
anorexic experience. If "madness" is not abstracted from social 
structure by describing it as meaningless and incomprehensible we must 
locate it within the same material and ideological structures which 
shape "sanity". The rigid demarcation of "normal" and "abnormal" 
serves political and ideological functions; I do not want, however, to 
follow the critical strand which would describe anorexia as "the same 
but more" of what every woman experiences in a patriarchal culture. 
The anorexic experience does not simply intensify the conflicts 
between desire and control, dependence and automomy which characterize 
women's experience of their bodies and their relationship with food. 
Rather, anorexic women transform the categories through which female 
experience is created in an attempt to resolve at the level of the 
body the contradictory demands of individuality and femininity which 
all women face in a patriarchal and bourgeois culture. 
Through an analysis of my own survey material as well as the existing 
literature, it can be shown that the sense of impersonal control in 
anorexia centres not on a "biological take-over" but on the desire for 
food, seen either as a property of the body or as a force in its own 
right. The controlling force is variously conceptualized as food, 
appetite, the body or the anorexia itself, but appetite is the 
primordial reality underlying all these categories. Seen as an active 
force rather than inanimate material, food takes power from the 
intense desire of which it is the object; the body controlles through 
appetite - it, rather than the self, desires food; and the anorexia 
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controls as negative appetite - it is the resistence to desire which 
gives the illness-as-active-force its power. 
The end of anorexia is, then, the complete overturning of the 
conscious will which began it. The self shrinks from omnipotence to 
become the object of a force outside of its power. The anorexic woman 
cannot understand what is happening to her; she is a mystified and 
powerless object of what she herself set in motion, the victim of her 
own creation. 
In anorexia the controlling force can be conceptualised as wholly 
magical or supernatural, as Bruch's work shows. In my own survey this 
was rare, but Andrea did explain how she feels during a binge in a 
very similar manner: 
"I usually feel possessed by some evil spirit who drives me 
back into the kitchen in search for more." 
And Lynne writes that as well as feeling the characteristic tension 
and anxiety of anorexic eating, she also feels excited: 
" ... because to me food is something magical which has hidden 
powers of making me feel good sometimes <when I resist) and 
bad when I eat it." 
Here it is the "magic" of food, rather than her own willpower, which 
gives satisfaction; but the magic is far from being positive: 
"I begin to panic, I want to 'shove' the food down before 
it does me any more harm, I feel very scared just looking 
at it." 
Caskey, too, comments on food as magically malevolent in anorexia. 
After pointing out the nutritional expertise common to many anorexic 
women, she goes on to argue that; 
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"Once food is inside the anorexic ... her attitude toward it 
undergoes a considerable change. It is no longer a matter of 
numbers or chemical composition; suddenly food is 
metamorphosed into a dark dragging force that threatens to 
take over the anorexic, to sink her under suffocating waves 
of unwanted flesh. To anorexics, food seems to linger 
ominously in her body; it has a living presence inside them 
which overpowers them and which they resent." 
<Caskey, 1986: 183) 
Sometimes the body itself resists the malevolance of food. June speaks 
of her fear of literally choking when she has food in her mouth: 
"I felt as if there was a lump blocking it and not allowing 
the food in ... my mouth and throat were dry and choaked, I 
felt I couldn't swallow, I could not taste the food. It 
seemed to be stuck in my mouth." 
Zoe and Lynne also express an unwilled physical resistence to 
appetite: 
"Sometimes it's a terrible effort, my jaw aches, I eat and 
eat and still the plate is full, Sometimes I cannot eat 
another mouthful. Sometimes it seems like there are bugs and 
insects in the food" 
"If there is just enough <food) to quell my raging hunger, 
then that is OK, but if I can feel food actually 'sitting' 
in my stomach then it feels very uncomfortable, and it plays 
on my mind." 
The resistence to food and its powers is here located in the body 
rather than being a conscious strategy of the self. There is a 
struggle going on here different to the conscious war of self and 
appetite which we saw earlier. Here the struggle is between two forces 
separate from, but contained in the self - the irrisistable force of 
magically evil food and the immovable object of the resisting body. 
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One of Hilde Bruch's patients also expresses an understanding of her 
body functioning independently of conscious control; indeed, for her, 
it is the .mind which is "weak", the body strong: 
"My body could do anything - it could walk forever and not 
get tired. My mind was tricky but my body was honest. It 
knew exactly what to do and I knew exactly what I could do. 
I felt very powerful on account of my body. My only weakness 
was my mind." 
<Bruch, 1973: 95) 
Hunger escapes conscious control as anorexia progresses and becomes 
ever more an alien force. The questionnairre asked if the women felt 
that they were in control of their eating, and as we have seen, 
security of control in anorexia is fundamentally precarious; the slide 
from you controlling it to it controlling you is remorseless: 
<Are you in control of your eating ?) 
"Yes/No I feel I am in control but also completely 
controlled by it." 
<Alicia) 
"Occasionally, but usually I feel that food is controlling 
me ... If I gave up trying to control my eating, I might as 
well give up everything else, as food would totally dominate 
my life." <Lisa) 
"It felt completely out of control. I was trying to control 
it, but it felt as if it was controlling me instead." 
<Jane) 
"No - I wish I were - I often feel it's more in control of 
me." 
<Irene) 
Appetite comes to be understood, then, as something apart from the 
real, resisting self: 
"<I feel) like I'm in a war. Knowing I shouldn't really eat 
but wanting the food, its comfort, its taste etc. It's like 
fighting an addiction. I'm constantly battling with myself, 
like having one part of my mind arguing with the other all 
the time." 
<Barbara) 
"When I eat normally I feel I am not Eleanor but somebody I 
don't even know myself. I am someone I- hate when I eat 
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normally ... there is something frantic takes over- truly not 
.me then." 
The self is either controlled by "anorexia" or through the split 
between "hungry self" and "real self": 
"I feel totally at the mercy of Anorexia, like a cancer 
which has grown in me, and at times seems to be winning." 
<Lynne) 
"Bulimia seems to me an almost logical counterpart to 
anorexia. It is in control, not you, as in fact anorexia 
was, and is an extreme." 
<Norma> 
"I never feel in any danger of hinging, and I adhere rigidly 
to my restricted eating pattern. But this 'control' is an 
illusion, because in fact my 'willpower' only operates in a 
negative and .masochistic way, and I feel powerless to 
reverse it. I'm 'programmed'." 
<Polly> 
"I don't care if I kill myself endeavouring to maintain the 
weight 'I' choose." 
<Annette) 
And Sophie explains the process as a split between her "rational mind" 
and the part that wants to be very thin. 
Well bourne and Purgold quote "Della": 
"Food assumes a major role in one's life, it dominates 
all activities. Food and control encircle the self and the 
self struggles helpless under its command. Knowledge of 
the self is confused. You do not know if you are this 
strictly imposed control, or if it is dominating you. You 
do not know who you are or what. You act, but you don't 
know if it is you acting or the control ... Your true status 
and identity are lost." 
<Wellbourne & Purgold, 1984: 18) 
For "Della" the struggle is between "the rational, intellectual mind" 
which knows that bodies need food and the "irrational, emotional will" 
which starves the body: 
"the self is battered in the conflict of wills. Is it :my 
self that blindly shouts 'no' to any offer of food that 
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is not yoghurt, banana, apple or muesli ? Or is it my 
self that struggles to assert itself and fails ?" 
(ibid.: 24-5) 
Finally, the appetite-as-oppressor can be seen as lodged in the body, 
which is wholly distinct from and struggling with the self: 
"My body craves for food." 
<Tracy> 
"At adolescence, I was very conscious of my body, aver which 
I felt I was losing control. I enjoyed the feeling of 
control which vomiting gave me ... Cnow) I'm not really aware 
of it belonging to me. I don't think about my body and it 
doesn't seen to belong to me." 
<Alicia) 
Zoe talks of her experience as an infant as though speaking about an 
inanimate object: 
"My mother was very controlling, terrified of 'spoiling' the 
baby, she fed it by the clock and then when she did feed it 
still tried to force it to take more than it wanted." 
The struggle with the appetitive body can be physical as well as 
psychic. <See, i.e. Well bourne & Purgold, 1984: 71-5) Twelve of the 
women who filled in the questionnairre had tried to hurt or damage the 
bodies which tormented them: 
"For a period of a few months, about 12 years ago, I 
scratched my face consistently with a needle." 
<Polly) 
"When I was ill I used to scratch and cut myself. I used to 
bang and hit my head against a wall. I would let myself get 
really cold and not bother to put on warm clothes, and would 
generally neglect myself." 
<Jane) 
"I often hit myself hard in the places where I would like to 
loose weight causing myself to receive large, conspicuous 
bruises." 
<Fiona) 
"Stubbed out cigarette ends on my wrist, when I was fat." 
<Celia) 
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Annette at sixteen used to cut "tiny pieces" out of her arms, and also 
ate "Weed killer. Rat poison. Lead. :Mercury.", arguing that "all of 
these are supposed to ruin your stomach but I don't think I could have 
taken enough". 
In anorexia the concepts of feminine desire as dangerously threatening 
patriarchal order and the masculine self and of femininity as self-
discipline are translated from sexuality to eating, and from an inter-
to an intra-gender process. The struggle between "male" rationality 
and "female" sensuality is played out in the anorexic body through the 
radical splitting of appetite from the conscious control of the self. 
The anorexic woman then becomes the object of the appetite she set out 
to eliminate. 
When the anorexic women encounters the medical establishment her 
carefully created and maintained control is taken away from her and 
she, her body and her eating become the objects of "real" external 
forces in the final irony of anorexia. I am reminded here of Elaine 
Showalter's comments on the treatment of female "hysterics" in the 
nineteenth century, where she argues that the "benign, protective and 
custodial" Victorian asylum recreated within its walls the restrictive 
lives from which, on the outside, its women inmates had fallen ill. 
CShowalter, 1981: 321) 
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Similarly, the social powerlessness and lack of control of her own 
life which leads a woman into anorexia is recreated in its medical 
treatment, which, as GF:M Russell points out, is rarely specific but is 
best understood as "a general management". <Russell, 1977: 280) One 
such general managment regime is described by Julie Dexter, a student 
nurse, as involving bed-rest, close supervision of meals and drug 
treatment to suppress "hyperactivity" (Dexter, 1980: 327) Some 
psychiatrists do recognize the power struggle between doctor and 
anorexic patient, but the justification of the risk of death allows 
even the most perceptive to take her hard-won control away from the 
anorexic woman. <See, i.e. Vellbourne & Purgold, 1984: 24) (5) 
Russell recognizes that compulsory admission has its drawbacks, 
retarding the development of trust between patient and staff; he 
recommends that women be "persuaded" to come into hospital 
voluntarily. Once "trust" has been established, the patient is 
encouraged to voluntarily hand over control of her eating to staff. 
But in any case, confined to the ward, and with nurses present at 
meals, discarding food is difficult. <Russell, 1977) Bhanj i argues 
that there should be "no undue emphasis on restrictions and 
supervision", but rather weight gain plus "elucidation" or 
"correction" of "the pathological attitudes underlying the illness". 
<Bhanji, 1980: 324) 
5 For differing views on the risk of death in anorexia, see Norton, 
1983: 318; Vellbourne & Purgold, 1984: 9; ~. 1980: 1042. 
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Restriction and supervision is, however, precisely 
hospitalization means for anorexic women (6): 
"Each time I was admitted to hospital, I was weighed, put on 
bed rest, I had my belongings taken away from me and told I 
would be rewarded if I put on weight to target weight ... as 
soon as I was discharged I immediately got back down to the 
weight I was before I went into hospital because I was so 
frightened of how I felt and looked at their target weight." 
CEve) 
"When I reached 5 stone 4 lb., my GP decided I should be 
hospitalized. Words just cannot convey my bitterness over 
what happened there ... The only 'question' they seemed to 
consider was whether what I was doing was 'deliberate' or 
not. They forced food down me, telling me how wicked I had 
been for vomiting. They told me I could leave when I reached 
6¥.! stone. So, I behaved like an angel, soon reached 6¥.! 
stone, and was allowed to leave - but I'd been eating 
everything I could lay my hands on in order to leave - the 
nurse said excitedly 'look at your chart - your weight 1 s 
going up and up - soon it will hit the roof ! 1 • This 
petrified me. Of course, the only reason I wanted to leave 
was so that I could loose all this unwanted weight - and yet 
I felt so guilty, so out of control, so confused." 
CUna) 
"I was a voluntary patient until I was sectioned, because I 
would not eat meat and wanted home ... The more I ate and 
gained weight, I was allowed special privileges, eg, getting 
a bath, hair washed, visitors, up to watch TV etc ... It was 
dreadful. I was fattened up to 8 stone, then released, when 
they thought I had recovered after I had cooperated, and 
said what they wanted to hear." 
<June) 
"Loss of privileges eg no clothes, no baths, no visitors 
unless I ate. Force feeding by nursing staff very 
forcefully and aggressively. Insulin injections. The worst 
treatment of all was ECT. M:y psychiatrist knew how much I 
hated this and so if I did not eat, and continued to lose 
weight I was threatened with further ECT ... I only gained 
weight as I knew that would be the only way I would get out 
what 
6 Though most of the women in the survey were to say the least 
critical of the treatment they received, as we saw in Chapter 4, if 
the woman can bring herself to hand over control of her eating 
willingly it can be quite a relief: "I was desperate to come out of 
the disorder. I was relieved that the doctor told me to indulge ... " 
CNorma) And psychotherapy in general was significantly more highly 




The end of anorexia is objectification: either appetite or the symptom 
itself come to control the anorexic woman as a force simultaneously 
internal and alien. She is responsible for it, but cannot control it: 
she is its object, powerless to change course. The end of anorexia is 
precisely the reverse of its original aim to transcend feminine 
appetite and eliminate its threat to the "self". The anorexic woman 
intended to be a fully individual subject, acting on her environment 
through the vehicle of the needless and inviolate anorexic body. 
Instead, the anorexic body remains a mirage which she continually sees 
in front of here but never reaches. In the end, her individual 
trensformation of the social meanings of the feminine body is no such 
thing: the object-status of femininity is reasserted. It returns, with 
a vengeance. 
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Chapter Eight: The anorexic body 
"I would describe myself as being kind of surrounded with 
glass - a kind of nole me tangere kind of thing ... I was 
painfully turned in on myself and didn't want human contact, 
whether it was touching or whether it was emotional, I just 
didn't want any kind of human contact." 
<Linda) 
"M B-L: 'Now be the food and tell your body what you are 
doing and why.' 
'Anne': 'I'm your food and I'm going into you now- stuffing 
you - making you disgusting - fat. I 1 m your shame and I'm 
making you untouchable. No one will ever touch you now. 
That's what you want - that no one will touch you. 1 
She looked up in surprise." 
<Quoted in Boskind-Lodahl, 1976: 350) 
Anorexia is "'a structure of facades constructed to hide a 
central hole of non-being'". 
<Quoted in Wellbourne & Purgald, 1984: 72) 
"I know that it <anorexia) is always there to be used as a 
last resort and a fina1 act of defiance against the too-
closely-impinging world which may threaten to engulf or 
annihilate me." 
<MacLeod, 1981: 160) 
"In the war against my own body, fatness was nat the only or 
even the most important enemy ... I began to get off on not 
eating, to enjoy starvation as an end in itself. .. ' I' was 
the mystical, starving self, in battle against the base 
instincts. I would refrain nat just from eating but even 
from drinking water. Calories were only the enemy's foot 
soldiers; the enemy I was fighting against was my body, my 
instincts, my desires. And I almost wan." 
<Valverde, 1985: 33) 
Anorexia transforms the social meanings of the body. It works with two 
opposing body-concepts: the "individual" (masculine) body as complete 
in itself, the owned instrument of the individual self or subject, 
used to act an an environment external to the self and the body; and 
the feminine body as alienated, incomplete and acted on, a 
passive/receptive object which, paradoxically, has a simultaneously 
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voracious potential to overwhelm. The individual <masculine) body is 
"an active, working thing"; the feminine body is "a passive vehicle 
intended to provide gratification", which exists in order to be used, 
to be consumed. <MacLeod, 1981: 166; 165-6) Anorexia aims at an 
individualized transformation of the degraded feminine body into an 
anorexic body which is owned, inviolate and needless. The anorexic 
body, as a possession, is intended to be the body of an active 
subject; the anorexic symptom intends the transformation of the 
feminine body-object from its status as the environment on which the 
masculine subject acts to that of an object amenable to personal 
control. Its success in achieving this intention is, as we have seen, 
uncertain and temporary: both bodily integrity 
instrumentality prove to be elusive. Desire, however, 
points out, goes beyond the possible. <Diamond, 1985: 59) 
and bodily 
as Diamond 
Anorexia begins as an attempt to control the feminine body in which 
voracious feminine appetites are lodged. The feminine body, sexually, 
is the object of the action of others; in eating, however, feminine 
appetite is, it is thought, under personal control. Desire for women 
means responsiveness - taking in. The anorexic body, thus, takes in 
nothing; nothing invades what Wellbourne and Purgold call "the 
anorexic fortress". <Wellbourne & Purgold,1984: 56) The ritualized 
eating pattern shuts out progressively more and more food; the 
avoidance of physical contact creates empty space around the anorexic 
body. It becomes, in Caskey's term, "a protected zone" <Caskey, 1986: 
184) in Douglas's, an "impermeable ... container" <Douglas, 1966: 158) 
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and in Sheila MacLeod's "cold, untouched and untouchable". (MacLeod, 
1981: 118) 
The anorexic body is empty inside, and emptiness means being clean. It 
is not contaminated by external things, but is pure. "Safe" food, food 
as fuel, is originally distinguished from food as pleasure; in the 
logic of denial the distinction, as we have seen, collapses and all 
food is seen as contamination. Food, as MacLeod argues, acts in 
anorexia as a metaphor for "all foreign substances": 
"I remember feeling swollen and polluted after consuming 
what, to others, would have been a negligible amount of 
food." 
(ibid.: 116; 70) 
Desire, for women, is constructed as responsive: it means opening up 
to allow intrusion. Desire, for the ostensibly gender-less individual, 
is constructed as a move outwards to satisy internal needs; the body 
remains whole as it moves out into the world. Feminine desire entails 
the inclusion of the alien, and expresses the status of women as 
acted-on environment rather than active subject. The central criterion 
of the subject is his ability to satisfy his desires through his 
action on the separate world of objects; he invades and manipulates 
that environment, it does not invade him. Invasion entails loss of 
subjecthood; if you are acted on, you are an object, not a subject. 
Objectification means the annihilation of the self. 
In anorexia the experience of feminine bodily openness is centred on 
the mouth. By not eating a barrier is formed between the anorexic self 
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and the threatening world against which the open feminine body has no 
defences. The refusal to eat is a denial of feminine responsiveness; 
it protects against the invasion which threatens to annihilate the 
self. The anorexic body is a "fortress" ; it is a "shell" (Lawrence, 
1984: 22); it contains and protects the self in a way the feminine 
body can never do. 
Desire, for women, is understood as voracious; feminine desire 
threatens patriarchal order, it threatens to encompass the (masculine) 
subject, it threatens chaos. The masculine subject, as an active 
subject, is defined by difference: it is not the passive feminine 
object. Masculine penetration completes the incomplete feminine; at 
the same time, however, feminine incompleteness threatens to engulf 
the intruder. When women threaten to become active subjects, the 
patriarchal definition of personhood is undermined. Anorexic women are 
engaged in the project of integrating the individualized or masculine 
self and the anorexic body, a body which is closed, complete, non-
feminine. Voracious feminine appetites, however, threaten the 
anorexic body, and must be eliminated. Feminine appetite is chaotic; 
it threatens an end to the dualism of subject and object. "Fat" is the 
external sign of voracious appetite; it intrudes into masculine space. 
Food is an external form of appetite, while the desire for food is 
internal. Food in anorexia is appetite made concrete. Starvation, 
then, has two meanings; it intends to eliminate both appetite and 
intrusion: 
"' I dream of the perfect day when I have no appetite, no 
thought, no desire, or temptation for food or to eat.'" 
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<Quoted in Abraham & Llewellyn-Jones, 1984: 37) 
Anorexic emptiness has a dual meaning. Not eating means that nothing 
is taken in; not wanting to eat means that the desire to take in is 
also eliminated. The annihilation of appetite closes and completes the 
open and incomplete feminine body around an empty, pure and static 
inner space. It cannot be acted on; it offers no way in; it is no 
longer open to the invasion of others. Neither does it threaten to 
engulf the self. From within this void the "real" self can emerge: 
"The clearer the outline of my skeleton became, the more I 
felt my true self to be emerging, like a nude statue being 
gradually hewn from some amorphous block of stone." 
<MacLeod, 1981: 79-80) 
Anorexic metamorphosis, however, is an individual and private 
transformation of social meaning; what the anorexic woman really 
struggles to contain is not her own appetite but feminine desire. The 
individual woman cannot negate a social meaning; in the end it comes 
to control her, either as appetite, or as denial. The core process of 
anorexia is denial; but since the anorexic woman is trying as an 
individual to eliminate a social creation, she can never deny enough 
or be thin enough to contain its threat. This, then, is the "moral 
spiral" <Turner, 1984) of anorexia. She continues to elaborate her 
rituals of denial in a never-ending spiral, and can never finally or 
securely reaches the place where, with personal control of her body as 
an object, she might begin to act as a subject. 
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The empty and inviolate anorexic body is the ideal end of the anorexic 
process; few anorexic women ever reach it. Existence in the anorexic 
body is grasped momentarily but continually slips away. The road to 
the anorexic body has two detours, both dead-ends. In the first, 
appetite controls the anorexic woman directly. Characterized as non-
human, it overwhelms the self in binges and fantasies of binges. 
Anorexia here is the continual attempt to impose denial on an appetite 
perceived as unstoppable, as, in Caskey's term, a force "at once alien 
and interior". (Caskey, 1986: 184) Here, "fat" in general and the 
"bloated" stomach in particular are signs of the failure of anorexic 
discipline in the face of an appetite which is alien to the anorexic 
woman but which is nevertheless her responsibility. Wellbourne and 
Purgold quote "Petra": 
"
1 It 1 s the feeling of how dirty you are inside that makes 
you feel it must show outside, which may account for the 
fact I'm not happy unless I am slim enough to see my bones, 
1 the real me 1 • ' " 
CQuoted in Wellbourne & Purgold, 1984: 110) 
Flesh, then, is appetite made concrete: it is "something swollen, 
polluted, dirty." <MacLeod, 1981: 69) Flesh is the feminine body; the 
skeleton contains the anorexic self. Anorexia aims at the 
transcendence of appetite; its most common outcome is a never-ending 
struggle with appetite and its sign, flesh. 
In the second anorexic detour, appetite controls indirectly. The 
symptom itself, not-eating, negative appetite, comes to control the 
anorexic woman; she feels herself to be powerless to end a process she 
herself began. Sheila MacLeod writes: 
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"I didn't know what I was doing: I just felt compelled to do 
it." (ibid.: 10) 
And Vellbourne and Purgold's "Della" explains: 
"'You do not know if you are this strictly imposed control, 
or if it is dominating you. You do not know who you are or 
what. You act, but you don't know if it is you acting or the 
control. Both come from within and mingle together in an 
inseparable fusion.'" 
<Quoted in Vellbourne & Purgold, 1984: 18) 
The denial which she participates in is itself, of course, a social 
construction. Feminine self-discipline is the self-policing of 
feminine desire, and is one element in the social control of feminine 
desire. Like appetite, then, denial is a social force; what the 
anorexic woman struggles with is not her own denial but a form of 
social control. Her original resistence to her incorporation in the 
degraded feminine body rises up, and with phantom substantiality, 
controls its creator. 
The reality of anorexia, then, entails a re-obj ectification of the 
feminine body, which becomes the object either of interior-but-alien 
appetite or interior-but-alien anorexia. (1) The anorexic woman 
thinks, accepting the definition of the body as individual possession, 
that her body is the one thing she can control. The object-status of 
the feminine body is, however, ultimately, inescapable. The subject in 
bourgeois patriarchal culture is a consuming subject: acting to satisy 
1 My argument here is indebted to ~·s incisive analysis of 
schizophrenia, in which, following Marx, he suggests that the 
position of the human subject as the object of capitalist social 
relations is transformed and reexperienced in schizophrenic 
"withdrawal". <Gabel, 1975; see, especially, p. 146; Marx, 1954: 77) 
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its desires, in its own self interest, is what defines it; i twants, 
therefore it is. Women, as the environment of the masculine subject, 
have, ultimately, no wholly separate environment within which to act; 
they are part of the world of objects. Women ought to desire to be 
possessed as objects. Possessive desire as subjects is constructed, 
for women, as non-willed, non-human. It is not controlled by a true 
subject and thus will overwhelm, rather than express, the self. 
There is, then, a fundamental internal limit to the gender-neutral 
individuality at which anorexia aims. Women cannot desire as subjects; 
women are objects; women are bodies. In anorexia women are the objects 
of a socially constructed feminine voraciousness; or they are the 
objects of the social control of feminine voraciousness. They cannot 
be wholly subjects. Desire as active defines the self; anorexia aims 
to eliminate desire, and in so doing eliminates the self. The 
desireless anorexic body contains nothing: 
"towards the climax of the disease, there was very little of 
me left, in more than the physiological sense." <MacLeod, 
1981: 108) 
Anorexia is an attempt to resolve at the level of the individual body 
the irreconcilable demands of individuality and femininity in a 
bourgeois patriarchal culture. Because it works with largely hidden 
social meanings it works indirectly. 
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Kim Chernin has argued that patriarchal culture has opened its doors 
to women in response to feminist pressure. CChernin, 1986) In Chapter 
Three this claim, which owes more to bourgeois ideology than to actual 
practice, was criticised. The "equal opportunities" culture suggests 
that women can now compete, as individuals, for wealth, status and 
power. The ideology of bourgeois individualism conceals the structural 
constraints on i ndi vi dual achievement. In its gender neutral 
incarnation the masking of the reality of class relations extends to 
mask the reality of gender relations: we live in the era of "post-
feminism". 
Post-feminist theorists claim that the individualistic pursuit of 
self-interest is now as open to women as it is to men. White middle-
class women, because of their specific location in gender, class and 
ethnic relations, are the special objects of post-feminist ideology, 
since a relatively privileged class position combines with the 
benefits of being white in a racist social order to allow them 
increased access to career success and public position. But the closer 
they get to independence, the more directly its inherent, gendered, 
limits are experienced. 
White middle-class women who reach adulthood in the equal 
opportunities culture must personally reconcile this contradiction; 
they must create a sense of self in which individuality and femininity 
can coexist. Anorexia is one attempt at such a reconciliation. 
Feminism brings the contradiction into the light of political 
discourse partially and fitfully; feminist analyses give some women 
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the opportunity to directly and collectively grapple with the 
continuing realities of patriarchal oppression. But femininism's 
alternative social analysis exists in a social order which bourgeois 
patriarchal ideology already structures and makes sense of. Feminist 
explanations and resistances are continually undermined, and a 
bourgeois and patriarchal individualism reasserted. 
Vellbourne and Purgold's proto-feminist analysis of anorexia provides 
an example of this. They argue that: 
"the pressures and demands of ... 'society' on young women are 
more confused and internally self-contradictory than the 
equivalent pressures and demands on young men ... adult 
autonomy is acquired in different ways and to different 
degrees by boys and by girls and ... the acquisition of 
autonomy by girls gets a more mixed reception from adult 
observers." 
CWellbourne & Purgold, 1984: 114; 117) 
This situation, however, is not, for Wellbourne and Purgold, an 
outcome of a patriarchal social order. They argue that such pressures 
arise from "the social imperatives of yesteryear" affecting "parental 
policy". Ci bid.: 115) It is an outdated and faulty upbringing rather 
than the social control of women which leads the "pre-anorexic" girl 
to feel that she has no "personal rights". (ibid.: 112) Therapeutic 
intervention will give the anorexic women what "most of us who are not 
anorexic" ha'>lei that is, a "central 'core' self" which allows us to 
regulate and prioritize individual needs and the demands of others. 
Ci bid.: 120) It will teach the anorexic woman that autonomy is both 
possible and acceptable. (ibid. :128) 
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The argument that autonomy and femininity are not reconcilable is 
presented only to be explained away as outmoded tradition and familial 
pathology. The dilemma which the anorexic woman feels is not "real"; 
it is one which the more competant upbringing that "most of us" have 
had resolves naturally as we reach "maturity". <ibid.: 128) Even in 
more fully feminist analyses of anorexia individual therapy which will 
"re-nurture" women into true individuality is suggested as a solution 
to the anorexic dilemma. If, however, we understand anorexia as an 
individualized "solution" to a cultural contradiction we can see more 
clearly that its ultimate strategic failure is explained by its very 
individuation. We cannot fully understand the anorexic symptom without 
an analysis of the structures of social meaning and social practices 
in bourgeois patriarchal culture; only a collective feminist 
engagement with those meanings and practices as social can transform 
the subjection of women which leads to anorexia. 
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Appendix 
I'd like to ask you questions on 4 topics- about your anorexia, when 
you had it, how you were treated, etc.; about food and eating; about how 
you feel about your body; and about how you think anorexia fits into 
your life. 
If there are any questions you don't waznt to answer, just say so and we 
can skip them. 
ILLNESS HISTORY 
Would you say that you're anorexic now? 
YES- when would you say it started? would you say you're 'cured' ? 
NO - could you tell me when you realised you had anorexia, and how 
long you'd say you had it ? 
How did you realise that you were anorexic ? gradually dawned on you 
suddenly realised 
someone else told you 
Looking back, can you identify any particular incident or remark or 
feeling that you would say 'triggered' the anorexia? 
How did you control your weight? 




What sort of treatment did you get/are you getting ? 
where ? 
who from ? 
duration ? 
what sort ? 
more than one kind of help ? 
What do/did you think of the treatment that you got - did it help ? 
How did the 'people around you - friends, family - react to your illness 




- in control 
- out of control 
-as though you just couldn't stop? 
Why do you think that you were/are anorexic/bulimic ? 
Do you think that you understand what causes anorexia ? 
Do you think most people understand about anorexia ? anyone ? 
FOOD & EATING 
Were there any particular foods or drinks that you wouldn't eat ? 
Or special foods/drinks that you did eat ? 
What was it about these foods/drinks that you liked/didn't like 
What foods/drinks/sorts of food do you really like ? Do you eat it now? 
Did you eat it when you were anorexic ? If NO why ? 
What did/do you feel like/think about when you eat/ate ? 
Could you describe what you would eat and how you would eat it on a 
'good' anorexic day? 
How did/does it feel having food in your stomach ? mouth ? 
How did you feel when you managed to eat as little as you wanted to ? 
How di you feel when you were thinking about/about to eat ? 
Did/do you feel completely in control of what you eat/ how much/how 
often/ who with etc. ? 
How did/do you feel about giving up trying to control what you eat ? 
Did/do you prefer to eat on your own ? 
It's sometimes said that anorexics don't feel hungry, or can't recognise 
hunger - do you think this is true ? did you feel hungry when you were 
anorexic ? 
For RECOVERED - how do you decide what to eat now ? 
- 'healthy diet' 
eat what you want/feel like 
eat what others eat 
is it easy or difficult to control what and how much you eat now ? 
For BULIMICS- do you eat different kinds of food when you're binging? 
- which foods/drinks 
-do you eat faster if it's a binge? 
How often do you binge eat? 
could you tell me a bit about how you feel when you're having a 
binge ? - before 
- during 
- after 
If you could survive healthily without eating anything, would you ? 
If you could eat anything at all and nothing would make you put on 
weight, what would you eat ? lots ? how would this feel ? 
BODY 
Are you reasonably happy with your body now? 
- is there anything you'd like to change ? 
would you like to lose weight ? how much ? 
would you like to put on any weight ? how much ? 
do you think you're thin/fat/OK ? 
Do you think about or worry about your weight ? 
Do you weigh yourself often ? 
Do you think that most women think/worry about their weight and how the 
look ? too much ? not enough ? why ? 
If YES - can you ever imagine just not caring about your weight ? 
What do you think is the ideal shape/size for a woman ? 
- ie size 10 
- or ie Selina Scott 
Do you know what the 'correct' weight for your height is - ie 
medical tables ? How would you feel if you were this weight ? 
How would you feel if you were fat ? 
from 
How would you feel if you were back at the lowest weight you've ever 
been ? 
LIFE 
How important is being/having been an anorexic ? 
Are you frightened that it will recurr ? 
Do you tell people about being/having been anorexic ? 




Do you know other anorexic women? did you ? did it help knowing you 
weren't the only one ? 
In some of the questions there will be a number of options which you 
can choose by ringing/ticking them, but most of the questions are 
open-ended and ask you to describe your feelings and behaviour. If you 
need more space, please use the extra sheet, numbering your answers. 
Before you start, there are a few general questions about you. 
Which of these descriptions fits you best ? 
Wage earner Student Housewife Unemployed Other 
If you work outside the home, what is your present occupation ? 
Are you 
Divorced/separated Single Widowed Living with someone Married 
Do you live 
Alone With parents/relatives With husband/boyfriend/lover 
Shared house/flat with friends 
Have you attended/do you attend 
Secondary school Grammar school College University 
Age 
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I'd like to start off by asking you a few questions about your anorexia 
and the treatment you have received. 





(if you have recovered, please 
answer for the period v.rhen you 
were anorexic) 
2 How long has your illness lasted ? 
3 What methods do/did you use to try to control your weight ? 
Starvation 
Gradually eating less and less 
Vomiting 
Diuretics/Laxatives 
Other Cplease specify) 
4 Do you/did you binge ? If you do, about how often ? 
5 Have you had medical treatment for anorexia ? 
From your GP 
From a psychiatrist 
FrQm a psychoanalyst 
From a self-help group 
Any other kind of treatment 
6 Have you ever been hospitalized for anorexia ? If you have, please 
say for hm; long, and if you were a voluntary patient. 
7 Please describe the treatment you received. 
8 Do you think this treatment helped you ? 
9 could you try to explain why you became anorexic/bulimic ? 
Now I'd like to ask questions about food and eating. 
1 Do you have a set of specific foods/drinks that you eat roost or all 
of i;he time ? If so, please list them. 
2 What is it about them that you like ? 
----------------
3 Are there any foods/drinks that you never, or very rarely, eat ? 
4 Why don't you eat these foods? 
----------- ·-----
5 What are your favourite foods and drinks ? 
6 Do you eat them now ? If so, how often ? 
7 How do you feel when you eat ? 
8 Do you plan each day v1hat and how much you are going to eat 7 
Yes No Sometimes 
Other 
9 Please describe v1hat and how much you would usually eat if you 
kept to this plan. 
10 How do you feel when you've managed to eat what you had planned and 
no more ? 
11 Can you describe your feelings before, during and after you eat 7 
----------------------------------------~----------------------
12 Do you feel that you are completely in control of your eating ? 
13 How do you feel about giving up trying to control your eating ? 
14 Do you prefer to eat on your own ? Please tick the sentence that 
best describes how you feel. 
I like eating with other people. 
don't mind eating with other people. 
prefer to eat alone, but I do ea:t with others some of the time. 
I hate eating in front of others, and try to avoid it. 
I never eat in front of other people. 
Other 
15 Do you feel hungry ? 






16 Could you describe how you feel with food in your mouth ? 
1? Please describe hov~ you feel when there is food in your stomach. 
18 Some anorexic women have eating 'rituals' - for example, cutting 
each bit of food into 6 pieces, or chewing each mouthful 10 times. 
Do/did you have any rituals like this? 
19 If you could survive healthily without eating anything at all, would 
you ? How would this feel ? 
20 If you could eat whatever you liked, and nothing vmuld make you put 
on weight, what would you eat, and how would this feel ? 
21 Do you binge ? 
Never 
Rarely 
Sometimes: Once a month ? 
Once a week ? 
More Often ? ____ times each week 
22 If you binge, do you eat different foods/drinks during a binge ? If 
so, could you list them, and say about how much you eat in a binge ? 
23 Why do you choose these foods ? 
24 Some women say that they eat much faster when they binge. Could you 
describe hQN you eat when you binge ? 
25 Have you ever eaten a non-food substance, and if so, what was it ? 
The next 3 questions are for women 'Vlho have recovered from anorexia. 
1 Hov; do you decide v;hat and how much to eat now you've 'recovered' 
from anorexia? For example, do you try to eat a 'healthy' diet, or 
just whatever you feel like ? 
----------------------------------------~--------------------
2 How difficult is it for you to organise your eating now? 
Very difficult, I continually think and worry about food 
Quite difficult, but I have to pay attention to what I eat 
Quite easy, I eat more or less what I feel like 
Very easy, I rarely worry about food 
Very easy, I am interested in food, eating and cooking 
Other 
3 If you find eating difficult, is the difficulty 
in eating enough? in not eating too much ? 
other 
I'd like to finish off by asking a few questions about how you feel 
about your body. 
1 Are you reasonably happy with your body now? 
Yes No 
Other -----------------------------------------
2 Is there anything about your body that you would like to change ? 
3 Would you like to be a different weight ? 
I I d like to weigh more About bow much ? 
-------------
I I d like to weigh less About how muc1l ? 
------------
I'm happy with my weight 
4 Vould you like to be a different shape ? 
5 How often do you weigh yourself ? 
Daily Veekly 
:Monthly Hardly ever 
Never Other 
6 Do you knm-1 what the 'correct' weight for your height is ? 
Yes No Other 
7 Hm-1 would you feel if you were this weight ? 
8 How would you feel if you were back at the lowest weight you'd ever 
been ? <Or if you are at that weight, how do you feel now ?) 
9 Can you imagine being very fat ? How would this feel ? 
10 If you have ever physically hurt yourself, could you please describe 
this. 
11 How do you feel about other people touching you, or being very 
close ? 
12 Could you describe how being/having been anorexic has affected your 
sexuality or sexual feelings? 
Thank you very much for taking the time to fill in this questionairre. 
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